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IL GRANDE PARVUS

Garzanti

First edition: October 1988

ISBN 88-11-69400-0

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Printed in Italy

To Tommaso

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Of the four historical figures of the theory and technology of the Marxist revolution, who at the dawn of the century elaborated communism con-

Temporary, three are still widely present today: Luxemburg, Lenin, Trocki].

Indeed, it can certainly be said that they still appear in the role of interlocutors in today's political debate because of the prize that history gave to the conceptual elaboration carried out by them, making available the flesh and blood of Russia for their project and beyond extending its suggestion to increasingly vast and distant territories.

Since, despite the tens of millions of victims and the total economic, political and civil failure of the utopia of the "new society", the weight of this experiment and its action on the history of the century have been immense and conditioning, the architects of the core of thought from which the phenomenon emerged continue to be remembered and re-examined in the most varied references

Of the four, the one who was instead the first, absolutely the initiator is forgotten: that Parvus who not only chronologically preceded everyone. He was the first to theorize the techniques of the proletarian revolution in the "era of imperialism" and an alternative power: workers' democracy, offering models that would have been tested already with the Russian revolution of 1905 and taken up by Luxemburg, Trotsky and, partly and distorted, also by Lenin. He was the Marxist rheoric most set in the problems of political economy and of broader horizons in the strategy and tactics of the labor movement; the first to feel the changes of modern capitalism and the world geopolitical balance; he was the first, still in the Marxist field to see the need for the unity of Europe and the first monitor about the dangers of the centralized socialist state.

But he is practically remembered only as the one who organized Lenin's return from Swiss exile in Russia to take power there, as an opulent mysterious and ambiguous adventurer who on that occasion came out of the shadows on the story scene to disappear immediately and forever.

Communist historiography removed it even before removing Troc-ky and Luxemburg: only Lenin was supposed to be the founding father. But there is a more serious reason: Parvus is the only one among them who already after 1907 consi-

He ended the illusion of the Soviet revolution and thought of a long historical process of grafting socialism into capitalism. The hic Rhodus hic salta was not the conquest of power, but the ability to transform the capitalist economy into a socialist economy to be invented. For this reason, a mass socialist movement was needed, democratic but not compromise, not the centralized and militarized party of Lenin, which he had already rejected at its birth in 1903.

This was considered his absion, his apostasy, his great betrayal by all three "comrades", and this even more so when, at the outbreak of the First World War, Parvus openly maintained that the power of Germany, home of the strongest socialist party in the world, had to be supported and used to bring down Russia, homeland of tsarism, of a de-

Asian spotism gravitating on Europe.

Secretly conniving with this position and the consequent Parvusian action against public statements was Lenin, who benefited the most from it for repatriation, the seizure of power and beyond. Parvus, who had believed to use the German war machine and Lenin to open up the prospect of a democratic socialism in Russia and play a leading role in it, was displaced by the Germany of the Kaiser and by Lenin himself, who through Riezler agreed directly and excluded him.

Defeated in his political design of historical dimension, he appears in any case as a too little-known protagonist of that crucial thirty years in the history of Europe that goes from 1895 to 1925: the end of an era, the beginning of world conflicts, the entry of the masses into history, the birth of totalitarian regimes.

And Parvus, who had been the greatest thinking head of Marxism as a revolutionary "method" (as he called it), but also the first to see its limits, was in that post-war period the most convinced assertor of the economic and political unity of Europe in the face of the predatory geopolitical entities of America and Russia; he elaborated a series of theses for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the economy of Germany and the Curopean continent, preceding Keynes in many respects. The last years of his life saw him promote the union of all democratic forces, from socialists to liberals; Ebert's personal advisor, vigilant mind behind the scenes in the face of the problems of the Treaty of Versailles, the pacts of Rapallo and Locarno, architect of the defeat of Kapp's right-wing Putsch. Not for nothing, immediately after the murder of Rathenau, the designated victim of another attack that failed, however, had to be Parvus. While the Nazis indicated in him the emblem of that world of ideas and that Germany they wanted to annihilate, immediately after his death Stalin designated in him the main initiator of heresy in order to prepare the liquidation of Trocky.

He was never a party man despite the long militancy in the ranks of German social democracy, despite the close relations with the Russian social democracy even in controversy with the Bolsheviks as well as with the Menshe-vics; despite the leading part he played in Petersburg in the 1905 revolution; despite the decisive help to Lenin in 1917. He was an outsider, who brought together in himself, representing an exceptional and unique case in the history of the century, the revolutionary thought and action and the genius of the capitalist manager, the rigor of statistical and financial economics studies and the taste for adventure; German, Russian, Turkish prisons, Siberia and the grand hôtels of Europe; nonfiction, journalism, publishing and conspiracy; political foresight and secret diplomacy; tireless work and unbridledness in the pleasures of life; the theoretical lucidity and grandiosity of projects; the writer's vein and the skill in large export-import enterprises; the rebellion against the dogmas of the established order as well as those of the social-list movement; the most diverse languages and cultures: Yiddish, Russian, German, Turkish, Ukrainian-

Na, French..

The writings of Lenin, who highly esteemed and feared him, frequently cite him; the same is for Luxemburg and for Trotsky, who in his memoirs wrote: "Parvus was undoubtedly the most eminent Marxist figure of the end of the last century and the beginning of ours. He freely dominated Marx's method, had a broad view, followed everything that mattered most about the world arena».'

But also on the other side: on the side of the world of the aristocracy of German politics and culture, the judgments are no less admiring. Count Harry Kessler, of the German high society and one of the greatest art experts, friend of Einstein, Grosz, Becher, Maillol, Cocteau, Gide, so he speaks of Parvus in his diaries: "Helphand is an incredibly fat Socrates and his mind is as immense as his body". * The Catholic Victor Naumann, ambassador and head of the press office of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, left this judgment on Parvus: "There are so many different images of Helphand by his friends and enemies, that I, who in the late course of the war often had the opportunity to meet with him, cannot fail to add mine. I state that we were on diametrically opposed political positions and we both knew it. I was monarchist, while Helphand, one of the authors of the Russian revolution of 1905, was a convinced socialist, although it is completely false to consider him a Bolshevik, as his enemies did. If in 1905 he worked for the establishment of the soviets, he was later outraged that this institution, which he called provisional, had been turned into permanent by the supporters of the soviets. It was a demonic nature, the mixture of two races had imprinted on him an absolutely original imprint. Era

Much more an expert in political economy than in foreign policy; he was much more of a harsh critic of the existing order or disorder than a builder. His intelligence was simply all-encompassing and was not limited to political knowledge: from this man.. I heard the most ingenious and subtle judgments on philosophy, painting, literature. You could fight him or agree with him, but under no circumstances ignore him, since too much was significant. You cannot evaluate with the common meter, measure with the centimeter that is used for small intelligences a man who has been imprisoned for months in Siberia and in the darkness of the underground cells of the Petropavlovsk Fortress and has not succumbed to madness. He studied philosophy, history, mathematics, physics by heart for hours to be stronger than his fate. His maximum efforts were aimed at achieving a rapid peace between Russia and Germany that would also force the Western powers to follow it. He was determined to achieve a revolution in Russia and wanted to commit himself to this purpose of peace. Since we could not agree with Kerensky's men, he made a mistake that he later bitterly regrets: that of sending to Russia, with the chancellor of the Reich and the great headquarters, the Bolsheviks who were in Switzerland so that they would become the peace negotiators. He thought he could direct them from Germany and this was his fatal mistake. No one was later more indignant than him for the gender and type of their regime, for their economic stupidity»'

How much authority Parvus had is evidenced by the diary of Kurt Riezler, the secret advisor and factotum of the German foreign minister, a true negotiator behind the scenes of the peace of Brest Litovsk. In this manuscript that only after many doubts was published in 1972, on 25.11.1917 we read: "I have the feeling that my transmission of Parvus' telegram has given the impression that I am under his dependence. I couldn't reject his first wish. When I finced that the Bolsheviks don't tell him everything, I had to use other ways beyond him and despite him... He himself says that Lenin and Trotsky, who were previously his disciples and whom he wanted to increase in importance, might have a tendency to cut him out». The historian who edited the edition observes that:

«Riezler valued not much the qualities of Parvus; he was even inclined to place him as a capacity above Lenin».'

Both Naumann and Riezler were not only senior government officials, but men of great culture, writers and essayists; and the second after the advent of Hitler he taught in US universities and published in English important essays on the philosophy and aesthetics of ancient Greece. Like Par-vus, his life was poisoned by the remorse of having been one of the implementers of the operation that allowed Lenin to take power. But he, who died in

1955, thirty years after Parvus, he could see all the incalculable consequences and historical significance.

Has the historian G. Katkov already spoken of a "conspiracy of silence" about the way in which the Russian revolution of the 1917 tebbrai took place, on which he also published the most serious and exhaustive work so far? He already complained about the "delitered clouding" of the events on the Soviet side, but also on the German side (as in the case of Bernstein's revelations in 1921 and the non-publication of K. Riezler's diaries in '64), as well as the "disappointing" character* of the memories of German politicians who had an important role in the 1st World War and in the policy towards Russia in it: from Kühlmann to Nadolny, from Ludendortf to Helfferich and Scheidemann.

Even more hermetic was the cloak of silence lowered on Parvus: not only on his role in this context, but on his entire life and activities. So it seemed rage of emigrants discount the revelations contained in the books of the colonel of the Russian counterintelligence B. Nikitin and the eminent historian S.P. Mel'gunov," released in Russian in Paris in 1937 and 1940 respectively. They shed light on unexpected backstories of the 1ª World War and the Russian Revolution, bringing out the figure of a mysterious Parvus, of which almost nothing then the Western historiography knew, with rare exceptions poorly informed about Russian things.

The indisputable controversy came from the discovery by the Allies, after the Nazi defeat of 1945, of an important batch of secret documents from the Germanic archives, including those referring to the Revolutionierungspolitik, or the "revolutionary policy" of Russia implemented in the context of the 1914-18 conflict and of which Parvus was the main architect. The first documents were published by G. Katkov in 1956,? After that, W's large collections soon followed. Hahlweg on Lenin's return to Russia'" and Z.A.B. Zeman on Germany and the Russian Revolution." Other works enriched the documentation in this sense, such as the revealing book by N. Futrell on the clandestine activities of Russian revolutionaries in Scandinavia," who first spoke of Kesküla and the Institute and society of Parvus and Hanecki; as well as the account of Lenin's journey from Zurich to Petersburg, the most reliable so far known, published by N.F. Platten j.," son of the well-known Swiss communist who saved Lenin's life in the first attack and was then sent by Stalin to die in a camp.

All these publications among other things, but not only, raised a question that historians had already asked themselves: if Lenin's journey, organized by Germany then at war with Russia, was a decision of the last minute: imposed on Lenin by the urgency of being present after the unexpected February revolution and the collapse of tsarism; and to Germany imposed by military difficulties and the entry into war of the US; or was it instead the result of

A long-standing agreement, according to which Germany undertood to help the Russian revolutionaries so that they would weaken the enemy country inside and guarantee it peace in case of success? Soviet historiography has, for obvious reasons, always supported the first thesis, while in Russia already in July 1917 and in the Western world later credit had been given to the thesis of a deliberate German-Bolshevik conspiracy. Today this last thesis appears even more sustainable, but there are historians waiting for further confirmations, which perhaps, despite today's glasnost', will not come. Yet there would be no reason to hide anything: was the European Resistance to Nazism perhaps ashamed of the help of the Allies, who were at war with the governments of their respective countries? The problem is not moral, but historical.

On the other hand, many Soviet sources, if properly consulted, offer valuable points of reference. This book has benefited from it, as others had already done, as has benefited from Kurt Riezler's diaries which, finally published although with gaps, are an inescapable testimony to the history of the First World War and Russian-German relations."

In light of all this documentation it can certainly be said that the three subjects: Lenin, Parvus, Germany were undeniably in conscious contact and the extent of their respective commitments and their implementation varied according to the course of events and according to the capacity for overwhelm that each of the parties at various times could have over the other. Pacts of convenience between enemies of this kind, as were the parties between them, do not respect precise and constant clauses; and this not only because of their obvious conspiratory character, but also because of the variation of the premises that determined them and the con-

Joint. They never have a clear and univocal face, nor can the representation that is given to them be.

An element hitherto unknown to scholars of the 1stª World War, the Russian revolution of February and the entire following period until the Bolshevik coup d'état and even later, had therefore emerged from bullying: Par-vus. The subsequent discovery was that of his enormous role as a Marxist theorist and politician at the turn of the two centuries, something on which the official historians of the Soviet Communist Party and the German Social Democracy continued to remain silent even in the 1960s. This recovery is mainly due to Z.A.B. Zeman and others, who in '62 published essays on this subject." Two books on the life of Par-vus followed a short distance away, similar but not identical in the two German and English versions, written by four hands by W.B. Scharlau and Z.A.B. Zeman. At this point the character definitively entered specialized and informed historiography.

So we find it not occasionally mentioned in the works of I. Deutscher on

Trockij, by D. Shub, by P.J. Nettl on R. Luxemburg" and others, as in the one already mentioned here by G. Katkov on the Russian revolution of February, as well as

Also in Italy in the writings of G. Migliardi, M.L. Salvadori, V. Street, V. Zilli * All these works concern almost exclusively the Marxist and revolutionary theoretical Parvus, the one that Peter J. Nettl defines: "the great leader of German and Russian revolutionary socialism."

Outside the field of specialized literature, it was A. Solženi-cyn who saw in Parvus a great figure of the Russian and European revolutionary movement, Lenin's antagonist, in his important cyclical historical novel Krasnoe koleso (The Red Wheel), where he gives a portrait plastic rich in ideas. The German writer Peter Weiss also makes Parvus one of the key characters of his drama Trotzki im Esil," while Enzo _ Bettiza dedicates many pages of his Mystery of Lenin" in a suggestive and sharp interpretation.

A complete biography, however, and above all updated, and also released from the ideological evaluations inside the movement, was still missing.

Complete, because it encompasses all the moments of Parvus' life until death; updated, because it records all the data available to date;

Unhooked, because the historical location of Parvus can no longer be conditioned by party diatribes, whether Soviet or other parish.

Since he is one of those historical figures that continue to interest for his ideas and his actions, regardless of the ideas of the time and the trend to which he belonged and continued to be attributed, indeed often in contrast to them, in such a light he must be concerned today that the movement of ideas, the culture in which he moved appear to us instead dated.

The ambition of this book was therefore to give the reader a story as concise and unified as possible of the life and multiple activities of Helphand-Parvus, seeing them from beginning to end in the double reference in which they basically took place: German and Russian. The latter has so far been the least surveyed and it is hoped that from the side where the research has been omitted until now, namely the uRss, silences and vetoes will be removed, today that a little truth has begun to be told about the past and its men.

Another side of Parvus' life to which attention was paid in this book is the period of Weimar Germany. In my summary account of those years I believed to highlight moments and aspects of his work that seem to me of interest and that I have not seen sufficiently addressed in Germany itself so far.

One of the difficulties of the reconstruction of the character is undoubtedly in its double, sometimes concomitant and sometimes alternating, presence in German and Russian history in different and sometimes contradictory parts. But the difficulties are of all kinds already in the documentation phase. As others have already observed, this was in his very nature: to make known as little as possible about himself. Thus was born his definitive pseudonym, indicative both in the

Its Latin meaning, both in the Russian meaning da parus, the "sail" pushed by the wind away from the Odessa of the origins. Thus was born the "Parvus legend" and was born very early: already in Saxony, then in Munich, then in Russia and especially in Petersburg, then in the Balkans and elsewhere. In this regard, the author likes to remember a personal fact. In 1910 in Vienna, Parvus was fabled in left-wing and intellectual circles and here the author's father saw him, then René Armand Cveternik, who attended Café Central and Alfred Adler, Freud's Pallievo who had left the teacher and kept in touch with Miguel de Unamuno and Eugenio d'Ors in Spain. A legend was still Parvus in Berlin in the very early 1920s, where the anonymous stock market operator who was then always the father of the writer heard the name of Parvus as that of a shareholder as wealthy as he was mysterious and then read in the right press as on the left press denigrations and justifications clearly inadequate to their object. So he was induced to cross that threshold of Schwanenwer-der, but could such a random and futile visit give an answer to his curiosity? However, there was enough to transmit to friends and children the echo of the legend, which echoes, as its law, reiterates and multiplies the sound that moves it. So even the author wanted to cross that threshold to go back into Parvus' life and this book was born.

It was also possible thanks to the support of the Faculty of Teaching of the University of Messina and its Annals, in the series of which "Quader-ni" I published a preliminary work in 1984: the essay Parvus, an anticipatory figure," to which I refer those who want to have more understanding of his theoretical and political writings.

I still have the welcome duty to address a thank you to the memory of Mr. Alexander Timofejeff, whose help was fundamental in finding rare texts and in my research in institutes and libraries in various countries.

They were carried out in particular in London, Munich, Berlin, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Helsinki, Istanbul; and, in Italy, especially at the Basso Foundation and Library in Rome, the Feltrinelli Institute in Milan and the Goethe Institute in Rome.

I also express my gratitude to my wife Dina Rinaldi for her active collaboration in all phases of the work and to Lisa Foa for her contribution to editing.

1983-88

Notes

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15 Z.A.B. Zeman, From the Communist Manifesto to the Declaration of 81 and H. Schurer, La revoluzione permanente: L. Trotsky, both in Revisionism, London 1962 (cit. from the Italian ed.: Milano 1967).

16 Cfr. Bibliography.

17 Ctr. Bible

18 Cfr. Bible.

19 P.J. Nettl, op. cir., p. 60:

20r Cr. Bibl. (of P. is spoken mainly in the chapters grouped under the title Lenin s Cjuriche, Paris 1975; in Italian: Lenin in Zurich, Milan 1976).

21 Cfr. Bible.

22 Cfr. Bible.

23 Cfr. Bible.

Chapter one
From Beresina to the Rhine

1 The years of training

«A childhood memory is alive in me. More of an impression than an image. The neighborhood where we lived, of a Russian provincial town, caught fire one evening. I was a little kid and I was playing unsuspecting in a corner of the room. The window glass had been tinted with a beautiful red glow: I had noticed this and I was happy about it. All of a sudden the door opened violently, I saw the terrified face of my mother rushing towards me, picking me up without saying a word, rushing out immediately. Mom ran across the street. I stumbled behind her who held me tightly by the arm, and I stumbled, I was always about to fall, lost, without knowledge and no sense of fear, amazed with my child's eyes wide open on the people who looked at me and rushed from all sides towards us. Everyone carried beds, trunks, furniture. Agitated and muffled voices were heard. A confusion of voices in the incipient darkness of the night. Here and there you could hear blows and bangs. I wanted to look around, but I couldn't, because I was always being dragged forward by fury. Then we arrived in a large and open space, full of all kinds of stuff, furniture, beds, etc., all put in two rows. In one place there was already some of our stuff. A camp had been made with the mattresses and pillows and here they put me with the strictest warning not to move. I didn't even think about it: everything around was so different, fantastic; it had come so unexpected, and it was so soft and warm to be in the middle of all those fluffy pillows!''

This provincial town was Berezino, where Izrail' Lazarevič Gel'fand was born on August 27* 1867. But it was not a city, even if small, but an agricultural and artisan village almost entirely made of wood, on the Beresina river (from the birch woods, the bereza, which crosses). And he was above all a shtet/** cbraic with his small houses sghimbes between carts, quadrupeds, farm animals and tools of all kinds, as can be seen in certain paintings by Chagall, who was also born in those parts. To Berezino. Lazar'

* Until 1918 in Russia the Julian calendar was in force, thirteen days behind the Gregorian one in use in Western Europe.

** Village, settlement (Yiddish).

Gel'fand, the father of little Izrail', had arrived from Odessa, his original city, at least as far as he could go back to the wanderings of his nomadic family, counting on finding an outlet for his activity, which there did not seem to have many competitors. It was a workshop that manufactured and repaired tools, tools and various articles for a peasant economy: from plows to horseshoes, from chariot aces to harrows and sickles.

He had a house and a well-established business, he was wealthy compared to most of the inhabitants, but the fire destroyed almost everything, and then off, back to the white Odessa, where the sun was shining and the houses were made of stone.

For Izrail' the fire was the first perception of life outside of him, of a power and a world outside the family, of an unknown reality full of threats. He will remember it all his life, because it had been his wake-off, his coming out of limbo. So incredibly big, tall and strong for his three and a half years, thoughtful and attentive but grim and closed in on himself, he seemed intent on listening to the vital energy that flowed through his veins. Another exciting memory was the day of his arrival in Odessa, for him an endless corridor of high stone walls, which their izvozie* loaded with stuff traveled, while he looked up to see where those walls ended, and rejoiced when they stopped with some low wooden construction, with a widening, with a square in the shade of the lime trees, or when the car flowed into those wide streets, surrounded by hippo chestnuts, behind whose trunks you could see the belts of villas and houses hidden between acacias and lilacs.
But Odessa city, «Odessa, mother of all the ribaldi»,** would come for Izrail' later, with adolescence. «I spent the best season of my childhood - he will write one day - in the territory of Kuban', and the years of my youth in Odessa. I dreamed under the starry sky of Ukraine, I listened to the beating of the waves against the coasts of the Black Sea, in my memories the Ukrainian songs are intertwined with the fairy tales and the stories of the artisans, who every summer from the provinces of central Russia came to my father.

Ševčenko was the first to teach me the idea of class struggle. His Haj-damaki excited me...».? After Taras Sevchenko, singer of the rebellious Cossack peasants of the 700, came the readings of Mikhailovsky, Saltykov-Schedrin and Uspensky, who, in his words, "gave a precise direction to my subsequent spiritual development". Mikhailovsky was the publicist, the literary critic, the sociologist of the populist left, close to Narodnaja Volja, the terrorist organization that in 1881, when Izrail was fourteen years old, murdered Tsar Alexander II; Saltykov was the unplacable and corrosive critic of the tsarist bureaucracy and of all forms of

* Car and, by extension, square car.
** Local saying, which is completed with "Rostov is the father".

Life; Uspensky, the naturalist narrator of the miserable and one of the founders of Narodnaya Volja herself.

To be admitted to high school it was not enough for the Jew Izrail' Gel'fand, unlike Russian students, to pass the exam. He also had to get an excellent vote, so as to fall within that "percentage rule" of 10 or even 5 percent that was established for them. And in Odessa the aspiring Jews at the gymnasium were many and well prepared. Odessa was an international, cosmopolitan center, where Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Turks, Persians, Tatars, even many Italians and a few Germans lived with Russians and Ukrainians. The real Russia was very far from this world. Here the free port, free trade, the capitalist enterprise were touched by hand in the movement of the city, in the signs of shipping, export-import and insurance companies, in the enlistment offices of the teams, in the white palaces and villas, in restaurants as in taverns. The ships from Liverpool, Marseille, New York, Buenos Aires, Trieste, Amsterdam and Barcelona gave proof that the coordinates of the future were not intertwined starting from the backs of Russian tsarism, but from that development that faced the gates of his empire. This world, insic-

Me to the ideals of the revolution, the gymnasium Gel'fand, who had read "as his first book of political economy the Principles of political economy by John Stuart Mill with notes by Chernyševskij"*

The high school students of the time, with their uniform of good gray cloth and silver buttons, sang: "To the cursed questions give us answers that are direct!". It was a generation of idealists: they were animated by a thirst for truth, justice, universal good, hatred for the "black lie". They despised the bourgeois sitting at Caffe Fankoni. When they passed in front of them or through the central via Moldavanka, the eyes of the girls were fixed on Saša, as everyone had long called the teenager Gelfand. In fact, he made me think of a leader, Alexander the Great or a sculpture by Michelangelo for his athletic build surmounted by a powerful head covered with curly hair, big magnetic eyes, an immense forehead: an exceptional figure even in that crucible of lineages and types that was Odessa.

He was a son of it even in this respect, with his crossbreed of Jewish, Russian and Tatar blood, and spoke with pride of his grandparents who had been port dumpers of legendary strength and that some old sailor still remembered.

At the end of high school, in 1884, his father made him take a private course to prepare for university. He would have liked to read the Capital, whose translation, the first in the world, had been published in Petersburg as early as 1872.

He had discovered it by chance, flipping through old issues of periodicals to which he was subscribed, like most of the educated bourgeoisie, the father of one of his compa-

Gno of gymnasium. They were the "Vestnik Evropy" and the "Otečestvennye Zapiski", on which a violent controversy had flared up about Marx's book.

But, when a friend lent him the work, he realized that it was not as exciting as the controversy about it. What relationship did those reasonings have on capital, the commodity, the value with the Cossacks of the Kuban', the peasants of Ukraine, the dumpers of the port of Odessa? Where was this oper-raia-political force class? «It was the time of the disintegration of Narodnaya Volja.

We didn't know if we should resort to terror or propaganda among the workers. Together with Sargorodsky, who was later deported to Yakutia, I decided to learn a trade to come into close contact with the workers. For about a year we wandered from one blacksmith workshop to another. The attendance of the workers made us recognize even more clearly the need for a clear and precise program»?

So he spent all of 1885, but the experience only served to reveal to him the i-anity of that youthful revolutionary romanticism that, if he could

¡Tare the instinctively rebellious but naive nature of his friend Sargorodski],®

Instead, it appeared to him without prospects.

For a trip to Switzerland, his parents created the opportunity for him, worried that, instead of preparing a career, he would get lost in the dangerous sentimentality of communion with the people or worse. Sasa abandoned the experiment and left - as he would write later - "in the hope that abroad my political doubts would be resolved and that, first of all, I would be able to obtain working-based literature there. In Zurich I dug out everything that the illegal Russian press had created since the time of Herzen, but except for the book The Ingenious Mechanism and the booklet by Dickstein,* I did not find

Nothing suitable for workers»?

«At the same time - he continues his story - I got into the full turmoil of party disputes. At the center of the discussion were Our Differences** by Plechanov. A program that put the class struggle of the proletariat in the foreground corresponded to my course of thought. I declared myself a social democrat and took part in the founding of the Union of Russian Social Democracy. And then the number of open questions had become even greater for me. From Russia's point of view, I was concerned that Plechanov's program left no room for the peasants. Since, as far as the matter is concerned, Russia is basically a peasant country. Then the world questions crowded: how could the workers come to power and how could the economic upheaval of socialism take place? I went back to Russia, but the thought so de-

* The first is a well-known popular text of socialist propaganda. The second, entitled Di che vive elu, is the work of the Polish Szymon Diksztajn.
** Famous essay of Marxist controversy against populists.

State didn't give me respite. When I talked about social democracy, they listened to me willingly, but I was tortured by the fact that I could not give the workers an answer that would first of all satisfy myself. On the contrary, the more I deepened the problems of the social revolution, the more new questions were peassinq me»
And then, what to do? Go abroad? Staying in Russia, and what path to take here? In the end he made two decisions in one: in the summer of 87 he married Tat'jana Naumovna Berman, whom he had already known for three years, and in the autumn they left together for Switzerland. In the fragmentary notes that the wife left we read: "Inventer 1887-88; we live in Zurich... I dissolved in him»?

Until 1899 Izrail' will not return to Russia; never again to Odessa.

In Zurich he immersed himself, as during his first stay, in readings and studies, also perfecting his French and German in the high school. He re-knited his friendships, first of all with Pavel Axelrod, who had been one of the founders of the Union for the Emancipation of Work, the nucleus of the future Russian Social Democratic Party. This one, who looked like a good tired uncle with a stim glasses and a ruffled gray beard, had a dairy company in Zurich and protected the young revolutionaries. And then with the old Leo Deutsch, hero of all escapes, who took him at will. And again with Vera Zasulič, bohemian of subversive romanticism, the long black braids, the dark and volitional eyes, from which she shone, in addition to the fanatical dedication to the cause, also an affective and maternal strength that she poured in part on Saša: she could be her son and gave him the affectionate nickname of "Seal". I don't link, however, with Professor Plechanov who, with his straw, the white butterfly on the starched collar and the beautiful quiet face with almond-shaped eyes under sinuous dark eyebrows, looked like a landowner out of Turgenev's novels. He also had a lively discussion with him that Plechanov never completely forgave him.

But the young man, who now signed the German Helphand, did not want to bind himself too much to the circles of emigration and preferred to dive completely into Western reality. So he avoided Geneva and Zurich, the cities where the colonies of emigrants from the east were concentrated and moved to the quieter Basel, which was however a city alive and free in trade and customs, where a more European air was breathed. It was the thirst of the West that took him from the Beresina to the Rhine to begin an adventure, a conquest of life that his ancests had been denied in Asian Russia.

When they arrived in Switzerland, he and Tanja, in the fall of the last year, enrollment at the university was already closed. He therefore enrolled, for the 1888-89 course, in Basel. It was not far from the fourteenth-century Porta Spa-len and the two found a room near the Fish Market, two steps away

Yes from the Rhine. Helphand threw himself into the study with fervor and was lucky enough to find a professor like Karl Bücher, who had moved from the liberal journalism of the "Frankfurter Zeitung" to an academic career. He knew how to link the study of the classics of economics to the concrete and current problems of capitalism and socialism, economic development and its laws, also bringing together the living experience he had accumulated in his profession as a journalist. From him the tenacious student Helphand assimilated a method that he will no longer abandon: that of never starting from theories, but from the reality of the facts, from concrete data.

She had been there for two years, when Rosa Luxemburg arrived from Poland, nineteen-year-old, still with braids, still dressed like a collegiate. Small in stature, thin, slightly lame, but full of enthusiasm and sacred fervor, she soon got in touch with everyone, from Axelrod to Plechanov, and became the center of the Eastern student colony in Zurich. Around the Oberstrasse his little group of friends converged, including Julian Marchlew-ski, who already looked like a travet, Adolf Warszawski and Leon Jogiches.

The latter was a beautiful young man from a rich family of Vilno and will become the great love of Rosa and her partner, even if almost always far away, until 1906. Helphand befriended her and Marchlewski.
In the winter semester 1890-91 he agreed with Bücher the thesis on the problem of the division of labor. He prepared it in a few months by exposing in meticulous analysis what classics such as Adam Smith, Wakefield, Say and Stuart Mill had claimed in this regard, and then moving on to a wider part in which he exposed his thought. It was naturally "his" along the lines of Marx and it read, among other things: "repression, that is, to use a harsh and yet significant term of modern times, the exploitation of the masses, slavery, constitutes the basis of the division of labor". ° And the solution? "There are very special conditions that counteract these pernicious influences... essentially the organization of the working class and the growing class consciousness." This thesis did not go very well with the new professor Kozak, who had replaced Bücher in the summer session. He was immediately prejudiced against the candidate and in the oral exam put him in difficulty in physics and mineralogy. He thus had a score that was anything but brilliant. But the "career" that the doctor of philosophy Israel Helphand had in mind, as he now wrote to the German, would have done it on his own.

2. Who is Ignatieff?

Who is Ignatieff? — Plechanov asked Engels in May 1894. And many in socialist circles asked themselves the same question in those first years of the last decade of the century. Already in 1891, in the "Neue Zeit", then the most important Marxist magazine in Europe and therefore of the world, a criticism of the theses of the well-known Austrian economist Böhm-Bawerk had appeared under the signature of I.H., who accused Marx of making mistakes in his theory of value and consequently demolished the theoretical construction. The essay of I.H." was the first well-founded and pertinent response of the Marxist school, preceding by twelve years the famous defense that will make Hilferding it. Historiography has forgotten it; and, worse, it has ignored the even more significant fact, that that essay anticipated, in his vision of the social character of the law of value, the treatment of Marx himself in the third part of the Capital, which came out a few years later. With the pseudonyms of Ignatieff, of Unus, and the acronym I.H. other writings had then come out that had stood out.

«Ignatieff - replied Engels then from London, where he lived, to Plechanov who was staying in Morneux, in the French Savoy - is the pseudonym of Helphand, who is now in Stuttgart. She probably knows him...»."

Yes, Plechanov vaguely remembered "Gell'font", as he would always call it. A burly and brazen young man who many years ago, as soon as he arrived in Zurich not yet twenty, to him, who was the founding father of Russian Marxism, to whom everyone presented himself, more than on a visit on a devoted pilgrimage, had responded with an abrupt and indisposing "no" to his authoritative advice to deal with the critic Belinskij, national honor of progressive literary Russia. He had to write to Kautsky immediately to get more information about that Gell'font. Since it was he who opened the doors of his magazine to him, he must have known him better than anyone, especially since Gell'font, or Helphand, wrote in German in German newspapers.

That method of meticulous analysis, that detailed update on economic problems, on Germany and also on Russia and on the world market, and even the simple and elegant style of the exhibition. Even the series of editorials of the «Vorwärts» on the «situation in Russia», which just two years earlier had made so much noise in Germany, provoked the indignation and the reply of the Russian populists, and then again the reply of the newspaper, must have been of the same pen!'" In them the end of the old woman was announced

Peasant Russia, the development of Russian industry and the consequences of this shocking process for the future of Europe.

If Ignatieff is also I.H. - Plechanov ruminated - we, Russian Marxists, Axelrod, I, Zasulič, also owe him gratitude! It is only thanks to him that the German comrades began to consider us the real ones

Exponents of the movement in Russia and no longer gave space to "non-

Ni» populists and their "grandchildren" terrorists. And only thanks to him that since March '93 my correspondence with Engels began... He remembered that editorial in the "Vorwärts" of September '92, signed I.H. and entitled Social Democracy in Russia." The editorial staff informed that the article had arrived in the form of a letter from a Russian social democrat, but, considering the importance of principle, they printed it as an editorial. And it was clear why: the author pointed out to the German "comrades" that the working class in Russia was already active thanks to the Marxists, that the Spo could no longer ignore this "historical fact". Until the previous July, in fact, when they had even published their program in the «Vorwärts», the representation of the Russian revolutionary movement in Germany had been a monopoly of the Narodnaya Volja with the signatures of Sergeevsky and Petrov, pseudonyms behind which the well-known Rusanov and Lavrov were actually hidden.

They had also gone to Engels to discredit Plechanov and to present themselves as the real leaders of revolutionary Russia. But now the whole picture had changed, and now it was his Emancipation of Labor group to represent revolutionary Russia at the German party and to collect-

In all the well-deserved credit.

And what was Helphand doing in that May 1894, when Plechanov noticed him? Meanwhile, he had removed, like an old dress, the name of Israel and had given himself the new one of Alexander, less oriental and revealing of precise origins. In life he was now Alexander Helphand, but he still signed "Unus". He was in Stuttgart and he wasn't there. Precisely at that time he traveled continuously, always in third class, between Stuttgart and Munich, Dresden and Leipzig with episodes also in Switzerland, where he met his Po-lacchi friends, first among others Rosa Luxemburg. For the newspaper "Sprawa Robot-nicza", an organ of one of the two Polish socialist parties, which she wrote in Paris, she also wrote something. But, in the summer of that year, he was especially taken by the elections to the Bavarian Diet, where the socialists intended to support the government in the issue of the budget.

He strongly opposed it and split into "Parvus", his umpteenth and this time a pseudonym. So he signed for the first time in 1894 in the "Neue Zeit" the article Not a man, not a penny. Some considerations on the budget of Bavaria." The article aroused noise and surprise, all the greater when it became known that Parvus was the same person as Igna-tieff, I.H., Unus. Because, especially, Unus the year before had taken a very different position in the face of the elections in Prussia, the same anti-abstentionist position as Bernstein (a theme, this of participation or abstention, which would be nerve-like in the coming decades and would have torn apart social democracy in Germany and elsewhere). From that moment it was

So Parvus: like Unus, the pseudonym is Latin, but with a deliberate irony towards one's own build and with a, not entirely in-

Conscious, propensity to make yourself small, to keep in the shadows, to hide behind the scenes of history.

In that summer of 1894 he had been in Germany for over three years, since he had arrived in Stuttgart after graduating in Basel. He was already well known in Germany, he had a certain history behind him: two years of wandering life, 1893 and 1894, which would have temporarily ended at the beginning of 1895 with the landing in Leipzig. But they were important years and not only for Helphand. Although poorer and more nomadic than his friends, his position in the German party was becoming solid and even prestigious: he had a reputation as an economist, a connoisseur of foreign countries, an excellent writer and journalist, even if sometimes bizarre and reckless. He knew not only German perfectly: as a real polyglot, in addition to Russian of course, he also spoke Ukrainian and Yiddish, French and English fluently. Yes, he presented himself as the wandering Jew, but still looking for a homeland, which he wanted to find in Germany, where the strongest and most organized socialist movement in Europe and the world existed. "Russian or German," he would have written, "the struggle of the proletariat always remains one and the same and knows no national or confessional differences... If I therefore betrayed my Russian homeland, this happened at that time and it was also the betrayal of the class from which I come: the bourgeoisie»."

Helphand wanted to act, have her say, make her way in that party, in that press, in that Germany that, although lagging behind in economic and industrial development over England and France, now, reunified by Bismarck, was quickly regaining ground and in many respects was already at the forefront. And so, as he would later write: "German social democracy became my new homeland... I continued to be interested in the events in Russia, but now from the point of view of German social democracy, that is, from the point of view of their influence on the political development of Western Europe as they approached the social revolution». * A homeland, a legal passport of any Germanic state, even the smallest, were also necessary to have freedom of action and movement. Two years earlier, in '92, in Berlin, he had been arrested, locked up in the gloomy prison of Moabit and struck by an expulsion order as a foreigner in-

Desirable, subversive subject of the Russian Empire. And so he had to interrupt after a few months the stay in the modest room rented with Tanja in a working-class suburb and the collaborations with the "Vorwärts", directed by the host Wilhelm Liebknecht, and the "Berliner Volkstribune", an organ of the left wing of the SPD. They were modest collaborations that allowed the couple to survive, albeit with difficulty. He then turned to Karl Kaut-

Sky to help him obtain a non-prosecutable citizen status. And Kautsky, who had already recommended Helphand to his comrades in Vienna as a correspondent for their newspaper "Arbeiterzeitung", took the question to heart: "There is a Russian here, Dr. Helphand; who has already been in Germany for six years, a very smart person... who carefully follows the German situation and has a good judgment... He lives in Stuttgart, because he was expelled from Berlin. He would like to be naturalized in Austria to be able to participate freely in the movement. In Germany there is not even a need to think about his naturalization after expulsion. The party would gain with him an important strength, of solid formation." Nothing was done about it, as would be repeated later, in 1896, when Helphand would have tried to obtain naturalization from the federated realm of Württemberg.

Helphand's meeting with Kautsky dates back to the end of 1891, when after graduation he had arrived with Tanja in Stuttgart. He had already sent him the essay on Böhm-Bawerk for the "Neue Zeit" from Basel and Kautsky had replied, with an encouraging tone, that he would publish the writing. Kautsky, a native of an open and cultured city like Prague, welcomed the young Russian and his wife as friends and almost fellow countrymen; he opened his house to him, which was a meeting point for all those who wanted to discuss and learn. Even Clara Zetkin, who owed her surname to her marriage to a Russian emigrant, having been born Eisner, and who directed the union of socialist women, took him under her protection. Bruna virago with square jaws, the Zet-kin looked like a big Teutonic aunt, but how strict and moralistic she was, she was so sensitive and good. To help him make ends meet, he had him write on the "Gleichheit", the revist for women that she made all by herself. With Luise, Kautsky's wife, but with Clara above all, Tanja formed a friendship that would last until her death. Casa Kautsky, where the editorial staff of «Neue Zeit» was also, became their daily landing in those months:

Tanja was called the "Famulus" by Helphand; and Kautsky's children, with a linguistic mess that combined the name with appearance, now familiarly called him the "Dr. Elefant".

In '93 there was the first congress of II Internazionale in Zurich. Helphand did not participate as a delegate, but was able to wander through the corridors almost like a stranger to glance from afar at the rustic table with mugs of beer and wine, where Engels, Bernstein and Clara Zetkin sat.

Also in that year the Russian social democrats abroad had held two congresses without being able to agree; and Plechanov had preferred the isolation of his group from the Emancipation of work.

Helphand was then betrayed in Leipzig. The editor of the «Leipziger Arbeiterzeitung», Bruno Schönlank had his eyes on him. He had-

That newspaper must be transformed, from a boring party propaganda sheet, as all socialist newspapers were, into a loose information organ; updated, interesting. Schönlank called Parvus to the editorial office, who naturally accepted and threw himself dead body into the new job. He was twenty-seven years old: his work skills, his energies were inexhaustible.

After sleepless nights, he spent with his director in endless discussions, which began the evening in the editorial office to continue until late in the breweries or at the Thüringer Hof, an illustrious place in the Saxon city; after dawns consumed in the readings or in the writing of his articles, he presented himself in the morning to the newspaper to set the issue of the next day, coordinating the work, layout, going down to the printing house. Between him and Schönlank a friendship was born, a partnership of esteem and mutual consideration. They were memorable months for both, which they would never forget, not even after the ideological and political disagreement that came quite early, in the late summer of 1895.

That summer, on August 5, Engels died and his ashes were submerged by the waves of Eastburn, the rock of the southern English coast where the great old man loved to meditate. His disappearance, even if until the last he had been present in the political struggle, dyed with vivid light those signs of a deep split in the lands of Marxism, which Parvus and not only he, had been feeling for at least a year. A silent earthquake was already passing through their bowels: they were different and contrasting seismic currents, but soon they would emerge on the surface with disruptive force and the panorama of theory and movement would be completely changed.

Perhaps also the unconscious feeling of this, as well as a more extensive information through a reading in a different key of texts also known in Germany, as well as old and new that appeared in Russia, which others were not able to read or simply neglected, pushed Parvus to write things, which even Schönlank judged too radical, extremist, intolerable. Like, for example, his heated interventions on the Agrarfrage," which provoked a hoard of resentment, or his controversy with Bebel about the unions." With regard to the first question, namely the problem and the agricultural program, Parvus argued that social democracy should set itself not only as the party of the industrial and agricultural proletariat, but also of medium and small farmers. Everyone considered such a thesis as a heresy — this time of the right — but already in 1925 an old manager asked himself: «Yet, putting a hand on our heart, the development of these three decades has finally not given more reason to him than to Schönlank, Vollmar and David.?..'" As for the unions, Parvus was the first to support their importance and autonomous identity at a time when they were considered a form of pre-recruitment for the party, a sem-

Plice subsidy if not a danger, as they distracted the proletarians from the political struggle by directing them towards contingent economic battles. Instead, Parvus stated that "the future belongs to them in Germany." Despite all his propensity for the eccentric and his friendship with Par-vus, Schönlank at a certain point no longer feels like showing solidarity with him against the whole opinion of the German party.

He, moreover, was a born journalist and, in front of Parvus' long series of articles, he put his hands in his hair exclaiming: "But it's a book again what Parvus is putting together!" And it was the end of their collaboration.

3 Director of a newspaper

«The Book of the eminent German publicist who writes under the pseudonym of Parvus is composed of a series of essays that contain some phenomena of the world economy, with particular regard to Germany. Parvus attaches importance mainly to the development of the world market....

Based on the data of commercial and industrial statistics, Parvus describes the original division of labor established between the different capitalist countries, some of which produce mainly for the sale in the colonies, the others for the sale in Europe. In the chapter Cities and Railways, the author makes an extraordinarily interesting attempt to define the main "forms of capitalist cities" and their importance in the general framework of the capitalist economy. The remaining and larger part of the book is dedicated to the problems of contradictions in today's capitalist agriculture and the agrarian crisis... We strongly recommend that all readers who are interested in these problems take note of the book of Parvus»." This is how Lenin would have written in 1899 from exile in Siberia, reviewing on the "Nacalo" the Russian edition of The World Market and the Agrarian Crisis, the long series of essays that Parvus had published between '95 and '96 on the

"Neue Zeit"

But also Plechanov, Axelrod and the other "revolutionaries of the east" in exile had meanwhile convinced themselves of the importance of the writings of Parvus. In their correspondence between February and April 1896 they discussed his articles, while keeping in touch with him. Although deep down they continued to distrust Parvus, Luxemburg, Bernstein, in whom they saw, regardless of their contrasting positions, the threat of new ideas. Plechanov, always obsessed with populism, closed a letter to Axelrod with the words: "In the name of every holy thing, do not forget-

Dear to write (immediately) to Gell'font about the campaign against obstina. ....». ** And Axelrod from Zurich wrote to Plechanov: «Helphand will probably come to me soon for a couple of days if nothing to the contrary happens in the meantime. It may be that he manages to accompany him to you, although it is difficult, since he writes to me that he is not master of his time»." Precisely at that time, in fact, Parvus, less than twenty-nine years old, had accepted the offer to direct another socialist newspaper, the "Säch-sische Arbeiterzeitung" of Dresden, which was financially sailing in bad waters. The Dresden Socialists wanted someone to raise the fortunes of their organ, and Parvus, with his spirit of initiative and energy, seemed the right man.

For the newspaper to come out of the passive it had to have its own printing house. For this purpose, Helphand, not hoping too much, asked the party for funds: in fact, only the central body, the "Vorwärts" of Berlin, was subsidized, while the local press had to live on its own means. Parvus then had the idea of turning to the unions, for which being able to have a say in the press was a novelty and an achievement. With their funds and private loans they put together the necessary capital to buy the printing house and renew the newspaper. It was a new kind of publishing venture, for which he strengthened the editorial body, first of all calling Julian Mar-chlewski, his friend from his university days in Switzerland, alongside editors such as Emil Eichhorn. The first would one day be the founder of the Polish communist party; the second would become the head of the Spartachi-sta police in the revolutionary Berlin of 1918. It was not long before the newspaper not only became positive, but also became an authoritative political and theoretical body, followed with interest well outside of Dresden and the region. And this above all thanks to Parvus' articles.

They were especially liked by the young social democrats and left-wing intellectuals, who finally found themselves in their hands a combative newspaper, which called things by their names. Again, as already in Leipzig, he was at the center of discussions, in meetings as in breweries or at the ancient

Café Büchel; and his heavy and dangling figure was popular like no other in working-class circles, in journalistic and intellectual circles. Popular above all for his familiar, open and friendly manners, strangely fascinating for women and surrounded by esteem: everyone spoke with respect for the "Russian", "Dr. Barfuss", as the soft Saxon pronunciation had transformed the osly and incomprehensible name Parvus; and in German Barfuss

It means "barefoot".

As soon as she took over the direction of the newspaper, Helphand started a

* The Russian peasant community.

Campaign that touched on the pain points of a social democratic policy that he considered weak, renunciatory, devoid of a general vision. He resumed the issue of the role of the unions on which the position of the party was uncertain and contradictory. Sarcastico wrote: "It's really a nice dream that, without realizing it, you enter socialist society as in a big gap and that one fine day your eyes widen: "Hey, we're here!" Spring flowers, radiant sun, Argentine bells, the last policeman has vanished into thin air and in his place a graceful nontiscordardimé blooms. Station:

"State of the Future!" Everyone come down! But it's just a dream! Since for this reason we should count on a collapse of capitalist production, while there will still be countless intermediate layers of society, the economic division will not yet be remotely completed, the proletarian class struggle will still be intertwined with countless collateral currents, extremely contradictory economic interests will tend to a political expression... from this derives the need to unite the working organizations all the more firmly... and first of all we need trade union organizations». *

In addition to ridiculing the theory of the fatal collapse of capitalism, Par-vus faced the questions that most nagging the social democrats, after Engels had decreed in his "political will" the sunset of the old tactics of the barricades, and that in Germany, just around 1895, they were made topical by rumors about the threat of a reactionary coup. And here is his wise Coup d'état and mass political strike," which also had a strong echo at the Socialist Congress of. London, in which Helphand participated as a Russian delegate. This essay was at the origin of all the Marxist theorization of the ways of conquering power after the so-called "te-

Political statement» of Engels about the sunset of the forty-tesca revolution. Setting the equation "disorganization of society = revolution", Parvus considered in what was written all the forms and moments of the mass political strike both as a defense against a right-wing coup d'état ("Be on guard against the proletariat when it uses all its means of struggle in defense of the Constitution!")" Both as a weapon and first act of the re-revolution. The thesis would have been relaunched by Rosa Luxemburg after the Russian revolution of 1905, who had given a model of its implementation by Parvus himself and Trotsky.

In that essay, in which later the idea of the "permanent revolution" was also seen," there were preliminary intuitions: that the A-chille heel of the modern state is in the media, that economic paralysis brings power to its knees, that the modern army is not only made up of officers but above all of proletarians who can turn their weapons in the opposite direction, etc., up to the role of semantics in the political struggle. It was a theoretical treatment, but also a practical guide. Many

They took up those concepts, including Lenin himself; and many of those concepts were experimented in various historical situations. It was still Parvus who, from the pages of his newspaper, was the first to open a machine gun fire against Eduard Bernstein'ses, against those writings on the "problems of socialism" that began to come out almost in the winter of 1897 and that were destined to mark a historical turning point in the evolution of Marxist doctrine and the socialist movement, giving rise to "revisionism". Signed first "Pv", then Parvus, ten articles were published between January and March 1898 with the overall title The Bernsteinian remake of socialism" and a series of well-known controversies. *

It was like a warning signal. In Bernstein's arguments he recognized not a misrepresentation of some principles of socialism, but the danger of the destruction of it and its Marxist theoretical building, of the abandonment of the revolutionary perspective aimed at giving free space to the no longer capitalist production; he saw a betrayal of the "ultimate end"

Of the party and the proletariat.

Many socialist newspapers followed him in this campaign, but the party leaders preferred not to speak out. They were uses to what is now called pluralism of opinions; and moreover, Parvus' outings, due to his lack of tact and his disregard for the rules of political etiquette, often bothered and aroused resentment.

Faced with Parvus' attacks, Bernstein's attitude was that of an English gentleman. He thought that one could reason civilly and replied: "It is ridiculous, after fifty years, to still argue with the phrases of the Communist Manifesto, which correspond to political and social situations completely different from those we are dealing with today." But Parvus did not feel reasons: he agreed that the Marxist theory should be updated, but in Bernstein he recognized his denial in nuce and therefore he became even more enraged, with other writings, until at the Stuttgart congress of the Spd, in November 1898, he had the Dresden organization presented a motion according to which the class character of the existing state could not be overcome with reforms, but only through a revolution. The party leaders did not agree. Bebel then wrote to Kaursky: "This man suffers from a devouring ambition and his resolution shows that he does not know our conditions. God forbid that the congress solemnly decided to aspire to a social revolution!». * The congress, in fact, if he rejected Bernstein's theses as opportunists, he did not condemn him, rather recommending him to meditate on his own ideas and to resubmit them reworked in the form of an essay. From Auer, to Bebel, to Liebknecht, turri were instead inflexible with Parvus: what a tone, what superb, what a presumption, what a lack of savoir faire between comrades! Only the

"Young people" like Haenisch and his friends from the East like Luxemburg and Mar-chlewski applauded him together with Clara Zetkin, of whom a word of solidarity was recorded for Parvus. *

It was therefore a block, an outcast in that Germany where for seven years he had led a battle for a living, combative and operating party and had already provided theoretical indications and anticipations to which history will prove. His status as a foreigner had not even allowed him to have a mandate in congress to defend his theses in person. But in the party there were those who followed him: the «Rhein-Westfalische Arbciter-zeitung» would have written in April '99 that «in addition to Kautsky it is first of all Parvus and Luxemburg who have made a decisive front against Bernstein... and at the Hanover congress it is presumed that they will find the majority». Luxemburg, who was also in controversy with Parvus despite having excellent personal relations with him, wrote to Jogiches: "I hope to be the one who sets the tone for the entire party press. Parvus was on the best track in this sense, because the party has no people with a rest and character and those who find them have open doors in front of them. But Parvus broke his neck. ....». * The dear Russian comrades were also haughty and contemptuous with him. Axelrod, for example, wrote to Plechanov to dissuade him from attacking Bernstein: "Dear Georges!.. I simply would not want you to give reason to the mediocre public to confuse you with Parvus, a man who, although out of the ordinary for intelligence and knowledge, is not remotely free from Nörgeln and Streitssucht. * As far as I know, he doesn't enjoy sympathy in the executive spheres and it also seems to me that he doesn't deserve it." As director of the «Sächsische Arbeiterzeitung» Parvus had tied Luxemburg with a contract. On July 10 he wrote to Leo: «... With Parvus I set up relationships in the happiest way: I write him notes about Poland, France, Belgium. They give me 30 fixed marks, plus of course the compensation... There will be money at the end of the month... Even Parvus is happy and of course it already fills my head: "by the way, also England and Ica-lia, and also Turkey!.."»."

Since May Rosa had settled in Berlin in a beautiful accommodation in front of the zoo in Cuxhavenerstrasse, "in the most aristocratic part of the city, all in the green, without trams". * He had Parma violets on the window, a pretty lampshade and a porcelain intaker. Moreover, he told Leo, he was in a relationship with "the most important: Bruhns, Schönlank, Parvus, from whom I can get what I want". *

In June she thought of writing against revisionism: «... In the evening I work on Bernstein, let a lightning catch him, what a difficult thing! Ohi, how

* In German in the Russian text, respectively cavillosity and eagerness to fight.

My head hurts!»." In those days Plechanov, who had noticed Parvus' articles,* had decided to write about Bernstein too.

When she read Plechanov's article, Rosa got very dry, sent a postcard with a language that stretched out to stutter Georges and wrote that he "not only approached the subject from the most stupid side, but he treated it in such a miserable way that you can't understand anything." In another letter:

«Certainly in the whole party, except me and Parvus, no one is able to talk about this»:* that is about Bernstein.

With Parvus, on the other hand, the relations were excellent and confidential, so much so that he was aware of something that very few knew: that Rosa's real man was not Lübeck, the official husband, but Leo Jogiches, with whom in front of the others, those few times they met, they always gave each other "you" in Polish and "she" in German. Leo was jealous of the friendship between Parvus and Rosa, who to reassure him wrote to him: "Just don't think that Par-vus infected my imagination. We didn't talk much between us... and in general we didn't tie at all».

On Parvus, meanwhile, new clouds were thickening: he had put himself too much in sight with his newspaper and his writings. Both he and Marchlewski reached the expulsion order from Saxony at the end of September. On the 24th, Luxemburg told Jogiches: "I receive a telegram from Dresden:

Very important to come immediately. * I go there and at Marchlewski station he tells me that I have to direct the newspaper! It's of course an idea of Parvus..»." But, to the direction of the «Sächsische Arbei'erzeitung», Luxemburg did not last even the space of a morning, because it made the mistake of answering for the rhymes to Gradnauer, the powerful Dresden deputy of the Reichstag, and he had it removed ipso facto.

In that autumn, Parvus, in addition to being expelled, was full of family tries. The wife was expecting a child and the mother had arrived from Odessa, who suffered from mental disorders. He took her to Zurich to the famous French psychiatrist Auguste Forel. Then he started moving again between Switzerland, Stoc-carda, Leipzig, Hamburg, where he could stay less than a month before being expelled from there as well. He also went to Berlin several times, but he happened to be stopped by the police and spent two nights in prison. He finally found a temporary landing in Gera, where he hoped to obtain the citizenship of the Grand Duchy of Reuss. Driven out, however, also from which, in January 1899 he moved to Munich in Schiessstätstrasse, where he was immediately the subject of a well-informed police report."

Shortly before, on November 29, 1898, his first-child was born in Dresden, to whom he was given the name of Leo Lazarus, but in the family he was called-

* In German in the text: "Very important to come now".

No Ženja, Russian diminutive of Eugenio. Parvus also turned the happy event into a trumpet ringing. In the newspaper once his appeared the 1° December a listing:

«We announce to the comrades of the party the birth of a robust and vital enemy of the state... although he was born on German soil, he has no homeland. And condemned to exile with us... The child will be educated by us as a fighter, in the ranks of the revolutionary army. Fighting for the liberation of the working class from the yoke of capital, he will also conquer a homeland for himself. Parvus and wife».

A bit of revolutionary romanticism didn't hurt: then it was taken seriously. But no one, then, would have imagined that the prgolo, who grew up later in Russia, would have become so drunk on that romanticism that he denied after 1917 his father, an opponent of the Lenin regime, changing his surname and becoming a devoted official of the state-party until he ended up in a Stalin camp and then, reluctantly freed from the successors, he will pass to dissent.

But about that later. Let's now go back to the parent, who at the beginning of the last year of the century found himself again without a permanent home, without a place, not to be prestigious but at least not too precarious. He continued to write for various newspapers and magazines; since December 1898 he had begun to publish in Munich a kind of press bulletin on world politics and finances to which newspapers subscribed to publish the texts." The Bernstein debate, the debate on Bernstein, continued, and Parvus silently prepared his new speeches, therefore moving away from active politics.

Meanwhile, contradictory news came from Russia: of a new famine, of economic development and of workers' strikes, of a great ferment in the camps. The bosjaki, the barefoot and the vagabonds, uprooted from the countryside, had set in motion. The great anthropological revolution began, which will be decisive for 1905 and February 1917. Parvus wanted to feel the pulse of the country, feel its vibrations, its sounds and flavors, immerse himself in deep Russia. I send everything and everyone to hell and leave with his motto of the crucial moments «Gewalt aj-waj! Screamed». * It was a fascinating and risky undertaking, a clandestine trip to Russia. It would have taken almost half of 1899.

* It imitates the Jiddish cry of protest, defiance and lament against raids and pogroms, which can be roughly translated: "Ouch-ahi, violence! They shout».

1 C. Lehmann und Parvus, DhR, pp. 172-73.

2 Parvus, *IKW*, p. 4; *Pgk*, p. 4.

3 Ibidem, p. 5; ibidem, p. 4.

4 Ibidem, p. S; ibidem, p. 4.

5 Ibidem, p. 5; ibidem, p. 4.

6 F. Kon, Za pjas' desjat' ler, Moskva 1936, t. 3, p. 254.

7 Parvus, op. cir., pp. S-6; op. cic., p. 4.

8 Ibidem, p. 7; ibidem, p. S.

9 From a written communication of the descendants to the A.

10 L. Helphand, Technische Organisation der Arbeit ("Cooperation und Arbeitsteilung"). A critical study, Phil. Diss., Basel 1891, p. 50.

11 Ibidem, p. 72.

12 I.H. Oconomic pocket players. Eine Böhm-Bawereiade, "Neue Zeit", 1891-92, B. 1.

13 Perepiska K. Marksa i F. Engel'sa s russkimi političeskimi dejateljami, Moskva 1947, p. 269 (180. Engel's-G.V. Plechanovu, 22-5-1894).

14 I.H., Die Lage in Russia, «Berliner Vorwaerts», 17/21-6-1892.

15 I.H., Die Sozialdemokratie in Russland, «Berliner Vorwaerts», 23-9-1892, p. 1.

16 Parvus, Keinen Mann und keinen Groschen. Some considerations about the Bavarian Budget, «Neue Zeit», 1894-95, B.l, pp. 80-87.

17 Parvus, *IKW*, pp. 7-8; *Pgk*, pp. 5-6.

18 Ibidem, pp. 7-8; ibidem, pp. 6-7.

19 V. Adler, Briefwechsel mit A. Bebel und K. Kautsky, Vienna 1954, p. 182.

20 Cfr. no. 9.

21 Parvus in «Leipziger Volkszeitung», 18-7 / 2-8-1895.

22. Parvus in «Leipziger Volkszeitung», 20-6-1895.

23 K. Haenisch, PBE, p. 8.

24 In addition to the articles of P. cited in n., cf.: N. Welcome, Party and unions in Germany (1890-1914), Milan 1981, which contains some of P.'s writings on the subject.

25 K. Haenisch, op. cit., p. 12 2.

26 V.I. Lenin, OC, v. IV, Rome 1957, pp. 65-64 5.

27 Parvus, Der Weltmarkt und die Agrarkrisis, «Neue Zeit», B. 1, 1895-96, pp. 197-202, 276-283, 335-342, 514-526, 554-560, 621-631, 654-663, 747-758, 781-788, 818-827. Also in Russian: Mirovoj rynok i sel'skochozjajstvennyj krizis, S. Peterburg 1898.

28 PP, pp. 140-141.

29 Ibidem, pp. 115 et sex.

30 Parvus, The trade unions and the social democracy. Critical Report tiber the La-Ge and the next tasks of the German workers' movement, Dresden 1896, p. 46. Also in Vrgs (Profesional' noe dviženie i socialdemokrastja, PP. 5-83), p. 81.

31 Parvus, Staatsstreich und politischer Massenstreik, "Neue Zeit", 1895-96, B. 2. Also in Vrgs (Gosudarswennyj perevorot i političeskaja massovaja stačka, PP. 174-222).

32 Op. cit., p. 51; op. cit., p. 222 !.

33 Z.A.B. Zeman, From the Commist Manifesto to the 1981 Declaration in Revisionism , Milan 1967, p. 143; and subsequent other historians.

34 E. Bernstein, Problems of Socialism. Own and Translations, «Neue Zeit», 1896-97, B.1 e B. 2.

35 Pv., Parvus, E. Bernstein Umwälzung des Sozialismus, «Sächsische Arbeiterzeitung», 28-1 / 6-3-1898 (Nn. 22, 23, 30, 31, 35, 40, 43, 45, 47, 54).

36 Parvus, Eine Erklärung E. Bernstein, ibidem, 2-2-1898; Ed. Bernstein Herumwälzung, ibidem, 9-3-1898; Ed. Bernstein als armer Toms, ibidem, 11-3 and 24-3-1898.

37 E. Bernstein, Kritisches Zwischenspiel, «Neue Zeit», 1897-98, B. 1, p. 75.

38 Some Briefs R. Luxemburgs und andere Dokumente, "Bulletin of the International Institute of Social History", 1952, p. 10.

39 Protocol on the negotiations of the party days of the SPD in Stuttgart, Berlin 1898, pp. 70 ss., 95-130.

40 R. Luksemburg, LdLJ, 1, p. 527 (in Italian: Letters to Leo Jogiches, Milan 1973, p. 170, ed. Reduced)1

41 PPA, c. 1, pp. 202-203.

42 R. Luksemburg, op. cir., 1, p. 237.

43 Ibidem, p. 156.

44 Ibidem, p. 242.

45 Ibidem, p. 238.

46 PPA, 1, p. 205.

47 R. Luksemburg, op. cir., Pp. 253 and 255.

48 Ibidem, p. 351.

49 Ibidem, p. 289.

S0 Ibidem, pp. 286-287.

51 F. Hitzer, LiM, p. 243.

52 E. Gnedin, Kvr, p. 7

53 «Korrespondenzblatt für die Arbeiterpresse. Die Weltpolitik»

Chapter two
In deep Russia

1 Petersburg and Moscow at the end of the century

«As we approached the Russian border, we had the same feeling as those who feel like falling into an abyss in a dream: where will I end up and what awaits me in the end?... We knew very well that the police is the only power that governs in Russia and towards it the ordinary citizen has no guarantee, nor any protection... the well-known exile in Siberia is imposed "administratively", that is, at the discretion of the political police. The SpiR,* which in Russia is always also a provocateur, brings together in a single person the powers of the investigation, the prosecutor's office and the judge. There is nothing more characteristic about Russia's political situation than the fact that a large number, if not perhaps the majority, of its writers and men of culture have served a political exile or, in any case, are on the police lists. Would our itinerary also have led us to Siberia?».' In early May 1899, on the train that took them to Petersburg, these were the considerations of Parvus and the doctor Carl Lehmann, who paid most of the expenses of the adventurous trip to study on the spot, in the territories affected by famine, the health problems of endemic hunger. Lehmann, son of a wealthy family, had already served in the then illegal Social Democratic Party in the early 1980s, had graduated in medicine in Strasbourg and had been practicing in Munich for some time now. His address would have been Lenin's secret address for correspondence with Russia in a year and the doctor would have provided him with many valuable contacts. In this expedition he had a regular passport of Germanic subject, while Parvus traveled with a fake passport in the name of a certain August Pen, Bohemian, a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

"... While at nightfall the espresso took us quickly towards the border, we looked with the tension of the darkest uncertainty what would happen to us... The train stopped... c, as if from the earth, a rigid and thin figure appeared inside a gray military coat: the first

* Russian term for the police officer.

Russian gendarme and, at the same time, the first thing we could see of Russia. Without moving a muscle of his face, he stretched out his hand and said a single word: "Passports!". After giving him ours, we got off the train and followed the current of travelers, which flowed in a large modestly lit room. We took our seat in front of the well-known horseshoe counter that runs through the entire room... A quarter of an hour passed and none of the travelers had yet been checked. In Russia you can learn from life the meaning of the ancient Latin proverb "festina lente"....

The first passport holders were finally called. They were naturally titled personalities, counts, princes, generals... Then came the turn of the normal plebs. With a busy and indifferent voice, our names were also called: we received our passports back, the luggage was inspected very superficially for this time; we could continue.

«We were traveling through a sand desert. The first thing I saw early that morning from the upper bed of the sleeping car was my fur coat, whose light gray tint was no longer recognizable under the layer of yellow dust that covered it... It hadn't rained for many weeks. There must have been many forests in that area of Russia, yet we couldn't see anything from the windows... Down there, in the turmisy distance, beyond the horizon, there could still be large forests, but all around the railway

It was the desert...».

Why this change, which even in other and larger areas of Russia was already the cause of drought, famine, hunger? Parvus says: "The railway had arrived in that region and first a road is built by cutting the forest. And, with the first smoke of the locomotive that worked on wood, the process of swallowing the forest heritage also began. The beautiful oaks, birches, pines, firs were cut down to make wood and burned; the best logs were loaded and shipped in whole convoys abroad. So the forest was squandered and the lean hard land was laid bare.

Isn't it curious that the railway, to which all our modern civilization is connected, has here created only an image of destruction and ruin?...».

«The Russian landscape is not very lively... The villages are very far from each other... with their low houses, the isbe, gray as earth.. From time to time the golden cross of a church shines and its round belly blue dome stands out on the white body of the building. In reality, there is little to see».

«The scenery changes a little up to the vicinity of Petersburg — our travelers notice —. At two in the afternoon we pass through Gatčina, where the tsar lives in voluntary confinement for fear of the terrorists of the Narod-

Well, Volja.

In Petersburg, Dr. Lehmann and Parvus went down to a hotel on the

Perspective Nevsky, always the fulcrum of administrative and commercial life

Cial of the capital, but now also home to the industrial and financial companies of Russian capitalism in full development. From the windows they contemplated the spectacle of a huge crowd in perpetual movement in the great urban life, which had rhythms and colors that no other Russian city knew at the time.

It was the first time that Parvus saw Petersburg, this European face of Russia, since he had grown up in southern Odessa and then immediately plunged into the Germanic world and culture. And you discover that the nightlife of Petersburg had its own charm and its own breadth, which did not exist in Swiss and German cities. Life began at eleven in the evening, especially in the period of "white nights", when between sunset and sunrise the light persists, denying any entry to the night. The summer theater, with the variety, the culinary specialties, the Viennese operetta, the confusion of the crowd, the winking of eyes and female forms, the gypsy orchestras, the people on the street until the late hours, the comings and going of carriages, the open pastry shops that offered refined delicacies, made him exclaim: "So in Russia you don't live in a spartan way if you have money!".

«The Russian has figured out how to defend himself from the cold and suffers much less than we do... The houses have thick walls, double windows and double doors"; for the Russian "eating is more an occupation than a nourishment and helps to kill time" whose "concept does not exist" for him. «Along the streets, one in ten people who meet has a uniform: they should be the civil cream of this society composed of undifferentiated and amorphous plebs». And there would always have remained a castal hierarchy above the people, iterated by the new power, without ever, until today, the leap of democratic transformation having been made. The huge Kitsch of Kazan Cathedral, built by the Frenchman Montferrand in the early 19th century, with 136 columns, on the

Model of St. Peter's in Rome, it was its symbol, and even today it is laughably exhibited by Intourist guides to foreign travelers as a heritage of Russian art.

At seven in the evening, with an express train and beds obtained thanks to a tip, Parvus and Lehmann left for Moscow. They arrived there in the middle of the following day with a delay of two and a half hours on the time, a blem for Russian customs. They went down to the second-category Hôtel Berlin, frequented by German business travelers. First he prescribed an izvozčik to be taken to the suburbs, where political "friends" lived, where they found letters from other "friends" from various parts of Russia.

The journey made him cross most of the city, also unknown to Parvus until then, who noticed that it "is considerably more Russian than Petersburg. People, houses, life, mud: everything is strongly reminiscent of Asia». The signs of the shops «are much more grotesque; they are paintings that, due to the audacity of the design and colors, would be the envy of our sim-

Bolisti». His famous Ochotnye Rjady* were actually an immense bazaar, built by ancient merchants near the Kremlin, with more than a thousand barrels, a restaurant and a concert hall. It was enough to cross the Red Square and the Spasskie Gate to enter the Kremlin, which our people did not have time to visit.

The next morning they had to send some Russian books to Germany, which they only managed to do to the central post office through a thread of six employees and as many tims. From there it was a must to visit the legendary Chitryj Rynok, a place where people looking for work from all over Russia, traffickers, delinquents, adventurers and women of crime. It was the large Petrovka square, in the center of which stood a building open on all sides: today all this has given way to modern buildings. The two had breakfast based on roast veal and hot tea in one of those popular Russian traktir**, now disappeared, with overheated and heavy air, impregnated with smells and smoke; they went around the shops to buy maps, useful things for the trip and supplies, until, surprised by rain and sleet with a temperature dropped to zero, they had to shelter in the hotel. Before leaving, one more visit to the Iverskaja Chapel,*** the greatest place of veneration in Moscow, but also that venerated icon was the copy of another copy of the original, once preserved by the monks of Mount Athos in Greece. The first copy was taken around Moscow, on a horse-drawn car and escorted in livery, to bring salvation to the sick rich who could afford such a service. There were still many devout rich people back then in Moscow, but there were already the enlightened and revolutionary rich, such as the Sčukin and the Morozov brothers. The pseudo-moorish palace that the "twenty-two-year-old industrialist and millionaire" had built, for its bizarre and sumptuous shapes made one think of India; soon he got tired of living there and "wanted to give it to the city as the seat for a museum". But the power of bad taste is all over the world such that this palace has survived the almost total destruction of old Moscow.

So today the ancient Russian city of Niznij Novgorod has completely disappeared, not only renamed Gorky, or "Amara" according to the meaning of the writer's pseudonym, but replaced by an anonymous city of concrete.

Parvus and Lehmann, on the other hand, still saw it as it was, arriving there "on a triumphal sunny day in May" and seeing it "picturesively placed on a high on the right bank of the Oka", where this river flows into the Volga. On the left bank stood the buildings of the renowned Fie-

* Files or counters of hunters, original designation from the type of goods sold (hunting and furs), then become of all kinds. Today they no longer exist.
** Traccoria.
*** Chapel of the Madonna of Iberia.

Annual ra, visited by about half a million people with a turnover of almost two hundred million rubles at the end of the 19th century.

Ours had left the Moscow station called Nizhnij-Kursk, facing one of those overwhelming assaults on the train that are customary for the Russian railways and their crowds of travelers even today. But «the railway cars in Russia are much more comfortable than ours... an employee in uniform from the Ministry of Justice, a medical student and a forestry official were also traveling in our department.

In the car there were also many merchants, an officer, etc. There is a lot of talk about politics during train trips in Russia. And the exchanges of opinion that are heard are almost completely liberal. We were surprised to make this observation, because feeding liberal convictions in autocratic Russia is not without danger and for those who eventually express them can have very unpleasant consequences. But the situation incites criticism to such an extent that the initial caution is forgotten. The state system, from the police to the ministries, is ill-considered. Everyone, from businessman to employee, from their experience of daily life has to communicate an incredible sum of wrongs, ridiculousness, injustices. Some speak with discovered indignation; most, with that certain cheerful sarcasm that also gives its timbre to Russian literature. He likes to illustrate the backlog of Russian conditions compared to Western Europe...».

Waiting and restlessness had taken over the hopes, which the new emperor had nipped in the bud with a speech given on January 17, 1895 at the Palazzo d'Inverno on the happy anniversary of his wedding, a speech written to him by the Minister of the Interior and attorney of the Holy Synod, Pobedono-scev. A fanatical but lucid conservative, he had been hired by Tolstoy as the prototype of the official Karenin, husband of Anna in the famous novel.

In response to the Tsar, a clandestine proclamation was circulating: "You have spoken your word. Yesterday we didn't know you. Today everything is clear: you have launched a challenge to the society: it will give you its answer». The answer was the continuation of terrorism and the bombs of Narodnaya Volja, but also the development of capitalism and industry, a new culture and civil society, liberal ideas and Marxist socialism.

In those years it had made giant strides and Plechanov and Dragoma-nov were no longer the only luminaries, even if you don't want to consider Par-vus, already so active and avant-garde in Germany and still Russian.' The important book on the economic development of Russia by Petr Struve, a young Marxist scholar, who would have a brilliant future as a liberal leader and a role in the life of the country, was out. The essays of Plekhanov and Ul'janov, future Lenin, had also appeared against the theories of the

Populists. The entire Russian culture was in motion: from philosophical thought to science, to art, to music; to literature. In a sense, two great figures of the time embodied in a certain sense the broad and anticipatory gaze and multiple interests: the utopian religious thinker Nikolaj Fëdorov and the precursor of Cyolkovsky astronautics. With the philosopher Solov'ev, with Rozanov and with Chekhov, with the symbolism movement, although Tol-stoy was still alive, poetry, fiction, theater, thought sought new paths.

2 Traveling on the Volga to Kazan'

As soon as they got off the train at Niźnij station, Parvus and Lehmann booked a cabin on the steam that was to leave an hour later for Kazan'.

They didn't find a vehicle and had to run on foot to the port. On the ship all the seats were sold out, the reservations were not valid. With effort, tints and cunning Parvus still manages to conquer a cabin. The ship was elegant and comfortable and had a Tatar crew. The radiators were working, the electric light was shining and there was a great restaurant. The view of Nizhny Novgorod moving away was magnificent: "its houses and domes, slightly covered with fresh snow, sparkle in the afternoon sun". The ship was full of passengers of all races: Russians, Tatars, Mordines, Bulgarians, Ce-remissi, Gypsies. At sunset, groups of women and men sang melancholy Slavic, gypsy and oriental songs. In first class the travelers were mainly rich Tatar merchants with tall caps and expensive fur cloaks, yet lurdy and full of insects.

A trip to the Volga on a cool sunny day was something extraordinarily new for a foreigner, as Parvus noted. The strong current and the impetuous wind, which raised large waves of brownish water, were impressive; while the left bank covered with woods was flooded in spring, on the right one paraded gray wooden villages with large white churches with colored domes. When the steam reached Leskovo, the famous Makar'ev Monastery appeared on the opposite bank, built as a fortress and surmounted by domes and crosses. At that point the Volga, as wide as a sea, was furrowed by boats of all kinds and by tugboats with three and even four large overloaded barges.

The restaurant was crowded and ours also ate the famous caviar, which today, due to dams and pollution, has become as rare as Taurus. "It was ridiculously good at a good price," Lehmann commented. To eat a classic Russian lunch they then ordered borst, sudak* cooked with

* Respectively: Ukrainian soup based on beetroot and cabbage; such as perch.

Legumes and lemon and roasted partridge: "all excellent and tasty", accompanied by plenty of vodka. They then took a tour of the steam and discovered that on the third class deck there was a huge table, on which every blessing was exposed: pieces of beef, veal, pork and bird, as well as various fish, and also sauerkraut, raps, tomatoes, lemon slices, bread, a wide variety of sauces: the same things that the passengers of I and II class ate in the dishes at the restaurant. Here, however, everyone took with their hands what they wanted. Despite the big difference between the passengers with the cabin and those on the deck, circulation was free for anyone on the entire ship.

Life flowed along the river: fishermen and small traders on wooden rafts that lowered the current, many boats and vapors, partly still working on wood, but there were more and more ships fed by the naphtha of the Caspian Sea, which therefore, Parvus noted, "will strongly pollute the water of the Volga to the detriment of fishing, which however could certainly be avoided with the necessary attention. The Bädecker* warns against the excessive enthusiasm for the beauties of the matuska Volga,** but the true friend of nature, who understands other wonders other than the ravines and romantic rocks, does not need this warning. Here nature is great, great in a simple way»

Kazan was then one of the largest cities in Russia with its one hundred and thirty thousand inhabitants, the university and the railway that connected it to Moscow since '93. But, in the winter of 1898-99, the storms and the frost had blocked it for three months: more than a thousand freight trains, loads of food and more, were stopped along the line. Built on terraces, the city was dominated by the ancient fortress, the Tatar minarets and the bell towers of its many churches. Famous for its beggars, so much so that throughout Russia the expression "orphan of Kazan" created a proverbial synonym, by now it also had a growing industry and Parvus commented: "These proletarian Russian peasants are the raw material from which an industrial proletariat must develop".

A dense welfare network for the poor - mensc, free dormitories - tried to alleviate the misery of this mass of inurban peasants, while the Tatars, although indigent and now reduced to a minority, did not make all the question, they knew how to read and write their own language and partly also Russian; with trade and crafts they performed "the same function performed by the Jews in Western Russia"; they did not live like the Russians on the street, but in their own neighborhood, the cleanest in the city, at the great

Kaban pond, dominated by the majestic mosque and animated by the bazaar.

From Kazan' the two friends embarked on the real journey in the moors

* Name of a German publisher of travel guides so famous as to make it synonymous with them.

** Mommy Volga.

Of hunger, joining an expedition of the newspaper "Volžskiy Vestnik". After the zero degrees of arrival they had had a day with 22 °C in the shade, but on the evening of departure a tremendous storm of wind, sleet and frost was unleared. They sailed into the night between a confusion and a noise in-

Describable, and the steam struggled to get out of the port due to the currents.

They opened a porthole to admire the grandiose view of Kazan' that was going away, but a violent wave flooded the entire cabin. Fortunately, the radiator was in full operation and during the night the steam passed from the Volga to the Kama River. At four in the morning they landed in Murzicha: "You can only see a small pier. No village, no house; only, vast and wide, the green shore of the Kama... So here is the kingdom of hunger!».

In the village of Romadan they had many meetings. Meanwhile, the pope invited them to his house for tea and rang the bells for two hours before people came to mass in honor of the tsar's birthday. And here they found the first signs of famine: the scurvy patients in the local hospital, which made me think of Meunier's painting The Hecatomb. They were then invited to the home of the landowner Svencickij, who was of Polish origin, but welcomed them in a Russian merchant's dress. «The famine is there - said the affable gentleman to them - because the mugicchi are great actors, they cry to eat for free and not work». In fact, the village was full of Red Cross canteens and various other bodies. They also met a certain Brodskij, a Jew who spoke German, who arrived with a lot of money to give help: he had found - in his opinion - summary assistance. The government had sent many horses, but the trouble was that the animals were too young and weak, the farmers had no food for them and so they were sentenced to certain death. The conversation took place in a living room, where the sa-movàr towered next to a carafe of vodka, among a great back and going of ladies and gentlemen pretending to be busy to hide their curiosity.

But a more in-depth knowledge of the village, - of the isbe of the peasants, of their food, made from house to house and from which it emerged that, yes, hunger was there, - led Parvus to the conclusion that there were two worlds: "on the one hand "we", of civil society in Russia; on the other hand, they, the peasants". Already a worthy writer like V. Korolenko had dealt with these problems "in his very interesting book on famine of 1891-92", but now the situation seemed more serious: no more dogs were seen, nor pigs, "even very few children". The visit to Romadan and surroundings was over, but there was a moment of suspense: the pope warned them that the police commissioner wanted to see them and check their passports. Soon, however, they became friends: the policeman invited them to his house "for tea", which then included beer, vodka and steaks; he marveled at Parvus' excellent Russian and took a picture of himself in front of his house with him, the vet and the pope.

They left Romadan in the evening, after ordering the horses for the long ride to Cystopol. In Maslovka they were guests of Count Mengen, owner of more than five thousand hectares. He welcomed them warmly, offered them tea and then entrusted them to his German administrator, because he had never gone to his lands, nor did he know them. The count saw the future with a lot of pessimism:

"The weather conditions - he said - are getting worse from year to year", the rains were increasingly rare, and so were the snow, the springs had dried up. A friend of his, a great owner, more than him, had horses, dogs, numerous servants; now almost nothing, only the garden was regal and at night the nightingales always sang; but, if the time of before had not returned, it would be the end: even the winds had changed.

All the villages in the area were terribly poor: what could the mugico do with his socha, the Russian wooden plow, if the owner, despite all his means, pondered leaving the countryside because of the climatic adversity? In those movements of them from village to village, ours saw misery, famine and entire villages razed to the ground until the last chicken coop from the fires. Because the isbe were made of dry wood and straw, they burned like matches for the poor maintenance of chimneys and stoves, due to peasant ignorance. An isba caught fire and the wind spread the fire to the entire village. So every year in Russia more than one hundred and fifty thousand houses burned. Considering that each isba requires at least twenty tree trunks, every year three million trees went up in smoke. And this even if each village had its own detachment of firefighters with guards who patrolled the town day and night.

At a gallop, crossing birch forests on a clear moonlit night, they finally reached the capital of Cistopol", which stands on the impetuous Ka-ma, and took accommodation at the "Rooms for Travelers of L. Archipov", a typical provincial hotel sign of the time. In the morning they were aroused by the clamor of a party and the songs of a procession: it was St. Nicholas Day. But Parvus had a visit to make and strongly recommended to Leh-mann not to move away and not to talk to anyone so that they would not notice that they were foreigners. In fact, he had to meet with Nikolaj Po-tresov, the revolutionary confined to that area, to study, among other things, the vague project of the newspaper "Iskra" and his network in Russia.

That same night they had to go up the Kama, which in its path of one thousand eight hundred kilometers crossed the governorates of Perm', Ufa, Vjat-ka and Kazan': a crucible of different peoples. The steam, which was supposed to pass at five, at seven in the evening was still not in sight, so ours settled in a łajnaja* with a beautiful view of the river. It was full of mer-

* "Tea room", where you could also drink more and eat.

Songs, but how different they were from those described by Leskov, Ostrovsky, Goncharov! Now they were all dressed in the western style and such that they could meet in Vienna or Berlin. The merchants had taken the place of merchants and noble landowners: they felt the winners and lords of the moment.

They returned to the pier, where, as usual, a large crowd was waiting, but they managed to secure a beautiful cabin on the upper deck of a large and elegant steamer of the "Kamensky Society". After a whole night of travel, at twelve the next day they arrived at Staryj Pjanybor' in the

Vjatka governorate.

All around the countryside was flooded by one of the great floods of the Kama River, hundreds of people were blocked, but a policeman kindly tracked down for them a boatman who took them to Menzelinsk and, during the journey, talked to them about the changed climate, the drought, the death of the woods, the scurvy and the lot of fish that despite everything was still in the river. The town of Menzelinsk seemed dead, many cars were waiting in vain for customers. The two stayed in the "Andreev Commercial Rooms" with an incredible amount of staff, excellent dinner and hot heating. However, the beds were so bad, the room smelled so much of oil, abundantly as vainly sprayed against fleas and cockroaches, that the alarm clock asked for four in the morning was useless. Moreover, the mail car booked for five o'clock only appeared after six, and they left when the sun was already scorching. This time they crossed such opulent villages, such as Karan, rich in horses and cattle and with abundant crops, that they were even surprised. But suddenly, around one in the afternoon, the panorama changed again: it was the landscape of the mi-

Serious. Where there were woods, the earth was moist and fertile; where they had disappeared, the aridity and famine advanced.

Around two in the afternoon, under a scorching sun, they entered the steppes of the Samara governorate. * At the post office of a miserable town, the Tatar coachmen became csigent and threatening. Lehmann kept the revolver ready, but Parvus shouted something in Russian that, scaring them, appeased their lit souls. He resumed the race of the two cars, but just in case, in the stretch that crossed a forest, the two held the guns in their hands. They arrived at the capital of Bugul'ma at two in the morning after one hundred and fifty journeys. The next morning they visited the city and the hospital. The director was a young doctor and asked him in excellent German, but with an annoyed tone, what the two Germans wanted from him and why they had come this far. Faced with their reticent answers, he made it clear that he had incon-

* Today Kujbyšev.

I treated Parvus many years ago in a German clinic. Parvus was stunned and of course denied, but he knew perfectly well that the doctor was right. However, he does not allow him to visit his hospital. The two friends did not want to waste any more time and at noon they left with a trojRa, continuing the journey with mail horses to the south, to Buguruslan, district center and Trans-Siberian station.

3 Here Europe, there Asia

As the train ran towards Samara, Parvus and Lehmann rearranged their travel notes, data and observations collected, which allowed a first assessment of the extent of famine, hunger and consequent diseases, first of all scurvy. They were not simply the effects of weather changes or wild logging, but they had proton socio-economic motivations. In any case, the primitive peasant economy was over, as the large land ownership was over and the craft had disappeared. The German colonies on the Volga were also in crisis. Created with a 1763 uraz* by Catherine the Great, for more than a century they had shown the supremacy of the German farmer over the Russian one. Parvus remembered the enthusiasm of the scholar and traveler Hax-thausen, who in 1842 had visited them in the Samara region, finding them prosperous and happy: "A little piece of Germany on the outskirts of Asia... a flourishing country with more than a hundred thousand souls with a completely Germanic physiognomy". «Yes, an interesting social experiment — remarked Parvus in the staps of Haxthausen — because the German communities, initially based on private property, absorbed the community principle of mir** to the point that it found wider application there than among Russian peasants, while then, before among the Russians and more quickly, private property was reformed». "The social destiny of the German settlements in our eyes has greater value than all the attempts, so far made, of communist organizations aware of the end," said Parvus, because "it shows that the form of property is not an absolute... that, if the economic conditions change, the form of property must also change". *

Arriving in Samara with his friend Lehmann, Parvus had a bad surprise: the newspapers talked too much, too much, about the two of them and their trip. But he reacted according to his style: they had to introduce themselves for what they were and say

* Ordinance.
** The community of the Russian village, also stands for obitina.

Openly what they were looking for. They went down to the "Rossija" hotel,* and immediately went to work, that is, meetings with local exponents. Everywhere they were well received, from the zemskaja uprava** to the great brewery of Ziguli, whose owner was a German and whose beer was famous throughout Russia. *** Dr. Lehmann was very impressed by the monument to Alexander II, known as the Liberating Tsar, which stood in Alekseevskaja Square, in front of the Go-stinyj Dvor. **** At the four corners of the plinth, four allegorical figures: a peasant holding the decree of emancipation of the servants; a female figure who represented the liberated peoples of Asia; a circassian who broke his sword, and another temporal figure who broke the chains and depicted the liberation from the Turks. «How many freedoms, commented Lchmann, in a country that does not have fundamental freedoms!».

Samara was a great caravanseraglio, with crowds of street vendors and beggars, yet she gave a less Asian impression of Kazan'. It had some large courses with rows of leafy trees and the magnificent Stru-kovskij Park with a large restaurant from whose terrace, among the comings and goings of waiters, ours admired a red sunset over the Volga. The port was the liveliest area, with its intense freight traffic, its heterogeneous and colorful crowd, with the branches of important companies from Petersburg and Moscow, as well as foreigners. Samara was still an agricultural and commercial capital, but also cosmopolitan, as indicated by the great sign in German "Bierhalle"***** of one of the most modern and grandiose Renaissance-style restaurants in the city.

From the countryside in crisis, farmers in search of work also arrived in Samara, as in other cities. Parvus and Lehmann visited the location office, in front of whose door hundreds of men were queuing.

Telegraphic requests for labor also arrived in Samara from the Moscow and Petersburg industries: in groups of five hundred and more men.

After a few days of stopping, with regret for the much that there was still to see and explore, the two embarked on a steamer coming from Astrachan' on the Caspian Sea to take themselves to Simbirsk. And the view of the "immense surface of the river and the majestic current above which the rays of the setting of the sun play" induced Parvus to some considerations: "There is a double Russia: the Russia of the great communication roads and the Russia of the kingdom of the earth without peasant roads. Between the two there is a difference

* "Russia".

** Direction of the zemstvo.

*** Today that place is called Tol'jatti (i.e. Togliatti alla russa) and there is the car factory set up by Fiat.

**** Sales warehouse, also hotel.

***** Great brewery.

Of two cultures... This steam is the last word of the technique... It is equipped to meet the most refined needs of modern man. You could take it on the Rhine or the Mississippi and no one would notice...

Even the public that moves in the first two classes is in no way different, with a few exceptions, from the public traveling in Western Europe...

Here there is luxury, comfort, civilization, wealth... In the lands behind the hills, instead, there are miserable houses that have not changed their shape for centuries, archaic tools, ways of life and customs of now remote times, misery, poverty, backwardness, incivility. Here Europe; there Asia. The great artery of the Volga has brought European culture from Moscow and Petersburg to the Caspian Sea... Now you can travel easily in Russia. You can get there with maximum comfort from Hamburg to Astrachan'. But we must not leave the "Russia of the great communication routes". One must see only this Russia and report impressions of Europeanism, of beauty, of wealth, of abundance in everything... And you don't have to know that... here the nineteenth century is as if canned in the early Middle Ages...».

Simbirsk, a name of Tatar origin that means "mountain of the winds", at ten thirty in the morning appeared from the river as an agglomeration of chies, convents, barracks, which dominated the modest houses, mostly wooden, of the city, its gardens, its streets made of dust that became mud with every rain or thaw. But it is the city of Karamzin, a great historian and writer of the 18th century, and at the end of the summer of 1899 he naturally did not know that he was also the city of Lenin, with whose surname Uljanovsk is now designated on the cards. Parvus remembered that Haxthausen in 1842 had noticed a great quiet, but now, after half a century, that quiet was immobility, stasis, a sinister sleep. In any case, at the gubernskaja uprava* the authorities gave him a royal welcome and were well willing to give any information about the famine, the hunger, the economic situation.

With the usual horse transport they went to the nearby large village of Archangel'skoe, immersed in sunflowers, but hungry and at the mercy of the scorbutus. Guests in the bizarre turreted palace of the noble S. of the good old days, they obtained many economic data and courteous indications to visit the peasants in their isbe, to see their conditions. The Tatars did not want to eat meat unless slaughtered by one of their own; the Russians were complating, because in the sti** and kaša*** there was pork and not veal; it turned out that 160 grams of meat were available per day per person, but it was considered too little. It was a fact, however, that not only there, but

* Administration of the governorate.
** Traditional Russian cabbage-based soup with other ingredients.
*** Russian millet polenta.

In all the countryside the diseases raged. In addition to scurvy, typhus, syphilis, widespread in large areas, trachoma induced by blenorrhagia, tuberculosis, malaria, especially in the Volga region, dysentery, Siberian plague and tremendous flu epidemics that had a high mortality rate. The flu, already known in the Middle Ages, had reappeared in Europe in 1899-90 coming from Russia. It had to be recognized that the free medical aid was efficient, that the Zemsivo had achieved good success in this field, as in that of education, but any help, which cost huge sums, was "a drop in the ocean" for the vastness of the country, the absence of communications in the discounted moors, the prejudices and the ignorance of the peasant masses.

A new railway line recently connected Simbirsk, through Ru-saevka, with the direct line to Moscow. Parvus and Lehmann left with that train, but most of the line ran on a sand embankment, so every rain, as they could see for themselves, slowed down and stopped the trains: "After thirty-six hours of travel we arrived in Moscow and went down again to our old hotel, where we were welcomed like old friends".

And what were the conclusions of the trip? Many, rich, contradictory. In addition to the findings of Dr. Ichmann on the sanitary and hygienic conditions of the areas visited, Parvus touched on some economic-political aspects, c cioc: "a precise and complete analysis of Russian finances on the basis of official data is impossible"; "it is necessary to create a modern state, and this can only be done through a parliament, but parliament is feared, because it can shed light on the regime (and this was the French situation before the great revolution!)"; "the sunset of the structure of the peasant world with the pomestiki* and with the periodic famines is the result of a certain economic development and political system"; "the destruction of forests without a reforestation plan follows the lethal example of Spain"; "the US on the world market has violently hit Russia, anchored to the high conservative power of agrarian communism, namely the obsčina"; the enlightened "anglicizing" owners are ruined and "in Russia a mechanized agriculture has not developed as in the USA

They were the theses already proposed in his writings on the tede socialist press-

* Landowners,

Sca until the spring of '99, which would have reappeared, comforted by that journey into the heart of Russia, up to the articles on the "Iskra". Indeed, further meditated and developed, enriched with new data after the Russian-Japanese war, they would have resulted in his theory that would later take the name of "permanent revolution".

As for the chronicle of the trip that lasted about three months, from Moscow Par-vus and Lehmann returned safely to Germany with a train of the line that passed through Smolensk, Minsk, Warsaw. Transiting through Minsk, the capital of the region where he was born and had spent the first years of his childhood, perhaps only a more intellectual than sentimental curiosity pushed him to scrutinize the station more carefully from the trains, teeming with a crowd in which they stood out for their clothing and their physiognomic groups of defeated Jews, a world that he had also denied because he was convinced, like Axelrod, like Luxemburg, Martov, Ryazanov, and then Trotsky and others, that in a elsewhere not only and not so much geographical as made of culture and a challenge to the future their salvation was found; he looked at the villages to see the changes, already knowing that even there the difficult double struggle against the theocratic Rahal* on the one hand and the autocratic tsarist repression on the other had made immense progress: the Bund was delayed, cultural and political emancipation grew, young Russian and Polish Jews discovered Marxism.

* The local Jewish community, dominated by rabbis.

1 C. Lehmann und Parvus, DiR, pp. 5-9. All subsequent quotations, if not indicated, are understood from this text.

2 Cfr.: M. Pavlik, Mikhailo Petrovi Dragomanov, Ego fubile), smeri, autobiography i spis tvoriv, L'vov 1896: D. 'Zaslavskij, M. P. Dragomanov, Kiev 1925.

3 Era published the year before in Petersburg his work on the agrarian crisis and the mon- market Dial. See Bibliography.

4 Kritiłeskie zametki po voprosu ob ékonomiłeskom razvitii Rossi, S. Peterburg 1895.

S Respectively: K voprosu o razvitii monisticeseogo uzgada na istonju, S. Peterburg 1895: and Cto tatue «druz'ia narda», S. Peterburg 1894 (polygrate).

6 For further information, see the entire chapter of the work "Die deutschen Kolonien an der Volga", pp. 254-267. As for the further fate of the German colonists, they followed that of the Russian peasants, moving from a capitalist development to forced collectivization until, in 1941, the approximately 700,000 superstites were deported by Stalin to northern Siberia and abandoned without tools or equipment in the rundra. Survivors still vainly ask for permission to cheat in Germany.

Chapter three
«Under the eyes of the West»*

* From the homonymous and pertinent novel by J. Conrad

1 Renewing Marxism

The century ended with the international hype of the Dreyfus affair. In France it had unleashed a wave of anti-Semitism, divided public opinion and dragged intellectuals into politics: from Zola to Prévost, from Mirbeau to Rostand; and also artists and theater people among which Sarah Bernhardt stood out. But the whole world was involved. Pending the second trial, in all the synagogues, from Jerusalem to New York, they prayed for Dreyfus; in the most humble Jewish communities of Poland, Russia, Romania, Galicia, near the Thora stood his portrait.

The Russia of Nicholas II and Minister Vitte cared very little about all this: the empire's finances were a disaster, France was looking for support against Germany, it needed to support its prestige. Paul Morand, the future "immortal" of the Académie, wrote: "France has paid a young gallard to defend itself. The mugicco will keep it, but he doesn't know how to take his eyes off the swollen handbag in which the République keeps her loot. It's infuriating: this crowd always has money in the army, while the Russians, who own millions of hectares, never have enough to pay the wood supplier!... What a bizarre fate... to think that all this money of misers will serve to prepare the great Moscow expansion from the Sea of China to the Adriatic».

What Parvus had already foreseen in the '92 articles on the

"Berliner Vorwärts", and he reiterated now, returning from the long trip to Russia, in the book he was writing, also using the documentation of his friend Lehmann. He was nailed to the desk, while in Munich the ORtoberfesi was in full swing, and songs, music, dances, tavo-

Milk, streams of beer, hectoliters of wine: that vital great confusion of live flesh and dead meat, devoured, savored, conjugated, exalted in every possible way. The crowd crowded under his windows: he invited him to immerse himself in his own rive, to be dragged, overwhelmed. And he knew what the land would be: at the «Bunte Blumen» or at the «Zur Traube»*

* «Colorful flowers», «Al Grappolo», typical places of the Schwabing district in Munich.

Until late at night with friends, whether even before the party or even after, in their own company or from outside, life did not offer him a face, a woman's body. This could always happen in Munich and in particular in Schwabing, where he lived, the peripheral district of artists, bohemians, intellectuals and rebels, cheap breweries and cheerful pensions, but also proletarians, workers or students.

In the essay Russia's agricultural misery, now completed and soon to be published in the "Neue Zeit", he summarized the events of agriculture and the economy in Russia after the Crimean War. If Haxthausen in his famous book had given Herzen the idea of agrarian socialism that avoided capitalism, that is, the idea of populism, it should be specified that after the Crimean War "the entire building of Russian power and opulence had collapsed like a paper castle", and also that "industry is developing, but Russia is still an agricultural country", although of course he was "far from wanting to underestimate the industrial progress" of the country."

Outlined the history of agriculture after the abolition of the servitude of the gicba in 1861, Parvus noted the "strong conservative action of Russian agrarian communism, which holds together the members of the obstina and prevents proletarianization"? And he still stated that "the sunset of the Russian peasantry dragged larger and larger environments into crisis", so that "the entire state organization was strongly involved in this process of imposition", to the point that "the deficit is now chronic and the state would have been bankrupt for a long time if it had not been fed by the money of the French stock market"? The major railway lines were also in crisis, such as the Trans-Berian, whose construction had begun after the Crimean War had demonstrated the need for modern communications for the army as well as for trade and industry. His essay was successful, as was the following one on the financial situation of Russia, which Lenin reviewed on N.1 of the magazine "Zarja", calling the author "a great expert in the fi-

Nanze».

Meanwhile, while he was writing, the fierce screams of his son Zenja came to him from the next room. In that cramped accommodation the dear one-year-old boy obsessed him and took his breath away and serenity in his work much more than the noise of Schwabing's crowd. However, that noisy presence was for him almost a relief to the penalty of having seen his mother die without the light of reason. He had welcomed her into his apartment in Munich after the Forel clinic had discharged her as incurable, but she had died very soon, almost happy to give in to her quiet madness. Nor could serenity be offered to him by his wife. Tanja was dear and good, but, after the son was born, also because she was weakened by the difficult birth and the mother-in-law's illness, she had become incomment and apprehensive. He looked like another person,

No longer that girl who had lived a miserable life with him for years, but freely chosen and faced with enthusiasm. She had always behaved bravely, even when they were expelled from this or that country, and it was difficult to find accommodation even in poor pensions with that passport of Russian emigrants, on which was imprinted with the mark of foreigners in-

Desirable? Yet, Parvus had at that time introduced himself well into the journalistic, cultural and political life of Munich, writing for the "Münche-ner Post" whose director Adolf Müller, deputy of Bavaria, had become a friend, as he was of many politicians and intellectuals of the time, including the well-known director Max Reinhardt and the first scholar of erotic art Eduard Fu-chs, whose collection would later be drawn by publishers from all over the world.

In April 1900, the Exposition Universelle in Paris was inaugurated: the celebration of the orgueil français, world industry and trade.
The Eiffel Tower was renovated to remind us that everything had started there, with progress in iron and steel technology. At the Expo, instead, the new technological frontier of the modern era shone: the electri-

City. It was accessed from fifty entrances, beyond the Monumental Gate built in the most absurd Arab-Moorish-liberty style: two brick minarets next to a gigantic flaming arch surmounted by a siren on a golden globe. Between lights and standers, Flemish carillons and muezzin songs, you entered the metropolis of the pavilions of all the villages, between a fantastic architecture with the castles of the Carpathians and a reconstruction of the Escu-rial and finding San Marco near the pagodas of Java.

The Russian pavilion with the two-headed eagle of the tsars excelled over all, with the luxury lavished in mountains of gold, precious stones, ermines, to prove to the world that Russia was rich and powerful and foreign loans for it were like four changes for a billionaire. We climbed the wagon-salon of the Trans-Siberian: behind the window flowed the painted landscapes of Russia, the forests, the rivers, the ancient churches, the steppes, the gold mines, the Mongolian kurgan*, and finally, on arrival, the Russian mugicco that offered vodka and zakuski. ** In the car, on Ural crystal tables there were on display furs of all kinds, glassware and silverware, the objets de vertu of Fabérgé, the jeweler artist from Petersburg. But Parvus wrote sarcastically:

«Without the help of the République, Russian absolutism would hardly hold up. For more than a decade, the French bourgeoisie has been the main support of the throne of the tsars." He was also in Paris as a correspondent for the German socialist press for the Expo and, in addition to political articles, he wrote reports

On cultural and literary innovations.

* Tombs of ancient Tatar heroes.
** The famous Russian appetizers.

In those same days his book, La Russia che ha fa-ne, was published in Stuttgart." The preface read: "The world exhibition in Paris, like the one in Chicago, once again gave the Russian government the pretext to make a grandiose advertisement. With a sumptuous staging and an image of wealth and abundance, it enchants visitors. Isn't it the ancient art of the 'villages of Potëmkin'? *... This book shows the other side of the coin. Official Russia, tsarist, presents itself as the Russia of opulence — our book instead paints the Russia that is hungry." It was not simply a political book, but a lively and exciting story, as a writer. It was very successful, it was also reviewed outside the circle of German socialist newspapers and gave a lot of trouble to the Roma-nov Empire. It was also written that the unknown Russian co-author of the book could have traveled with impunity around the great country without being reported and stopped.

That year, on the "Neue Zeit", Parvus' articles followed one after the other. He continued to write about major political and economic issues, from the debate on Bernstein and revisionism to the analysis of developments in the world economy, and to intervene in disputes over the most current problems.

He had also spoken - alongside Bebel, Kautsky, Bernstein and Lu-xemburg - in the investigation promoted by "La Petite République", the newspaper of Jaurès, with which he also had a conversation in Paris, on the participation of socialists in bourgeois governments, "a problem sensationally raised by the case of Millerand; he wrote about the elections in Bavaria," to support the moderate wing of Vollmar who pursued the integration of the SPD into the bourgeois state, thus causing the ire of Luxembourg. «The task - replied Parvus - lies solely in making the proletariat as a class a force that is always and everywhere faithful to itself: in the parliamentary mechanism, in the revolution and in war, which therefore first of all protects its own interests... Even outside the revolution and using its own parliamentary rights, the proletariat can constitute a solid, organized and disciplined political party with a purpose of social-revolutionary struggle.

He had also published a theoretical essay on "commercial politics and dortrina"," in which, among other things, the methodological difference between Marx and Engels was noted for the first time: the former was rigorously theoretical, the latter was more attentive to social and historical conditions. He also resumed the subject of commercial policy with an essay on 'agrical import duties'. The management of the Spd had declared, in fact, that the socialists had to remain alien to the issues and difficulties of the bourgeois economy.

Parvus made an effort to demonstrate that the economic performance of the company, te-

* Russian saying for those who show fiction for reality, such as Catherine the Great's favorite, Potëmkin, who made the tsarina visit fake Florentine villages.

Desca and international, although bourgeois, it touched the workers in the first place and therefore the socialists had to work out their own policy, evading the dilemma between the fatalistic expectation of the collapse and revolutionary velleitarism. The discourse took on international dimensions in the documented and subtle analysis of his essay on "industrial duties and the world market". *

"The world market has its own great wave of rise and fall, which cannot be disturbed, altered, slowed down, nor raised through the trade policy of a single state; this motion acts on the industrial development of individual countries in a fruitful or paralyzing, regulatory or disruptive way." And again:

«..Although slowed down, the development of the world market has nevertheless progressed powerfully. And the result today is that the competition between the individual industrial states of Europe has expanded to an entire part of the world. In order to cope with this huge global struggle, free trade is a sine qua non condition for Western Europe. Because the Curopco capital is not only petty towards the working class, but it is also mean in its commercial policy. It is torn and hunts for fragmentary interests and mo-

Mentane. Hence the political fight. Europe suffers more than ever from the Klein-staaterer. * Although, in fact, states have become larger, their overall historical value exceeds their own size. It's the curse of political tradition. Finally, free trade will clean up all this, create large national complexes, lead to the United States of Europe»™

His geopolitical vision, open and renewing, was supported by the data of economic diagnosis, and in it the dictates of the doctrine gave way to the facts of economic and technological development.

2 In the house Parvus: the «Isera» and Lenin

«When Lenin, Martov, Porresov — would later write Parvus — they came to me in Munich and presented me with their project for the magazine «Iskra»,** I persuaded them to settle in Munich and publish their magazine there.

I pursued the purpose of putting that editorial staff of intellectuals in close contact with the mass workers' movement of the social democracy rede-sca. It was the last decade of September 1900: Plechanov, Axelrod and Vera

* Division into states.

** "Iskra" or "The spark from which the flame will fly", according to the famous motto of Herzen; the magazine that meant a crucial moment in the genesis of communism.

Zasulič, who would later be part of the editorial staff, were in Paris as Russian delegates to the International Socialist Congress. The "Iskra" project had been talked about for over a year, from the summer of '99, when Par-vus had met with Potresov in Vjatka, and then, concretely, from the beginning of the following year, when Lenin and Potresov settled in Pskov, perfecting the project and making contacts in Petersburg with Struve, Martov and Zasulič.

Like Parvus, but after and independently of him, Zasulic had also made a clandestine trip to Russia from the end of '99 to May '900. The intemerata terrorist from a noble family, who in 1878 had shot General Trepov, now converted to Marxism, still loved risk and action. Lenin, who only began to sign like this in Munich, until 1901 was still called Ul'janov, Petrov, Nulin, Il'ič and was one of the many revolutionaries catapulted by Russia to the West. Compared to him, not only Plechanov, Kautsky, Bernstein, but also Parvus and Luxem-burg were celebrities. Arriving in Switzerland that August, he had resumed contacts with Russian emigrants who had been in 1895; he had then been in Paris and Nuremberg, where Zetkin and Adolf Braun helped him in the preparations! Ratives of the «Iskra». For the same purpose, similar trips were made that month by Potresov. And in September they started together with Martov to make the newspaper.

The first eight numbers were made at Parvus' house in the Schwabing district, on Ungererstrasse, as evidenced by one of the many reports on him by the Munich police." Lenin lived a few blocks away. Dr. Carl Lehmann had found him a room, initially hosting him with a trusted companion on Scheffelstrasse. Almost immediately, however, Lenin moved to a boarding house nearby, at Kaiserstrasse 53 (now 46), a three-story house with a red facade; he stayed in an internal room of the doorman and ate meals at the tavern "Zum Onkel". * Only when his wife Nadežda Krupskaja joined him in the following May, he rented a apartment on the third floor of N.14 of Siegfriedstrasse, also in those parts.

He already knew many things about Parvus Lenin: Potresov had written to him, who had met him in 1895 in Kautsky's house before returning to Russia and being arrested: "I had a very high opinion of his theoretical abilities, I expected a lot from him in the future and I hoped to attract him to the Russian movement... I told Lenin about this in a letter of mine... to which Lenin replied with his of January 20, 1899." Lenin on the other hand, as already mentioned, had read and appreciated the writings of Parvus, which he had sent to his golden Siberian exile." And now the fre-

* "To uncle".

He was daily, he used his library, while with him and others he prepared the «Iskra». From Leipzig they brought, thanks to the good services of Braun and Dietz, the left-wing publisher who, among other things, also printed Parvus' texts and would later print the legal magazine "Zarja", a small special printing machine, which made it possible to destroy ready-made matrices in case of emergency by simply pressing a button. The material then passed to a real printing house, first Dietz of Leipzig and then Ernst of Munich, who carried out the complete print run on rice paper and took care of the clandestine expedition to Russia through various channels."

Lenin at first lived under the false name of Meyer, then used a Bulgarian passport in the name of Dr. Jourdan Jourdanoft,* provided to him, as well as to Plechanov and Zasulič, by Christo Rakovski," a friend of Par-vus since the time of Switzerland. Suspicious and cautious as always, Lenin did not, however, trust much to approach his German comrades and to be seen too much around. He met Luxemburg herself for the first time only at Parvus' house in the spring of 1901. He was already bald early and seemed much older than his age and Parvus himself, who was then thirty-three years old, only three years older than him. The two men were not made to sympathize on the human plane: closed, silent, cautious, immersed only in himself, in his intentions and in his certainty of having a mission to fulfill, Lenin," extroverted, wealthy, full of interests and eclectic, rich in curiosity and ready for communication, Parvus.

Lenin, tough, determined, already absolute in his opinions and judgments, and at the same time still in need of information on European politics and its men, coming from Russia and from three years of exile, found in Parvus an inexhaustible source of information, a jet even too bursting.
Helphand's redundant personality opposed to his questions, his statements, all his harsh determination, his apoditicity, an agility and sultiness of mind that annoyed and baffled him. And, even more than his skeptical and ironic criticism, Lenin couldn't stand his blundering even in the breweries, his taste of spending between the stupid playfulness of the German crowd in the grip of alcohol and the easy loves caught on the street.

He, Il'ič, pursued a well-defined end and he alone had in mind the pawns gradually to choose, to move. Parvus, on the other hand, was the only politician he knew who understood and shared the enormous importance that the organization of an active political force could have,

* Even today his signature with this name is kept at the Bayerische Staatsbiblio hek in Munich, as well as the signatures of Helphand and Marchlewski, who had guaranteed for him no posia daio di paia, instead, if he sent it to Dr. Lchmann, friend and

Sectors of the capitalist economy — of technology, the money market, trade, colonies — which inevitably produce a considerable expansion of the world market and raise the entire world production on a new and much more extensive basis. A period of Sturm und Drang then took over. The periodic alternation of ascent and fall is not eliminated, but the ascent develops with greater twist and the crisis is more harshly manipulated, but in a shorter period of time. This process lasts until the hidden force, which is accumulating, reaches its peak. It is the moment in which the most acute form of commercial crisis occurs, which then turns into a general economic stagnation, characterized by a slowdown in industrial development. This slowdown reduces the size of the economic rise, but protracts the trade crisis, which as a result loses its sharpness. One thus has the impression that production can no longer rise again, but only until the strength of development is ripe for a new boost of capital.

"If the Parvusian theory of the Sturm und Drang periods of capital is confirmed," wrote Kautsky, "we have in it a valuable complement and an enrichment of the Marxian theory of crises." Such recognition by Kautsky was no small thing, but in any case Parvus at that time was considered one of the greatest Marxist theorists, and he also enjoyed good popularity in the movement, because his writings were also extraordinarily simple and incisive. Above all, he encouraged the desires, the hopes of revolution or at least of renewal of the masses. If in many popular and intellectual circles his positions provided him with consensus, in others, inhabited by political and party handymen, they caused him not only protests, but hostility and enmities.
All this exploded shortly when he wanted to say his final word in the Bernsteindiskussion with the essay on "opportunism and the

Practice."

In particular, Parvus thought that the use of arguments that could easily be denied by economic developments should be avoided. His comrades, such as Luxemburg, Kautsky, not to say Plechanov, based their own refutations of Bernstein on the interpretation of the "sacred texts".

But if you wanted to tackle it seriously on the theoretical ground, it was then necessary to take into account Werner Sombart and Conrad Schmidt, who before him had questioned the scientificity of Marxism, and the same replica of Engels still alive at that time.

In any case, in one thing Luxemburg was wrong, in that she immediately defends herself: the theory cannot be touched! In some cases it could be true, but, Parvus specified: "No stasis can be imposed on scientific knowledge, and it is even trivial to say that with the development in the economic conditions

Able to put himself at the head of the movement, to solicit and strengthen it, to connect theory and practice, intellectuals and masses.

The preparation of the "Iskra" was progressing, but in a sea of difficulties. Tu-gan-Baranovsky, a former ally of Ul'janov when in Russia a few years earlier together with Struve they had struck the theories of the populists with their strals, was offended because he felt cut out: from an ancient Tatar family, Tugan "with all his soul wanted to be of help with his work and his money". * But, for the financing, Lenin had that of Aleksandra Kalmykova, a rich editor from Petersburg; and for the technical basis, all the support of the powerful apparatus of the Spa, provided by Bebel.
Petr Struve had also agreed to come all the way to Munich to discuss with all of them and a compromise had almost been reached, when instead Lenin decided that it was better to break up. The editorial staff met until May 1901 in the Caté Noris in Leopoldstrasse 41, in the center of Schwabing, and then in Lenin's house.

So here is the first issue of «Iskra»: 24 (11) December 1900, with its editorial for «a strong organized party», here is the attack on the Credo of the Kuskova," which «deluded itself» to relaunch the ideas of Bernstein in Russia. «Before joining and in order to unite we must first of all decisively and basically discriminate against each other!»." They were different, special, and their newspaper was to be a tool of battle, a center organizing a dense network of illegal agents in Russia, which he and Martov had already taken to weave months ago, before leaving the country. But Lenin could do little in that direction, alone, in Munich. The friends he now had next to him were certainly not of great help to him, much less Parvus, all absorbed by his theoretical work and his lucrative business dreams, and with those explosions of undisciplined vitality that pushed him among people, in the streets, in the nights, to waste precious time. And yet that he thought there was no doubt, because that his essay on Russian finances that he, Lenin, had reviewed on "Zarja", and the other signed Molotov," as well as the study on opportunism, which Martov was translating into Russian, testified to it once again. Even to make it known in Europe that the Russian Marxists finally had a political newspaper had been Parvus with one of his articles on Russia in the «Süd-Deutscher Postillon», the lively weekly that competed in nonconformism with the «Simplicissimus».

Meanwhile, his theoretical contributions increased: he deepened the economic study in a new book, where he addressed the theory of crises, the action of banks, the Sturm und Drang* of capital and the consequent role of the unions. «Some periods are distinguished by such a high development in all

* Classic German expression: "assault and empire".

A revision of economic theories is also necessary. No one can dispute it." He had already given an example of a freer and more critical approach to "sacred texts" with his essay on Böhm-Bawerk in 1891 and then again in 1896 with the criticism of Engels as an economist. Among other things, he had noted the misreknowledge by Engels of the Marxian law of value when he stated that in mature capitalism it would not be as valid as in the manufacturing period. This "error" of Engels, indicated by Parvus in 1896, was "rediscovered" later and to this day by various Marxists who prided on it. *

And instead the Plechanov, Axelrod, Potresov, Luxemburg, also Marchlewski and Rakovski and certain Germans, for whom Marxism was a new table of the law, and not a "historical method", contested it. Parvus insisted a lot on this interpretation of Marxism, which moreover the same initiators of it had claimed several times as the most correct in the face of doctrinals. And this interpretation allowed to link theoretical rigor to political realism. Of that generation of Marxists, he was the only one to have such an anti-dogmatic vision and to go into that terrain on which Lenin soon imposed himself in a completely different way and with very different intentions.

Yes, there were the sins of opportunistic revisionism but, for some time now and increasingly, Parvus was torn between an almost innate need to attack the established power and the awareness, confirmed by studies, that modern capitalism was a machine, albeit monstrous, but functioning, which, by continuously correcting itself, was changing the world. Something very different from the immobile obtuse kingdom of the Arakcheev and the tsars, which he had known in the plumb days of his adolescence, where only the flashes and the roars of the terrorist bombs, the blood, the screams were flashes of life, of exaltation. Life in Germany, in-

Instead, it flowed in factories, in large companies, in companies and banks, on rivers and ports, in the countryside that were already beginning to electric mechanization, in the lights of the cities, like a great rising tide. That vital world was moved by the capitalists with the fatigue of the workers, who in some way also participated in it: whose greatest merit? It was not the moral question that interested and in this Marxism was clear. (

And so, however, it was necessary to make those who wanted to understand what the reality of the time was: it was now in the period that already in 1885 Engels had called "imperialism", and capitalist development proceeded much faster than the development of the so-called "public opinion"; that is - Parvus pointed out - "the ideas that set the tone in parliament and in the press are always significantly behind"." Nobody says, for example,

That "the industrial future belongs to America and Russia. Compared to the old Europe, these countries have the advantage of the geographical position, of an imposing extension, of gigantic dimensions... of the political unity»." And Parvus advanced his own theory in this regard: since "the development of social democracy cannot be ignored by general political development... even in the struggle for the emancipation of the proletariat, as in the economic and political development of capital, there are periods of enhanced development and delayed development". *

He managed to have the essay published on the "Neue Zeit" without the knowledge of director Kautsky, who had taken a summer vacation. It was an attack across the board, not only against Bernstein, but also against Vollmar and Ignaz Auer, the head of the party organization, whom Parvus defined in one step as "the tutor-master of opportunism". Bebel, however, did not consider the essay a defamation, but "an objective criticism even if not always correct" and in these terms he wrote to Kautsky, adding that he feared that those to whom Parvus "was on his stomach" would react violently. And he closed his letter: "You can't believe what animosity reigns in the party against Parvus and Rosa; although I am not of the opinion that such a prejudice should be followed up, it is not possible, however

Ignore». *

Actually at the Lübeck congress of the Spd, in September 1901, Parvus and Luxemburg were covered with contumelia: some delegates of no small weight used terms such as "literary pimps", "the male and the female from the east". Wolfgang Hei-ne, a well-known lawyer from Berlin and socialist deputy, distinguished himself against whom, in addition to Bebel and Zetkin, also the "Iskra" energetically reacted: "Heine, attacking Luxemburg and Parvus, not only insulted them as Jews and Russians, who must not interfere in "our" German affairs, but, as far as Parvus is concerned, he carried out an act that Ledebour and Stadhagen, with the approval of the majority, had to call "a denomination"":" that is, the public revelation of his status as a Russian refugee with temporary residence. And yet, although an editorial of the "Münchener Post" of October 3, perhaps inspired by himself, supported the arguments of the "Iskra",

Parvus was again rejected by the Spd as a black sheep after years of theoretical and practical work spent on his cause. From the end of 1901 until after the Russian revolution of 1905, the "Neue Zeit", of which in those years he had been one of the most important collaborators, closed his doors.

Other SPD bodies did the same.

Parvus' response to the party that condemned him to political isolation could not be entrusted only to the agency bulletin that he sent to the newspapers every week. In it, with the signature "Wp", he usually wrote the most important piece, a summary of information deduted from the international press and accompanied by original interpretations. The sheet had the defect of being of too much higher level than the party press to which he offered his services. According to the police report on Parvus, already cited," it was printed every 8-14 days and newspaper texts such as the «Münchener Post», the «Reussische Tribune» and the «Saz» of Dresden were taken up.

The result was however great and the initiative lively, giving little fruit compared to the effort it cost, although even the "Iskra" used it.
«In 1902, after the Lübeck congress - Parvus would later write - I was convinced that I had to have my own magazine. At that time, in fact, I suffered attacks from all sides for the mici articles on opportunism... Total boycott. I was designing a big magazine, but large sums were needed. Where to get them? I therefore decided to get to the money with my mind. But, to invent something, you need a technique. It was clear that I had to move towards the field of law, where capitalist property is protected by all sorts of legal ingenuity, and see if a commercial interest could not be discovered there. And in fact I found one. Russia at that time had not yet acceded to the Berne Convention for the International Protection of Copyright and I found a means to protect these rights both for Russian authors abroad and for foreign authors in Russia."

In fact, by publishing in any country adhering to the Convention the texts in the original language of authors from non-member countries, those texts automatically fell under international protection. Devising this ploy in 1902, Parvus also won a place in the history of international reading, because it was used until, a few years ago, the USSR joined the Convention. From the texts of Gor'kij, Andreev and Korolenko, published by Parvus, to the books of Zamjatin, Belyj, Doctor Zivago of Pa-sternak, Solženicyn and many others, with this system not only were the authors guaranteed the rights of their works, but these same works, which could not see the light at home, were printed in Russian and in translations, and made known all over the world.

In June of that year Parvus founded together with Marchlewski the Verlag für slawische und nordische Literatur* based in Franz-Joseph-Str. 36, and in-

* Editions of Slavic and Nordic literature.

In the summer he made a clandestine lightning trip to Russia to sign a ten-year contract with Gor'kij. The two met at the station of Sevastopol-li in the presence of Pjatnickij, a well-known figure from the left-wing Russian political literary world. Parvus had a forged passport and Gor'kij came from Koreiz - a well-known holiday resort where Stalin later lived during the meeting in Yalta -, because he was in the police confinement in Crimea. The vigilance of the Ochrana* must have been really low not to notice in a public place of one of the main ports of the Russian military fleet, today forbidden to foreigners, two types not only reported, such as the now famous singer of the bosjari and the Genosse-tovarist, ** who had already played the shot of the underground journey of three years earlier and the scandalous book on Russia, but two types also with an unmistakable appearance: one, Massimo l'Amar, with long hair up to the shoulders and the thin danged figure wrapped in the usual big black cape; the other, with his heavy build and the big head of Socrates on a bull torso. Both were almost an invitation to police curiosity and too vulnerable; but until the First World War in civil Europe people traveled without a passport and Tsarist Russia demanded it for its subjects but without photography. * So, undisturbed, they signed the agreement, which would then have a long history until the death of Parvus and

Others. *

Gorky's slums immediately had immense success in Berlin, at Max Reinhardt's famous theater, and then throughout Europe. The publishing house of Parvus therefore began brilliantly and continued with works by other well-known authors: Polish, Norwegian, Swedish, Danish and even German, such as Gerhardt Hauptmann and Frank Wedekind, as well as Oscar Wilde and the now re-evalued

Franziska zu Reventlow with the autobiographical novel Ellen Ollestjerne, published on the recommendation of Stefan George and Rainer Maria Rilke.

Parvus would later recall: "My business initially went very well, but then it slowed down, ran aground, as usually happens with new publishing initiatives, especially if the basic capital is insufficient. But, above all, the great Russian movement of 1904 and 1905 began. And I decided to go to Russia». *

Here, after the great strikes at the end of the century, peasant agitations had spread and exacerbated; strikes increased and discontent grew even in the middle classes, expanding from student and intellectual environments, to the people of the liberal professions and even to industrialists.

Many of these financed the social democrats, such as the famous Savva T. Morozov, in love with Gor'kij and patron of the Art Theater, men-

* The Tsarist political police.
** Companion (German and Russian).

Three Ivan A. Morozov was a collector of Russian porcelain. The latter, but above all the brilliant merchant Sergej Ivanovič Sčukin bought in Paris the Impressionists, the fauves up to Picasso, Gauguin, Matisse, of which Russian museums are now rich. Savva Morozov's money also went to the committees of the Leninian "Iskra", now spread around the spring of 1903 throughout Russia.

That year the government gave a great gift to the Leninist conspiracy: it retired S.V. Zubatov, the intelligent opponent of the subversive network. Zubatov had a police genius: since high school he had put himself at the service of the Ochrana, but he had understood that repression was powerless in the face of a growing movement, and thus created legal workers' organizations, which conducted economic struggles, excluding political purposes of subversion of the tsarist regime.

"Subatovism" was the most subtle response that the regime knew how to give to the revolutionary offensive, which was theorized by Lenin in the famous writing What to do? * a political brochure like so many others that came out at that time, but which did not become famous for nothing: ¿'cra inside the whole core of the "new party", of the centralized, military party, tormated only by "revolution-

Zionari by profession» aimed at the conquest of power. On the character of this party, as well as on the problems of tactics and strategy, disagreements flared up, which exploded sensationally in the summer of 1903 at the congress convened in Brussels and immediately rushed to London, because the Belgian police had discovered the organization. There came the contrast between "soft" and "tough", according to the definition invented and preferred by Lenin; there, above all, the famous split into Mensheviks and Bolsheviks that would have played so much part in the history of the Russian revolutions and the entire world socialist movement was determined. Menschevi, that is, minority, were almost all: from Potresov to Axelrod, from Zasulič to Trotsky, as soon as he arrived from Russia, from Plechanov to Martov, who became the leader of the group. Parvus was kept out, because he was considered a "German" socialist, while the Germans, despite having welcomed him into the party, kept him at bay in

How much "Russian".

Even the whole of 1903 was a year of agitation, horrendous po-groms, and terrorist acts in Russia. The strikes broke out a little everywhere, like endemic fires, but they were accentuated in Odessa, in the factories of Brodsky, Radokonaki and also Vysockij. He was accused of causing the port crisis and exploiting Jewish poverty. But Vysocky, a Jew, had also created an excellent school that gave Jewish students the right to continue their studies in any Russian institute. Discontent was spreading in society, which did not see the two main problems faced by power, the agrarian and the constitutional one. The government's new legislative measures, including the a-

The workers were given the opportunity to elect their representatives in the factory, they were still too shy." Above all, Kisinev's terrible pogrom made a huge impression, giving the whole world the image of a country where the most fierce and indiscriminate repression was unleashed. From noon to dawn, in that April, in the Russian-Romanian city of con-fine, with a large Jewish population, the murderous squads and the plebiscite raged, killing, massacring, setting fire, devastating the houses that did not display the symbols of the Christian God and the tsar in the windows. The streets were covered by the feathers of pillows and quilts, by the shreds of Jewish sacred robes, by pages of the Talmud; on the sidewalks, streams of seaped blood, bloody stones; mountains of furniture and household goods torn to pieces everywhere, devastated shops. The assallants broke into Jewish houses: they looted, killed on the spot, threw children out of the windows. On the street, they grabbed the people who were fleeing, they snatched them from the fleeing wagons. Trains of escaped Jews, semi-naked, fasting for two or three days arrived in Odessa. *

In Germany, meanwhile, the Spd had become the second party in the Reichstag by number of deputies, winning the vice-presidency by right. But the vice-president had to respect the protocol and present himself to the emperor. Even just the idea of such an act horrified the party. His boss, Bebel, was for the refusal. Bernstein, on the other hand, maintained that such an important political position should not be lost for reasons of etiquette and custom. Parvus agreed with him: "For formal reasons one does not renounce a place of prestige, which also means power and capacity for influence". Bebel reacted by delaying him to the Dresden congress of 1903" and there was once again the measure of the isolation of Parvus in the Spd. What was the place he occupied between German and Russian socialism and what his way of considering and one and the other in those years results from his own words:

«Over the course of more than a quarter of a century all my mental activity, all my thoughts and my hopes intertwined with the life of the Spd. With it I was enthusiastic and with it I lived disappointments. There were disputes and differences between us; I was right or I was wrong, I was outraged and I was angry, I criticized and I continue to criticize, but one thing I could never do: to get out of social democracy. Often, criticizing the Russian socialist intelligencija, I reproached it for missing this living link with the labor movement. As wisely as the Russian intellectuals wrote about socialism, everything resonated with bookisc wisdom; the working masses lost their life force and turned into statistical figures; socialism became the implementation of an abstract principle, for which intellectuality was ready to sacrifice the whole world, including the class

Worker. In reality, for the majority of Russian intelligence, socialism was only an instrument for the revolution.

Since the birth of the "Iskra", Parvus' attempt was to associate these two forces: the powerful mass movement of the SPD, an expression of an industrial society and a European culture, and the doctrinal elaboration of the Russian intellectual avant-gardes, from Plechanov to Lenin, from Struve to Martov.

In his opinion, the first lacked a revolutionary Marxist head, the other the body of a mass movement. The two united forces could have changed the history of Europe in the sense of revolutionary democracy. Such was his idée fixe, his obsessive thought, for the achievement of which he undertook all sorts of actions.

But already in Munich, when Lenin lived there and for the "Iskra" all the major Russians agreed, Parvus' attempt had seen a first failure: no symbiosis had been established with the German party. Lenin then left Munich, in the spring of 1902, for London, but only when he left the "Iskra" furiously, after the split congress in the summer of 1903, he began to attack Parvus. And yet he would have always done it in terms that, considering his language usually inflorated with insulting epithets towards the opponents, seemed inspired by good-natured respect: "the good Parvus", he called him in a Letter to the "Isera" of that November, mocking his attempts at conciliation between Mensheviks and Bolsheviks.

Parvus was among the first to react to the party's Leninist concept and see its consequences. In November 1903, in the article for the German press The beginning of the end? * wrote about the Posdr: "The organization is not a dead lace that is thrown over the masses, but a ferment that is injected into the masses to generate a living tissue. Those who believe... to gather in their own hand the cables and the tie rods to command the workers from a precise point, be it Petersburg or Geneva, follow the delusional idea that social democracy can govern the masses as never even Russian absolutism could govern them». In his essay in Russian In what we diverge we read: "Whoever only aspires to an organization of agitators and ignores the organization of the masses, believe that he knows how to use the workers as material for the revolution, just as they serve as cannon meat in the army...

«For Lenin, the organizational scheme he himself invented is a kind of trumpet of Jericho thanks to which, with his cheeks, he prepares to destroy with the sermon of the revolution both the towers of autocracy and the walls of capitalism... Immense and multiform is the class struggle of the workers, since their historical task is multiform and immense. They must not only break down the dominance of the capitalist class, but they must know how to put themselves in their place to pave the way for the development of a so-

Cialist... And in front of this grandiose historical process is a little man with a worried face, who, with a revolutionary wave of arms, gets busy, strives so that both socialism and revolution do not disappear."

In the essay After the war, on the eve of the peak of the revolutionary uprisings in 1905, he would have specified the reasons for the divergences: "With conspiratorial anguish, which arose on the ground of Russian intelligentsia, in the What to do? Of Lenin, unfair general conceptions are intertwined. He is an opportunist to the ro-vescia. Assuming that the labor movement is opportunistic, he wants to make it turn in a revolutionary sense... The workers did not create socialism as a political vision of the world. But they will create the social revolution...

Socialist ideas only make sense in that they are the expression of this real historical process. Lenin, on the other hand, transformed materialistic socialism into ideology. According to him, the doctrine must change the character of the political process. Hence its organizational task: the enlightened Marxists, strong of their centralization, direct the working mass into the al-veo of the social revolution."

He wrote among other things to Axelrod in that January 1904: «... I know and I have already written it many times, that the proletariat in its political struggle cannot stay outside the general life of the state, but must penetrate all its corners and ravines and fill them with the contradictions of its class interests...»."

In a letter to Potresov, at the beginning of February 1904, he also anticipated what he would have published in an article on the "Iskra" of those days, but here more explicitly: "We are facing a revolution in Russia and, according to all appearances, on the threshold of major events in the West. The pace of political development will probably accelerate. I have plans of all kinds»" If Lenin reproached the sectarian vision and the contempt of reality, he reproached the Mensheviks for their passivity: «You all seem to make the movement and instead you are only like a cook in front of the piñatta of history and you can't even skim the broth in time; now you fight among yourselves and you are ready to spill the historical soup to eat which you have been inviting all of Russia for a long time»." On March 1st, again in Potresov: «Die Ereignisse überstürzen sich». * And what does the Russian social democracy do? Quo usque tandem. *** April 15: "In Russia the Japanese cannons are flying, the split of the autocracy is underway, political parties are formed, the decisive moment of the struggle for political power is being advanced...".

* The events precipitate (red. in the Russian text).
** In Latin in the rest.

Like a seismograph, Parvus felt the deep shocks in the bowels of the-
There Russia, felt the urgency of historical times.

Deaf to the news from Russia, and which was echoed in Paris by the pro-zarist "Russian Courts", in those weeks Lenin took a walking tour of the Swiss mountains. He took a vacation of almost two months until the end of August: "We left work and worries in Geneva and here we sleep ten hours a day, take baths, walks.

Volodja* doesn't even read the newspapers... and for two weeks we'll go to the mountains with bags on our shoulders... We made a deal not to talk about anything (work is not like the bear, it does not escape into the woods), not to talk about anything and possibly not even think - so the Krupskaja in a letter of June 19 to her mother-in-law.

The war between Russia and Japan was raging, at the end of July the Minister of the Interior Pleve was assassinated by a social revolutionary, the liberals and the progressives organized themselves into leagues. But the "generals" of the social democracy exiled in Switzerland were exhausting themselves in acrimonious verbal fights. Like a worker, the Krupskaja weave for Il'ic the web of the armed party's cells in Russia. She was the Penelope of the utopia, but her canvas, instead of herself, will always be destroyed by the police and events.

More than the conspiracy, in the summer of 1904, Parvus was concerned with the possibilities of the future development of a revolution in Russia. He was already thinking "of participating in the provisional government long before January 9, 1905, the date after which this question took on prominence in the political literature". In this same period, not surprisingly, he published the essay On the general strike, "re-proposing in the face of the problems raised by the events in Russia the theses that he had been developing for more than a decade and that had become more current than ever.

In that period he had a continuous presence, even if not institutionalized, in the internal life of the Russian party. And she was also tack of personal contacts: in March he had met with Potresov in Berlin; in August he went to Geneva to see Lenin back from vacation. He went down to the Grand Hôtel Beau Rivage: "Lenin has arrived and is waiting for me at his house." The meeting pushed the two men even further away, but for Parvus this did not mean that the Plechanovs, the Potresovs, the Axelrods had to boycott Lenin as an enemy. From a certain point of view he saw them all as "Leninists": "I know Lenin's mistakes, I remember them, but he is a socialist and a revolutionary: why then is this precious force wasted unnecessarily, worse, does it go to the detriment of the party?

He is mainly to bless, but, seeing your attitude towards others, I begin to conclude that Lenin is only the most conspicuous

* Diminutive of Vladimir (Lenin).

Representative of Leninism that is in all of you... Now you also push Trotsky on the same road... You have already lost a whole year in internal fights. And it is not just a period of time, but a year of events. The split of autocratic Russia is already underway in all its corners. Just watch what happens!... The upheaval is near. The events are in-coming."

Notes

1 P. Morand, 1900, Paris 1931, pp. 84-85.

2 Parvus, Das argwirtschaftliche Elend Russlands, «Neue Zeit», 1900-901, B.1.

3 A.F. Haxthausen, Studies on the internal conditions, the people's life and in particular the rural areas of Russia, Hanover 1847-52.

4 Parvus, op. cit., p. 69 passim.

5 Ibidem, p. 113.

6 Ibidem, p. 118.

7 Ibidem, p. 119 steps.

8 Parvus, Die Finanzlage in Russia, «Neue Zcit», 1900-901, B.1.

9 Parvus, PhAK, op. cit., p. 1335.

10 Parvus, Russia and France, "Neue Zeit", 1900-901, B.2, p. 133.

11 C. Lehmann und Parvus, The Hungernde Russia, Stuttgart 1900.

12 Ivi, p. VII.

13 «La Petite République», September-October 1899.

14 Parvus, Und abermals die bayerischen Landtagswahlen, «SAZ», 21-9-1899, n. 219, Beila-ge, p. 1.

15 Parvus, DSHS, p. 23.

16 Parvus, Die Handelspolitik und die Doktrin, "Neue Zeit" 1900-901, B.1.

17 Parvus, Die landwirtscheftliche Einführzölle, «Neue Zeit», 1900-901, B.1.

18 Parvus, Die Industriezölle und der Weltmarkt, «Neue Zeit», 1900-901.

19 Ivi, pp. 715-16.

20 Ivi, pp. 783-84.

21 Parvus, IKW, pp. 8-9; Pge, p. 7.

22 L. Stern, Die Auswirkungen der ersten russischen Revolution auf Deutschland von 1905-07, Berlin (RDT) 1957, p. 40 (Munich Police Directorate to the Government of Oberba-ern, Chamber of the Interiors. Munich 30-8-1905 n. 10. The political activity of the Russian social democrats Alexander Helphand...;

23 SDD, I, p. 350, n. 20. For Lenin's answer, ivi, pp. 35-37, where, in particular, we read: "As for Parvus, I have no idea of his personal character and I do not deny his great talent. Unfortunately, I have read very little of his works...».

24 For Lenin in Siberia cf.: V. Valentinov, Maloznakomyi Lenin, pp. 38-52 (Cap. Cude-snaja ssylka); A. Tyrkova-Williams, cfr. n. 27.

25 M. Futrell, NU, p. 43; also L. Stern, op. cit., p. 40

26 The thing has been ascertained by F. Hitzer (cf. LiM, p. 206 ss.)

Some significant episodes that illustrate Lenin's character are reported in the memoir of A. Tyrkova-Williams, Na putjach k svobode, New York 1952; in particular, pp. 33, 36, 42-43, 188.

28 SDD, I, p. 76.

29 E.D. Kuskova, Credo, S. Peterburg 1899.

30 L. Shapiro, KPSS, Florence 1975, p. 74.

31 P. Molotov [Parvus], Evropejskie rabočie i ich russkij historik, «Zarja», n. 1 1901, Icip. Ilg; also in Vrgs (Nemeckoe rabočee dviženie i ego kritik, pp. 134-173).

32 P. Molotov [Parvus], Opportjunizm na pratire, «Zarja», nn. 2-3; also in Vrgs (pp 223-259), trans. of Der Opportunismus in der Praxis, «Neue Zeit», 1900-01, B.2.

33 Parvus, Handeserisis und Gewerkschaften, München 1901, p.26; also in Vrgs (Torgo-Voj krisiz i professional noe dviženie, pp. 84-133), p. 101.

34 K. Kautsky, Krisentheorien, «Neue Zeit», 1901-02, B.2, pp. 143 and 137.

35 Cfr. n. 32.

36 Parvus, op. cit. For pronouncements on Marx and Engels see in particular: OT TA, SAM, IGS, DSHS

37 Parvus, op. cit., pp. 614-15.

38 Ivi, p. 613.

39 Ivi, p. 610.

40 Binige Briefe Rasa Luxemburgs and other documents, cit., p. 26.

41 Protocol on the negotiation of the party councils of the SPD in Lübeck, Berlin 1901, p. 189.

42 "Iskra", n. 9, 1901.

43 L. Stern, op. cit., pp. 40 and ss.

44 Parvus, IKW. PPiR, P23; P84, pp. 21-22.

46 Ctr.: Parvus, IKW, Pek, PbAK; M. Gor'ki), Lenin in Works X V, Rome 1963; N. Drink-Berova, ZŽ; Gor'kij and Leonid Andreev. Neizdannaja perepiska in the series «Literaturnoe Nasledstvo», t. 62, Moskva 1965; K. Haenisch, PBE, p. 39; G. Alèxinsky, La vie amère de M. Gor-ki, Paris 1950, p. 180; H. Schumacher-F. Tych, Julian Marchlewski-Karski. Eine Biographie, Berlin (RDT) 1966, pp. 109-113.

47 See no. 44, ibid.

48 Cfr., for Lenin's text and the debate it aroused, the preface of V. Road to: V.I. Lenin, Cbe fare?. Turin 1971; A. Avtorchanov, PP. 1. Frankfurt/M. 1973.

49 A.A. Kizevetter, Na rubeže dvuch stoletij (Vospominanija 1881-1914), Prague 1929, PP 344-53.

SO "Iskra", n. 39, 1-5-1903.

51 Parvus, Nutzloser Streit in «Âus der Weltpolitik», no. 35, 31-8-1903; also Protokol. Ilber the negotiations of the party days of the SPD in Dresden, Berlin 1903, p. 311 ("But look at that Parvus (hilarity in the room) on whom until yesterday it was sworn that he was a radical... and now he has gone to be a revisionist, but here too he has a fiasco!").

52 Parvus, IKW, pp. 7-8; Pgk, pp. 6-7.

53 V.I. Lenin, OC, V, 7, Rome 1959, pp. 115-16.

54 Parvus, The beginning of the end? In «Aus der Weltpolitik», n. 48, 30-11-1903, cit. in S2, p. 68.

55 Parvus, V tem my raschodimsja, Rir (pp. 150-76), p. 169.

S6 Parvus, Pasle vojny, "Iskra", n. 111, 24-11-1905; also in Rir (pp. 182-197).

57 SDD, p. 109.

58 Ivi, p. 110.

59 Ivi, p. 112.

60 Ivi, p. 113.

62 V. Lenin, PR, pp. 114 et sex. Cir also the memories of the Kupskaja (v. Bibl.) and V. Go-Lentinov (op. cit., pp. 80 and ss.).

63 SDD, It Ther den Generalstreik, "Leipziger Volkszeitung", 23-8-1504.

6S SDD, p. 137.

66 Ivi, p. 143.

Chapter four
«The bloody dawn of future events»

1 Master of Trotsky in Munich

At the beginning of 1904, analyzing the situation in Asia, Parvus wrote: «The Russian-Japanese war is the bloody dawn of future major events. It was prepared in Europe, more than in Asia or America... it broke the weave, which already barely held up, of the political relations of the capitalist states. The political balance of the capitalist world is threatened... the English influence on Asia is paralyzed. The war, which began only for Manchuria, already calls into question the hegemony over Asia. However, it will end with a shift in political balance around the world and its first consequence will be the fall of the tsarist autocracy.

A few months later Trotsky landed in Munich and immediately found hospitality in Parvus' house, where his second wife Natal'ja Sedova joined him.

Parvus and Trotsky knew about each other, but until then they had never met. Lev Davidovic Trosky was twenty-five years old, twelve younger than Parvus. His real name was Bronstein, the son of an enterprising and wealthy farmer, who, despite all the limitations imposed on Jews in land ownership, had managed to manage his farm in Ja-novka in Ukraine so well that he almost reached wealth. At the age of seventeen his son had put himself on the road to the revolution, he had been arrested, he had learned the rudiments of Marxism by reading Labriola's writings in French in the prison library; then exiled to Siberia, like everyone else he had easily escaped with a passport packaged by himself, using the name of his jailer, Trotsky, who will remain with him all his life, He presented himself in the fall of 1902 first to Auer in Vienna, then in Switzerland in Axelrod and finally in Lenin in London. Lenin was very impressed by his intelligence and his youth and made him enter the editorial staff of the "Iskra". But, at the congress of the split of 1903, Trotsky sided with the Mensheviks, from whom he detached in April 1904 and joined Parvus in Munich.

A friendship was immediately born between the two also due to the common origins: southern Ukraine and Odessa, where, as teenagers, both had become aware of the world, although in two different decades; the affinity of political conceptions and the common interest in every aspect of life: be it the ar-

You, technology, the economy, were the fun, the show, the participation in the most diverse passions; a friendship also based on the relationship that, in a natural way, was immediately established between the disciple, prematurely matured but still uncertain, and the authoritative, political and theoretical navigator, rich in knowledge and relationships. The brand that Helphand molds on Bronstein was fiery and remained on Trotsky for life.

But one can agree with Deutscher, when he writes that "Trocky, for his part, possessed some qualities that put him from the beginning in a position to be more than just a disciple of Parvus. He was fresh from experiences about Russia and the clandestine struggle, which Parvus lacked.

He had political conceptions full of ardor, while Parvus' analysis and anti-veggen-za were the result of a daring but cold mind... Not only were Parvus' international conceptions and revolutionary predictions to become an integral part of Trotsky's thought, but one can also go back to Parvus for some of Trotsky's points of view on Russian history and, in particular, for his concept of the Russian state... The influence of Parvus is also felt in Trotsky's form and way of expressing himself, especially in the characteristic touch of his historical predictions».?

Parvus was also the mentor for the young Trotsky in the discovery of the artistic, literary, cosmopolitan world, which then had one of its greatest centers in Munich and right in the Schwabing district. It became memorable and marked a season of the arts, thought, custom and a playful conception of life, because already in itself the city in which he grew up was a center of intelligence and culture and had the reputation of being a "new Athens", as Heinrich Heine had already defined it. Although now surpassed by Vienna, it was still a capital of the "Sezession". * The "Cafte Simplicissimus" was the meeting place of the famous satirical magazine of the same name, born in 1896, in Turkenstrasse, in the heart of Schwabing.

Then the editor-in-chief was Serge Schewitsch, a Germanized Russian. Journalists, but even more cartoonists, later became famous. They were, among others, George Grosz, the Trieste Dudovich, Kathe Kollwitz, Alfred Kubin, Jules Pascin. The latter was actually called Pinkas, he was a Sephardic Jew, and he came from Bulgaria. He was already an expert in the legendary brothels of the Balkans, whose wonderful and lascivious women were the highlight of his great painting, made of soft and soft colors, ochre yellows with a bit of celestial. In 1930 the gaudente, the drinker Pascin will hang himself in Paris in his studio at the peak of success, when his paintings were worth millions.

He will hang himself for a disappointed love the erotomaniac who in painting had fabulously exposed that sex that then first bent down to stu-

* Secession, the avant-garde artistic movement.

Think about Kraftt-Ebin and Herr Professor Sigmund Freud. But, in his works, as in those of Klimt, of Schiele, even today exults that life of the senses that in the pages of the learned dries up like a dead leaf.
It was the era of the exploration of unknown lands in art, sex, custom, politics; and the avant-garde men of all these camps met in Munich in the same cafes, in the same newspapers, mixed, they were often friends. Kandinskij had his art school in Akade-mienstrasse and then lived with Paul Klee in Armillerstrasse. There were famous artistic currents such as "Die Brücke" and "Blaue Reiter". * The pessimist augurs of the "sunset of the West",** Oswald Spengler, from his Agnes-strasse had to take a few steps to come across Isabellastrasse in the genius of the operetta Franz Joseph Strauss. Frank Wedekind met on the ground of the decadent avant-garde with the Germanized Polish Stanislaw Przyby-szewski, who exalted the "dance of love and death"*** and "the naked soul". Andrej Belyj, one of the renovators of the Russian novel, was also a "Monacense". The young people of the time were with him: Erich Kastner, the poet Thomas Heine, Shälöm Ash, in the future famous Viddish writer. There was also for three months the cubist and surrealist poet Guillaume Apollinaire who, struck by an exhibition of empty coffins, will write the first verses of Alcools. Rainer Maria Rilke also passed by. Stefan George, the most famous German lyricist of the early twentieth century, dressed as Cesare Imperatore, surrounded by baccant menadi, danced like a drunken faun at the Brauerei «Helenen in jedem Weibe»**** during the so-called "meat festivals»; he was unleashed in the «Fest der Enormen und Erotiker»,***** which always ended in an orgy. Inexhaustive, with an aristocratic face and a diaphanous nose, he then dragged himself to his "Pension Fürmann", where the groups could freely mix and consume themselves to the limit of their senses.

This was the atmosphere of Munich and its Schwabing rion, which also swallowed Parvus and Trotsky in its own whirlwind. They could move and communicate with ease in that assembly of people eager to break rules and traditions, which came largely from the east. The Slavic languages and German were of common domain; cosmopolitanism, a good given by circumstances, but also conquered, was proudly defended against the prejudice of bourgeois homelands.
Even in that year, 1904, Parvus' activity was intense, at times hectic. In addition to the articles he wrote for the Russian and German press and for

* "The bridge" and "The blue knight".
** Italian title of his famous book.
*** Title of one of the dramas of S. Przybyszewski.
**** Brewery «An Elena in every female».
***** Party of the huge and the erotic.

His periodical "Aus der Weltpolitik", made active politics in SPD circles and among Russian students and emigrants in Munich and elsewhere. He had also launched a campaign against the collaboration that the Prussian police gave to the Tsarist police in the persecution of political emigrants. One of his articles entitled The Russian Revolution and the Prussian Police had made a lot of noise in the political spheres.

These works hindered commercial activities that allowed him to make ends meet better than the miserable proceeds of collaborations with newspapers and especially with the semi-country "Iskra". The publishing house committed him a lot but his performance was occasional. «Business and commercial concerns of all kinds have spilled on me — he wrote to Potresov — I lack capital, I would need another three thousand marks and I don't know where to find them. I had to go to Berlin again. Until next fall, when theater money starts to flow again, it will be very hard for me. And, because of that, a lot of worries». Parvus had not lived for a long time as an emigrant without half, despite always being a Russian who had escaped, but his nature led him to live with breadth without having the basics. How much he earned, he spent: in everything, from books to family, to entertainment and travel. The family weighed on him and not only economically, because relations with his wife had become difficult. In that same letter to Potresov there is a hint:

«At the same time, given my relationships with... [Tanja], I have to take stock of my personal life». Tanja had taken refuge with her child in Switzerland with a friendly family. Even the ailments got in the way:

«I caught a lousy flu, with coughing, sneezing, and other pleasantness like that. I had to quit the job». *

And instead he felt that he had entered "a period of concentration of general ideas, when one wants to isolate oneself from everything surrounding... to open up broad perspectives to the gaze of the mind. I want to embrace once again with my eyes the historical process in its great currents and define its next political combinations... The mental clarity necessary for all this has been established in me and I feel an influx of fresh ideas, but I have no peace, I have no free time, a mass of meanness and unpleasantness clutters me and distracts my mind... The situation is such that every day my presence in the office is essential... I look forward to Saturday every week, when I shake off the dust, and of the city and everyday life, and I go to the mountains: alone!»? He gave up going to the Leipzig fair to establish personal contacts with publishers and booksellers: "Prefer-SCO - he wrote to Potresov - think, dream, read, write." And, in mid-August: «With the disappearance of the summer heat, my lethargy has also disappeared. Thanks to this I have given a new boost to commercial enterprises and I

I am eager to finish my Russian articles. Now, unfortunately, I have a lot of chores, because Mu* went to Amsterdam. If I have not finished the articles for his return, I will plant the publishing house for a couple of weeks and come to you, not in Geneva, but on the nearby mountains. There I will conclude my cycle of articles and see what else can be undertaken in favor of the Russian Kladderatsch**»?

Despite economic and marital difficulties, he was in one of his best periods. He was finishing the last two essays of the series on war and revolution, which would appear in the "Iskra" at the end of the year.

The friendship with Trotsky became more and more a political partnership: he too joined the positions of Parvus for a conciliation between Mensheviks and Bolsheviks. Trocky had difficult relations with the "Iskra" group, especially because of Plechanov's hostility towards him, and Parvus worked to help him. He wrote in early October to Potresov: "Trocky's change of opinion occurred before my eyes. He threw away by himself the eggshells of sectarian dogmatism that tends to isolate a principle, fearing the influences harmful to it, and has passed to political materialism, which sees in social-revolutionary principles a unifying and leading force. If you could have an influence on him, you can be sure that it would be in this sense. Of course, he is not exempt from the sins of youth, which gives the world from the day of its birth, and, being in the development phase, lives under the impression that humanity lags behind it... That Trotsky is an intriguer is an inflated nonsense... Ah, if in Germany, instead of the Schippel, there were Trotskys, how much boiling life there would be! Youthful fervor, that's what we need most now!» *

The distrust of the Mensheviks towards Trotsky was also due to the fact that he, in the project of the popular newspaper that the party intended to release, had insisted that the editorial staff should not depend on the "Iskra". Fearing to lose ideological control, the Mensheviks did not allow it despite the repeated efforts of Parvus to convince them: "You feel like a kind of guardians of orthodoxy, that in every little fish that comes to the surface from the ideological abysses of the socialist movement see a pike ready to devour them. Look at the river in flood! What does not drag with it: debris, dirt, clods of earth, but the ice breaks and dozens of different streams run on its surface; and you are sedured on the shore and want to remove the foam and clean the turbid with a soup spoon!»." The newspaper then came out with the headline "Social-democrat", but under the control of F.I. Dan.

* That's how J was signed. Marchlewski on the redasca press.

** Paratrac and confusion (German). She was also the headline of a satirical magazine of those years in Berlin.

In the autumn Trotsky from Munich moved to Vienna, but in those few months he had received from Parvus and elaborated together with him some ideas that would be the foundation of his theories. First of all: the original conception of the Russian state as a symbiosis of Asian despotism and Curopean absolutism; the international vision of the economic and political development of capitalism; the problem of the revolution in a backward country, in contrast to the postulates of Orthodox Marxism, and the thesis that nation states no longer had a decisive role in the game of world economic interests; finally, the revolutionary possibilities inherent in the mass political clash. He had also understood that economic-political analysis, the continuous and flexible link between everyday politics and revolutionary ends

They were absolutely indispensable.

The influence of Parvus on Trotsky was decisive, as Trotsky himself partly recognized: "Parvus was undoubtedly a prominent Marxist figure at the end of the last century and at the beginning of the current one. He freely dominated Marx's method, had breadth of views, followed all the essentials on the world arena, which, given the strong audarity of his thought and the muscular and virile style, made him a truly distinguished writer. His old works compared me to the problems of the social revolution, definitively transforming for me the conquest of power by the proletariat: from a "final" purpose, even astronomical, into a practical task of our times." But not even the intelligent and sensitive Trotsky followed Par-vus in his rejection of socialism as a monastic order, which obliged party militants and organizations to make a vow of poverty and chastity. And in fact he would then write: "This revolutionary was obsessed with a completely unpredictable dream: to get rich. And in those years he also linked this dream with his social-revolutionary conception: "The party apparatus is ossified - he complained - it is difficult to even get into Bebel's head. We, Marxist revolutionaries, need a great newspaper that comes out simultaneously in the three European languages". So the thoughts of the social revolution and the thoughts of wealth were intertwined in that heavy fleshy bulldog head».

Then the two still operated together and on the same line. Trotsky "in the-

In the autumn of 1904, during the liberal campaign of banquets,* soon bogged down in a dead end, the question was asked: "And then?" — to which she replied:
- "Only the general strike and therefore the insurrection of the proletariat that puts itself at the head of the popular masses can open a way out".

The mass political strike, as we have seen, has been the ace for years in the

* Since rallies were prohibited, the liberals indicated banquets during which political speeches were made.

Parvus' sleeve, who had been the first and most fierce assertor." The situation in Russia was now precipitating: the Japanese had occupied Korea and neutralized the Russian fortress of Port Arthur, which would fall at the end of the year. The Russians were also beaten on land, in Harbin. The situation that Parvus had described in the articles on war and revolution was determined in the country: the government could not grant reforms from above without having to fear that the regime itself would be put in danger from below. And the day of Bloody Sunday came, January 18 (22), which went down in history as the symbolic date of the Russian revolution of 1905

The revolution began with a crowd movement led by an Orthodox priest, Pope Gapon. No one imagined it, least of all Lenin, who would later say: "Two months before January 1905 and on the eve of February 1917 no revolutionary, whatever his experience and knowledge, no one who knew popular life could have predicted that such a case would explode Russia." And instead the first Russian revolution was foreseen by two men: Parvus, as evidenced by his articles and letters; and Zubatov, the former leader of the Ochrana, who in a confidential report had assumed that Russia could emerge defeated from the war against Japan, which would have triggered "mass revolutionary actions". A year before the revolution of 1905 he outlined in that special report such a picture of the future with such a logical approach, that that report was for Minister Durnovo first the basis of a preparatory work and then of all the measures to repress the revolution.

But was Pope Gapon a leader or a simple agent of the workers' organizations created by Zubatov? Parvus then wrote first: "The e-roe and the crowd: here is the formula of January 9." And Trotsky: «Gapon was one of the most brilliant surprises of the revolution..» *. Of the same opinion was Lenin, who in turn commented: "We hope that Gapon, who has lived and felt so deeply the passage from a politically unconscious popular conception to revolutionary conceptions, will succeed in completing his work.." He was very interested in his personality, meeting him personally in exile in Switzerland and seeing in him a typical character expressed by the Russian people." And Lenin was right in this: the personality of Gapon, like that of Nečaev, of Rasputin, of Azev, of Savinkov, of himself, is dichotomized, ambiguous, multifaceted, marked like the others by a tragic fate, and could be in the gallery of characters of Dostoevsky and among the jurodivye, the crazy Russians in Christ, mystics and eversors of everyday life. Parvus wrote again: "He led the masses towards the tsar, but went against the tsar; he led the masses to a peaceful demonstration, but went towards the revolution. He had behind him

An organization of seven thousand workers. No doubt he was closer to the masses than we were."

And what did Parvus deduce from it? In that same writing Results and prospects, published by the "Iskra" a few days after Bloody Sunday, he lucidly analyzed the situation: "in the field of Russia's political conditions, every great strike inevitably takes on a political character"; "there was an eroc, but not a political leader: an action program, not an organization"; "it was a spontaneous movement yet it had a clear proletarian character"; "the program exposed by the Petersburg workers, despite all its eclecticism, is extraordinarily characteristic: it is not at all a program of bourgeois liberalism, it is a program of workers' democracy". From all this it was derived: "The insurrection must reach its highest tension throughout the country"; "we must organize the revolution". And again: "In the revolutionary moment that Russia is experiencing, we must throw to sea both the dispute and the

Disputes». *

The Mensheviks of the "Iskra" immediately specified that they did not agree, trying to reduce everything to a diatribe of formulas. Thus, the lucid Martov wrote: "While comrade Trotsky says: except us, no one; and comrade Parvus proclaims "provisional social democratic government", the newspaper "Vpered" declares: "Dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasants". The "Vpered" was the organ that Lenin had begun to publish in those days thanks to the funding received above all from Gorky and the rich A. Eramazov. * Even Lenin nibble on the pieces of Parvus that suited him: "Organize and organize, says Parvus insistently, as if suddenly he had become Bolshevik." But we saw that Parvus had started fighting for the organization at least ten years earlier.

2 The "permanent revolution"

None of the party leaders: Lenin, Plechanov, Martov, Axelrod, Potresov, thought it was appropriate to take to the place, to Petersburg. Trotsky was the only one to face the journey right away. He found himself in Vienna in the middle of a "river of emigrants that flowed back to Russia. Viktor Adler was completely swallowed up by the matter: he provided emigrants with money, passports, contact details... In his house a barber transformed my face that was already quite well known to the Russian border police. ". * He will go to Kiev and then to Petersburg, where he will have to repair in Finland after his wife's arrest. Before leaving he had stopped in Munich at Parvus, and during this-

This meeting the famous brochure Before January 9 was born, which has gone down in history as the basic text of the theory of "permanent revolution".

«With my wife, who in the fall of 1904 had returned abroad, - says Trotsky, - we headed to Munich. Parvus is staying at his house. Here he read my manuscript dedicated to the events before January 9, which put him in a state of euphoria: "The events have fully confirmed this prognosis," he said. Now no one can deny that the general strike is the fundamental method of struggle. January 9 is the first political strike even if covered by a priest's casca. It is only necessary to add that the revolution in Russia can bring a democratic working-class government to power." In this sense, Parvus wrote the preface to my brochure». * The brochure in fact only reiterated what Par-

Vus had already written in his previous articles.

In Parvus' preface, entitled What gives us 9 January" the most cited even today, and almost the only one to be, of his important writings, in only twelve pages full of new theses, was instead outlined the entire political program of the first Russian revolution. First of all, for the first time the question of the seizure of power by the proletariat was raised. This made a huge impression inside the party and outside; it especially raised alarm among the Bolsheviks, who in this vindication of power almost saw the betrayal of their own secret with jealously guarded intent.

"January 9 opens a new era in the historical destinies of Russia," wrote Parvus. Russia has entered a revolutionary period of its development... the concept of a provisional revolutionary government and a democratic republic, which until now appeared utopian, acquire a character of political reality». He then explained the historical reasons for the weakness of the bourgeoisie in Russia. In Western Europe, cities had developed thanks to the middle classes of crafts, who had made them centers of activity and trade, and centuries of this history had created an active, conscious and often radical civilization and bourgeoisie. On the contrary, in Russia, where, due to the centralization of the state, "the cities have developed more according to the Chinese model than according to the Curope model", that is, as "administrative centers" of the central power and as "trade bazaars for the surrounding owners and peasants". Only in relatively recent times had capitalism in Russia created its own modern bourgeoisie, but it was still too small and isolated.

These positions of Parvus were linked to the thesis of the semi-Asian character of the Russian state, exposed in the previous essays, which had also put to good use the teaching of the famous historian and liberal politician P.

Miljukov. But he gave a new interpretation and distinguished between indurious, technical, entrepreneurial bourgeois and bureaucratic, parasitic, poly-

Tically inert, with all the political implications that followed.
On the other hand, "the peasants will be dragged into the movement in ever larger masses. However, they are only capable of increasing the country's anarchy and thereby weakening the government, but they cannot form a compact revolutionary army. Consequently: "It is only the proletariat that can carry out the revolutionary upheaval in Russia". And he concluded: "The provisional government in Russia will be a government of working-working democracy, A provisional social democratic government in Russia cannot carry out a socialist upheaval".

If with this statement Parvus showed that he shared the opinion of the Mensheviks and of Lenin himself: that in Russia a bourgeois revolution was on the agenda and not a socialist revolution, he nevertheless emphasized the possibilities that opened up for a long revolutionary development.

The moment of the bourgeois revolution thus remained for him susceptible to a radicalization or rather a progression, which included at least a democratic constitution, civil rights, parliament, the guarantee of the eight-hour working day, freedom of association, social rights, or a social democracy. Here were inherent those concepts of workers' democracy and the opening of the revolution to further developments, which are the basis of the "permanent revolution". But this Preface, which is often cited and judged in isolation, was only a chapter, albeit important, of his theory. The other chapters, in which the specificity of the Russian state is clear, the world capitalist development is seen in its entirety and taken into consideration for the revolutionary effects it can have on backward Russia, and therefore the placement of the revolutionary perspective in an international context, had, as you can see, already been written by him previously.

From this conception of Parvus was born that theory, called the "permanent revolution", because, through a "historical process", it presupposed the transition from "bourgeois democracy" to "working democracy" and "socialism". Parvus had conceived it for Russia at that given historical moment. Since, according to Marxism, revolution can only take place in developed countries, Parvus had always focused on the need to develop a conception that would justify and promote the revolution even in a backward country. Subsequently, the concept of "permanent" included two meanings: in addition to process in time, also process in space: that is, the revolution that extends from one country to another, is internationalized. Parvus' design was anticipatory because, from the Russian one of 1905 until those after the Second World War, all the revolutions took place in backward countries, even more backward than Russia at the time.

The seeds he selected were therefore among the most vital and dangerous-

If, but he distanced himself from 1907 and ten years later he was out of the communist hor-to, just when Lenin gave this name to his party. Now he trembled in Munich for the revolution, while Trotsky was traveling to Russia with a fake passport in the name of second lieutenant Arbuzov, while Pope Gapon was traveling the opposite road to Switzerland and declaring himself a social democrat. On February 17, Grand Duke Sergej Aleksandrovic, governor of Mo-sca, was killed in broad daylight in the Kremlin. Faced with this umpteenth terrorist action, in Munich Parvus had a regurgitation of Jacobine exaltation: "The social revolutionaries have worked well again. Well done! They are the first line shooters of the revolution.

They are asked for nothing but personal courage, while our task is to transform the crowd into a revolutionary army."

Of his long important essay After the War" a part had already appeared on the "Iskra", the second would have appeared in the last issue. With the Mensheviks, especially with Axelrod, Potresov and Martov, he had friendly and polemical relations together, but factual. He had to insist a lot so that they wouldn't delay the printing of the articles and flyers. «I'm waiting for the immediate sending of the drafts, the proclamations, the preface to Trotsky's brochure.. But you have strange customs and traditions!» * - wrote on February 15 to Axelrod and Martov. He insisted on writing flyers that soldiers could easily hide in their pockets and pass from hand to hand without showing it..." The most famous of these leaflets were La sanguinosa tavolata and Senza zar, ma governo operaio." The latter disdained Luxemburg, which did not allow a single person to address the people, because only the party could do so." But there were also controversies with Lenin and Martov about it.

Parvus pressed incessantly on the Mensheviks, treating them almost like schoolchildren. He wrote to Axelrod: "One of the last editorials of the Iskra" denies a priori the possibility of organizing the revolution and, quite consequently, reaches the adoration of spontaneity... Crowds of workers push towards the revolution and in front of them are the liberal leaders, the anarchists, the adventurers, anyone but not...». And he added: "You fear that the proletariat will be faced with tasks that it cannot carry out and quote Engels. I object, that in this case you schematically transport individual his judgments and his historical criticism of Russia instead of applying to the analysis of Russian political development the historical method elaborated by him and Marx... The essence lies in reaching in every historical moment the greatest possible political changes in the presence of given political forces, and this in the direction of the social revolution... You solve too simply complex political issues. Isn't a social revolution possible here? Ergo, it will be bourgeois. But even the bourgeois revolution has its di-



Versed. It proceeds through countless nuances from capitalist liberalism to workers' democracy». *

This prominent part, which Parvus also supported with practical instructions, also echoed in Russia during the revolution. The Bolshevik newspaper "Vpered" of March 29 reported that a "parvusist" group had formed in Petersburg, which was trying to implement a consequential policy. The two most prominent exponents were David

Rjazanov and Ermanskij-Rudenko."

His activity had long been in the crosshairs of the Bavarian police who, in the aforementioned report of August 30, 1905, reported on his "close contacts with Russian students here and especially with the Russian and Polish student unions... In all these Helphand environments, like the nicknamed

Marchlewski, enjoys esteem and influence. In the hands of the police headquarters has recently received a song by Helphand written in the Hebrew dialect* and composed of Hebrew and Polish-Jewish words, which incites the workers to fight against the landowners... This song too, like other revolutionary Russian songs, is polygraphed for Russian-Polish student unions... In addition to students, Helphand is also in constant contact with local social democracy. The "Münchener Post", despite the explicit differences from him, gladly accepts his articles... Helphand uses his relations with Russian student circles on the one hand and with social democracy on the other to enlist supporters for the revolutionary movement in Russia... A consequential propaganda like that of Hel-phand undoubtedly determines the danger that not only the local Spd, but also the anarcho-socialist movement, again resumed with a certain success, reach a close union and a gradual interpenetration with foreign social-revolutionary elements, and also give place, especially in local workers' holidays, to an undesirable change in their nature, which has so far been peaceful».

The report concluded with the following more personal news about Dr.

Helphand-Parvus: «The press of the "Welpolitik Korrespondenz" for financial reasons has ceased since the beginning of this year: difficulties in payments have given rise in the current year to calls for auctions and foreclosures; this has forced the appointed Helphand to change house.

On the other hand, not infrequently, especially after returning from trips abroad (Switzerland, France), he was able to immediately dispose of large means.

Parvus had been in Switzerland and Paris in May precisely in order to find means to remedy the situation of the publishing house and the magazine. In

* He means the jiddish, which even its speakers called žargon (jargon).

A letter from Marchlewski to Luxemburg reads: "Helphand is gone. He is in Paris, where he does chores of his interest. I don't have any money, because the company's cash register* is empty... I hope Helphand will return in a few days. If you can believe his optimism, things are going well in Paris, which would mean that I will soon be free from this jail." On the first of June Parvus was in Berlin. So says Luxemburg: "Today Parvus arrived for a day. It looks horrible, you can see that business is going bad, although it doesn't say anything. He's in such a mood and speaks in such a strange way that it depresses me to be with him and I really can't find the right tone».

Was he an "optimist" as Marchlewski said, or was he a desire for optimism in a nature driven by anxiety, driven to run to save himself from the tragedy, from the abyss, which always made him flash in the unconscious and run with shivers through his body the ancestral memory and the memory aware of what he had seen around him since he was a child in the miserable Jewish gatherings of Ukraine, in the pogroms, in the angrifrats of the port of Odessa? Didn't the lust for revolution and wealth have this same origin of revenge, of conquest?

At that meeting he discussed with Luxemburg the problem of war which, as he had written about the Russian-Japanese conflict, threatened to become a current and worldwide problem. He had already addressed the war-revolution issue in the article Our agitation against war," stating that the proletariat had to respond to war with revolution: an anticipation of the debate on peace and war that in the SPD would drag on until the outbreak of the world war. Par-vus developed his theses in another article, The Danger of War," written shortly before leaving for Russia.

In that summer and early autumn of 1905 he had fixed the thought of going to Russia, in the vortex of events. He was held in Munich by the economic difficulties to be settled before the creditors obtained further judicial summons. He was held back by the need to somehow smooth out relations with his wife, who threatened to take legal action after he had gotten together with another companion, Ekaterina Groman, already the wife of the well-known Menshevik economist. Meanwhile, a new wasp of disputes had broken out in the Russian social democracy, with shaken in the German one, when the tsar, under the pressure of the uprisings, the defeat of Tsushima, the mutiny of the "Potemkin" and the growth and organization of democratic public opinion, in August had finally agreed to establish a limited parliament, the Imperial Duma.

Lenin and the Bolsheviks were for the boycott; the Mensheviks too, but

* The "commy" is the publishing house.

Then they changed their minds. Parvus was immediately for participation, and in the article "The Social Democracy and the State Duma" he wrote that one should not limit oneself to curling one's nose, but eating the arm of those who offered his hand: that is, transforming the pseudo-parliament into a real democratic parliament. It was a bit of a repetition of the old controversies that arose at the time of the Prussian and Bavarian elections, and this time too Luxemburg rose up indignantly, writing to F.I. Dan that Parvus' mistake had the aggravating circumstance of being made in a revolutionary era. * Parvus and Luxemburg were friends, but they had diametrically opposed conceptions of life, the world and politics.

For flexibility and unscrupulousness, Parvus was if anything closer to Lenin, even if the controversy between the two that year had worsened and on both sides heated words were used, one on the "Vpered", the other on the "Iskra". Par-vus would then have thus evoked that climate of tension: "The last issues of the "Iskra" ended with my essays, in which I tried to demonstrate that the intelligence had completed its function in the workers' movement in Russia and that, while it had taught Russian workers to think politically and to organize themselves, it had also exhausted its mission; the mass workers' movement, which had opened its way in Russia, from now on had to develop autonomously and get rid of the protection

Of the intelligence»."

In his last article Parvus vented against Lenin and also against the Mensheviks: "Nowhere have they studied Marxism with so much zeal, and philosophical, and historical, and economic, as in the environment of Russian social democracy. And they write extraordinarily well about Marxism. Only that they apply it in their own way. He lacks the experience of a mass workers' movement. I'm like a ship captain who has studied navigation beautifully, but has never been at sea, or like a technician who has never gone beyond laboratory experiments... They have transformed the ideas of revolutionary Marxism into a kind of orthodox fly shaters with which they hit each other on the cheeks. The accusation of opportunism plays the role of the rubber ball that acrobats throw at each other with their foreheads». *

3 In the Petersburg of 1905

In Russia the events were pressing. The countryside was in agitation and the watchword launched by the social-revolutionaries: "The whole land to the con-

Tadini!» It unleashed entire villages, districts, regions. The master estates ve-

Nivano invaded and looted, the horses seized, the owners escorted to the train stations to leave. In many places the police withdrew helplessly and the peasants created their own administrations. The same thing happened in Poland. Large strikes and protest demonstrations took place continuously in the south of Russia, especially in Kiev and Odessa.

In those days Parvus could no longer resist. He didn't even have the money for the train ticket to Petersburg, but he threw himself into disarray.

He would have liked to fix the matter of the publishing house first to get out of it honorably, but Gor'kij had also popped up, who all of a sudden had put the issue of copyright in the streets, involving the major parties in his requests for money to Parvus: German, Russian, Polish. He had chosen a good time! Historical events took place in Russia, the first soviet was born in Petersburg; while he had married the famous, fascinating actress Andreeva, a rich widow of the industrialist

Savva Morozov committed suicide a few months earlier in Nice, which brought him a dowry of one hundred thousand rubles. Parvus was close to bankruptcy.

Around mid-October he unexpectedly appeared in Leipzig, in the editorial office of the "Leipziger Volkszeitung", the newspaper that had seen him as a young editor and to which he had continued to collaborate. He could not have set foot in that city, having been expelled from Saxony since 1898, but he had often returned there as he went to Berlin anyway. He asked and got an advance for a book that he would write about his "adventures". * Continue to Berlin, from where Luxemburg pointed it out in a letter to Jogiches: «Parvus is here with me... he plans to go to the North Pole,* as before, but, poor guy, he is in trouble because of Gor'kij, who strangles him.
Of course it bothers me a little, but I want to mock him affectionately, as always. Except us, however he has no one and in essence he is a good man and made of the best material." Parvus left from Berlin, but the journey was much longer than expected. After a stop in Katowice, continuing proved to be very difficult due to the great railway strike that had been paralyzing the Empire for several days, making it impossible for those coming from Europe to reach Petersburg if not by sea.

In those exhausting waits in the stations and in the casual overnight stays in provincial hotels he often heard what his grandparents called the "dialect", the Jiddish speech. He wondered what was happening. The railway strike was part of a general political strike, and this would result in a revolution? And what was Trotsky doing? The latest news from Russia reported the arrest of the members of the Union of Unions, the body that gathered intellectuals, professionals and arti-

* "Russia" in conspiratorial language.

Giani of liberal-radical orientation. He knew that Zasulic and Potresov were also about to leave, that Axelrod hesitated having his wife very sick, that Plechanov had no intention of it. And Lenin? In Berlin, Kautsky and Luxemburg knew nothing about it, so Jogiches in Ka-

Towice: he still had to be in Geneva.

He thought back to his last writings, where he argued that war could be exploited to bring down the tsar and a mutiny of the Black Sea fleet had to be provoked; he remembered the recent discussions in social democracy. A few months ago Martov, Luxemburg, Kautsky had started using the expression Revolution in Permanenz," coined by Marx in '48 for the Paris Commune. He and Trotsky had abstained, although it was the term that best suited their theses; they had not even been so explicit in formulating the idea of the upheaval in the West. He, Parvus, had been meditating on all this for years: according to the thread of Marxist reasoning, everything led to this, yet it seemed to him that the economic and poly-ric reality of capitalist Europe did not allow such hypotheses to be formulated so easily, which could create illusions. The discussions he had had with Trotsky on the subject had been many and heated; in his youthful enthusiasm Trotsky pressed to formulate this drawing explicitly, but not even he had later decided to put it in black and white.

On the other hand, it was useless to discuss revolution, permanent or not, if a party was missing. This was his thesis, as he had set out in the second part of the article After the war," which the editorial staff of the "Iskra" had then decided to publish in the supplement of the last issue of the newspaper, 112. "There is no longer a social democracy. In his place, the two groups, who devour each other, the "Bolsheviks" and the "Mensheviks". They are prisoners, "as Bernstein has already, of a fatalistic conception of historical development... If class relations determined in a simple and direct way the historical course of events, we would not need to break our heads: it would only remain to calculate the moment of the social revolution as astronomers calculate the moment of the passage of a planet, and then be comfortable to watch it».

It's quick - he thought - to say class struggle, class force, parrotingly repeating Marxist formulas. You have to look at life. There are men, there are subjective factors. And then, "over the entire course of the class struggle, state power plays a huge role. With the help of state power, a social class can extend its dominion even in spite of economic conditions... The same tsarist autocracy has been up for decades in spite of the economic and political development of the country.

«In Russia, unless there is a social revolution in Western Europe, socialism is currently not feasible»: everyone said about this

Agree, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. «But what will be the form of domination of capitalism, what will be the strength of its state power, what the parliament, how democratic will be the development of our homeland, what role will the proletariat play in this process, - all this depends to a considerable extent on the victory of the revolution, on the course of the revolution, on the revolutionary energy of the Russian workers, on the political determination of social democracy and on whether it will succeed, even temporarily, in using political power in the interests of the working masses». Thus, it seemed to Par-vus, the problem had to be posed to open an alternative to the paralyzing dilemma: bourgeois revolution or socialist revolution. There was an intermediate perspective, the one he had long proposed: workers' democracy.

These were the thoughts with which he arrived in Petersburg at the end of October. He had been thinking about it for months, he had exposed them publicly in his articles for over a year; and privately, in letters and interviews with all the leaders of the party. Now he was preparing to face the events in person.

In those autumn days, Russia was on the threshold of chaos. The communication routes were paralyzed, the aqueducts did not work, the shops were closing, even the pharmacies, the strikes were spreading to ever new categories, there was a lack of meat, there was a lack of milk, there was a lack of food products in the shops; in Moscow and in many other cities there were clashes between groups of strikers and a crowd exasperated by the deprivation caused by strikes. A spontaneous civil war was looming between gangs and conflicting masses in the streets of the cities as well as in the provinces and in the countryside. At night the cities were deserted, like shadows sneaking around the corners and in the halls the conspirators, you could hear explosions, isolated shots. Petersburg without electricity on the dark days of October was ghostly, as Andrej Belyj described it in his novels Petersburg and The Dove of Argento." «Menacing and quiet days have arrived, — the tsar wrote to his mother

- exactly quiet, because in the streets there is an absolute order and yet everyone knows that something is being prepared». *

On October 14 (27), the soviet appeared on the political scene, made up of elected workers in the factories and delegates of the revolutionary parties. The adventurous lawyer Chrustalev Nosar', already active in the liberal movement, immediately took the lead. Trotsky, who arrived in Petersburg in those days, after being sheltered for a few weeks in Finland, immediately made the soviet his tribune. A few days later Parvus arrived. On October 17 (30), the Tsar's Manifesto granting democratic freedoms under a constitutional regime was announced as a bolt from the blue. The Tsar had signed it at five in the morning under pressure from Minister Vitte, who had recently returned as a triumphant from the United States, where he had signed peace with Japan, and Prince Nikolaj Nikolaevič, who threatened with the revolver in his fist in

Otherwise to kill yourself. In his diary the tsar noted: "After such a day I had a heavy and confused head. Lord, help us, tame Russia!»." The tsar had finally given in to the Vittian program of reforms, which ended with the words: "The course of the historical process is unstoppable... There is no choice: either to put yourself at the head of the movement that drags the country or abandon it to the elementary forces that tear it up». * The Manifesto partially displaced the political parties, which however only believed in it up to a certain point, continuing their action. So did the liberal or "cadet" party,* of recent constitution, which despite having reforming positions and heading the Zemstvo Union, had already advanced demands not very dissimilar to those of the revolutionary parties: a "democratic republic" as a product of the "armed insurrection" and the establishment of a "provisional government". At the same time the revolutionary wave was reaching that peak beyond which it would break. In Poland, after the Warsaw demonstrations, martial law was in force; the Kron-stadt naval base had mutined; other mutinies broke out in Odessa, in Se-bastopoli, in Vladivostok: As Vitte later wrote in his memoirs: "The im-

Canteen majority of Russia was like an outlet of sense». *

On November 1, the soviet declared the end of the strikes, but extremed its claims: abolition of autocracy, constituent assembly, republic. He thus became the spearhead of the revolution along the lines of the program outlined by Parvus and Trotsky. They were the so-called "days of freedom", strange days in which the country was at the mercy of itself: Vitte did not find any political support, not even in the cadets Struve and Miljukov (who will later be accused of having destroyed the prospects of a liberal development of Russian history); the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks were devoid of their political minds, which arrived late, after the amnesty granted by the manifesto. But even when Martov and Lenin were present, the head of the movement remained the soviet, led by Parvus and Trotsky. Lenin went there, almost incognito, and judged it negatively as a "workers' parliament".

It took a "combative party organization," he said and remained completely out of events, moving from one accommodation to another in the capital in endless meetings. The Bolsheviks were against the Soviet as an extra-party organization.
On the soviet looked, instead, to all those who wanted the revolution and needed guidance: in the first place the workers, even the Bolsheviks. It was that center of orientation and action that the parties did not know how to be. Not only delegations and groups flocked there for

* Called "cadet" by the Russian pronunciation of the initials (K.D.) of its designation (Costi-

Democratic rutional).

Have directives, but also an anonymous crowd that listened to new words. And Trotsky, with his exceptional skills as a tribune and leader, was the most visible figure. Parvus worked in the shadows, writing essays and articles for the "Načalo", the Menshevik newspaper that had replaced the "Iskra", to which he and Trotsky collaborated freely but decisively. And it was precisely to Parvus that he was entrusted with the task of writing the programmatic editorial of the first issue, released on November 13 (26) with the title Our homework."

Here he re-presented in a concise way his analysis of Russian society, characterized, due to the delay of the bourgeois revolution, by an extreme confusion of class relations, re-proposing his conception of "working-class democracy": "In Russia we cannot yet place as our task the transformation of the bourgeois into a social revolution. But even less, we need to submit to the bourgeois revolution... Our task is to expand the limits of the bourgeois revolution, pushing forward within it the interests of the proletariat and creating in the same bourgeois constitution the widest possible basis for the social-rivo-lutionary upheaval... The revolution did not begin by our decree and we are not the ones who can decree its end... The revolution is a historical process...

Consequently, we are not dealing with a moment, but with a prolonged development... we must merge the old conspiracy organization with the new, mass organization, develop trade unionism». And finally, to further clarify the theory of the "permanent revolution", a term that he did not use, however, did not lack the reference to the international scene:

"The further revolutionary successes of the Russian proletariat on the way to the realization of a working-class democracy, which are also already the successes of the world proletariat, can give the impetus to a decisive battle between the social and revolutionary organizations of the proletariat and the state power of Western Europe... Then we will be faced with the task of extending our revolutionary programme beyond the boundaries of a working-old democracy.

Parvus' editorial was both a historical analysis, a theoretical stance and a program of revolutionary tactics; and it made a great impression in political circles and also on the public. Martov was struck by the way Parvus had set the problem of relations with the liberals, as possible road companions and opponents at the same time: a problem that clearly divided Mensheviks and Bolsheviks. Almost simultaneously, on the first issue of the liberal organ "Narodnaja Svoboda", Mil-jukov wrote that the revolutionaries "sooner or later... will recognize that, in their hope... of immediately making Russia a democratic republic, there was - or there is - a large dose of overestimation of their own forces...

From the state of mind of the neutral clements depends to a considerable extent the

Fate of the Russian revolution... From there, pogroms and agricultural fires come out of this plebs... There you have to go to have the right to protect-

About the future of the Russian revolution."

Precisely in that year 1905, The mean demon came out," the great prophetic novel by Fedor Sologub, which announced how Dostoevsky's nihilistic "demons" would be taken over by "measty" demons: the basic anthropological type of the rebellion of the masses and future dictatorships. The liberals, who were aware of it, feared it and were then for reforms, not for the revolution. For them the times were not mature; they were not even according to Lenin, Parvus and Trotsky, but in the opposite direction: those primitive and amorphous masses had not yet succeeded in mobilizing them and therefore wanted to force them. Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo — as Mil-

Jukov. ®

Notes

1 Parvus, Vojna i revoljucija, "Iskra", no. 59, 10-2-1904; also in Rir (Pp. 83-133), p. 83

2 1. Deutscher, The Armed Prophet, Milan 1956, pp. 145 and 149.

3 P. Cabanne, The night is also a sun. Les hors-la-loi de la peinture, Paris 1960, pp. 179-198; I. Ehrenburg, Ljudi gody zizn', II, Moskva 1963, pp. 272-78.

| Parvus, The Russian Revolution and the Prussian Police, "Aus der Weltpoliti", n. 9

9-2-1904. An opcrative anti-terrorist pact was in force between Germany and Russia from 1881 to 1914, according to which the Prussian police reported and handed over to Russia the Russian subjects involved in revolutionary activities.

5 SDD, pp. 123-24.

6 Ivi, p. 124.

7 Ivi, p. 116.

8 Ivi, p. 124.

9 Ivi, p. 136.

10 Ivi, PP. 139-141.

11 Ivi, p. 139.

12 L. Trockij, MZ, 1, p. 193.

13 L. Trotsky, ibidem.

14 L. Trotsky, ivi., p. 192.

15 For this theme, its importance for the conquest of power, the "permanent revolution", the inevitability of wars and their connection with revolutions, the soviet as an alternative power, the writings of P. until 1906 and his relations with Trotsky, cf. also M.L.

Salvadori, The German Social Democracy and the Russian Revolution of 1905 in History of Marxism, II,

Turin 1979, pp. 547-594.

16 Parvus, Samoderžavie i reformy, "Iskra", n. 82, 1-1-1905; also in Rir (pp. 124-133).

17 V.I. Lenin, Soč., t. XXIII, pp. 118-19.

18 P.P. Zavarzin, ŽiR, p. 61.

19 Parvus, *Itogi i perspektivy*, «Iskra», n. 85, 27-1-1905. In it. cfr. G. Migliardi, *Lenin e i menscevichi*, Milano 1979, in cui è riportato l'articolo di Parvus, pp. 271-79.

20 L. Trockij, *Lettere politiche*, cfr. G. Migliardi, op. cit., p. 287.

21 V.I. Lenin, OC, v. vill, p. 150.

22 V. Valentinov, op. cit.

23 Parvus, op. cit.

24 Ibidem.

25 For this controversy of the first half of 1905 cf. 'Iskra' Nos 85 to No 112, and 1 «Vpered»; cf. also G. Migliardi, op. cit., who reproduces in part the texts, as well as V Strada, La polemica tra bolsheviki e menschevichi sulla rivoluzione del 1905, in Storia del marxismo il, Turin 1979, pp. 444-495.

26 V. Valentinov, Maloznakomyj Lenin, Paris 1972, PP. 78 ss.

27 V.I. Lenin. OC. v. vIII. p. 153.

28 L. Trotsky, MŽ, 1, p. 194

29 L. Trotsky, Do devjasogo janvarja with pref. of Parvus (Čo daet nam 9-oe janvarja), Zeneva 1905. Of the two texts there is a translation. it. unfortunately incorrect: Before the January ship, Milan 1982.

30 L. Trotsky, MŽ, 1, pp. 192-193.

31 Paryus, Cto daet nam 9-oe janvarja.

32 SDD, p. 158.

33 Parvus, Poste vojny, cit.

34 SDD, p. 157.

35 Ibidem. And he added: "I want the soldier to keep it to take a look at it from time to time".

36 Ivi, p. 379, n. 556.

37 Ivi, p. 158.

38 Ivi, p. 153-55.

39 David Ryazanov, whose real name was Goldenbach, became an important historian and theorist; Ermanskij-Rudenko does not seem to have had political fortunes.

40 L. Stern, The Impact of the First Russian Revolution on the German Revolution of 1905-07, cit.

41 R. Luksemburg, LaL), t. 2, p. 344.

42 Ivi, p. 372.

43 Parvus, Our Agitation against the War, «Leipziger Volkszeitung», 18-4-1905.

44 Parvus, Die Kriegsgefahr, ivi, 17-10-1905.

45 Parvus, Socialdemorratija i gosudarsivennaja Duma, «Iskra», n. 110, 10-11-1905.

46 SDD, p. 161 and n. 568, p. 380.

47 Parvus, IKW, p. 9; PgK, pp. 7-8.

48 Parvus, Posle vojmy (Okončanie), «Priloženie k n. 112 Iskry»; also in Rir (pp. 182-197)

49 K. Haenisch, PBE, p. 21.

50 R. Luksemburg, LdL.), 2, PP. 488-89.

S1 L. Martov, Na očeredi. Rabočaja partya the «zachval vlasti», RaR naša bližajjaja zadača, "Iskra", no. 93, 15-3-1905; R. Luksemburg, Nach dem ersten Aks, «Neue Zeit», 4-2-1905; K. Kautsky, Die Folgen des japanischen Sieges und die Sozialdemokratie, "Neue Zeit", 2-7-1905; F. Mehring, Die Revolution in Permanenz, «Neue Zeit», 1905-06, B. 1, p. 171.

52 Parvus, Posle vojny, cit. The following quotes are from this rest.

53 A. Belyj, Peterburg, 1913; Serebrjanyj golub', 1910. In it. respectively: Turin 1961; Milan 1966.

54 S.S. Ol'denburg, 251R, p. 312.

55 Dnevnik Empress Nikolaja II, Berlin 1923, p. 222.

56 S.S. Ol'denburg, 251R, p. 309.

37 P.N. Miljukov, Vospominanija, New York 1955, t.1, p. 306.

58 Mémoires du comple Witte (1849-1915), Paris 1921, p. 211.

59 V.I. Lenin, La rivoluzione del 1905, 1, Rome 1949, Pp. 219 et passim: this results in Lenin's absolute indifference to the 1905 Soviet as a "other power", which Parvus and Trotsky had theorized and supported. Wanting to transform them from elective bodies into organs fighting for insurrection (on a date, moreover, in which it already proved to be chimerical), or also formed by the Bolsheviks and the social-revolutionaries, Lenin completely dropped their character of popular representativeness, the very concept of a democracy "from the bottom". But almost everything Lenin wrote on the soviet, apart from the few pages above, is

Following the events. It is instead curious to note that the first and most challenging article he published, a few days after his arrival, in the newspaper "Novaja Zizn'", was the cele bre Partijnaja organizacija i partijnaja literatura [Party organization and party literature], which from 1917 onwards, and especially from Stalin until today, constitutes the regime's pseudo-legici-mation for the submission of all the mass media to the strictest control of the party. One would think that at that time Lenin was only concerned with the party's control over its political press organs. This more pertinent interpretation has been put forward though [cf. V Road, Soviet Literature, Rome 1964, pp. 51-68 and 324 ss.; V. Valentinov, Maloznakomyj Len, op. cir., Pp. 82 ff.; both also ray on the «Novaja Zizn'»]

But in the USSR it still remains

The most extensive interpretation, to which the let-

Teratura and every artistic expression. The historian, in any case, cannot but point out that, in the vortex of the 1905 revolution, when in Russia the press finally enjoyed a freedom never before known that grew until 1917, the first public pronouncement of Lenin, as soon as he arrived from exile, was not of tactics or political strategy, but a theorization of the limitation of freedom of expression. The successive events in the USSR for almost a century have demonstrated the tragic co-belience of Leninism in this sense as well.

60 Parvus, Naši zadači, "Načalo", 13-11-1905; also in Rir (PP. 198-206). Appeared at the time also in the "Neue Zeit", 1905-06, B. 1, pp. 451-58.

61 P.N. Miljukov, op. cit., p. 347.

62 F. Sologub, Melkij bes in «Problemy žizni», 1905, Peterburg (in it.: The meschi-No, Milan 1964).

63 P.N. Miljukov, ibidem.

Chapter five
In fortress and in Siberia

1 The last days of the Soviet

The "days of freedom" were running. The soviet, completely dominated by Trotsky and Parvus, who made every effort to be the outlet and the spokesman of the masses, had already become a second power in opposition to the state apparatus: it issued administrative orders, which were executed; it requisitioned; it demanded important reforms such as the eight-hour working day; it openly prepared the insurrection. Parvus, who was not like Trocki) totally immersed in the action, had found a way to assert his organizational and entrepreneurial attitudes as well. Already at the beginning of November he had bought the headline of the "Russkaja Gazeta", a liberal newspaper almost without readers, turning it into a popular magazine: his circulation suddenly went from thirty to one hundred thousand copies, and after a month it reached half a million copies. Even the "Načalo" had had great success since the first issue, and its circulation increased day by day. The Bolshevik newspaper "Novaja Zizn'", published by actress And-dreeva but reorganized by Lenin immediately after his arrival in Petersburg on November 20, never exceeded fifty thousand copies.

For a month and a half the government co-existed with the Soviet. But Petersburg was beginning to appear tired of the revolution and life had resumed a normal course. On November 26 the government of. Vitte, who wanted to prove that he had the situation in his hands, arrested Chrustalëv-Nosar. Trosky was elected as the new president of the soviet and, since the weapon of strikes had now dropped due to his abuse, it was decided to launch the economic boycott of the state. It was an idea that Parvus had cultivated since he had written the brochure on a hypothetical coup d'état in Prussia.' Now that idea seemed to find fertile ground, given the widespread distrust in the state that was in deficit for half a billion rubles. A soviet commission was then appointed with the aim of drafting a financial manifesto capable of paralyzing the economic life of the country and thus bringing power to its knees. As an expert in Russian finance, Parvus drew up the draft of the manite-sto and on December 2 the text was published by almost all the newspapers of Peter-burg: as well as by the "Izvestija", which were the organ of the soviet, and by the

"Načalo", from the Bolshevik "Novaja "Žizn'", from the liberal newspapers of Struve and Miljukov and from some media.
In the political-economic premise, the Soviet Manifesto on the financial situation described the situation of Russia, where the tsar, for fear of losing control of the country, prevented the convening of the consiting assembly, and where the government, through false balance sheets and loans from foreign exchanges, practically robbed the people and prevented the free development of trade, industry and communications. It was necessary to "cut off the last source of subsistence from the government" - proposed the Manifesto - and that is to stick to the following instructions: "Refuse the payment of taxes; in all commercial transactions, in the collection of wages and salaries, demand payment in gold and, for sums of less than five rubles, in silver currency; withdraw deposits from savings banks and state banks, demanding the balance of the entire sum in gold".

The Manifesto represented a real threat, both for the consensus that the soviet enjoyed, and for the prevailing climate of uncertainty and the lack of credibility of the government. All the newspapers that had published the Manitesto were immediately seized, while already the rows in front of the bank counters gave the measure of the consequences that the appeal could have had.

It could have meant economic paralysis, the depreceation of the paper ruble due to the depletion of gold reserves, the impossibility of obtaining foreign loans. In such a situation, another general strike would have increased the chaos and prepared the favorable ground for the armed insurrection. This was Parvus' plan, already overshadowed by him in 1896. Keynes will agree with him, but mistakenly attributing the authorship to Lenin, when he writes: "It is said that Lenin has declared that the best way to destroy capitalism is to alter the circulation... Lenin was certainly right. There is no thinner and safer way to overturn the current base of society than a deregulation of monetary circulation. *

But, on the night of December 3 (16), the headquarters of the soviet in the building of the Imperial Free Economic Society on the Zabalkanskij Perspective* was surrounded by large military and police units. Then Trotsky and the other deputies were gathered in groups and taken away, "without any incident and without shedding a single drop of blood", as Prime Minister Vitte later stated. The workers and the masses of Petersburg hardly reacted. To direct them it was necessary to immediately form another soviet. Parvus worked there, who that night had not been arrested by pure chance, having left shortly before the raid. With many difficulties he managed to gather about two hundred de-

* The Company was still based there! 1917 at no. 33 with phone number 2119. Today it's called- But Mezdunarodnyj pr.

Legates, who elected a new executive committee of which he became president. The new soviet could still publish only two issues of the "Izve-stija", while the other opposition newspapers were also closed by the government.

The situation had now changed profoundly. The soviet no longer had an organ to make its voice heard, it had to act clandestinely, the coffers were empty, the workers exhausted by the strikes. The executive decided to send Leo Deutsch to Europe to ask for the solidarity of the German proletariat and other countries. But in Berlin he was reached by the news that any help would come too late. He returned to Petersburg with a few thousand rubles and shortly after he was also arrested. On December 8 (21), the Soviet presided over by Parvus called for an insurrectionary general strike. The proclamation, also signed by the Posdr, was addressed "To all the people" and was a declaration of war on the regime: "Citens! Freedom from slavery! A Russia ruled by the people or a Russia looted by a gang of thieves. That's the question... It is better to die in the struggle than not to live in slavery." At first it seemed that the initiative was successful: eighty thousand workers went on strike in Petersburg, almost as many in Moscow and the example was followed in other large and small industrial centers. But after a few days in Petersburg the agitation was already in decline. The workers, also economically exhausting by two and more months of strikes, were unable to continue: there was a lack of money and weapons. In Moscow on December 9 (22) the Bolsheviks rose up, unleashing bloody street battles.

In Petersburg in the soviet they discussed what to do. Parvus wanted to promote an armed insurrection parallel and in aid to that of Moscow: together the two cities in revolt could have infliced a deadly blow to tsarism. But his passionate speeches, pronounced with the emphasis and insistence that were his own, left perplexed the other members of the executive, mostly workers, who began to consider him an exalted who had lost touch with reality

After long debates, the Soviet executive accepted in principle the idea of the insurrection, to be realized, however, not immediately but in due time; for the moment, indeed, the strike, which in itself was already extinguishing, had to stop. With a proclamation of December 19 (January 1, 1906) it was explained that, in that phase of the revolution, an economic boycott strike was no longer enough; that the proletariat had to arm itself in the meantime to

'Insurrection and prepare for new struggles. ® In protest against this decision, taken while fighting on the barricades in Moscow, Parvus resigned as president. He intended to resume his place at a scholar's desk or at an editorial table, and maybe start a new newspaper. But he didn't make it in time because on January 3 (16) also the second so-

Viet was arrested. Parvus was saved once again because, after his resigns, his contacts with the executive had loosened.

In those days, Lenin, Martov and the other social democratic leaders had stayed away. Lenin had been to visit his mother in Moscow that month, but he had returned before the insurrection broke out in the city, which followed from afar. The part actually played by Lenin in those weeks has never been clarified: he was certainly predominantly concerned with the reorganization of the Bolsheviks and the creation of a compact and combative party; he continued to support the non-participation of the social democrats in the Duma, as a fictitious parliament, but it is not known to what extent he participated directly in the preparation of an armed insurrection

Ta, which he also mentioned in his writings.

A technical preparation of the insurrection by the Bolsheviks had been underway for some time. From the beginning of 1905 the pianist Burenin, who would one day be director of the Bolšoj Theater, led the Bolshevik combatant organization of Petersburg under the orders of the engineer Krasin, responsible for all of Russia. Burenin used his mother's estate on the Russian-Finnish border to introduce weapons and explosives.

He also bought passports for the dead in hospitals to supply his comrades (there is always Gogol" in all Russian events, even revolutionary!).

The Finn Konni Zilliacus, who supported the Russian revolutionaries to free Finland from tsarism, had established a clandestine base in his country, the Nortbern Underground, to let into Russia, in addition to the press and correspondence, also loads of weapons." But, as Parvus had written to Potresov in February 1905, "for an insurrection, before weapons, at least a unitary and efficient organization was needed.

In those short intense months Parvus had understood that he was not a public man, that he did not have the qualities of a leader, that he did not possess the charisma of a speaker or that of a leader, that he was not an agitator like Trotsky. Having escaped arrest, in the first weeks of 1906 he returned to his old occupations and completed some initiatives that he had started shortly after his arrival in Petersburg in the previous autumn. They were the Russian editions of his writings, published in the German social democratic press and on the "Iskra", which he considered most relevant on a theoretical and political level.

He had found the publisher in N. Glagolev and, at the end of winter, despite the difficulty of collecting and receiving the missing essays from Germany, the drafts of two volumes were ready, Russia and the Revolution and In the ranks of German Social Democracy." He also worked on the essay The current political situation in Russia and the prospects for the future," which came out in a brochure, escaping censorship. Two months later it also reached Kautsky's "Neue Zeit", who immediately published it, highlighting its relevance.

In one way or another, Parvus wrote, we would also have come to a frontal clash with the autocracy. The rhythm of the revolution was dictated by the workers and the soviet could only ride the tiger: "We were only those ropes of the harp on which the hurricane of the revolution sounded. We were the recognizers of the revolution and we were moving forward on the path towards which the heavy masses that urged behind us were pushing us...

In the Soviet of the Workers' Deputies of Petersburg it was heard for the first time that this institution was not only destructive, but also constructive. You feel that here the force was created that was able to restructure the state...

In addition, the soviet was the first effective elective representation of the popular masses... the workers are beginning to see in the soviet the core of a new state power... The experience of all the revolutions has shown that the people cannot overwhelm the army, but that they win with the fact that the army passes by their side».

In those few pages was condensed the theory of the soviet as a power other than that of bourgeois democracy, a scheme that would later be accepted by the Bolsheviks but only formally, especially for its suggestive effectiveness: the soviet as a formula of basic democracy would have always been subordinate to the organs of the party-state, the supreme seat of power. Parvus' essay also took up the themes dear to him: the dynamic vision of the revolutionary process, the concept of workers' democracy, the link with the international movement. But even here he did not use the term "permanent revolution", as if he wanted to differentiate himself from Trotsky, who had now made extensive use of it in the articles on the "Nacalo".

The revolutionary wave that began a year earlier had ended with February, but the acquired freedoms continued to exist. The government's repression fiercely hit well-defined objectives: terrorism, riots, looting that, especially in the campaigns that moved late, continued, albeit sporadic and isolated. However, the press had freedom of speech, meetings and rallies were held.

On April 3, Parvus was arrested in the house where he lived with Katja Groman. He was preparing the publication of a new socialist newspaper. «At the time of his arrest they found fifty theater tickets in his pocket. The gendarmes lamed on this "revolutionary mystery" for a long time. They didn't know that Parvus did everything with greatness." He had liked a new satirical comedy so much that, having received an anti-ipo the day before on the rights of his books, he had bought dozens of front-row tickets for his friends.

"I was arrested on April 3, 1906. A very kind police captain for-

I merged my desk and, since it was next to it, also my friend's desk; she rummaged through our entire accommodation, took away every piece of written paper and took me too, to the police district, of course with the proper escort. Here I could observe for about three quarters of an hour two civil servants and the police lieutenant on duty during their writing-action work. So I was handed over to a gendarme, who sat next to me on an uncovered carriage...»."
Thus Parvus evoked the beginning of his detention. Translated into a simple drozri,* with only one escort gendarme, he almost wanted to overwhelm his nerborous companion and run away, but what's the pros? In about twenty minutes they arrived at the wide staircase of the gendarmerie management, where he was accompanied up to various rooms with relative stops and, finally, into a large room with a row of windows, a clutter of suitcases, unmade beds, piles of newspapers, tables, continuously crossed by the comings and goings of the police. Hours passed and his questions were answered to wait.

He didn't know why he was arrested or rather for what of the various reasons he could be arrested: activities such as the president of the soviet, violation of press laws, or more. He didn't even know if they knew that he was Parvus, and that Parvus was the pseudonym of Gel'fand-Helphand, their old acquaintance. He entered a column, lit a large stove and, using a long iron, began to press bundles of newspapers and printed paper into it. The flames flared up and the burning jaws of the stove began to devour one after another the mountains of paper piled up on the floor. Parvus approached and saw that one of those mountains was a bunch of Martov's brochures. All that paper was press

Revolutionary confiscated.

Towards evening a gendarme arrived and ordered him to follow him. In the courtyard there was a closed carriage, not without a sad elegance. The gendarme brought him up and sat down in front of him. "We'll take you to jail," he said. «In which prison?» — «In Vyborg prison». ** - "So to Kresty?" ***

"So you know what it's called," the gendarme grinned. He was armed only with a saber and a gun. Then he had the idea again that he could escape. Finally appeared the long gray wall of the prison-

* Light and fast carrige.
** Suburban district of Petersburg.
*** This is how this prison was called for its cross-shaped plant (krest).

King. After passing the iron gate, they entered a large courtyard, here and there spotted with snow, here and there with puddles. As they got off the carriage, a loud and resoning male voice was heard: "Comrade, welcome-

Nuto!» The cry was taken up by others. The slashed door opened and closed behind them.

They took him to cell N. 902. The electric light was on and the heater was hot. On the table he immediately saw with joy a bowl, a copper jug with a chain glass and a salt shaker. There was also the Holy Scripture.

It was similar to Moabit, the Berlin prison, it was said, but more welcoming, with its white and stucco walls. On the table he also found a linked file, such as the restaurant menu, which contained the list of products that the prisoner had the right to buy. There was everything and every item with its price: soap, toothpaste, shoe polish, shirts and other garments, butter, sausages, jams, tea, cigarettes, tobacco, chocolate, and more. Later they brought him the library catalog: all books left by generations of prisoners. They were mainly works of economics, history, sociology, anthropology, philosophy, psychology, natural sciences, but there was no lack of school books: from mathematics texts to la-

Tino. They were Russian works and works translated from various languages and there were also art books.

He resumed wondering why they had imprisoned him. After the arrest of the first soviet, the second was immediately formed with the surviving delegates of the factories and with new elected officials. Parvus had been elected president and in December he had called the great mass strike that had failed. Since the repression had already begun, the names of the members of the presidency had not been disclosed and the sessions were held daily in secret places.

For the whole month of December the police had searched for them without discovering them. Only on January 16, when the movement was formally and in fact concluded, they managed to arrest the executive committee. Again by chance he had escaped the police. Then more than a month and a half had passed. And then: why, now, the arrest? He lived in Petersburg with a fake Austro-Hungarian passport in the name of the Bohemian subject Bawerk.

A few days later, the interrogation gave him an answer. He would have always remembered that interview for the "tone so courteous and mellifluous, which only in Russia the police know how to have": "You are a foreigner: why did you come to Russia?" - "Many foreigners come to Russia, I could give you the names of my compatriots who came to Russia as foreigners and now hold important positions". - "That's right, but you don't come to Russia to be locked up in an isolation cell". - "I'm not the one who got into it." - "Is your identity is not Parvus?" - "Indeedly, my literary pseudonym is Parvus. I sign the articles and the opu-

Scoli that I published with this name, but I would like to know what I am accused of». - «Weren't you the president of the soviet of the workers' delegates?...

We have established that Parvus was elected in the leadership, that in the plenary session of the soviet in Terioki he then resigned from the presidency for reasons that are unknown to us; from the protocols we know the resolutions of Parvus, which were adopted by the assembly. After all this, we must keep you in custody."

So things were like this: cra fully involved, as was to be expected, in the great political trial against the soviet. And when would this process have been done? Maybe never, because, with the opening of the Duma, an amnesty was held. One thing, however, had not emerged from the interrogation: they knew it was Parvus, but did they know that Parvus was Helphand? This would have made things worse and had negative consequences for his family members. For now, all that was left was to wait, adapt to prison life, read, write, do some gymnastics. The anguish for Katja, and the stinging desire for her, so strong in the early days, had now been sedated, as if placed in a different dimension: the simple concern that nothing bad would happen to her after the arrest. She was expecting a baby, she wanted it from him. Maybe she was now in the same prison, but certainly not in the same building. During the minutes of "air" he saw only men and the guard of the jailers was not so fierce as to prevent the isolation from breaking: he also saw well-known faces, including Trotsky. They exchanged rare jokes,

Fleeting observations.

What did the farmers do? Didn't they move? From the newspapers, which he could buy almost every day, he was informed about everything that was happening. And, from the newspapers, it seemed that the time had come for the cadets; everyone predicted their victory in the elections for the Duma. All the prisoners expected amnesty, but the revolutionaries preferred a public trial against the soviet, which was to become a tribune of denunciation and political agitation.

And so, while waiting for the amnesty, Easter was approaching. From the window of his cell Parvus saw the prison church: a continuous coming and going, women and children carrying bundles and baskets full of food to bless them. Many looked up, at the windows of the cells, smiled, greeted. And he clung to the window for hours, looking at the people, life; looking for a friendly face with his eyes: On the eve, the little church was illuminated in daylight: garlands of light bulbs shone on the portal.

The solemn night mass of Orthodox Easter began. Even in prison, where a grave silence usually reigned at night, everything was light and party that radiated into the cells. A great happy bell: it was the culmination of the ceremony. A second appeared on the door, which

He offered him the gifts of Russian Easter: colored eggs, white bread, cottage cheese and others

Traditional foods.

The same second three days later announced to him: "Make a bundle. You will be released». He looked at him suspiciously: "What happens: a general amnesty?" - "No, but you will be released... There's another one coming out." — "Who?" - "Trocky". Here's the deception: no amnesty and just the two of them released? «I know - he said to the second - they take us to the Fortress of the S.S.

Peter and Paul». He put his stuff together and, as soon as he came out of the cell, he announced loudly: "Comrades, take me to the Fortress. I and Trockij!" The cells responded with a compact roar of solidarity. The Petropavloskaja krepost' was the most infamous prison in the entire Empire where, from the middle of the eighteenth century, they were walled up alive for years, for decades, for the entire life of the tsars and power. Everyone in Russia knew that those who were locked up in there could hardly get out of it if not to embark on the long journey to Siberia.

During the translation procedures Parvus feels prey to a sort of playfulness, of exaltation. Upon acceptance, he apostrophized the officials of the gendarmerie, announcing the next showdown. He knew that neither the shooting nor the life imprisonment were waiting for him anyway. He had fun: that translation into the fortress was the sign that the Soviet would be tried, and therefore he entered history and the story seemed to him the great goddess, the protector nume, who used them, him, for his drawings. In this state of mind he met Trotsky. He saw him in a corner of the big room, intent on his big bundle. He was on top of him and grabbed him by the arm. They hugged and kissed. Trotsky had a rested and colorful face compared to how he remembered it: the countless meetings, the continuous rallies, the night sessions of the soviet, the discussions in the newspaper had even more undermined his already fragile constitution.

They had a lot of things to say to each other. There immediately and then during the translation into the fortress, which they did in the same carriage, Parvus told what had happened after the arrest of the first soviet, and then they talked again about the common activity, their newspapers, the political plans elaborated together and their results. Was it the end now? "No, certainly not, the revolution is in full swing. The cadets won't get the better of them». Trotsky was of the opinion that the first Duma would be short-lived. And he, embassing: "We therefore have before us a liberal period in which the revolutionary masses will make political school and organize themselves. Neither the government nor the liberals can solve the big political and social problems. Therefore, the revolution will continue in its course and cannot be completed until the forces it has brought out will not be fully expressed. But it takes a long time».

And, finally, when they had to say goodbye, he added: "Trocky, just

Outside, we'll meet the same evening and a few days later a workers' newspaper will come out. The two of us stay together». And Trotsky of momentum: "I don't want this!".

When they were in front of the fortress door, Parvus read the number "47" from the window of the carriage. Trotsky, on the other side, saw "17". Dun-que, 1747: the year of the construction of the walls. And he was still standing a century and a half later! It will still be for a long time and until today.

In the Petropavloskaja krepost' he felt buried alive. Beyond the walls of the fortress there was the Neva with its rapid, swollen current; and beyond, Petersburg, now a modern, European city, which had also made the revolution. And this fortress, separated only by the course of a river, was instead the colossus that symbolized medieval, imperial, archaic Russia, of slaves and lords. The thought of what was happening outside harassed him: what about the summoning of the Duma? Or had a military dictatorship been established? Everything was possible: the government did not have many other means to cut the mass movement. And what were the executives left out doing? What did Lenin, Martov and the many others do?

As for him, he had risked to come to Russia and pursue similar in-

Try, when he could have stayed in Germany and thus prevented the publishing house from being bankruptly liquidated by Marchlewski, fearful of La-dyżnikov behind whom was Lenin. He had faced the journey from Munich to Petersburg with a few marks in his pocket, when he could have earned a lot of money if he wanted to exploit the conjuncture of the revolution for the book market. The publishers courted him, offered him a thousand rubles per page if he wrote something. «But I didn't throw myself into the whirlpool of the first Russian revolution in order to make money. I didn't even have the time». And now he was paying, nor did he know for how much and how: it all depended on the course of events. In any case, even if power had not been won, - but the last word was not said, - the events in Russia would leave a deep trace, of this was certain.

Around mid-May they brought him two letters from Katja, the first he received in the fortress. She said that she was "in hectic activity and that everything was magnificent again; and soon, in a few days now, we will see each other again!"

In one of those days, spent in an alternation of hopes and decessions, suddenly a tremendous dind resound. He even seemed to discern cries of urrab! And that roar of thunder continued even in the following days, but they were not thunderstorms; they looked like cannons.

He wondered if they bombed the city to crush an insurrection or if it was the people who stormed the fortress as they already did to the Bastille. He expected them to burst in and shouted in the cell the speech he would have addressed to the in-

Sort. That night I will be delirious.

Only later did he learn that these were demonstrations for the election of the candidates for the Duma, which on May 10 had been received at the Palazzo d'Inverno and had immediately taken place in the Palazzo di Tauride. The cadets had won and obtained the vast majority of the seats.

Parvus could not even know that, a few days earlier, the IV Congress of the Posdr, called "unifier", had ended in Stockholm, which instead saw the deepening of the groove between Mensheviks and Bolsheviks. However, his shadow was present not only because in the face of the inevitable electoral victory of the cadets, everyone, including Lenin and a part of the Bolsheviks, denied the policy of boycotting the Duma, to which Parvus had always been con-

Trario; but because he was indirectly represented by Rudenko-Erman-sky and other "parvusists" and "trozkists", who according to Lenin "forced the Mensheviks to back down".

Meanwhile, while waiting for the trial, he prepared his defense speech and regulated the work, the study, the readings according to the bells of the fortress tower. But he also needed to "dream". He usually dedicated the hours of dawn to dreams and exasperating, exciting or reassuring dreams. The latter were mainly of travel: «I said to myself, for example: "Now we will go to the sea... and I was on the sea and I was swaying in a boat and watching the sun... even composing verses calmed me down: in mental gymnastics I found an analogy with mathematical operations». With the beginning of May, the conditions of imprisonment had improved a lot: three times a week he had books, received letters, had twenty minutes of air a day.

On May 13, after much insistence, he was finally given the tools to write: pen, ink and a booklet of 147 numbered pages. He didn't have to tear one, he didn't have to write anything of his own, just notes from books. But he immediately set out to write the defense speech and a few pages of diary. «The first thing I need — he noted on May 25 - is work. I'm fighting a battle for my right to work. So I will have the second thing that I miss: the struggle, the spiritual tension. The third thing I need is poetry. Not poetry books, I can receive these, but the poetry of reality. The poetry that reveals life to us and envelops it to make it precious, that generates enchantment and disappointment».

As if to give himself a substitute for life, he continued in his dreams and on the 27th he noted in the diary: "Early this morning I dreamed of Italy. I was going down from the Gotthard. The foamy Ticino flowed next to me furiously down the narrow passage... with my bicycle... I passed villages and towns... beyond, beyond, always beyond: Bellinzona!... enchanting Lake Maggiore... green mountain ranges, green islands, here and there white houses, bell towers and windows that shine in the gold of the rising sun... Cramped between the mountains, Lake Como rests...». They were reminiscences of the trip made to Italy in 1903.

On June 4, the second-man brought him tea with black bread in the morning instead of the two white sandwiches that he paid for at the pantry. The next day they brought them to him, but not fresh. Strike? - he asked himself. A strike of the ovens meant that other categories were also on strike. General strike, therefore. Yet he heard the sirens of the factories. On June 6, the sandwiches were stale; the sirens howled, but not as usual, but continuously or in a disorderly way. Certainly strike, even if the jailers did not answer questions or said that nothing had happened. On June 8, no sandwiches: another confirmation. He didn't know if his two books had been published, of which he had seized the drafts. The incessant tubating of pigeons on his window, from which he could not chase them, exasperated him and he fell prey to neurosis.

In these conditions, he continued his defense speech for the trial: "Mr. Judges! If you want to ascertain what the second executive committee of the Soviet Workers' Deputies of Petersburg aimed... you must first of all establish what kind of revolutionary instrument of struggle it was and what it was based on in its revolutionary activities... The Tsar's Manifesto of October 17 (30) meant the capitulation of the old form of government. Since then it no longer exists.. In this vacation of power, in this situation of illegality... the people felt the need to transform the entire state order». The legality of the power of the soviet derives from the people, who are "the only source of legitimacy".

While Trotsky in his defense speech would have accepted in full, and with proud pride, the thesis of the accusation - that the soviet was a revolutionary body, which intended to overthrow the established order with weapons, - Parvus, based on well-known legal theorists such as Rudolf von Fhering, overturned the accusation of illegality, blaming it on the regime. Were they accused of wanting to bring down a legitimate order with violence? Well, he disputes, what had even Minister Vitte written before the Manifesto? «The roots of the unrest lie in the breaking of the balance between the ideal aspirations of the thinking Russian society and the external forms of its life. Russia has surpassed the forms of the existing order. There is a legal order based on civil liberty...».

The speech, written in about fifty pages of minute writing, also outlined the situation of the country on the eve and during the revolution, the attitudes of the different political parties and classes, focusing in particular, as well as on the nature of the soviet, on the weapon of the mass political strike, which he had already theorized in 1896.

On July 1, he wrote the last note in the diary. The nine plunged into the most gloomy mood: he didn't feel like reading or writing. The 10the was the same, but, in the afternoon, while he was all intent on detaching a piece of the table for

Making a ruler out of it, suddenly the door opened and the officer on duty appeared to him: "You will be taken to the preliminary prison. Prepare your ro-ba». What did it mean? Not freedom, of course, but still a great improvement.

3 Deportation to the Enisej

Outside he was dazzled by the sun. The Neva, which he had seen for the last time still cluttered with ice, now flowed full and majestic. From the vehicle that carried him under escort he tried to scrutinize the faces of passers-by: they no longer had the expressions made and exasperated of the revolutionary months. Everyone was running for their chores. «Life is wonderful, - he said to himself - it takes and understands everything in itself! But those who want to enjoy it, must always and continuously conquer it».

The next morning in the detention jail, as soon as there was light, he hoisted himself on the window to look out. He was rewarded, because already in the first group of politicians who went out into the courtyard for air he saw Deutsch's head with small glasses and a big beard. He, Parvus, had been the last to leave the fortress.

Deutsch, Trosky, Chrustalëv are already there. «The prison regime had been liberalized, - Trotsky would later have told - it was the period of the first Duma, the cells were not closed during the day, we played horse for hours, my wife came to visit me twice a week. Parvus was walking in the courtyard with the old Deutsch. There is a photograph where all three of us are depicted in the prison kitchen."
Rosa Luxemburg went to visit him in August. «It's always the same, - he then wrote to Mehring - resolute and enterprising. We chatted for a long time and send cordial greetings to all the friends in Germany. Let's hope he can come back soon." In those days it was already known that the government had decided to send only the members of the first soviet under public trial to avoid too much resonance on the international scene. Parvus himself, so well known in Germany that he was believed by many to be German even though he was still a Russian subject, represented a delicate case in this sense. Deutsch was also because of his fame and his late age. They were sentenced to three years of deportation to Siberia.

But immediately "the indomitable Deutsch - according to what Trotsky told in his memoirs - prepared a group evasion, easily involved in the Parvus enterprise and insisted even with me. I opposed him, because I was attracted by the political significance of the imminent trial." The escape plan was about to succeed, special tools, fake keys and more had been prepared; but

There were too many accomplices and someone betrays himself for imprudence. The same authorities pretended to ignore the attempt, they only accelerated the date of par-

Tenza of the convoy, destination Turuchansk, in the northeast of Siberia.

They left on September 4: some "politicians" and about fifty "communes", escorted by a large contingent of gendarmes and soldiers. The first part of the trip took place by train, but then also by river, with horses and on foot in the long stages where there were no means of communication. The politicians had already decided to flee at the first favorable opportunity, per-

Because, the more we went into Siberia, the more difficult it would be to go back. Parvus had everything ready: files for the railings, diamond to cut the glass, an identity document and money for everyone.

They traveled for a few weeks to Krasnojarsk. Here they had to board a ship to continue along the great Siberian river Enisej.

Parvus attempted a first escape, climbing up a hatch, to dive into the river, but he had to return to the hold. From Kra-snojarsk to Enisejsk, the last city before entering the tajga,* the ship would take four days. They exploited them to study the situation and their escape plans in every aspect. In Enisejsk, which was the last well-stocked emporium, deportees were allowed to go on escort to shop; and this tour of the city gave good opportunities for an escape.

Leo Deutsch took the opportunity to disappear, and the searches were in vain.

At midnight the prisoners were taken to a pier to continue the journey by river, it was now in autumn and soon navigation to the north would be interrupted due to the ice. After various vicissitudes, because the boats were too loaded and the current of the river was violent, they sailed. The sun was at sunset; the forests, which accompanied the wide and fast river on both sides, were now compact dark masses. The prisoners had started chatting with the farmers at the oars, also involving the escort in the speech: they wanted to create an air of familiarity and then offer a drink. Soon the first of the fourteen bottles of sa-mogonka** at 95 degrees to buy in Enisejsk was emptied. The escort began to dissolve their tongues. The second and third bottles made the miracle, and the police agreed to stop in a village that could be seen on the bank of the river.

As soon as they landed they were surrounded by the peasants of the village and among them there was a companion with whom they had agreed. In a pile confused with the local peasants and the gendarmes all went to the nearest isba, where the inhabitants wanted to offer tea. For their part, the deportees distributed

* The dense Siberian forest of low conifers.

** Ordinary distilled vodka extra-monopoly.

Vodka to everyone present. Everyone shouted, fraternized, while other people rushed and the policemen were getting more and more drunk. This was the moment chosen by Parvus to hide in a ravine. After a while you hear that they had started looking for him, that the landlady accompanied the policemen from room to room and that they, not finding him, cursed with a voice hoarse with alcohol. But he couldn't move, he had to wait for the others too. An hour has passed and you hear a lot of running and shouting: "Now it's two that I've got out of it! From the window!». He still heard shouting: "The other two have also escaped!".

He welcomed them and hid the tajga, which began immediately behind the isbe to extend, boundless and impenetrable, for hundreds of kilometers all around. Looking for men in that wooded ocean was like looking for a needle in a haystack. But for them it wasn't over. If it was easy to get into the tagga, it was difficult to get out of it. And, since they couldn't have moved far away, they were still looking for them. The Trans-Siberian line was over four hundred kilometers away. Between the village that stood on the Enisej and the road ran a large side arm of the river. The escort policemen arranged themselves on the bridge that crossed it and also on the river, so as to close any escape route.

It was late at night when Parvus left his hiding place and, accompanied by local friends, joined the others. A hunter led them without moving a leaf to the river, where a boat was waiting for them and they ferryed without skipping the oars, hiding among the islets. In the distance you could see the lanterns of the pursuers blying and the full moon was the worst enemy. Arriving on the opposite bank, they slipped into the woods and marched until dawn in the tangle of branches and bushes. They were cold, tired, scratched and tired, as all their supplies had remained on the boats. They reached the river lower, where there were fresh bears of bears gone to be watered. In the distance you could see the white houses of Enisejsk. The wide expanse of the river allowed to see if anyone was approaching. Here they had to wait for another boat. The sun had risen, but to warm themselves they lit a fire. It was Sunday: the city's bell came to them in the teer Siberian air. With scissors they cut their hair, beard and mustache to change at least a little in appearance.

After several adventures, including a false alarm for which they had to take refuge in the tangle of the forest again, they arrived by boat in Enisejsk in the middle of the night, while patrols continued to patrol the streets, and here they remained hidden for several days in friendly houses. On a dark rainy night

Parvus then leaves together with a merchant with a mail car to Ačinsk, near Krasnojarsk, where you could take the train. The trip lasted two days. So, disguised as a mugicco, he got into a crowded car

Third class. The most difficult thing was now to pretend to be a farmer with the peasants, especially because in Russian trips, which often last days, everyone becomes familiar. He was benefited in this by the experience gained in transit prisons, among criminals and vagabonds. He played cards with them, drinking samogonka, eating what they offered him and offering something bought at the stations. He had proof that he had assimilated when the gendarme on duty on the train jokingly apostrophized another farmer, accusing him of wanting to get "the big mužik" drunk, that is him, Parvus. The train marched slowly and with long stops on that stretch of the Trans-Siberian that he had already traveled on his clandestine journey to Russia in 1899. But he risked betraying himself for a triff: when, without thinking, he took out the most trivial thing, a safety pin, and the peasants looked at her and him as if they had fallen from Mars.

Just when he thought he was safe or almost safe, everything seemed to be lost. At a large station a large contingent of gendarmes get on the car. With terror Parvus recognized the patrol that had escorted them for a week on the outward journey to Siberia. He curled up, he became small, while the soldiers settled down with noise. But a counter-order came, and with relief he saw them hurry and get back out of the car.

Fortunately, the next station was his: that of a city where he had addresses of friends. Here he cleaned up and changed his clothes, becoming a distinguished citizen again. Then again on the train, but this time in second class. By now he was on the Volga. After the large bridge that crossed it, the train stopped at Syzran'. Here, at the station restaurant, Leo saw

Deutsch in lively conversation between people.

Until that moment he had not heard anything about his escape companions. Deutsch was so short-sighted and always distracted that even with glasses he never recognized anyone. Now she was wearing the same dress she had on the translation trip. Parvus passed by him muttering: "Change your clothes". Then he returned to the train and lost sight of him. Arrived in Moscow, in the waiting room of the station here is Deutsch again, who still hasn't recognized him. In the nightly assault of the crowd on the train to Petersburg he lost sight of him again. In the morning, leaving in the corridor of the car, the first person he saw was still Deutsch, who did not show to recognize him. So they traveled another half day like two strangers.

At a friend's house in Petersburg, he told the incredible story of meetings with Deutsch. Even more incredible was that Deutsch, who went to that same house a few hours later, concluded the story of his escape by asking what had happened to Parvus, whom he had never seen from Eni-sejsk. When they told him the story of Parvus, he exclaimed: "Ah, that in-

Solent joker who was always following me. It was him then!»."

Bad luck still haunted Parvus in Petersburg. He stared at the room in

Hotel for the night with a fake passport got from friends and left for his chores. In the evening he was about to return when he met by chance another comrade, who asked him what document he had used. To his answer he told him to disappear immediately: that series of passports was "burned".

Then, the same night he moved away from the city, abandoning all his stuff in the hotel.

But he returned to the capital, to Petersburg, a few days later. He went around the streets, discovering with joy that acquaintances from a few months before, to whom he addressed, did not recognize him. On the Perspective Nevsky also met a police officer who had seen him often in the past months in the fortress and he didn't recognize him either. So he thought that the story of his arrest and deportation was now forgotten, that he could stay in Petersburg and move freely.

However, both because it was better not to trust the blindness of Ocbrana, and • because he could not do anything, one fine day he went back by train and, in the first decade of November, he happily crossed, but literally without a penny, the border of Germany. His suitcase was full of the paper of his manuscripts and his Russian editions.

Notes

1 Cfr. Chapter I, note 31.

2 The text of the Manifesto is reported in: L. Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, Milan 1938, c partially in other texts. For the soviet in general and the role of Parvus cf.: 2905 v Pe terburge. Deputy, Moskva 1925; P. Gorin, Očerki po historii sovetov rabožich dele-

Gatov v 1905 g., Moskva 1930.

3 Parvus, SpM, pp. 48 ss.; Rir, p. 218.

4 J.M. Keynes, Les conséquences economiques de la paix, Paris 1919, pp. 189-90.

5 Mémoires du comte Witte, op. cit., p. 228; a testimony on the arrest of the soviet and Trotsky is in A. Tyrkova-Williams, op. cit., pp. 222-23.

6 1905 god v Peterburge. Socialdemokratiłeskie listuki, op. cir.

7 Cfr.: 1905 v Peterburge..., op. cic.; P. Gorin, op. cit .

8 Cfr. P. Gorin, op. Cit.; L. Deutsch, Viermai entflonen, Stuttgart 1907, p. 117 '.

9 The same official stories of the Bolshevik party, such as the famous Short Course of 1938, supervised by Stalin, and the History of the PC of the Soviet Union, published in 1959 under Khruschev (for both cf. Bibl.), they give contrasting versions. The first tells that "the Mensheviks took advantage of his absence [of Lenin] to creep into the sovier... and take over the direction. It is therefore not strange that in such conditions the Mensheviks Khrustalev, Trotsky, Parvus and others could orient the soviet against the policy of insurrection» (op. cit., p.

90). It should be noted, in the first place, the mention of Parvus, for the exceptional Soviet historiography, which only Stalin here had been able to authorize (probably because then the "lorca against Trotskyism" was still a sore point); secondly, the accusation to him and Trotsky of having failed the revolution of 1905 for submission when instead in 1920 the accusation was of having made it fail for too much "revolutionary" (cf.: Parvus, MSK, pp. 152-53). As for Lenin, the aforementioned work continues like this: *... when Lenin returned to

Russia, escaping the gendarmes and spies of the tsar, participated directly in those days in the preparation of the armed insurrection» (ibid, p. 91). Nothing more than all that in the history of the

1959: Parvus non è più menzionato, mentre Lenin, «giunto a Pietroburgo, iniziò subito una febbrile attività... Comitato Centrale... "Novaja Zizn'"... meetings... party assemblies ›
(Op. cit., I, p. 112). There is no talk of insurrection directed by Lenin.

10 M. Futrell, NU, pp. 39 ss.

11 SDD, I, p. 153.

12 Rassija i revolucija; V rjadach germanskoj socialdemokratii, cf. Bibliography.

13 Parvus, Nastojastee političeskoe položenie i vidy na budustee, S. Peterburg 1906; also in

Rir (pp. 212-224). See also: M.I. Salvadori, op. cit., in n. 15, Chapter IV.

14 L. Trotsky, MZ, 1, p. 206.

15 Parvus, In the Russian Bastille during the Revolution, Dresden 1907. All quotes from P. in this chapter, unless otherwise indicated, are taken from this book pc-

Raltro used as a track of the story.

16 Parvus, PhAK, p. 1334.

17 V.I. Lenin. OC. x. pp. 307-08.

18 Parvus, Dekabr'skie dni v Rossii. Rel v zastitu II-go Ispolnitel'nago Komitela Soveta Ra-
Božich Deputatov Peterburgskich Rabolich, in Rir, Pp. 233-264.

19 L. Trockij, MŽ, i, p. 217.

20 R. Luxemburg, Letters 1893-1919, Rome 1979, p. 152.

21 L. Trockij, op. cit., ibidem.

22 L. Deutsch, Viermal entfloben, Stuttgart 1907, pp. 196-97.

Chapter six

The economist the theorist the politician

1 Outlaw in Prussia

In Germany, the cyclone of the Russian revolution was almost not felt. Far from arousing uprisings of people, as numerous revolutionaries even non-Russians had hoped, it had appeared as a remote and exotic event. The country was experiencing a period of lively election campaign, and one of the themes at the center of the debate was colonial policy: was the economic expansion in the colonies to be considered an expensive and reactionary undertaking or did it also have positive economic aspects for both the colonizers and the colonized? The Social Democratic Party avoided taking a clear position; Orthodox theorists had discussed it, but in terms of doctrine and not current politics; the party organizations with their adherents each went on their own.

Parvus felt that this was a ground on which he could, had to intervene. He had often taken part in electoral battles in Germany, and with original and unexpected attitudes. The colonial question, with the inherent problems of the accumulation and concentration of capital was a topic that he had already addressed before others in many of his writings. But he needed a base on which to lean, being again a ramingo, a Flüchtling, * persona non grata in many German states; at the moment even without a job and without a home. He turned to Konrad Haenisch, editor of the socialist newspaper of Dortmund, although that city was in Prussia, where he was forbidden to stay. Haenisch had been his friend since the time of the "Leipziger Arbeiterzeitung", when they had nicknamed him "Parvulus", the little Parvus, not for his build that rivaled that of the master, but for the revolutionary fervor that found in Parvus an address, a guide.

Around mid-December he received this note: "Dear Haenisch! I'll look for her in the next few days. If you receive letters for Peter Klein, they are for me. So, goodbye! But, please, discretion, on your honor. Best regards. His Peter»' Haenisch immediately imagined who was the mit-

* Refugee (German).

Tente: klein, "small" in German = parvus in Latin. And, moreover, Peter's "P". Nor did he need these comparisons: that calligraphy was enough for him.

Now, having become head of an important newspaper, which was the reference point for the entire socialist movement of the great industrial zone of the Ruhr and West Germany, an imposing, strict but Romantic man, with a large red beard, welcomed Parvus into his home, who had to hide from the police. Happy that his old friend had returned, ready to regain a leading position in the socialist battle, he opened the doors of his newspaper and his house. For two months, unsigned articles by Par-vus appeared in the «Dortmunder Arbeiterzeitung», addressing a whole series of domestic and foreign policy issues. Also on what he called "ectoven elections", he also wrote a booklet, which came out at the beginning of 1907, in which, in addition to the problem of the colonies, he also touched on those of American commercial policy and competition." Due to his illegal status in Prussia, Parvus could not take an active part in political life in Germany. But not even the generals of the Russian party, Mensheviks or Bolsheviks, did nothing to bring him to themselves: jealousy, rivalry, fears of his intelligence and freedom of vision induced them, even without opposing a precise veto, to keep him away. The justification of convenience, which perhaps unconsciously were given, was that he operated politically in Germany. Similarly, the Germans said that he was a Russian, when he broke the rules of their game; but at least they always gave him the opportunity to make himself heard at their congresses. When, instead, in May 1907, the V Congress of the Posdr was held in London, it was as if Parvus did not exist. Parvus was not a man to beg for an invitation from Lenin and not even from his friends Trotsky, Martov, Potresov. In addition, on Russian things, on the events of the 1905 revolution, he had begun a meditation that would have taken him away from the theses of the Mensheviks, the Bolsheviks and Trokij himself.

The fifth congress, which took place in a "socialist" church, according to Trotsky's account, "was full of people, long, stormy and chaotic". Despite the brilliant interventions of Trotsky himself, of Luxemburg and the very lucid one of Axelrod, it sanctions a further definition of Bolshevism as a party in itself. Lenin continued inevitably on his way. He had money for his organization and felt safe. After the financing of Savva Morozov and the actress Andreeva, and the nice sum brought to him then by Gor'kij from the USA, the proceeds of the "expropriations" began to flow, the armed robberies of banks and other entities by special commandos. Lenin needed the money for the organization and to win allies. It is likely that already at that congress where Luxemburg, while criticizing Lenin, gave him substantial support against the Mensheviks, it

He had at least had the promise, if not an advance, of that Bolshevik money with which his party was fed for years.

At that time, Luxemburg was going through a proton crisis, at the center of which were relations with Jogiches, who had just escaped from prison, with whom he had decided to break the romantic relationship. In May Rosa left for Italy and stopped for a long time on Lake Garda. Parvus did the same for two weeks with the money earned thanks to the brochure on the elections, which "certainly did not make him fat", Hacnisch later told, bringing back the letter from his friend who told him to always be the usual "migrant bird"? If they had agreed on the trip or if the meeting had been accidental, perhaps we will never know, because the dense correspondence between the two for many years was taken away from historians more by political will than from the events of the time. Rosa and the "big one", as she called him, had not seen each other since August of the year before, when she had gone to visit him in prison in Petersburg.

Only a few months had passed and everything was already so different. The revolutionary atmosphere in Russia had taken over for them, in Germany, by the routine of daily politics. They were both obated and isolated by the bureaucracy of the German party; both continued to be viewed with suspicion for their ideas in favor of movements and mass strikes.

Both looked with great reservations at both currents of the Russian party; both considered themselves thinking minds of Marxism because of their ideological differences. On the other hand, the friendship was long-lasting: it dated back to the university days of Switzerland. If Luxemburg suffered from the end of the relationship with Jogiches, Parvus was alone again, because he had lost contact with Katja Groman, of whom he no longer knew anything after their joint arrest in Petersburg.

The holidays on the Garda were also work for him and it was here that he completed a study on the colonial question that he had begun to prepare a few months ago; a topic that he had already dealt with years before, examining the importance of the colonies in the evolution of the world market and in the alternation of cyclical cycles? The push towards the colonies, he now wrote in the essay Colonial policy and collapse, is generally attributed to "overproduction and capitalist competition", but it was also said that "there is no overproduction, but underconsumption, since the people cannot consume even what they need".

So there are two ways: either investing in the colonies, that is, to open up new markets, which involves not only huge costs, but disqualifies the continental industry that lacks technological impetus; or using these same capitals inside to make workers also consumers, raising their standard of living, and therefore finding in them a market

To new, completely sufficient and with the advantage of creating a new society, still capitalist, but more prosperous and advanced. We'll have to wait until Keynes for reasoning like this.

Therefore, not colonial politics, but social policy: "normal eight-hour working day", which means "a new era... they bring health, strength and vital energy... the possibility of a human existence... of education and training, of using political rights". "But isn't this the social revolution? Not at all, it is only a social reform program that follows from capitalist development, the implementation of which, moreover, paves the way for socialism. The capitalists themselves had to understand that they had no other choice, since: "This is how revolutions are born! Following the resistance that the dominant power of a country opposes to its own economic and political development»:

Parvus came to outline this alternative, which in any case remained the most interesting and accomplished project that the socialism of that era could have offered, through a detailed examination of the accumulation made by capitalism in Germany, of the stages and costs of colonization, the problems of the market and competition, especially American and in the future also Japanese. As for America, he wrote: "its great economic advantage is democracy. It has made the political and economic unity of the country possible... it has ensured that workers have a higher standard of living than in Europe, which, among other things, has also greatly benefited industrial development. And instead: «In Europe you can't take twenty-four hours by train without coming across one or more borders... The curse of Europe is its past... this division into small states... but also the idea of the political and economic unity of Europe will make its way against all the powers».

And so: "Democracy, unity of Europe, free trade!" - this should have been the watchword of the SPD in opposition to the reactionary line: low wages, protectionism, colonialism, imperialism. "The push towards the colonies," he maintained, "is the flight of capital from its own protectionist system, which at the same time, however, moves to the colonies. This is imperialism. An industrial state and a colonial domain separated from the rest of the world by a customs wall», but «this utopian policy of capital becomes a danger to the peoples because... it can lead to market catastrophes and explosions of violence, as has already happened». This appeared all the more urgent to Parvus as, to the competition of the USA and soon of Japan, that of Russia would be added: "The power of the autocracy is broken forever. Russia is facing democratic development... Even more grandiose, however, is its economic development.

The book was published in early 1907, and it would be a few years before the classic studies of Hilferding and Luxemburg on financial capital and capital accumulation saw the light, not to mention the "popular essay" on Lenin's imperialism, published in 1917. He was very interested in the book of Parvus, which also this time had the part of the pioneer, and not only for the specific problems of colonialism and the

imperialism, but also for the daring vision of a modern capitalism, sensed by the need for the consensus of the masses through a social democracy. It was then that Parvus began to see in a new way the antinomy capitalism or socialism, capitalist power or workers' power, established order or revolution. And all this, which had already manifested itself in flashes, in this book transpired clearly and led him to distance himself from the theory of permanent revolution, to heated discussions with Trotsky and then to the divergence of their paths.

Trotsky, also a veteran of the London Congress like Luxemburg, met Parvus in Berlin on his return from Italy. And, as already years before

Munich, Parvus was his mentor in the capital of Germany: he introduced him to the high spheres of the German party, made him receive him at the Kautsky house in Friedenau, opened the doors of the "Neue Zeit" and the "Vorwärts", had his writings published by the publisher Kaden in Dresden. Towards the end of the summer they went on holiday together to the mountains of Saxony and then went to Bohemia, in the town of Hirschberg, where they spent several weeks. «From Hirschberg we separated for different destinations: me at the Stuttgart congress; my wife in Russia... Parvus in Germany». *

In the meantime, the two friends had found themselves very distant in the deductions they drew from the 1905 revolution and in the political perspectives.

Trotsky had written a book in prison that would become famous as the key text of the permanent revolution: Our Revolution," a repetition and exasperation of the theses they had worked out together at the beginning of 1903. For Parvus, the revolution could exceed the political threshold

«Elle had to breraese po ando alocia del senapirio a

in Russia he was not yet mature for the transition to socialism. Trotsky wrote instead that this step had to be made, even if, given Russia's lag, "without direct political help from the European proletariat, the Russian working class will not be able to maintain power and transform its temporary rule into a long-lasting socialist dictatorship.

Ture.**

On this road Parvus did not follow him. Trotsky's mystical belief in the availability of the Western proletariat was not shared by Parvus, who also considered it dangerous to make the strategy dependent on the Russian proletariat.

I know about the fate of socialism in the West. He had already rectified his vision and now based all his theoretical and strategic perspectives on a large mass proletarian party, capable of taking the reins of an advanced democracy within an industrial society. For this reason it was just as far from the inertia of the German social democracy and the mensceviks, as it was from the military and conspiratorial party of Lenin and the forward escapes of Trocki).

It was clear to both of them, that autumn, that they were following different paths.

Trotsky, moreover, was beginning to have a noy with the Prussian police, but above all he did not like German socialism and its men. To their preparation based on the texts he could only oppose his own enthusiasm and a Marxism derived from Labriola and then still not very deep because of the revolutionary events. Brilliant jokes and vague "prospectives" were not very popular in Germany. And so in October he was already in Vienna, where there were more affability and condescension, where the good Auer was everyone's father and he felt closer to the Slavic and Russian world.

Parvus finally enjoyed the fruits of his efforts. They had realized in Germany, a year from his return, that he had been one of the protagonists of the Russian revolution. His theoretical writings were not much considered, except perhaps those translated into the "Neue Zeit" by "Nacalo". But his book In the Russian Bastille during the revolution," reported a remarkable public success. The "Neue Zeit" and the "Vorwärts" opened the doors again, and so did many other newspapers and magazines. He also resumed publishing the press bulletin, which did not hurt him. His economic situation had greatly improved and he was able to begin to financially help his divorced wife, who lived in Odessa with his son Zenja, now nineteen years old; and he often stayed in Borisov and also in Ackermann (today Belgorod) with the family of Dr. M. Brodskij, his cousin."

He traveled continuously to Saxony and Prussia, regions where he moved illegally because he had long been expelled, alternating quieter weeks in Stuttgart and Munich. His existence was not without risk. Von Bülow's policy of rapprochement with Russia and the "deal" of weapons and other Bolshevik materials discovered in Berlin in November 1907, with the stop of the expropriator Kamò and Cičerin," had made the terrain undermined. The newspapers raised a big scandal and the German socialists and the Mensheviks were also furious. But Parvus felt more and more alien to these bugs, and so he began to move away from the Posdr, while still maintaining relationships with individual people later. He was bothered by the continuous recycling that the party made of old formulas without seeing how life went on in Russia.

«There are interesting phenomena - he wrote to Potresov in April 1908 -

Also in literature and art, and in general the world is getting younger every day»" Russia lived, in fact, under the leadership of Minister Stoly-pin, an era of economic development, of freedom never seen before, a liberal era that bore fruit in all fields, which in art and literature was called «e-

Little silver».

Culture and literature in this period took themselves to the forefront of modern culture both by sum of research and by results, leaving practically empty any sector of investigation, not neglecting any of the components of thought and art that would have a weight in our century. In science, names of world celebrities emerged: from Pavlov to Mendeleev, Mechnikov, Zukovsky and many others. Russia of that period also had important international maîtres à penser, which belonged to the most diverse currents of thought, from Marxism "le-

Gale» to liberals and religious thinkers; from Struve, Berdjaev to Frank, Bulga-kov, Florensky; from Rozanov to Vjaceslav Ivanov. The old Russia of the ur-

The frontal between anarco-populist maximalism and land-bureaucratic absolutism was over. The failure of the 1905 revolution had also put an end to many illusions, but above all to the domination of ideologies and fetishes of the 19th century, of which Lenin's Bolshevikism was and would have been a fatal regurgitation. By now capitalism renewed the country, penetrated the countryside, where the farmer-entrepreneur was born (already then called ku-lak). A bourgeois elite had formed. A new nation had to arise:

Modern, curopca.

For the revolutionaries, especially for the Bolsheviks, that was only an era of reaction and decadence. So even today the history manuals made in USSR present it. Lenin in one way; Plechanov, Martov in another, but everyone stared only into the well of the past, looking for a moon that had disappeared. Inside the current of life was Parvus, always attentive to reality, to the new that was born in Russia, as in Germany: "There is a terrible desire to live," he wrote in April 1908 to Potresov - so that the breath is lacking, the strength is not enough. Come to Berlin sometime. But before June, if you want to find me. Then I'll go to the sea, but I still don't know exactly where." And, always outlawed in Berlin, which was beginning to contend in Paris for the role of capital of Europe, gave a new address: Gustaw Huth, Charlottenburg, Würzburgstrasse 22.

2 The "affaire" Parvus-Gor kij-Lenin

In this period, a conspiracy against Parvus took shape, which was known by Gor'kij's initiative as a dispute over editorial rights. The first signs, as you will remember, were in the autumn of 1905. Then, on the eve of Parvus' departure for Petersburg, the trustee of Gor'kij and Lenin, Ivan Ladyźnikov, head of the "Znanie" editions, had gone to Kautsky, claiming that Parvus had appropriated the rights to the drama I basıfondi for about a hundred thousand marks.

Concern of the Kautsky issue, namely the highest authority of German socialism, had been a skillful move by the Bolsheviks. In the ten-year contract stipulated in 1902 in Sevastopol by Gor'kij and Parvus on behalf of their respective publishing houses, it was provided that a large percentage of the rights would go to the Posdr. Its Central Committee should have been responsible for dealing the matter. But Gor'kij was then one of the greatest sources of funding for the Bolshevik fraction, and the Mensheviks therefore had to be kept away from this source. So Lenin wanted Kaut-sky as a referee, who knew as intransigent as the entire SPD on questions of personal honesty, but now adverse to Parvus, alien to the fractionism of the Russians and therefore easily maneuverable.

Kautsky took the matter to heart and also interested Luxemburg, whose first reaction, however, was of indignation for the way in which Parvus was accused, as evidenced by a letter to Jogiches in mid-October.

Parvus, leaving for Russia, entrusted the task of ruling the matter to his partner Marchlewski, who was also one of the leaders of the Polish party of Luxemburg. At the end of November, in another letter to Jogiches, Rosa was even more explicit: "I saw Karl* and his wife, they told me scary news about what is now being said about Par-vus. He is even talked about as a sloth and a scoundrell. And this is systematically done by Gor'kij through his agents! On Sunday we will have a small meeting about this... at Karl's, where Gor'kij's agent must show me the documents of Parvus' decept»* Luxembourg was all the more disdained by the matter, as she knew that Parvus was already in Petersburg, protagonist of the revolutionary events.

In Petersburg, in the months of the revolution, when in addition to Parvus, Gor'kij, Lenin and the Menshevik and Bolshevik leaders were present, none of them had asked for a comparison on this matter. But, in the spring of 1907, Gor'kij raised the issue in Berlin. He was returning from a trip to the United States, where he had earned such ingen-

* Karl Kautsky.

Which then allowed him to continue his wasteful life in Capri, where he had already established himself since 1906, and to travel around Italy staying in luxury hotels, such as the Grand Hôtel in Alassio." He had already met with Lenin at the London Congress and then went to Berlin, because, as he later wrote: "with the German social democracy I had a "delicate" issue pending: a militant of this party, who later became* very well known as Parvus...". And, after explaining the "delicate issue"

- a sum valued at 130,000 marks never paid by the Parvus publishing house —, Gor'kij added: «I consider myself entitled to inform the Central Committee of German Social Democracy... I did it through I.P. The-Dyžnikov.'"

In reality Ladyžnikov entered the scene because at that time he was preparing together with Lenin the refoundation in Berlin of the "Zna-nie" editions, failed in Russia, as a large Marxist publishing house to provide funds to the Bolsheviks." Parvus, who had contact in 1907 only with Ladyžni-kov, pointed out a whole series of circumstances concerning bargaining: "With M. Gor'kij I still had an open account. I owed him some sums that I had obtained from the sale and from the representation of his

Bassifondi, while I was entitled to a part of all the foreign rights and fees that should have flowed in for the works published from 1903 to 1913, and this as compensation for the fact that, solely thanks to the legal protection I had come up with, he received foreign fees and rights.

When later, after my escape from Siberia, I returned to Berlin, Rosa Luxemburg told me that, during Gor'kij's stay in Berlin, the publishing house had been liquidated with a composition on the basis of which the claims of both parties were declared lapsed. "You've done Gor'kij a favor," I told her. However, since it ended like this, I didn't insist on the accounts. After that from Gor'kij I had no more news. So where do the slanders come from according to which I would have imbro-Gliato?"."

The whole story of the action against Parvus, which would have been revived in 1919, is a big puzzle that can only be solved by keeping in mind and putting in their place the many and disparate tiles of the game. One of these is certainly the fact that in 1907 Lenin was reconstituting the Bolshevik organization dispersed after the revolution, and for this purpose it could be valuable to recover the sums of the copyrights related to the old Parvus-Gor'kij agreement. But there wasn't just that. The v. congress of the Posdr had decided to prohibit the practice of expropriations, but the armed assaults

* Nori the falsity of this "later": Parvus cra "well known" as cale since 1896 and especially with the early years of the 900 and the Russian revolution of 1905.

Banks and other properties, both state and private, by the Bolsheviks continued throughout Russia. There were several scandals: for example, when Litvinov, the future foreign minister of the USSR, tried to change stolen banknotes in Paris and was arrested." The Mensheviks protested vigorously that all those armed robberies discredited the party and deprived its consent; and demanded respect for congressional deliberations.

The issue of expropriations, which moreover provided the Bolsheviks with a lot of funds with which they financed newspapers and party schools, was certainly not unrelated to the controversy led by Lenin against the "liquidated" Mensheviks, accused of wanting to destroy the party's clandestine network.

Trotsky wrote an article about it and also told that, when he met Lenin by chance on August 28, 1910, in a station on the way to Copenhagen-Ghen, he had for this reason the hardest clash with him of their entire lives. Lenin, sore from toothache and with his head burped bandaged, wanted to force him to telegraph to the "Vorwärts" to stop the article, which in fact later at the congress aroused conflicts and incidents." «Zinov'ev declared that there was no need to read the article to condemn it»* and in this he was a precursor of the practice later in the USSR of having the people decree condemnations of unwelcome works in power without being able to know them. Later Martov, with Popuchus Saviors or Eliminators (who and how he destroyed the Posdr),* increased the dose against the system of expropriations of the Bolsheviks by citing precise facts, but by now the whole matter had become too dangerous and the expropriations in that period completely ceased. Also because the top "expert on the subject", Krasin, moved away from Lenin after being arrested and then released in 1908 in Finland, where the entire group of the Bolshevik terrorist school of Kuokkala had already been captured by the police in June 1907 with the same Burenin.

Another financial dispute between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks was in those same years the "Smit inheritance", the rich son of industrialists who died in prison leaving his share to the Posdr, while the Bolsheviks instead took possession of almost integrally of the entire heritage by circulating and making the faithful companions Andrikanis and Taratuta marry his sisters." To silence the rumors about all these unedifying events, what could be better than raising dust, moving on to the offensive with another story? Lenin used it unscrupulously and also had Taratuta co-opted in his Central Committee.

The Parvus-Gor'kij controversy was another opportunity not to be missed and from 1908, as has been seen, it was examined by a commission of inquiry formed by Bebel, Kautsky and Clara Zetkin. She worked for two years, but also kept secret from the party about the results achieved and the decisions made. Not much was known about it and not even Parvus accen-

Never at the conclusion of the story in his own writings. The verdict apparently consisted of a warning and advice to give up editorial positions for a certain period of time. Materially this did not affect Parvus in a serious way, since he lived above all on collaborations; psychologically he had, however, a great weight because he accentuated the distrust around his person, already not very welcome to the major exponents of the contrasting groups of the Spd for his theoretical and political positions.

In 1909, an intense debate was boiling in the Spd on the problem whether or not it was time to mobilize the proletariat in a political strike to counter the reaction. The right of the party warned against any adventure; the left, led by Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg and the Dutch Anton Pannekoek, argued that the workers were ready for the fight and that it was now necessary to engage in the decisive battle; Kautsky, Bebel and the centrists, who had the majority, said that the party was for the offensive, but the proletariat was not mature for a final battle. Parvus was, on the other hand, engaged in a reflection on the past experiences of the movement in Germany and Russia, as well as on the new developments of the world economy, and on this basis a new perspective for the political-social changes was being elaborated.

Between 1908 and 1909 some of his essays appeared in the form of brochures on the union struggle, on capitalist production and the proletariat, on socialism and the social revolution and on other related themes, writings that would later be collected in two unitary works entitled The state, industry and socialism and class struggle of the proletariat. But already what Parvus began to anticipate in articles in the various newspapers and in particular in the Glosses of culture and politics, which appeared in 1908 on the Sunday edition of the «Vor-

" was enough to arouse again surprise, misunderstanding and po-

Lemiche. If the labor movement in Germany had made progress, he noted, capitalism had also modernized and become more efficient.

At the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, no one could delude themselves that it would collapse by itself. The danger for the system, according to Parvus, did not reside in economic crises but in wars, because in this case the capitalist state was caught in the grip of the external enemy and the internal enemy class: "The great struggles on the world market can easily lead even to a war... War exacerbates all the contradictions of capitalism. A world war can therefore only end with a world revolution»*

But the revolution in what way? Meanwhile, Parvus once again recited the requiem for the barricade revolution: "The social revolution does not have the task of implementing socialism with violence... Capitalism, armed with imposing means of defense and entrenched in the state, cannot be so-

Praffatto with a battle. Like the battles of modern warfare, the battles of the revolution have also become more massive, richer in losses and have acquired a completely different imposing breadth in space and time. Modern battles require first of all scientific direction, knowledge of circumstances, exact assessment of forces and possibilities,

Caution and prudence...».»

For the purposes of the historical strategy of the socialist parties, he reiterated his innovative thesis: "In the twentieth century, the proletariat conducted its great battles with combined weapons". * «Marxism - he added - gives us the key and the method to scientifically draw the transformations of the social revolution from capitalist development. Solving this scientific problem on the ground of an analogy with modern capitalism is the main theoretical problem of the current generation."

In any case, "the conquest of state power in itself is not enough, the democratization of the state and the wider development of the autonomy of the municipalities are needed. * And that's not enough either. "We conceive the same operaic organizations, trade unions, social democracy, cooperatives as an integral part of the new state formation. We do not conceive of socialization simply as nationalization, but as a complex system of economic organizations, which will be closely intertwined with the complicated political system. Parvus warned against the omnipotence of the socialist state: "In addition to the increase in its political power, the state receives unprecedented economic power and, in any case, the entire industrial population with its wage and consumption depends on it. The state appropriates everything, it forces everything under its power; and the abstract idea of the development of a state to which everything must be subordinated can become for the peoples a calamity no less than the accumulation of capital is today... We need - certainly only within certain limits - the concentration of production under the power of the state, but we also need powers that we can oppose the concentrated power of the state. It therefore seems appropriate to clarify the guarantees that arise against the pressure of the state on the po-

Polar». *

By now Parvus spoke another language and was understood backwards. For the right and the centrists his strategy of the revolution was a fantasy, and an escape into utopia was his question about what socialism should be.

The left, from the opposite point of view, is not willing to get out of the traditional patterns. Rosa Luxemburg herself wrote: "Aparently, Parvus has completely vanished. His new book... in the beginning it reads as a great and interesting thing, but in the end it is a bla-bla: it arises as a program, which can prepare the social revolution, the nationalization

Of all the great industry through the capitalist state. It has become

I'm mad."

Parvus was an irregular, an outsider in theory and politics, as in personal life. We were outraged by him for his exuberance, tempestuity, immoderateness, for that inclination that was discovered in him, and that he did not care, towards hyperbole in everything, even towards the pleasures of life, although these were accessible to him too little extent. However, it was enough to condemn him the fact that he loved them and did not hide this propensity. His fault was not to have created himself, and perhaps for his proud nature he was never able to, his support group, his claque, his camarilla. He had only a few true friends, but it was not enough, when everyone, even the no stranger Rosa, worked to create a dense network of relationships, ties, points of support, and lived for this and depended on it, unavailable to any outing that was not in direct function of what they considered their political mission.

They also began to spread the rumor that his mother was crazy and that he too was irretrievably following the same slope. Twenty years were many: after twenty years of Germany he found himself with a bit of bran in his hand, like those poor two thousand marks received for two books that had cost him two years of work and in which he had condensed an immense amount of study and imagination. Apart from his previous theorical work, so rich that few could oppose him with the equal.

So go, change the air. Europe was on the eve of crucial events, Russia was on the move. All this would have led to something else, which those who thought about politics did not see, changes only in doctrinal terms. In the Balkans the ferment was scoaming, in Asia the papers were scrambled. How many points of observation and initiative opened up, while in Germany the majors of the Spd denied him a homeland no less than the bourgeois establishment. So in the summer of 1910 he moved to Vienna. And from there, enclosing him a note to be sent to Luxemburg, he wrote to Hae-nisch: «... We need strength not so much for today, but for the coming times, and many more. The events that are looming are so great, that the friar is cut off when he tries to embrace them with his gaze*». *

* Underlined in the original.

3 In the spelonches of Istanbul

Vienna was the capital of a great empire, which felt the first tremors, still peripheral, of that cataclysm that would lead it to collapse in a few years. Aristocratic and petty bourgeois city, with still living traditions of culture and art, with intense cosmopolitan ties due to its geographical position and the multi-nationality of the empire, it also perceived the impulses of the Slavic and Eastern world, the Balkans, the Mediterranean. From 1908 Trotsky published his newspaper "Pravda" in Vienna, in which he persistently continued to support the idea of the permanent revolution. Through Galicia or even the Black Sea, the newspaper was sent to Russia.

Trotsky welcomed Parvus as a friend and a companion. He returned the service that Parvus had rendered him in Berlin, when he had introduced him to Kautsky and the leaders of German socialism, now putting him in contact with the leaders of Austrian socialism. Parvus largely already knew them and knew their ideas, but he was not interested in joining the Austrian police just when he had left the German one. Nor was he interested in the action that Trotsky carried out in the Russian party. Their positions were now different and their ambitions diverged. Parvus was tired and bitter after the latest events in Germany. And then, contrary to the Russian revolutionaries, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, who were betting everything on the resumption of the revolution without seeing the extraordinary development that was underway in Russia, Parvus was of the opinion that there was time, that the process was not so automatic and rapid, that before that cycle of wars that had already foreseen since the end of the century and the Russian-Japanese conflict had to be unleashed on Europe and the world. And the warnings were in the Balkans.

The end of that summer in Vienna was for him a period of rethinking and meditation, after a vacation he had taken in Abbey and Dubrovnik, in Dalmatia. He finished arranging the book on the state and socialism, he frequented the immense Café Central where politicians, intellectuals and artists met. But the decision to go to Turkey was already made. To obtain the necessary funds, he presented himself in mid-September at the congress of German Socialists in Magdeburg, where all the directors of the party press had also agreed, and obtained the position of correspondent from the Balkans with the relative advances. «Parvus — commented then the Luxemburg — goes for three months to the "East" (he calls "East" Belgrade and Sofia); what he wants to do down there is mysterious to me, but he certainly needs a change of scenery». * Trotsky gave him another assignment from the "Kievskaya Mysl'", the most widespread newspaper in southern Russia, radicalizing with Marxist influences.

And it started again, this time to the southeast, towards the Great Door.

«In 1910 - he would later recall - I decided to go to Constantinople to get to know the Turkish revolution up close and study the diplomatic plots precisely at the central point where the knot of Gordio is intertwined-

He stopped in Belgrade and Sofia and then in Bucharest, from where he sent the first correspondences. In those countries his name was known and esteemed and his writings were translated with higher editions than those of Marx and Engels.

At the beginning of November he arrived at the Sirkeçi station, the railway terminal of Europe, in front of the Golden Horn, on that Bosphorus beyond which Asia begins. It was a completely foreign city for him, but in the cosmopolitan Constantinople, where the bourgeoisie and intellectuals spoke French, and where the German and English presence became stronger and stronger, he could immediately move without difficulty.

He leaned on Christo Rakovski, the Bulgarian-Romanian revolutionary who then, as in other periods, was in Constantinople, continuously expelled from Bulgaria and Romania, where he was a combative pioneer of socialism and where, in periods of legality, he also found time to work in his father's estate on the Black Sea. Graduated in medicine at the Sorbona, always elegant and rich in charm, also active in Russia as a Marxist, he spoke Turkish and all the Balkan languages in addition to the main Europeans; he was the author of political essays and short stories. In those weeks he had only made one of his clandestine trips to Romania, surrendering himself demonstratively to the authorities." He was sent back to Constantinople, and together with Parvus they tried to organize a demonstration for May 1 with a few hundred port workers, and then to start a trade union organization.

But the police of the Government of the Young Turks did not like such initiatives and the two friends spent several nights in guard. They made the socialist deputies in the Turkish parliament free them. Rakovski then concentrated on his work in Romania; Parvus, after trying to set up his own Balkan federation project," devoted himself to the study of the situation and to journalistic work.

The Ottoman Empire had been in decay and disintegration for years: peripheral domains escaped it, the economies in disintegration was practically colonized by Western capitals with heavy monopolies and concessions. The situation had not improved after in the summer of 1908 the renewal movement of the Young Turks had forced Sultan Abdül Hamit II to restore parliament. Parvus immediately identified in the "capitulations" - the economic concessions obtained by Europeans in exchange for loans - one of Turkey's main plagues: the capitulations had to be replaced by normal trade treaties. He took care of this above all for himself, working in every way to write about it in the newspapers. Initially the undertaking was not easy, as well as because of the obstacle of the language that he still did not

He had, for the difficulty of making himself known and appreciated by the environment Journalist of Constantinople.
A hard time passed: "I lived from my correspondence for the party press and the articles I wrote. There were days when I fed on focaccia with onions in the Stamboul* and often I had to raise my feet carefully so as not to show the soles with holes»." Woe to a curo-peo, especially a journalist, to make it clear in Constantinople at the time that he could not support the European standard of living debt. Parvus had to dress as his status required him; instead of a hotel or home address, he gave contact details in the mail or at newsrooms to hide where he stayed and ate. And, climbing up the narrow dusty climbs of Stamboul, where he lived in the first period, the decrepit wooden houses, sghimbesce, am-mucchiate, reminded him of the Tatar cities on the Volga and the Jewish agglomerations of the native Belarus and Ukraine.

But it was precisely one of these reminiscences that one evening brought back to his mind an episode that he had long buried in his memory. At that time he was much younger and, above all, he put all his hopes in the social and political battle and in the advance of the revolution with which the ambitions and prospects of his personal life were identified. It happened during the navigation on the Volga towards Kazan'. In the middle of the night the ship had stopped in Čeboksary and a crowd of people climbed, among which a tribe of gypsies had mixed. It was May 1899. He wandered from one bridge to another, climbing over bodies of mugicchi and sleeping soldiers, in-

Quiet, prisoner of the charm of the immense river where the ships exchanged siren blows and light signals. As if slipping into the dark under a lifeboat, a girl from the tribe, almost still a child, had sneaked up on him. He wanted to predict his fate. «Bisc te pangi... - he told him, - you'll still have twenty-five... pirdal desciutrin... in thirteen you'll be barvalò manusc, a barin bagaty... a rich gentleman... very... very... very... baro manusc... a great man!!». She mixed the Roma gypsy with Russian, her eyes shone, she laughed with her white teeth and stretched out her hand. He laughed too and gave her a coin.

Why did these things come to his mind now? Then he hadn't given him weight: a too easy enigma. Twenty-five were the years of life he predicted, in thirteen he would be rich: here is the naive arithmetic of the gypsy girl. But what did "rich" mean for someone like her? Maybe just a little more than not having to beg and steal. For him, however, it was another; it was much more. Always, or at least in the last ten years, he had it

*. Name of the complex of historic neighborhoods located on the punca between the Golden Horn and the Sea of Marmara, which then moved to the toponym Istanbul extended to the entire city

The problem of having money available has been peassed. But not to get rich: as the revolution was not an end in itself, so money was a tool to act, move on a different level, create newspapers, a great publishing activity, which also meant freedom, prestige, in-

Fluency, the possibility of feeling himself, satisfied.

Why don't you leave Turkey after the three months you set for yourself? He was not attracted to return to Germany, where not even his last two books had had the echo they deserved, but had fallen into a supposedly premeditated silence, and where the "Neue Zeit" paid a pittance for essays that cost nights of sweat. Here at least something was moving, there was an observatory for the next events and a road could also open for him.

In a political and journalistic world so unaware of the mechanisms of the world economy and the opportunities that a great nation like Turkey had to rise and count, its experience and its knowledge had to find their field of application.

He was still rongling on his analysis of the Turkish budget and on the "capit-lations" in the Galata room or in a çayhana,* always with a glass of whitish raki** in front of him, when the situation suddenly changed. Senior officials of the Turkish Ministry of Finance and German bank executives had set their eyes on his articles and looked for him to meet him. Through the first channel Parvus came into direct contact with the leaders of the party of the Young Turks in power; through the second he was given the possibility of large commercial business. Almost enthusiastically welcomed as a great German financial expert at the ministry, he also had a permanent position as head of the economic column of the government newspaper "Türk Yurdu". In a short time he had become an advisor to the High Gate and a trusted man of German banks and companies interested in operations in Turkey.

Giolittian Italy in 1911-12 had been snatching Cirenaica and Libya from Turkey. Taking advantage of the situation, Greece and Bulgaria allied themselves for the conquest of Macedonia and began the Balkan wars.

Among these events moved the action of Parvus. Everything was disorganized and lacking in the empire of the Great Door. Constantinople lacked wheat and he organized supplies from the interior of the country, from Anatolia, and imports from Odessa and the Balkans. It dealt with the supply of large batches of timber, iron and machinery from Germany and was at the center of that great operation that led German capital and brains to participate in Turkish industrialization: power plants, railways, va-

* Place where you drink tea and alcoholic beverages.

** Turkish anise liqueur.

Rie. He was now a figure who swam in the high waters of the Ottoman capital, frequented the homes of the Turkish political and economic elite, the directors of banks and European firms in the city. It was seen in the theaters of Pera,* where the most famous shows of Paris were given with international vedettes and where the composite high society of Constantinople was convenient: the great Islamic, Greek, Armenian, Israelite and Latin bourgeoisie. In these environments he met the trustees of the European companies that managed public services: from the port to trams, from water to gas and electricity; and many of them were in business relations with him.

He was also in contact with Krupp and perhaps dealt with military supplies in contrast to the famous Basil Zaharoff, who worked for the British in Turkey. But Parvus had argued since the Russo-Japanese war that weapons were not needed if a modern army was not created in place of the old military structure of absolutism, and that a modern army was only possible with a democratic regime that enjoyed consensus. Its action therefore not only took place in the field of commercial and financial-banking transactions, it was also political. As he would have written in the following: "I indicated to the Young Turks... not to separate themselves from the masses, that only a democracy that relies on the interests of the people can lend new strength to the state; step by step I showed them how their power lost root and the state was weakened... while the bourgeois press around the world exalted them as brilliant statesmen. In the Balkan war everything collapsed. Turkey was over. He became prey to the Intesa and followed his destiny. Only the world war changed the situation."

As soon as the latter broke out, Parvus was the first and decisive promoter of Turkey's alliance with the Central Powers, which actually changed the situation for it at first, but industrialization was still too embryonic and the government of the Young Turks inadequate to the tasks imposed by war and a decomposing empire.

Turkey gave little contribution to the war and followed the defeat of its allies.

Parvus trusted in a different outcome. In 1914 his collaborative and business relations with important Turkish politicians such as Enver Paşa, Ta-laat Paşa and also the Minister of Finance Djavid Bey, were already firmly established and allowed him to exert a significant influence. However, he was not yet a rich man, a man sure of his position. It was the war that determined the turning point: "When the world war began, the ways of capitalist accumulation suddenly opened up in front of me," he would then write, explaining how: "I was ahead of the others, for-

* Name of the prosperous Genoese settlement during the decadence of Byzantium on the former Gala-ta, the European and elegant district, today Beyoğlu.

Because I understood before the others the capitalist irdependents of the events and because even before the war I had created a commercial base. The common people conceive it in the sense that if one earns in wartime, he must have enriched himself on the rise in prices. But that doesn't always correspond to the facts. Personally I used a completely different method. I swam against the current and did not earn on the increase in prices, but because I reduced them, that is, not on the exploitation of the hunger for products, but on the organization of the supply of the same. So were the facts, which it would not be difficult to ascertain, because my commercial operations put me in contact with dozens and hundreds of people, with banks, commercial companies, shipping companies, brokers, commission agents, lawyers, notaries, city administrations, cooperatives, etc. etc.."." The outbreak of the First World War also marked the return of Parvus to militant politics.

Notes

1 K. Haenisch, PBE, p. 24.

2 Parvus, Die Reichstagswahlen und die Arbeiterschaft, Dresden 1907.

3 L. Trockii. MŽ. I. p. 231.

4 V. Valentinov, Maloznakomyj Lenin, op. cir., P. X.

5 K. Hacnisch, PBE, p. 27.

6 On the part of Rosa Luxemburg's abundant epistolary that is in Est ravi lipotheca of censorship, as well as on the epistolary of Parvus. He may have destroyed many documents before his death, but until 1918 at least, according to what he stated (PhAK, p. 1334), he kept a collection of letters from Luxemburg.

7 Parvus, Die Gewerkschaften und die Sozialdemokratie, cit.; Marinenforderungen, Kolonial-olitik und Arbeiterinteresse, 1898; Das vorsichtinge aber Zielbewussse Einlenken des «Vorwäris» in die Kolonialpolitik S.M. Kaiser Wilhelms II, «SAZ», 15-1-1898

8 Parvus, The Colonial Policy and the Collapse, Leipzig 1907. All quotes are taken from this text.

9 «I'm surprised not to see ads for a translation of Parvus (Kolonialpolitik und Collapse). Is it possible that no one has any initiative?... I could get in touch with the author, here abroad» (letter from V.I. Lenin to his sister M.I. Ul'ianova of 25-2-1908 in Per, A it.: OC, v. 37, p. 272). The Russian edition of Parvus' book was however, without or che lui knowing, about to come out for the editions of «Novyj Mir», trad. Grau (cf. Bible of the-The works of Parvus).

10 L. Trocky, MŽ, I, pp. 233-34.

11 L. Trocky, Nala revoljucija, S. Peterburg 1906.

12 Ivi, p. 245.

13 Parvus, In der russischen Bastille wäbrend der Revolution, cit.

14 Private communication of relatives to the A.

15 L. Stern, The effects of the first Russian Revolution on Germany from 1903-07, cit., B. 2/1I, pp. 70-90.

16 SDD, 1, p. 182.

17 Ibidem.

18 R. Luksemburg, LdLJ, II, Pp. 489 and 541.

19 See Grand Hôte records! D'Alassio, then owned by Marson.

O Works by M. Gorki, t. XV, Rome 1963, p. 12. The writing is a panegyric by Lenin, released in 1930 to rectify the obituary published in 1924, c G. introduces a partial re-enactment of the controversy with Parvus, which in the first writing he had omitted. But until 1925 he received the altifications of Parvus, while in 1930 he was in Stalin's orbit.

21 Archive M. Gor'kogo, Moskva 1959, t. 7, p. 292.

22 Parvus, IKW, p. 23; Pge, pp. 22-23.

23 N. Krupskaja, My life with Lenin, Rome 1956, pp. 155-56.

24 L. Trockij, MŽ, 1, p. 249. The article was Die russische Sozialdemokratie, «Vorwärts», 201, 28-8-1910.

25 L. Trockij, ivi., p. 250.

26 L. Martov, Spasiteli ili uprazdniteli (kto i kałe razrušal RSDRP), Paris 1911.

27 E. Yaroslavsky, Realizacija nasledstva posle N.P. Smita i moi ustreči s Leninym, «Staryj Bol'ševik», 5(8), 1933; N.K. Krupskaja, op. cit., pp. 164-65; Očerki po istorii VKP (b), t. I, Moskva 1937, p. 204; V. Valentinov, op. cit., pp. 97-129; M. Futrell, NU, p. 59; L. Shapiro, KPSS, pp. 169-171, 183-192.

28 Parvus, Der Staat, die Industrie und der Sozialismus, Dresden 1910; Der Klassenkampf Of the proletariats, Berlin 1911. Cit. here as SIS and KP.

29 Parvus, Kulturpolitische Glassen, «Vorwärts», February-May 1908.

30 Parvus, KP, p. 147.

31 Ivi, p. 149.

32 Ivi, p. 109.

33 Ivi, p. 4.

34 Parvus, SIS, p. 72.

35 Ivi, p. 163.

36 Ivi, pp. 150-51.

37 R. Luksemburg, *LdLJ*, III, p. 154.

38 K. Haenisch, *PBE*, p. 29.

39 P.J. Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, Oxford 1966, p. 371 n.

40 Parvus, IKW, p. 24; Pge, p. 23.

41 Ch. Rakovski, Avtobiografiia, Char'kov 1923, p. 26.

42 Letter from Parvus-to K. Kautsky (International Institute of Social History, Amster-Dam). Cit. in SZ, p. 137.

3 In the 19th century, the term "capitulations" referred to the legal protection of Christian migrants, especially traders, shipowners, bankers. But, since in the popular interpretation it had assumed the meaning of privileges to foreigners, 'capitulations' meant more generally the concessions obtained by the Europeans.

14 Parvus, PhAK, p. 1334.

45 Ibidem.

46 Parvus, IKW, p. 24; Pgk, p. 24.

47 Ivi, pp. 24-25; ibid., pp. 23-24.

Chapter seven
«The big business»

1 The shootings of Sarajevo

On June 28, 1914, the Archduke of Austria, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, fell in Sarajevo under the blows of the Serbian patriot Gavrilo Princip. Parvus was not taken by surprise by the event. For about fifteen years he had foreseen the cycle of wars and already in 1907-08, when it still made sense to premonitor, he had held the pen for peace. But then, when wars were now a fact, in 1911-12, he had not joined the pacifist campaign started by the Curopei socialists: it was no longer useful. "I have never been a pacifist," he would have written; and in fact for him, even as a Marxist, war was part of the mechanism of history. The same for Inin, who only a little earlier explained his position to Gor'kij:

«A war of Austria against Russia would be a very useful thing for the revolution... but it is unlikely that Francis Joseph and Nicholas will give us such a pleasure»

Parvus' reaction to the Sarajevo attack was immediate and feverish, but very different from the international peace campaign. While diplomacy was still in full swing — only a month later, on 28 July, Austria would open hostilities against Serbia, and only after that would the Curopean powers enter the war — Parvus published an article in the Turkish 'Tasviri Efkar' in which the world war and what would be the deployment of the great powers were already taken for granted. In two subsequent brochures — The result of the great war. If England wins and the arteries of Turkey and the debts of the Ottoman Empire* - he preconfigured a picture of the possible consequences of the victory of one or the other side, especially from the point of view of Turkey's interests: it could have gotten rid of the "capitulations" and therefore derive great advantages. Still cautiously, but still perceptible, he hinted at which side the Turkish empire should take and which side he had chosen, Parvus: a position that only a few months later would have procured him the infamous mark of "agent of German imperialism".

He then explained and theorized his choice exhaustively in a series of writings, the first of which was the article For Democracy — Against Tsarism,

Released in Constantinople in the fall of 1914 and also published by the Romanian and Bulgarian press Many thought at the time that Parvus was far from the drama that upset Europe. In reality, not only did he travel and did not stand on the sidelines, but he was deploying his own grandiose plan, which had been ruminating for years in his big elephant head, which had the Reich and Lenin as possible architects. Lenin would also have written on September 28 in Switzerland: "There can be no doubt that... the least evil would be the defeat of the Tsarist monarchy"*

Not by accidental coincidence, explainable with the fact that Parvus and Lenin started from the same method of analysis, and also that for interposed people (Rakovski, Hanecki, Rjazanov) each of the two had known what the other was writing, Parvus' writing began with words almost identical to the theses on Lenin's war, published in those same days. Both pointed to the tsarist state as the main enemy to be beaten, claimed to be idle to look for which power was to blame for the war, and argued that war should become a vehicle of revolution, of socialism. Lenin, in the part of the leader, came up with the watchword "transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war", an abstract, unrealizable watchword, which had no practical implementation in any belligerent country; Parvus, necessarily a realist, speaking more as a cosmopolitan socialist than as a Russian revolutionary, proclaimed that, if Russia was the enemy to be brought down, there was only to count on the power of Germany and its allies.

The victory, Parvus wrote, would give Russia "a new, furious and monstrous development of power. Supported by a rising bourgeoisie, by a powerfully developing industry, by an army that draws on a population of about 200 million people, tsarism would dominate Europe and the world... Such is the danger that threatens democracy and socialism." This apocalyptic vision of Russian power and its expansionism was rooted in Parvus since his youth and had consolidated in the face of the rapid rise of the country's industrialization in recent years; it remained a constant of his thinking and would be obsessed with it until death. "So, fight against tsarism!", concluded the appeal addressed in that summer of 1914 to the Russian socialists and revolutionaries.

The "big venture" would still take shape later. For the moment Lenin, who had been living in the then Austrian Krakow for a long time, that summer was on vacation on the Tatra mountains with his wife Krupskaja and his beautiful, cultured and no less useful friend Inessa Armand. Also next to him was Jakub Fürstenberg, a young and enterprising Polish Jew, best known under the pseudonym of Hanecki as an executive of the Sdkpil and the Posdr. A man of vast culture and pleasant appearance, he was a very skilled person even in the fac-

He gave up practices and, like Parvus, had a penchant for business. That summer Jakub, who was in contact with Parvus and knew about his commercial activities, discussed a lot with Lenin in Poronin, the village on the Tatras where they stayed, about the possibility of undertaking large-scale actions to finance the party: he himself could have been the manager.?
On August 8, Lenin was searched and then held under arrest in the nearby town of Nowy Targ. He was released about ten days later, and for this reason the conversation that Adler had with the Austrian Minister of the Interior was decisive: he persuaded him that Lenin was the worst enemy of tsarism. Much would be said later, in Russia and elsewhere, of Lenin's "poroninian commitments" to the central powers." However, it was in the logic of Germanic and Austro-hungarian politics to be interested in characters like Lenin and Parvus, even if there was still no precise design on how to use them. Already years before the war, however, as has now been proven by the archives and historians, "the Germanic authorities, also based on what Japan had plotted in 1904-05 with the Russian revolutionaries, had concretely posed the problem of Revolutionierungspolitik. * Parvus himself would later write: "The governments of the Central Powers had changed their attitude not only towards German social democracy, but also towards Russian revolutionaries. ** Of course, not for idealism. The war had placed them in a revolutionary position towards Russia, and the governments had understood this. It would have been ridiculous to expect them to continue to politically persecute Russian revolutionaries even during the war. The war had mixed the cards. While France and England were expelling Russian emigrants, Austria freed Lenin and gave Ryazanov the opportunity to live freely; Germany also granted a transit visa to Russia to the emigrants». **** Already on September 7, 1914, in fact, - and in the meantime Lenin was now in Switzerland - the Germanic ambassador in Bern, von Romberg, sent an encrypted telegram to his ministry and received confirmation of an orientation that was intended to be developed

It seems."

By now the affairs of Parvus, which Lenin always kept an eye on through his writings and through common acquaintances, had extended from Turkey to the countries of the central empires, to the Balkans and the "Mom Odessa". The war had opened up new possibilities for a man like Parvus who knew so well how to combine business with politics. On the one hand, he worked

* Politics to foment the revolution (in Russia).
** As already mentioned, a pact for the delivery of revolutions was in force between Germany and Russia, which expired in 1914.
*** In '15 Trotsky was expelled from France, while Lenin and other "emigrants" had every help from Germany to go to Russia from Switzerland immediately after the collapse of tsarism.

So that Turkey would ally itself with Germany and enter the war alongside it; on the other hand, since it was necessary for it to be prepared for this purpose, it intensified the import activity of all kinds of goods, from wheat to industrial products, everything that served to give the country a minimum of efficiency. The German ambassador in Constantinople was aware of this, and obviously consenting."

Within the framework of his many activities, his intervention in support of the "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine" was also placed. The Union had been created by independentists and socialists in the Romanian and Ukrainian areas along the border between the Habsburg Empire and the Tsarist Empire, and had headquarters in Lviv and Vienna. With the war it had had the support of Austria and Germany, certainly interested in a detachment from Ukraine. So, from the agitation and propaganda, now the Union intended to move on to the facts, organizing an expeditional force to be sent beyond the front. To complete the preparation of this enterprise, two leaders of the Union, Marjan Basok-Me-lenevskyi and Leo Hankiewicz, went to the Balkans and Constantinople at the end of September. Melenevskyi also made contact with Parvus, who would later say: "I knew him for many years as a Ukrainian social democrat and I gladly introduced him to the press in Constantinople to publicize Ukraine and its national claims. I didn't even have anything against the Ukrainian social democracy publishing my writing For democracy-against tsarism in its own language and I prepared a special preface. I understood well that this would have irritated the Muscovits of all colors, who took away the Ukrainian people from speaking in their own homeland... I also welcomed other Ukrainian, Georgian, Armenian socialists and, asked for advice, I told them my opinion. This still consisted of two points: 1) that the socialist and revolutionary movement in Russia cannot be directed from abroad and that emigrants must therefore remain in close contact with internal organizations...; 2) that a unification of the various socialist groups and fractions was necessary». And he added: "In Russia there is a double logic: when Macedonians work with Russian money and dynamite, they are heroes; now that they only have Bulgarian or Austrian money, they are traitors... I am for the independence of Ukraine: if not otherwise, through a separation. That the great Russia depends economically on Ukraine does not seem to me a well-founded reason to enslave the Ukrainian people. If you need Ukrainians, you learn to live with them».

Thanks to the support of Parvus, already at the end of October the Turkish newspaper "Tasviri Efkar" published the first proclamation of the Union. Melenevskyi, meanwhile, had put Parvus in contact with Max Zimmer, an expert on the problems of national minorities in this part of Europe, who had been in-

Charged by the German and Austrian governments to follow and help the revolutionary movements against the Tsarist autocracy. The collaboration between Parvus and Zim-

Mer immediately advanced the preparedness of the Ukrainian expeditionary corps: a good number of Ukrainians, Armenians and other Caucasians had already been recruited, some of whom would have to operate within Russia to foment revolts among the Circassians and the Cossacks of the Don."

Meanwhile, also following the work of Parvus, Turkey, after signing the treaty of alliance with Germany on August 2, had entered the war on October 31. The Turks resisted the English offensive in Iraq and on the straits, forcing the forces of the Entense to retreat; but they failed to stop the Russian advance from the Caucasus to Anatolia, where they lost Van, Erzurum and Trebishonda. These war developments only confirmed Parvus' thesis that only thanks to his empire Russia could hold up within and conduct a policy of expansion.

In the preface to the Ukrainian edition of his first writing on war, published only in December 1914 in Constantinople, Parvus underlined and theorized the motivations not only immediate military but also of revolutionary strategy related to the problem of nationalities: "The socialist conception of the state for the future is based on the independence of individual nations and their international union... The governmental power in Russia is extraordinarily strong and draws its strength from the unprecedented centralization of the empire.

This is the main reason why the great Russian revolution, despite having surpassed all the previous historical examples for its political tension, its duration, the size of the popular masses it set in motion, was nevertheless defeated by the state power».' ®

This was not only a polemical argument against certain Russian Marxists who, like Plechanov, then lined up for the defense of the homeland against German imperialism. The problem of nationalities was being discussed in social democracy, and Parvus once again took a clear stand against the centralized state, as the main obstacle to any democratic renewal.

The Ukrainian expeditionary force would not have left, because already in November the first revelations published abroad by the Russian pro-Zarist press appeared. In addition, the head of the Turkish government, Enver Pasa, ordered that nothing

'To undertake in that sense until Turkey had achieved naval supremacy over the Black Sea.' And finally, the funds collected turned out to be in-

Sufficient. As for Parvus, he now aimed at companies of greater por-

Nanny.

2 Received at Wilhelmstrasse

On the morning of January 7, 1915, the cold wind of the Black Sea invaded Constantinople and gusts of freezing rain swered the city. 1914 was over with its five months of war and disasters, with Russia already disevered, Austria in difficulty, Germany now stopped due to winter, Turkey exhausted after the lightning-fast September offensive of Enver Pasa

In the Caucasus.
Among the not many customers sitting at the tables of the Café Tokatlian in the Grand' Rue de Péra, Dr. Zimmer had no great difficulty in identifying the massive figure half-hidden by the open pages of the «Osmannischer

Lloyd". The unmistakable large shiny skull that protruded above the upper edge of the toglio, the pile of newspapers on the table and the bottle of champagne were more than enough to reveal to him that behind them was the person he was looking for. When he approached, Parvus, or rather Herr Doktor Helphand, laid down the newspaper and appeared to him in all the magnificence of his figure, for him Prussian too soft and ambiguous, and yet irreproachable in the anthracite double-per-to, the pearl brooch on the black polka dot tie, the high white starched collar. Zimmer was there to accompany him to an interview that was of decisive importance for Helphand and that had been granted to him at his pressing request. Together they left the big cafe to go, not far from there, to the Germanic embassy, where Baron von Wangenheim
He was waiting for them.

Here, in a confidential audience at the ambassador, Helphand-Parvus set out for the first time in general terms his plan for the destruction of the Tsarist empire by means of the joint action of the "Prussian bayonet" and the "Russian proletarian punch". "The interests of the German government are identical to those of the Russian revolutionaries," Parvus declared to Wangenheim. "Russian democracy can only achieve its purpose through the annihiation of tsarism and the division of Russia into small states." Germany, however, will not be able to achieve complete success "if it does not succeed in causing a great revolution in Russia. The Russian danger will continue to exist for Germany even after the war until the Russian empire is split into individual parts». The two forces that in Parvus' project were called to operate jointly should have been the central powers and the Russian revolutionaries, in practice Germany and the Bolsheviks, given the pacifist or patriotic attitude

Despite the differences on the concept of party and revolution, Lenin seemed to Parvus the natural candidate for the leadership role. For opposite reasons, his two great accomplices - the Reich and Lenin - would be

You are suspicious, recalcitrant; for opposite respective reasons, unable to fully feel the true nature and to fully measure the stature of that councilor; but, however fearful of losing the chance offered by him, they would have maintained contacts and, from the concrete trust that the Reich would have finally granted to Parvus, Lenin, even under the urgency of events, would have been pushed to move from a detached consensus to more concrete relationships. This story was decisive for the destinies of Lenin and for the story, where he triumphed and Parvus was erased.

According to the report that Wangenheim transmitted in Berlin the next day, Dr. Helphand, "a well-called Russian socialist and publicist", was "absolutely a friend of Germany" since the beginning of the war and he was already owed "valueful services". Helphand asked for "great financial means", he was committed to preparing the unity of the Russian revolutionaries, and assured that "a significant effect not only on the German socialists at the front, but also on his fellow Russian ideas, would have an imperial edict that already took into consideration from now on an improvement in primary schools and a normal working day, as rewards to the Spd for his patriotic attitude".

Helphand immediately set off for Berlin, a trip that included stops in Bucharest and Sofia. On January 9 he was already in Bucharest, where his old friend Christo Rakovski was waiting for him. Since the outbreak of the war, he had fought for the neutrality of the Balkans, of which he dreamed of a future socialist federation, and continued to lead the party and finance his daily with the proceeds of his father's estate on the Black Sea. With Rakov-ski, a cultured and disenchanted man, Parvus could speak in full frankness and without formalities or reticence. Rakovski had an international vision of politics and shared many of Parvus' ideas: his focus on Germany and his plans to undermine Russia did not find him hostile. He was then a precious link between Russian emigrants scattered around Europe and, thanks to his ease, an unsuspected dispenser of funds. In his autobiography, published in 1923 in Kharkov, when he was the leader of the newborn Soviet Ukraine and therefore completely self-confident, Lenin was still alive, Rakovski provided some precise reference points on the Parvus-Lenin-Trocky contacts at the beginning of 1915. He wrote infatri: "In April 1915, at the invitation of the Italian socialist party, I went to the international meeting against the war in Milan. On the way back, stopping in Bern, I met my comrade Lenin and the Swiss Workers' Party. Shortly before I had met Trotsky, who then directed the newspaper "Naše Slo-vo" in Paris." As we have just seen, in January Rakovski had dealt with Par-vus and, as we will see, he would still meet him shortly thereafter, in May, before Parvus met with Lenin.

Romania was traditionally francophile, but had not entered the war from the beginning. As Rakovski wrote: "The Romanian government was waiting for it to be clarified which side would be the victory and from whom it could have been expected more. Romania became the arena where the political aims of the two groups of states at war clashed. The fight was furious». In that situation, Parvus could say he was satisfied with having obtained at least an assurance of neutrality from socialists, such as Dobrogeanu-Gherea and Marinescu, whom he had known for a long time, the first since adolescence in Odessa. Parvus also met the German ambassador in the Romanian capital, von dem Bussche-Haddenhausen. This, an intelligent and concrete man, had cooperated for the "Ukrainian Action" and was also of the opinion that the Revolutionierungspolitik should be conducted with clarity, serious preparation and breadth of means. And he will do it to help concretely with a hundred thousand her the Romanian socialists," meeting Rakovski personally.

After the successful stop in Bucharest, on January 10 Parvus was in Sofia. Here too, as in Bucharest, known and appreciated, he was invited to speak at a demonstration called in the "Nova Amerika" theater by the fraction of the "stretti", that is, the hardies of Bulgarian socialism, supporters of neutrality. Welcomed, when he took the stage, by "stormy applause"," in tribute to his revolutionary pass, he ended his speech that incited Bulgaria to side with Germany in the glacial silence of the hall. A storm of criticism and accusations hit his head in the following days. While the organ of the party "Nove Vreme" attacked him on the ideological level with chauvinist, painting him as the mirror reverse of Plechanov, the strong pro-Russian faction unleashed a campaign of denigration of the figure of Par-vus as a German agent, shady businessman, corrupt speculator. The press campaign against him then went around Europe, feeding on the most diverse sources. Parvus would have responded in October with the article A slanderous undertaking and other subsequent writings."

In Bulgaria, the presence of Parvus had set in motion an advertisement that was not what he wanted. He was not a man of the spotlight, nor a tribune for agitated crowds, even if plauding. Every time he had dared to go out in the open field he had suffered a mental trauma. However, even if his work in Sofia was not a success, little time will pass and Bulgaria will enter the war on the side of the Central Empires.

The journey continued. Budapest saw him for a short stop and fleeting in-

Contri. He continued to Vienna, where he was welcomed by Rjazanov, his former high school classmate in Odessa and leader of the "parvusista" group in Petersburg in 1905. Rjazanov was a valuable connection point for Russian revolutionaries c, like Rakovski, was in direct contact with Trotsky and Martov,

Of which he shared the position of neutrality, but also with Lenin. * He did not formally adhere to Parvus' plan, but he was quite ductile, sharp and biased to understand its scope, and to him above all

Parvus recommended to hear what Lenin thought, who also hoped for the defeat of tsarism, of his great project. They were ballons d'es-sai that he threw - he had already done it with Rakovski and even before through Hanecki - well knowing the suspicious character of the man, especially towards those who, like him, had bitterly fought him with the pen and often preceded him with intuitions. In Vienna, however, Parvus had other meetings, such as the one with Giacinto Serrati. The then director of the «A-

You boast!» He gave him ample assurances, on behalf of the socialists, that Italy would remain neutral. This position was punctually referred to the Germanic ambassador in Vienna, von Tschirsky." Leaving the embassy, he decided to walk and took a long tour of the city. The imprint of the war was printed everywhere, wounded were found, newspapers wrote about Russian attacks in Galicia, persecutions of Jews and subjects of Germanic origin in Russia. But, more than anything else, he was impressed to see in the Untere Wlissgärberstrasse, in front of the military censorship headquarters, the line of people of all walks and ages who went to ask for letters that never arrived and perhaps never sent by the soldiers to the front.

Now he was urgent to reach Berlin, where he was now expected after the report and the warm recommendations of the ambassador to Constantinople Wan-genhcim. He was returning to that Berlin that had seen his first successes as a political journalist, but in which he could not set foot, because he was still formally banned according to the old decree of the Prussian police. And he returned to be received at Wilhelmstrasse, where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was located. Or had he already returned in the summer of 1914 or immediately after, "like a poor devil, illegally or almost", according to what the well-known journalist Maximilian Harden wrote in 1920? In that case, many other assumptions should be taken into account. This time he arrived in Berlin "in the coach-coach of the Turkish finance minister", in his wake, as the socialist deputy Heinrich Ströbel noted on March 3, 1915 after a visit by Parvus to the editorial office of the "Vorwärts"? There are no other testimonies, but both Harden and Ströbel had a strong political aversion towards Parvus: "Full of pride - the latter will write again - he immediately told what an important role he played in Constantinople during the war... But this adventurer with the belly of a Falstatt and the skull of a man with a great brain, with the knowledge of a scientist and the energy af-

* In Vienna, Rjazanov had extensive acquaintances in the political and university world and was friends with the head of the Schober Information Office.

Faristics of a cunning stock market speculator, repels our bureaucrats. In-
Asia Minor this mixture of political leader and captain of industry could be in its place; in Berlin... its time is not yet
Gluntoy."

He was wrong and by a lot. Already at the end of February, Parvus had a decisive interview at Wilhelmstrasse, documented by a telegram sent on February 28 by the undersecretary to the German ambassador in Romania." Kurt Riezler, direct collaborator of the Chancellor, had been summoned for the meeting by the Headquarters in Berlin, and Max Zimmer, former collaborator of Parvus for the "Ukrainian Action", who had just arrived from Constantinople, was also present. The conference of four saw therefore, in the majestic and severe headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the German Empire: the holder in person Minister von Jagow; a high official in charge of the general staff of the Kaiser; a collaborator of the secret Germanic diplomacy and Parvus. On the one hand, three Germans of the most austere tradition; on the other, a cosmopolitan revolutionary from the ghettoes of Belarus, who had Germanized and had become a rich businessman. But he knew how to use his multifaceted qualities.

On the German side, the key personality of the meeting was Riezler. From an ancient and cultured family of the Munich bourgeoisie, a scholar of Greek institutions and political economy, graduated in classical philology, in 1906 he was hired by the Auswärtiges Amt, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany, and had made a lightning career there. He knew all the countries of Europe and many of the East, up to Japan, and had published two important books on political theory" as well as many essays and articles. When Parvus saw him, he thought of the young Byron: the thirty-two-year-old Riezler was of the same romantic and yet icy beauty. But he was even more amazed by his knowledge of Russia and his conviction that the funit belonged to it. He had matured, also from a trip he had made there in 1906 as well as from his readings, the conviction that Russia was invincible, driven by an unstoppable potential, and therefore the main danger for Germany.

It was the thesis that he, Parvus, had come to advocate, and therefore immediately found an ally in Riezler. What divided them was the ultimate goal: he aimed at the revolution; Riezler, a constitutionalist conservative, feared it as a haringer of the end of that world right over monarchies: "Our disaster: preparing the Russian revolution...", he wrote in his diaries on January 11." However, faced with the specter of a victory of the tsar, he was in favor of Parvus' plan and, in front of the hesitant Zimmer and against the suspicious von Jagow, determined the outcome.

Parvus was invited to present a written Memorandum, which was conserv-

Vato and illuminates the interview with direct light, documenting its substance. *" The Memorandum was personally delivered by Parvus on March 9, 1915 and registered on the same day. It was approved by the personalities who had solicited it and made it their own. Ambassador Diego von Bergen was tasked with following it in its implementation. Kurt Riezler, who now held other duties, would have had the central part there from the spring of 1917.

3 The Memorandum of March 9, 1915

Parvus' Memorandum was political and operational at the same time: in essence, a strategy for the overthrow of tsarism, which was at the same time a sum of his political thought and the experiences he accumulated in about half a century of intense and tumultuous existence. The main pillars of the plan were: the mass political strike, which Parvus had always theorized and then saw concretely implemented in the streets of Petersburg during the revolution of 1905; the national movements within the Empire, especially in Ukraine and Finland, which he also repeatedly reported as potential factors in the disintegration of tsarism; the unity, which he had always advocated, of the Russian socialists for an energetic common action against absolutism (although Lenin's Bolsheviks were indicated as the most efficient organization and therefore to be privileged).

The plan was then articulated in a series of tactical initiatives, which also revealed the particular inclinations of the author: the accentuated sensitivity for the aspects of Russian and international public opinion, to which special press campaigns and propaganda materials should be addressed; the direct knowledge of vast areas of Russia: from Siberia - whose importance was emphasized - to the southern area from which he came and to which he had long been close: the neighboring areas of the Balkans and Turkey; the attention paid to the anti-Zarist potential inherent in the large colonies of Russian emigrants in Europe and the United States.

This first Memorandum was probably supplemented by other later plans. In the archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there is, for example, another Memorandum that, although not signed, can be attributed to Parvus for the style of writing and his insistence on the strike as a "fundamental form of the revolution in Russia",** and on the decisive function of the

* The text of the Memorandum is published in the appendix.

** And in this second Memorandum that proposes to "pay every day one ruble and nezzo to every worker on strike in the district of Petersburg

Bolsheviks and Lenin." Parvus was not, of course, the only one to think that the Germans might have an interest in financing subversive actions in Russia during the war. The Ukrainian Union, as we have seen, had already turned to Germany and Austria. In September 1914, an Estonian patriot, who in the early years of the century had been a committed Bolshevik organizer, put himself at the service of Germany for the independence of Estonia and the elimination of Russian rule in Eastern Europe. It was Alexander Kesküla, who met Lenin in Switzerland in that same September and agreed with him to use German funds for his anti-Tsarist operations. The minister

Zimmermann ordered Ambassador Romberg to treat him "in a friendly but dilatory way."

The diversity of Parvus' plan was in its political dimension and in its organicity, as through the social revolution and the independence of the peoples of the empire it aimed to strike the heart of Tsarist absolutism. But, if for Parvus the plan was to culminate in the overthrow of tsarism, for the Germans it was only one of the elements of their war strategy. For some of the Germanic leaders, it had to make the Russian empire tremble but not collapse; make it tremble enough to induce it to that separate peace to which Germany at that time aspired. Already at the end of November '14, the Chief of Staff Falkenhayn had notified the Reich Chancellor that the military situation was serious. The failure of the offensive on the Marne, the Austrian failure in Galicia, the failure of the Turkish offensive in the Caucasus: everything indicated that the war would not have a quick conclusion. Moreover, the tendency of the leading spheres in Germany, at least part of them, was to concentrate the war twists against England and France.

Even in Russia, on the other hand, the awareness that the war would be prolonged had created concern in public opinion and also in the hitherto patriotic political forces. And this nevertheless a relative well-being that was derived above all from the cessation of exports of cereals and other products. As far as the reserves of weapons and ammunition were concerned, however, the situation was disastrous. In that climate, some Bolshevik deputies to the Duma, including the well-known revolutionary Rosen-feld-Kamenev, had been arrested while they were gathered at the Ozerki party conference. * There was again an air of upheavals, as the conference resolution revealed: «... Organize the masses, prepare them for the revolution. Time doesn't wait. The day is near. Remember what happened after the Russo-Japanese war." Count Vitte, who had been ousted from the government, took a position for a separate peace, against war, "predicting great disasters in case of its continuation".

* Holiday resort near the capital.

Parvus' plan came to fit into this situation and for the Germans it was one more opportunity, certainly not despicable, even if they feared the final goals. Even among them there were, however, those who, like the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Arthur Zimmermann, thought: «... According to my conviction, for the very necessity of our conservation we must oppose with all force the cravings of expansionism of Russia. If we do not now settle accounts with our eastern neighbor, we will surely have new difficulties with him and a second war, perhaps already in a few years."

It was Parvus' lifelong thesis; and, when Zimmermann would take over von Jagow as head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he would receive more support. The attitude of the German leaders towards Par-vus was in fact ambiguous; and it can be characterized by these words of Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, then ambassador in Denmark and direct connection of the Germans with Parvus: "It may perhaps be risky to use the forces behind Helphand, but surely it would be an admission of impotence on our part to renounce them for fear of not knowing how to direct them." Each of the parties tried to cheat and play the other, certain to get rid of it whenever she wanted. Be that as it was, at the end of March the diplomats sanctioned their approval of the plan with a first payment of one million marks. According to his wishes, the sum "net of exchange rates" was credited to Parvus in Bucharest, Zurich and

Copenhagen. *

In that month and more of stay in Berlin, Parvus had to fix many chores, first of all re-knot relationships with the Spa. Many changes had taken place in the party: Kautsky had broken away from the center, allying himself with Bernstein and giving the "Neue Zeit" an orientation against supporting the war, while Luxemburg and Mehring had broken with the Spd. The new leaders, such as Haase, Ebert and Scheidemann, knew Parvus only for the bad reputation that had been created for him in Berlin: businessman, suspicious figure, man who had betrayed socialism. Parvus didn't care much about these rumors and judgments: they were old contrasts and conflicts, even character conflicts, that he had always had with German social democracy. Now he was sufficiently self-confident and aware of the acquired status. But cooperation with the Germanic socialists was contemplated in his ambitious plan and was necessary for him in various forms. Of course they did not know, nor should they know anything about his secret contacts with the government. Haase, who was president of the party and one of the biggest supporters of the policy of war, even believed him to be a Russian agent and warned the socialists against meeting him." On this side, however, Parvus managed to quickly climb the slope, earning the trust of the leaders of the party-

To Ebert and Scheidemann and the collaboration of left-wing exponents such as Cunow and Lensch in addition to his old friend Haenisch.

On the other hand, you don't go up the slope on the other side, that of the anti-militarist left. On his first attempt to visit Luxemburg's house, who had also been his close friend, he saw the door slamming in his face without being able to say a word, according to Clara Zetkin's story. A second visit had no better result: "Shortly after his return, he made an attempt in Berlin to regain contact with his friends of the past. It remains uncertain whether he was driven by the desire to justify himself in front of them and himself. It was a few days later that Rosa Luxemburg was arrested and locked up in "women's prison" to serve her year of sentence there. In his home were Leo Jogiches, Karl Liebknecht, a young Russian companion and me. No one invited Parvus to sit down. We asked him if he was not ashamed, as a souteneur of German imperialism, to visit the house of Rosa, the revolutionary fighter who had been thrown into prison by his current friends. At first Parvus tried to play the part of the naive and innocent accused. But, when he was convinced that he had no effect on us with his wits and his ingenious tricks, he showed the other side of the coin and moved on to the attack of our "short-sighted conception, narrow-ed, out of reality, dogmatic-paper". We did not remain indebted in the answer and we treated him in such a way as to make him lose the desire to be seen again»." Luxemburg learned of Parvus' positions in prison and wrote in response the article Una parvuseide published in the "Spartakus Briefe", in which she proclaimed herself contrary for moral reasons. *

Even Trotsky from Paris, where he published the "Nase Slovo" with Martov, had attacked Parvus in an article that appeared on February 14 with the title Epitaph for a living friend. But Trotsky was not so far from Parvus' positions and he himself then told in the memoirs of his life how anti-Russian and Germanophile that paper was. Precisely for this reason, Parvus had referred in his Memorandum to Trotsky as a foothold for the press campaign provided for by his plan. The newspaper, moreover, was financed by Rakovski, as Trotsky himself would have stated after his expulsion from France: a source of funding that, as we have seen, involved Parvus and the plots he woven, together with his friend Rakovski, in Bucharest. However, Trotsky's article was full of praise for the role played in the past by Parvus, the teacher who had taught him to "say complex things with simple words". But now he had become a "political Falstaff", a chuvinist, and "we must put him on the list of political dead". No accusations, however, that he was a cheap agent or a shady figure.

On April 11, on the eve of his departure from Germany to go to settle his affairs in Constantinople, Parvus sent through a man of

Trust a response to Trotsky which was above all a clarification of his political positions. But the "Nase Slovo" did not publish it and so he published it himself in the fall in his new magazine "Glocke". Parvus threw his arguments as a gauntlet. Paraphrasing Marx's sentence on "parliamentary cretinism", he wrote: "Today we are threatened by revolutionary cretinism, that is, ignorance of the course, development and consequences of world catastrophe, and this under the pretext of a pure and universal propaganda of the revolution. This framework also includes other ideological formulas, such as the propaganda of peace during the war, the propaganda of the universal idea of the international. They are all beautiful things and it is always good to show the need for them. But this does not decide the central question that the war has posed to us, it does not free us from the need to take part in the events and to try to influence their course».**a

This, of the concrete and operative intervention in history, instead of abstract and unrealizable pronouncements on questions of principle, was his fixed nail for at least twenty years. But even more explicitly Parvus replied to the accusation of social betrayal: "I remind the Russian comrades how we examined together, at the beginning of the Russian-Japanese war, the plans of the revolt of the war fleet in the Black Sea and saw in the military defeat of the Tsarist army the sign of the victory of the revolution. Now I can only regret that the Turks don't have enough warships to become the masters of the Black Sea... In particular, if Russia seizes Constantinople, the Balkan states will be turned into Russian provinces. This is in contrast to the socialist plans, which are based on a complete development of individual nationalities and their free union. And with clear unscrupulousness he draw the conclusions: "The current war was not a surprise for me. I have repeatedly predicted it and I also knew that the socialist parties would not be able to prevent it. As a resence, I made the war itself the starting point of our tactic.

First of all, the military power of tsarism, the strongest base of the reaction, must be destroyed. For this purpose, we must use the excellent armed organization that the German general staff has forged...».

Parvus also responded to the attacks launched by the Russian patriotic right, and in particular the newspaper "Rossija i Svoboda", which was published in Paris and was directed by G. Aleksinskij, former Bolshevik deputy to the Duma: "I know that I am not indebted to my readers of any response to these in-

Famie. It is also clear where their spear is pointed: through me, the Russian revolutionary movement must be suspected. And the old tactic of the Russian political police». And he noted that that Russian organ of Pa-

* Underlined in the original.

Rigi, who among other things accused Trotsky's organ of national treason, had "Mr. Mussolini among his main collaborators"... «I'm going my own way — Parvus concluded — because I have a mission to complete. This mission is to prepare an ideal union between the German proletariat in arms and the Russian revolutionary proletariat. I will do this and I know that the Russian workers will understand me just as well as the German ones». * It was the path he had chosen immediately after August 4, 1914: until then he had traveled a short but now irrevocable stretch, burning the bridges behind him; the road he would have traveled until December 1917 for the demolition of Tsarism, to the advantage of Lenin. After that date, against Lenin and his dictatorship.

Notes

1 Parvus, EV, P. 128.

2 V.I. Lenin, Soc., III izc., t. 12, p. 130

3 The article was in Turkish and came out on 22-8-1914 with the title The result of the great war. If Germany wins. cir. in SZ, p. 140.

4 Also in Turkish, cit. in SZ, ibidem.

5 Parvus, Na oboronu demokratii - proti carizmu, Constantinople 1914; appeared later on the «Glockc», n. 2, 12-9-1915, pp. 77-85, with the title Für die Demokratie - gegen den Zarismus.

6 V.I. Lenin, Sač., IV izd., t. 21, pp. 9-18. In it.: The imperialist war, Rome 1950, pp. 11-18. Originally: "Socialdemokrat", n. 33, 10-18-1914.

7 Parvus, op. cit., p. 84.

8 Ivi, p. 85.

9 In this context it should be remembered that in those days between July and August 1914 none of the socialist and revolutionary leaders of Europe had yet pronounced on the attitude to be taken. Jcan Jaurés was assassinated on July 31. The illusions about the prevalence of the pacifist line within the socialist parties and about the will of the masses were still strong and widespread. Trotsky also attests this in his memoirs, where, in this regard, he states that "when the issue of the "Vorwarts" announcing the Spd's accession to the war came out, Lenin believed it was a forgery of the German General Staff... so great was still, despite all his critical attitude, the faith in German social democracy... I did not consider it a fake" (L. Trotsky, MZ, 1, pp. 270-71). Trotsky believed he was taking two pigeons with a tava: to present Lenin as a fool and himself as a foresighted. In reality, both Lenin and he - who "is amazed by the festive state of mind aroused by the war" (ibit., p. 269) - were quietly going to Austria and here they were taken by surprise by hostilities: as is known, Lenin was arrested and Trotsky was advised by the chief of the empire police to repair himself as soon as possible in Switzerland. But can you believe that an intelligent man, cunning and suspicious of all danger would be quietly on vacation in a country at war with Russia if he had not had full certainty that he should not fear anything? This certainty was reinforced by the Spd's accession to the war, which Lenin welcomed with joy, because in the first place it greatly increased the possibility of leading Russia to defeat and tsarism to collapse (it was Parvus' line); secondly it offered him the way to discredit the social democrats as chuvinists; thirdly, it allowed him to wait for the events there in Krakow, near the Russian fronciera. Because, when would the Austrian police, knowing him as a sworn enemy of tsarism, would have bothered him especially after the SPD itself supported the

War? This was his mistake and perhaps not even, because the arrest was carried out by a local official, and moreover on complaint by the population who saw him as a Russian spy.

10 N. Krupskaya, Vospominanija Krupskoj, "Pravda", n. 21, 21-1-1931.

11 Immediately after the seizure of power, Lenin sent in great haste to Poronin Haneck to recover him, as the latter attested (J. Ganeckij, O Lenine, Moskva 1933; V poiskach archivov Lenina. Orčet o poezdee v Pol'su po poručeniju Inst. V.I. Lenina, "Don", n. 9, 1965, pp. 109-22). It is obvious that any letters from Parvus, Rakovski, Ryazanov, Trotsky and others, along with all sorts of such documents, have been subtracted from historiography. On the days of Lenin in Poronin, seen as the beginning of the Revolutionierungspolitile, see also: O. Gankin - H. Fisher, The Bolsheviks and the World War, London 1940; A. Scherer • J. Grune-wald, Germany and the problems of peace. Documents extracted from the archives of the German Office of Foreign Affairs. August 1914-January 1917, Paris 1962; P.P. Mcl'gunov, ZNK; B. Niki-

Cin, RG, pp. 235-36; G. Katkov, 1917 RF; M. Futrell, NU. The same entry visa of Lenin into Switzerland, after his release in Austria by order of the Minister of the Interior von Stürgck, you obtained quickly and without formalities thanks to Karl Moor, a publicly known Swiss socialist and secretly German and Austrian double agent under the pseudonym "Herr Maier", as well as a Bolshevik agent (cf. op. cited).

12 In addition to the op. cit. in note 11 see: Z.A.B. Zeman, GRR; W. Hahlweg, LRR; F. Fi-scher, Griff nach der Weltmacht, Düsseldorf 1962 (in Italian: Assault on World Power, Turin 1965); E. Zechlin, Friedensbestebungen und Revolutionierungsversuche, cit.; G. Bonnin, Les Bol-chéviques et l'argent allemand during the premiere guerre mondiale, cit.; K. Riezler, TAD, cit.; H Björkegren, RP, cit.; G. Katkov, German Foreign Office Documents on Financial Support to the Bolsheviks in 1917, cit., in addition to Soviet literature that concerns the subject without designating it or polemically.

13 Parvus, IKW, p. 21; Pgk, p. 20.

14W. Hahlweg, LRR, p. 39 (Documents No. 1 and No. 2) .

15 Unpublished documents of the AA. Tlg. No. 362 of 22-7-1914 in Germany no. 128

Go. Cit. in ZS, p. 132.

16 Parvus, EV, Pp. 126-27.

17 For the figure of M. Zimmer, his collaboration with Parvus and the activity of Hankie wicz cfr. SZ, p. 146 and ZS, p. 134-35 with references to diplomatic documents between Ambassador Pallavicini and Vienna.

18 Later also published in Terman with the title Meine Stellungnahme zum War. I. Vorrede zu der ukrainischen Ausgabe der Schrift: "Für die Demokratie - gegen den Za-rismus", "Glocke", n. 4, pp. 148-55. The quotes are from this text. For the Ukrainian text

Cf. Bible.

19 Pallavicini to the Austrian Foreign Minister, Tlg. No. 837 of 11-17-1914, HHuStA, Krieg 18b, 902. Cit. in SZ, p. 147. See also: R. Kühlmann, Erinnerungen, Heidelberg 1948: 12. Nadolny, Mein Beitrag, Wiesbaden 1955.

20 K. Hänisch, PBE, p. 31.

21 Report of von Wangenheim to the AA of 8-1-1915, in ZGRR, Document no. 1

22 Ch. Rakovski, op. cit., PP. 35 ss .

23 Von dem Bussche all'AA, Tlg. No. 42 of 13-1-1915, in ZGRR, Doc. No. 84

24 D. Blagoev, Plechanov i Parvus in Izbr. proiz., Sotija 1951, PP. 665-70 5.

25 Parvus, EV, 'Glocke', pp. 123-30, as well as: IKW, Pgk, ME 5.

26 On Rjazanov and Parvus in Vienna cf.: Nachlass Helphand, Rep. 92, Hauptarchiv Berlin; R. Abramowitsch, op. cit., I, pp. 372-374. Sull'incontro con G. Serrati cfr.: *Akten des AA*, von Tschirsky al Cancelliere Bethman-Hollweg, 10-2-1915, cit. in *ZS*, p. 143.

27 Cfr.: M. Harden, *Gold oder Weihrauch*, «Die Zukunft», Berlin, B. 108, gennaio-marzo 1920, p. 11; H. Ströbel, *Helphand-Parvus*, «Weltbühne», n. 51, Berlin, 11-12-1919, pp. 713-14. Note the concomitance of the two articles.

28 The Undersecretary of the AA a von dem Bussche, Tlg. n. 266 of 28-2-1915, Akren des AA, Romania no. 10 «The Romanian press», cit. in SZ, p. 158.

29 K. Riezler, Über Finanzen und Monopole in alsen Griechenland, München 1907; Die Er-Forderlichkeit des Unmöglichen, Munich 1913.

30 K. Riezler, TAD, pp. 241 c 243.

31 Memorandum of Dr. Helphand. Preparation of a political Mass strike in Russia, 9-3-1915, in Akten des AA. Pubbl. in ZGRR, Appendix i [trans. ingl.]; SZ, pp. 361 ss. [orig. ted.]. For the evaluation of the Parvus plan see, in addition to SŹ and ZS, also: F. Fischer, op. cit.; G. Katkov, op. cit.; E. Bettiza, The mystery of Lenin, Milan 1982.

32 Akten des AA, WK 11 c secr., n. 7122. Cit. in SZ, p. 217.

33 M. Futrell, NU, p. 145 and the entire cap. "The Ingenious Estonian". See also no. 14.

34 Cit. in S.S. Ol'denburg, *251R*, p. 546 n.

35 M. Paléologue, *L'écroulement du tzarisme*, op. cit., p. 231.

36 E. Zechlin, *Friedensbestrebungen und Revolutionierungsversuchen*, in «Beilage zu das Parlament», 17-5-1961, Pp. 275-77.

37 Letter of 14-8-1915, Akten des AA. In ZGRR, Document no. 5.

38 Frölich of the Ministry of Finance in von Bergen, 26-3-1915. Files of the AA. GRR, Document no. 3.

39 Estate Südekum, n. 161, Federal Archives Koblenz. Cit. in SZ, ibidem; ZS, p. 154.

40 C. Zerkin, Helphand-Parvus, "The Communist International", Moscow-Berlin, No. 1, 1925, p. 90.

12 Parvus, offener Brief am de et ong ord de pour i Paris, aGlocke», 1915, pp. 148-

62 pass. The following quotes refer to this article.

43 Parvus, EV, pp. 129-30.

Chapter eight
Conspiracy and diplomacy

1 Al Baur au Lac in Zurich

During the long journey that in mid-April 1915 took Parvus again from Berlin to Constantinople, where he stayed a few weeks, and then to Bucharest, important events changed the scenery and course of the war. In East Prussia and Galicia, the Germans had switched to the offensive with a new technology consisting of "hurricane fire". Only in the Dunacc sector in a few hours 700 mi-

The artillery blows: how much Russian factories could produce in ski months. The Germanic phalanx advanced relentlessly and in June the Russians were already counting the losses in 4 million deaths and one and a half million prisoners. Just on April 23, the tsar had gone as a triumphant to that city of Lviv, for the Russians L'vov, which in May would again be the Austrian Lemberg. With his august presence, believing those territories acquired forever, the tsar had sanctioned the crazy policy of forced evacuation, in 24 hours, of entire populations, especially Jews, Galicians, Poles, causing in the rear a chaotic wave of millions of hungry and exacerbated refugees, which paralyzed military transport.

In Russia there was talk of treason. On April 30, the large ammunition factory on the Ochta river in Petrograd* blew up and the roar was heard within a radius of tens of kilometers. The Minister of the Navy Grigorovič wrote to Prime Minister Goremykin: "Based on the most recent information I have received, the manifestation of the agitation is due to the activity of emissaries of the powers at war against us, which do not shy away from resorting to such unworthy devices". War Minister Suchomlinov was suspected of conspiracy with the Germans and sabotaging supplies; his protégé Mjasoedov, colonel of counterintelligence, was tried and hanged on the field on charges of transmitting news to the Germans during the battle in Masovia.' Subsequently, the situation would continue to ag-

* Since the beginning of the war the capital had been renamed like this to climate Germanism Burg-

Burdened with new defeats, mass demonstrations and looting in Moscow and other cities, voices of connivence with the enemy of court circles, at the head the German tsarina, already plagiarized by Rasputin.

The nation's confidence was lacking, people began to feel the deprivations of war. In June, the Liberals asked for a "ministry of public trust", rejected by the tsar, who in August assumed supreme command after the Germans had conquered Warsaw, Brest and Riga. Italy's entry into the war on May 24, when Austria had recovered from the collapse of March, did not in any way ease the pressure on Russia. On September 2, the French ambassador to Petrograd would have written: "An idea, which had been outlined in me for some time, imposes itself imperiously: Russia cannot bring back victory and tsarism is in danger of death".' Yet the resources of the "mainland Russia" were such that the Germans rightly thought they still needed Parvus and eversion.

Under the pressure of events, towards mid-May Parvus left Bucharest for Switzerland, where he intended to have a conversation with Lenin, whom he had already made known about his plan through Rakovski and Rjazanov. In the Romanian capital he had met his friend Christo and the German ambassador von dem Bussche again. From there, from Romania, the action provided for in its Memorandum towards the Russian ports of the Black Sea had begun, even if Romanian neutrality was already hanging in favor of the Agreement. Rakovski, moreover, was in contact with Trotsky in Paris and a liaison with his newspaper. It is not for nothing that Parvus had also been credited in Bucharest with a share of the million marks assigned to him in March in Berlin.

Another share awaited him in Zurich, where he had many things to do, especially seeing Lenin and recruiting Russian revolutionaries for his plan. In Zurich was, in addition to Fürstenberg-Hanecki, who would become his greatest collaborator, also Karl Sobelsohn-Radek, his great estimer. Both at that time were intimate with Lenin and his trusted men in the Polish Socialist Party, but Radek was politically more autonomous and prominent figure. Just thirty years old, Austrian-hungarian subject, scalp and glasses, restless eyes, loved jokes, and Lenin often did not hide annoyance for his sarcastic and provocative tone, as well as for the eternally lit pipe in his mouth. In Germany, Radek had made a name for himself in the Spd as an extremist, unscrupulous and a bit cynical, as well as a brilliant journalist and a quality politician. With sarcasm he said he was

«A Polish sheep from the Habsburg flock».

«Radek told many things about Parvus - recalled an executive of the

Jewish Bund, A. Litwak, then in Zurich — to him a man of great abilities, but dissolute, scoundrel and unfair to women. Radek knew him beautifully in all his flaws and yet he talked about it with

Great human warmth. Even of his faults spoke benevolently, as one speaks of the defects of a person we love. It seemed to me that the reason for this sympathy for Parvus was in the fact that even in Radek there was a lot of Parvus. He was in close relations with the German government. According to Radek, even with the German army. Fürstenberg-Hanecki worked at the service of Parvus and I must add that Radek was close to both». And also: "In Zurich there was a moment when it not only seemed to me that Radek was willing to actively cooperate with Austria for the realization of his political plans"'

But if Radek had made Parvus a legendary figure among the Russian emigrants of Zurich and Bern, when he arrived in mid-May, the impression he made exceeded all expectations. He occupied a suite at the Hotel Baur au Lac, the most luxurious in Zurich, in Bellevueplatz, so called for the view he enjoyed on the lake, and he was never alone, but accompanied by a procession of secretaries, galloping and young women. Opulence hovered around him, and flaunted it like an oriental sheikh. It was not a staging to make a sensation, but his way of living for a couple of years now, since a heritage had been built in Turkey. Rumors about his wealth grew in the colony of emigrants when Katja Groman, his companion at the time of the 1905 revolution and mother of his second son born in prison, began to distribute large subsidies for revolutionaries in conditions of need. With this gesture Parvus granted himself the pleasure of popularity, but he also prepared the ground for the drawing that was close to his heart.

To implement his plan, in fact, he had to enlist people willing to travel to the Balkans, Scandinavia and also Russia. And he was also looking for culturally qualified elements for an institute of social studies that he intended to create in Copenhagen. Katja or "Volnà"* according to her battle name, was also a scholar as well as her loyal and faithful friend, despite the fact that their love story was now a distant memory, and she was therefore the most suitable and confident person for such assignments. That's why he had kept her in mind when the big business began, and she would be his precious collaborator even in the following years. But also of the Menshevik lawyer, Vladislav Gustavovic Groman, the husband from whom she had divorced more than ten years earlier, was well present in Parvus the address in Petersburg:

Via Sadovaja 9, tel. 23946°

Together with Groman, Parvus showed up with a cigar in his mouth in the small place in Bern, where he knew that Russian refugees were having lunch and, among them, Lenin and his entourage. The appearance of that man dressed as a minister, with a massive build, the big almost bald head, the big

* "The wave", but also, with a slight difference in pronunciation, "free".

Fluid and magnetic eyes raised a lot of surprise. He was a completely unusual character in a cheap Gasthaus*. Even his question if Lenin was there and where he was aroused amazement, because not many of the customers knew who Lenin was. But he was there, and he ate in the company of Krupskaja, Inessa Armand and Kasparov.
There are various interpretations about the ways and terms in which the conversation between Lenin and Parvus took place, which are all based on only two sources: what Parvus wrote about it and what the Estonian Bolshevik Arthur Siefeldt wrote about it, ** Kesküla's trusted man and close to Lenin a

Bern. Lenin never wrote anything about it, and even today communist historiography is reticent about that encounter and would deny it, if it were not for the undeniable testimony of Siefeldt. In 1924, shortly after Lenin's death, he published a moving obituary in a Baku newspaper." Perhaps in that city thousands of kilometers away from Moscow, in the atmosphere of mourning for the death of the leader, the local censorship did not realize the importance of what it had published; perhaps it was Stalin who ordered the publication to discredit Lenin and Parvus himself: he already dominated the party and was preparing to launch the attack on Trotsky. Only thanks to this do we have a document that, compared to the testimony of Parvus, provides proof of the meeting between the two men and the place where it took place, as well as some elements about the content of the interview.

This is how Siefeldt described Parvus when he showed up at the club: "An exceptionally fat and pot-bellied man like a full sack, with a bouncing belly. On the chubby face stood out the very expressive and intelligent eyes»? He then told that Parvus approached Lenin, had the consent for an interview, after which Lenin and Krupskaja came out, followed by Parvus.
The other diners and also him, Siefeldt, although devoured by curiosity, continued lunch. The historic interview took place at Lenin's house, Distel-weg 11. Only later did Lenin tell Sieteldt that Parvus was an agent of Hindenburg and a social-shovinist - the same things he would have written in November on the "Social-Demokrat" - that he didn't want to have anything to do with Parvus, that he hadn't let him finish talking and had put him at the por-

Ta, telling him not to be seen again.
And this is Parvus' version: "I met Lenin in the summer of 1915 in Switzerland. I exposed to him my considerations on the social-revolutionary consequences of the war and I also pointed out to him that, as long as the war had lasted, there would be no revolution in Germany; that a revolution at that time was possible only in Russia and would be discovered

* Restaurant.
** A. Simunjasj in Estonian and A. Rudol'fovič Zitel'de in Russian.

Flat as a result of the German victory. But he dreamed of publishing a communist magazine with which he believed he could immediately pull the European proletariat out of the trenches and push it to revolution."

To his grandiose plan Parvus saw the project of a magazine opposed! Of course Lenin did not intend to discover the cards, but he did not have at his disposal much more than a small organization of Bolsheviks in Russia, with whom he communicated through the Northern Underground, entrusted to Krupskaja-Sljapnikov-Kollontaj. Parvus commented: "The war was expanding, destroying the borders of the states and annihilating the social structures.

Lenin stayed in Switzerland and wrote articles that almost never left the circle of emigrants. It was completely cut off from Russia, bottled." As for the network to be organized and made to act in Russia, this was contemplated in Parvus' plan: he had already started it and soon from Scandinavia it would receive great impetus. Even the action to make the soldiers abandon the trenches, not generically in all countries - which was pure utopia - but by Russian soldiers to turn them against tsarism, was part of that plan, but with great means and concrete interventions, not with wishful appeals.

Use Germany's support for this? It certainly wasn't

Lenin who worried about it and shed away from it: as long as, of course, nothing came to the surface. And if Parvus was now necessarily acting in the open, as a "Germanic agent", it took another who could be the spotless revolutionary in the fight against tsarism. In his plan it was to be Lenin who, among the first things, had to unify all the Russian socialist forces in the au-spicated congress. But Lenin had already made it known that he didn't even want to hear about a congress, and he probably also reiterated it in the interview, squinting in front of Parvus and the smoke of his Brazilian cigar those "red-golden lemur eyes with stiletto pupils", as the writer Kuprin defined them.'

2 Lenin and Parvus: what did they say?

How did things really go? If the interview had really taken place as Siefeldt reports in his agiographic account and as Lenin wanted him to believe, there would have been no need for so much secrecy. If Lenin really wanted to let everyone know that he did not accept any relationship with Parvus, that the bridges between them were broken forever, it would have been more suitable for the purpose of having witnesses, to have at least Ha-necki attend the interview, Siefeldt himself, also Radek, in addition to Krupskaja and Inessa. And all the

Party would soon know that Lenin had slammed the door in the face of Parvus So why so much secrecy?

It can also be assumed that everything took place in a completely different way: for example, that Parvus' sensational entrance to the venue was simply a staging, perhaps agreed, to mislead the al-

Tri, perhaps Siefeldt himself, who was also Kesküla's intermediary between Lenin and the Germans. And the same goes for what Lenin then told Siefeldt.

It may be that the interview took place at another time, before or after, it doesn't matter much. If it is true that in the summer of 1914 Parvus went to Berlin, he may have already met Lenin in Austria. In any case, she could easily have met him in the next two years, since it is proven that he went to Switzerland, as in Eastern Europe to Istanbul, traveling with a Reich service passport. Parvus was also well known to Lenin's extreme conspiracy caution, which he would hardly have risked breaking, presenting himself in that showy form in the modest Swiss Ga-sthaus: the "Lenin pawn" was central to his plan and he would have had no interest in playing it like this for free, even at the cost of sacrificing a certain taste in exhibitionism.

It is likely that many things did not go in the right direction in that conversation. There were deep differences between the two men in character, custom, way of living and thinking, which prompted mutual dislike and even physical aversion. There were, even more profound and motivated, theoretical and political differences, which arose since 1902, after the brief collaboration in Munich, cemented in years of controversy and still more alive than ever. Precisely in relation to this interview, Parvus, would then have provided this summary:

".. The reader knows that, between me and the Bolsheviks, although they also acted for Russia's military defeat, there was a difference of opinion. I took into account the determining factors - economic, political, military - of the correlation of forces, of any results. For the Bolsheviks on the contrary, for this and everything else there was always a ready answer: revolution»." Lenin knew that for Parvus the revolution was instead a "process" and he could well fear that in this process a situation would be determined in which not him and his party would be hegemonic, but a complex of forces and men: the Mensheviks and others, but above all Parvus with his powerful mind and theoretical ability and with the means that he now had at his disposal to such a significant extent, enormously superior to his own. He was still suffering from the lesson of 1905, when Parvus and Trotsky had displaced him in the prediction and conduction of events, exalting the soviet and marginalizing his party. But there was the other most serious weakness, that of the party that does not exist or almost. And precisely in this condition surrender to Parvus?

On the other hand, precisely because of his weakness, he could not reject

The immense chance offered by him, even though it is dangerous for its very overreathing dimension. And here we come to the points on which Parvus and Lenin probably agreed in that conversation, as subsequent events would have partly demonstrated. Not the acceptance of the general plan, as Parvus had designed it with a wealth of details and details; not a global pact, but a sectoral agreement, on individual points, Lenin reserving all freedom of withdrawal and termination. First of all, no ideological contusion, no compromise on the principles: he would have attacked him as a chuvinist to mark his distance and cover himself behind his back. And so he did: only once in less than two pages of newspaper" (nor would he ever take the pen against him again, not even when, in the summer of '17, the entire Russian press and the Intesa accused him of having sold himself to Parvus and Germany). Secondly, no encroachment of Parvus in the party. However, he accepted that one of his most trusted and capable men worked with him, which was Fürstenberg-Hanecki. He did not exception on other choices, except Bucharin, because he knew he was too influenced and lost in the clouds of theory, while he had nothing to complain about for Urickij, Čudnovskij in Scandinavia, Kozlovskij in Petrograd, for contacts with Rjazanov in Vienna and Rakovski in Bucharest: all men of the king, that the winning king would one day recover, including Hanecki, the most exposed. And this suggests, retrospectively, that Lenin had not "ceded" Jakub to Parvus, but that he was in 1915-17 their common man: as Fürstenberg collaborator of Parvus, as Hanecki agent of Le-

Nin. And that Parvus also made his network of agents in Russia, he too agreed with all the objectives of his plan, from strikes to sabotage, from robberies to propaganda. The party had always acted like this (he, Le-nin, had never appreciated Kant's rule of doing in politics only what can be said publicly), but the party had nothing to do with Parvus. His action could be parallel and contacts were to be held only through Hanecki. Neither Sljapnikov, nor the Kollontaj, the people entrusted with the links between emigration and the Bolshevik clandestinity in Russia, nor Bucharin up there in Scandinavia should have known anything.

Parvus insisted that the situation in Russia could precipitate and tended to set the date of the revolution for January 9, 1916, the eleventh anniversary of the Bloody Sunday; and therefore Lenin could not stay in Switzerland, he had to be close to the place of events, ready to leave, and therefore he had to move to Scandinavia. Playing on the defeat that Lenin still felt for having arrived late in 1905, on the expectations that the new Russian defeats also aroused in him, Parvus hoped to take him to his side. But Lenin, in the fact that Parvus settled in Denmark the

His headquarters, probably saw for himself a serious danger: the geographical proximity could unite the two names, which he wanted to avoid; and moreover Parvus, immoderate in gestures and risky in action, could involve him in a situation of complicity and de facto dependence. The Krupskaya had already written to Kollontaj for accommodation in Scandinavia-via," but now this was proving to be too risky. Still at the end of August, a letter from Śljapnikov on headed paper from the Bureau of the Posdr(b) to the leader of the Swedish socialist left Branting, whom he asked to probe the ground for a residence permit "with our editorial offices", revealed the intention of a transfer to the north." In the end, the decision to stay in Switzerland prevailed in Lenin; one day not far away, as we will see, he would have bitterly repented, and then he would have desperately needed Parvus.

Parvus therefore came out of the interview with a half success or failure, depending on the points of view. Lenin did not want to become his partner and so he lacked the leader of the toughest and most experienced professional revolutionaries, with what followed as a capacity for influence and radius of action. But Lenin allowed a pact of secret and silent complicity, which meant a relationship, it meant that from that side came the green light for the Revolutionierungspolitik; it meant that with the evolution of events new possibilities would open up, and the evolution of events was what Parvus had always trusted.

As for the money that Lenin would receive from the Germans through

Parvus, or other intermediaries, the evidence exists only for the period after April 1917, but it is not excluded that some funding would have been disbursed even earlier, taking into account Lenin's extraordinary conspiracy ability. The financial channels created by Parvus with Russia came into operation already in the summer of 1915, but it is unlikely that, until Lenin's return to Petrograd, they would also supply the Bolshevik party, as evidenced by its inactivity in the early years of the war. Lenin, on the other hand, living in Switzerland, had every opportunity to contact his emissaries traveling through Europe, primarily Georg Sklarz, but also his brothers Heinrich and Waldemar. They were all German agents. ® Gcorg met Dora Dolina in Switzerland. Costei, who already worked clandestinely for Lenin in Krakow, was the wife of Agent Dolin and also linked to Zino-v'ev-Aptelbaum, who had joined Lenin in Switzerland from London, and had become his right-hand man. Moreover, in addition to Parvus, Hanecki also went to Switzerland." Many of the complicated connections that worked at that time remain difficult to ascertain, since they took place through personal contacts or letters intended for destruction as soon as they were read.

It is also to be taken into account that already the Estonian Bolshevik Kesküla, in contact with the Germans, through Siefeldt paid funds for the organization

Bolshevik. Through Kesküla, in September 1915, Lenin would have transmitted to Romberg, German ambassador to Bern, his peace plan in case of Bolshevik victory. According to Germanic documents, it seems that in that summer 1915 Lenin played at least two horses in his contacts with the Germans: Parvus and Kesküla. Ambassador Romberg transmitted to the Chancellor of the Reich "the program of the well-known Russian revolutionary Lenin", had by Kesküla, which included among other things: separate peace, republic, full autonomy of nationalities, renunciation of Constantinople and the Dardanels, entry of the Russian army into India. But "Lenin personally seems to judge the prospects of the revolution quite critically," the ambassador continued. «He seems to fear very much the campaign of the so-called social patriots... who have great means that come openly from the government... According to Kesküla, it would therefore be urgently necessary to immediately help the Leninist current in Russia...»." On the dispatch there was the inscription "Geheim!" (Secret!).

It is not unlikely that Lenin, through contact with Kesküla, thought he could bypass Parvus, a personality that is too strong and therefore fearsome. When he met him in June, he certainly trusted the connections offered to him by Kesküla, who had been following him since September of the year before.

From here could derive his reticences in the interview with Parvus, who however did not want to reject definitively. But in Berlin they had already made their choice, which Ambassador Romberg in Bern still did not know, and in fact they answered him a few days later not to say a word about anything and not to undertake anything." The choice was for Parvus, whose plan, as we have seen, had already had approval and a first financing in the spring. There was no possibility of comparison between his personality and his project and the small cabotage work of Kesküla, who was only interested in the independence of his Estonia. At Wilhelmstrasse and the general staff they realized this and from that moment on Kesküla would have had a marginal share, until in the winter of 1915-16 he left Switzerland for Scandinavia and in November '16 he interrupted contacts with the Germans, dedicating himself independently to the cause of Estonian independence.

After the interview with Parvus, Lenin went on vacation to the mountains between Bern and Lucerne. Parvus arrived in Copenhagen in early June with some of the first collaborators for the founding research institute. In addition to the Groman, they were: Grigorij Cudnovsky, a follower of Trotsky (who in October '17 would have been at the head of the Bolshevik assault on the Winter Palace); Aršak Zurabov, an Armenian former Menshevik deputy at the Du-ma; Vladimir Perazic. They would have been joined by other recruits in Scandinavia, first of all Moisej Urickij, a Ukrainian Jew from Cerkassy, who was then a follower of Trotsky, as well as I. Kiselev and M. Sukennikov. But Par-

Vus had difficulty completing the staff of his institute because of the campaign that, once again from Paris, Alexinsky had orchestrated against him, accusing him of being an agent of the German government. Against Alek-sinskij there was however a protest of emigrated Russians and Martov also took the defense of Parvus. * In mid-June Jakub Fürstenberg also arrived in Scandinavia and on the 22nd Parvus met in Stockholm the secretary of the Swedish socialist party Fredrik Ström, among other friends of Kolontaj and Belenin-Šljapnikov. He told him about his nascent research institute and told him that Lenin also intended to settle there and would arrive as soon as possible. On the same day Ström wrote about this meeting to Hjalmar Branting, the dean of Swedish socialism, who had always helped Russian revolutionaries against tsarism, stating that they would have to come face to face for things that could only be dealt with with you."

3 The Copenhagen Research Institute

For decades, since the time of Bakunin, Scandinavia has been an ideal terrain for all kinds of illegal activities towards Russia: smuggling of weapons, men and ideas, secret correspondence, clandestine press. From Sweden, along various more or less secret routes, you could easily reach Russia through Finland, from which Petersburg was a few steps away. Scandinavia was also an open door to England, the United States; through Denmark it communicated quickly with Germany. During the war it tingled with journalists, spies, businessmen,

Agents of all kinds.

Not surprisingly, therefore, Parvus chose the city of Copenhagen as the place of his activities. At the end of July, his "Institute for the study of the social consequences of war" was established* based in the most central

Østerbrogade. Under his presidency, it developed rapidly, thanks also to the collaboration of prof. Karl Larsen and Secretary Svend Trier, a well-known Danish socialist. In addition to the Russian emigrants, an employee in Scandinavia, Marta H., also worked there. Döhring Wulfrath, and August Mai, correspondent for Germany. Soon a bulletin was published that updated on social, political and financial changes in warring nations, collecting extensive statistical and economic material. Parvus, to whom the management of the institute cost about 40 thousand Danish crowns per month, in addition to the extraordinary expenses, wanted to make it the center of international studies he had always dreamed of. Even with clenched teeth, Kautsky welcomed the initiative on the "Neue Zeit"; scholars and publications from many countries, including

The English "Statesman Yearsbook", they used it in abundance in the five years of its existence; Parvus himself used it for some of his works in the post-war period.

If on behalf of the institute some collaborators had initially been approached by him in Switzerland and elsewhere, who then carried out the activities related to his great plan or other commercial initiatives, the institute of studies remained as such and was never used as a cover of convenience. It was even born without the knowledge of the Germans: still on September 18, at a request for intormation from Berlin, the German ambassador in Copenhagen had denied its existence. Despite being in close contact with him for his plan, Parvus had not yet told him anything about that initiative that he wanted strictly scientific. The ambassador only later discovered his existence; and in January 1916 he communicated to Berlin that the activities of the Parvus institute were quite relevant and that they could not be denied a certain scientific value." Parvus cared so much about the moral inexpectability and seriousness of his institute that he challenged, through Zurabov, the usual Aleksinsky, who on the "Humanité" of October 19 had been detined by an organization of spies, to submit to the judgment of the party in Switzerland. * It was Berlin who advised him not to draw too much attention to himself.

They were other organizations, such as commercial companies and ex-port-import companies, through which Parvus carried out the plan exposed in the

Memorandum for subversion in Russia. Already on July 9 he obtained the authorization for a company of posters and billboards, which gave a safe yield and serves as a cover. He had then founded the Handels-og-Exsportkom-pagniet,* which would be the main channel of rivo-luzionarie smuggling, especially of men and money, and at the same time a large business headquarters with high earnings. Here his men were, in addition to Fürsten-berg, the Sklarz brothers; and in Petrograd, the lawyer Kozlovskij, Evgenija Su-menson and others, including, later, also the lawyer and senator Sokolov.

At the beginning of August, an old acquaintance of his from Constantinople, Dr. Zimmer of the secret diplomacy of the Reich, visited him in Copenhagen to check, on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the profitability of the work. And Dr. Zimmer, in addition to reporting on the consistency of Parvus' activities, in particular on the network of links created in Russia, added that he also discussed it with the ambassador in Copenhagen and concluded:

«Count Brockdorff-Rantzau attaches great importance to the work and... has the impression that he has set the task in a brilliant way. On the ground of a two-day conversation I was able to convince myself that P. uses all his energy in the direction of concor-

* Trade and export company (in Danish).

Given in Constantinople and Berlin, and that it is to be expected that the work will lead to the results that we have proposed." It was in fact the way in which Parvus had conceived and organized his business, through a skillful combination of politics and acts, that produced a huge impression

On his German interlocutors.

But Parvus was in a race against time. The German government and staff had welcomed with interest and supported his plan in the early months of 1915 and, as has been seen, continued to follow its implementation. At that time, the hopes for a quick and decisive war had proved to be fallen, but now, in the summer-autumn, the situation had turned upside down. Having had to leave Warsaw, Poland and Lithuania to the Gulf of Riga, Russia seemed on the eve of the collapse. Many in Germany thought that the "Russian danger" was water in the past. Even in the high spheres, Foreign Minister Count von Jagow and Reich Chancellor Bethmann-Hol-lweg seemed less and less to share the idea of taking down the Tsarist Empire.

In May, almost on the same days that Parvus had met Lenin in Bern, von Jagow had an interview in Berlin with Marija Vasil'čikova, the tsarina's lady-in-waiting. She had been surprised by the war in Austria, in her estate in Semmering, and here kept virtually prisoner, but with the utmost consideration, as a possible connection with the Tsarist court. Of the three letters that at German request she wrote to the tsar in per-

Sona, the last one of May 27 said that the Foreign Minister von Jagow had asked her to communicate to Moscow that "Germany sincerely wants to end the war", and that "it considers a continuation of the war dangerous for the dynasty". The tsar then replied with a refusal, but such attempts will be repeated again.

Von Jagow, a strict and intelligent representative of the old aristocratic world and the political balances based on monarchies, saw with fear the possibility of a collapse of tsarism, behind which he foresaw the end of the central empires and traditional society. He hated Parvus and figures like him, whom he considered revolutionary mestatori, with the purpose of breaking down the thrones. The chancellor, the foreign minister, with their separate peace plans with Russia, were therefore the antagonists of Parvus and his plan, those he had to beat over time. In this he found an ally in Count Brockdorff-Rantzau.

Since the first interview at the end of July '15, the Rede-sco ambassador in Copenhagen was so favorably impressed by Helphand, who immediately referred to Berlin." In his reports he expressed himself in completely laudatory terms and spoke of Helphand as "a very expert connoisseur of Russia and the entire Balkans", "a conscious politician of great stature", "an exceptionally important man, of which

Extraordinary energy, in my opinion, we absolutely must use ourselves for the duration of the war and, if possible, even later, whether or not we personally agree with his convictions».

By origin, education and culture Brockdorff was very far from Par-vus, yet he understood him, supported him and became more and more friends with him. He came from a noble family from Holstein, related to the Danish royal house; he had already been an ambassador to Petersburg, where he was keenly interested in the new Russia that was emerging; he was an aristocrat and a Guglielmine official, but a temporally sensitive man, full of curiosity and rich in irony. When they met, Parvus was forty-eight years old, the ambassador five younger, a difference not too big even if enough not to make him two peers. Perhaps Parvus' greater experience, perhaps his bursting personality somehow fascinated the count who, tall, almost hieratic, sober in bearing and gestures, was physically the exact opposite of the burly wandering Jew who weighed over a quintal: a strong drinker and gourmet, but also a cultured and thin man, sharp theoretical and fine essayist.

On two essential points they agreed almost immediately in their talks that lasted until late hours: that Russia had to be defeated and Germany to triumph; that an insurrection in Russia would be the fastest and most effective way to achieve German victory and a new development of Russia. Brockdorff also warmly supported Parvus' project to found his own journal of social and political studies. The organization was in fact now on its feet, the activities in Russia were well underway, there was still a lack of a press campaign that, leveraging the traditional aversion of European socialists to zarism, convinced them that Germany's war identified itself with the ends of socialism and helped them. Parvus had already explained this need in the talks with Zimmer, who had reported it to Berlin:

"Parvus expects a lot from the fact that he can intervene openly. Then the movement will begin its flow so that the various currents can be unified." And, in mid-August, Brockdorff announced the arrival of Parvus to

Berlin, recommending to favor the magazine's project in every way, since only the first part of its plan had been launched and it was not necessary to compromise its further developments. Having learned of the intentions of the high Germanic spheres to at least attempt a separate peace with Russia, and this also in order to focus on the Western front, Parvus mobilized Brockdorff in defense of his plan. He made him observe, so that he would make it clear to Berlin, that the revolution in Russia was inevitable and the position of the tsar so weakened that he could not offer a separate peace that could be trusted. The plans of the Germanic general staff therefore had to be coordinated with his plan, that is, with the Revolutionierungspolitik

That Germany had chosen to organize with him. He explained that the war "politically would be lost for us, even if militarily won, in case the Dardanellis fell". The German army had to attack to the south to conquer the Donec basin, a vital mining and industrial center for Russia, and give Serbia a blow to ease the pressure on Turkey."

When he was received at the Foreign Ministry on August 13, by Undersecretary Zimmermann and other officials, he also obtained consent for the publication of his magazine in Germany. From Broc-kdorff's correspondence it appears that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Staff did not raise objections; instead, the Ministry of the Interior was against it, which feared the effects of a mobilization of German and Curopei socialists against tsarism, but these perplexities, judged by the ambassador to be unilateral and short-sighted, were silenced.

However, the Russian rulers had begun to smell something. Already in April, as we have seen, a few weeks after Parvus had presented his memorandum in Berlin, the Minister of the Navy Grigorovich reported that the agitation was due to emissaries of the enemy powers, and in August he declared to the Council of Ministers: "The Germans are carrying out intense propaganda and distributing money with full hands to finance subversive organizations." That summer, the Putilor workshops had gone on strike with political demands such as freedom of the press and the release of Bolshevik deputies arrested in '14 and then translated into Siberia. Rasputin's dominion over the Court was now a public voice and in the capital there was open talk of the ineptitude of tsarist power and its imminent end.

In the fall, shortly before the first issue of his magazine came out, Parvus again urged Brockdorff to report his suggestions to the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister. He explained to him what he had already prepared for an action in Russia, where the ferment was sensitive and widespread, even in the army: it was enough for Germany to keep the front to reach the revolution. And it still gave military suggestions: it was not necessary to break through with an offensive on Petrograd, because the loss of the capital would have aroused a new wave of Russian patriotism, as at the outbreak of war, and then the revolutionary thrust would have stopped; it was necessary to bring the coup de grace to the south, in the Donec basin, a fundamental production center of coal and iron, indispensable for arms factories and the operation of the railways.

The ambassador adopted Parvus' recommendations and hastened to send a report to Berlin, pressing for "Helphand's enclused great plan to be taken seriously into consideration". Parvus had won with

Brockdorff, making him his own lawyer to the high spheres of the Reich; he had won, managing to pass even his most directly military recommendations, which went against the intentions of those who pursued peace with Russia instead of the revolution; he had created a conspiratorial network in Russia, and now he also had his magazine, Porgano of his policy, which he had called "Die Glocke" ("The bell") after the "Koloko", which Herzens printed in exile more than half a century earlier. However, the commitment he had made in front of the German authorities was gigantic: he had in fact set the date of January 9 (22), the anniversary of the "Blood Sunday" for the revolution. He had just over five months to prepare for the mass political strike that was to overthrow the throne of the tsars and bring down the empire. It was a reckless commitment: as always he had gambled.

Notes

1 S.S. Ol'denburg, 251R, p. 551.

2G. Katkov, 1917RF, p).135.

3B. Pares, A History of Russia, Washington 1944, p. 459; S.S. Ol'denburg, 25/R, p. 549 ; History of the PC (b) of the Ussr. Short course, Paris 1939, p. 200.

4 M. Paléologue, cit., p. 7.

5 A. Liwak, Geklibene Schriftn, New York 1945, pp. 254 c ss.

6 Personal documentation of the A.

7 The first, accompanied by news about Siefeldt, is by M. Futrell in NU; then followed those of Zeman-Scharlau in their respective works ZS and SZ, as well as by A. Solženicyn in Lenin v Cjuriche.

8 A. Zifel'dt, "Bakinskij Rabochij", 1, 3, 10-2-1924. Cit. in NU; ZS; SZ; Katkov, 1917RF, PP. 116, 121-22.

9 A. Ziteldt, ivi. Cit. in NU, p. 173; RP, pp. 208, 324 ss.

10 V.I. Lenin, At the extreme limit, OC, v. 21, Rome 1966. Originally: «Social-Demo-Kra», N. 48, 11-20-1915.

11 Parvus, IKW, p. 50; Pgé, p. 50.

12 Ibidem; ibid., pp. 50-51.

13 In addition to A. Kuprin, other and more important Russian writers, from Bunin to Remizov and to Cukovsky, left impressive portraits of Lenin.

14 Parvus, op. cit., p. 51.

15 See note 10.

16 Letter of N. Krupskaja in Kollontaj of April 1915. Cit. in NU, p. 152.

17 Letter from A. Sliapnikov to H. Branting of 30-8-1915. Cit. and fot. in NU, pp. 104- 5.

3 For the activity of the Sklarz brothers see: M. Futrell, NU; W. Hahlweg, LRR; SZ; ZS; ‹ Katkov, 1917RF; A. Solzhenicyn, LZ; G.A. Solomon, Skv; E. Gnedin, Kvr; H. Björkegren, KP.

19 Hanecki met with Lenin in Switzerland also in the winter of 1916-17 because, with him and Zinov'ev, he was part of the special commission (troika) appointed by the Cc of the Posdr er giudicare Malinovskij, Bolshevik deputy to the Duma, accused of being an agent of the 'Ochrana. The verdict was published in the "Social-Demokrat" of February 1917 and was of absolution, but the archives of the Police Department were made known shortly after with the collapse of tsarism and showed that it was a provocateur. Hanecki-Fürstenberg, with his pass-

Port of service, traveled freely in the area of the Central Powers and various neutral passes.
20 The ambassador to Bern Baron von Romberg to the Chancellor of the Reich von Bethmann-Hollweg, cifr., N. 794, Bern, 30-9-1915, secret, in W. Hahlweg, LRR, Dok. n. 3, pp. 39-43. 21 the Secretary of State von Jagow to the ambassador in Bern Baron von Rom-berg. cifr.. Berlin 4-10-1915, n. 1081, ivi, Dok. n. 4, p. 43.

22 PAM, Martov to Semkovsky, p. 344.

23 NU, p. 173.

24 The designation in Danish cra Selskabes for Social Forken af Krigens Føiger, dknown in the-esco as Institut zur Erforschung der sozialen Folgen des Krieae

25 Brockdorff-Rantzau to Reich Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, Report no. 6, 14 1-1916.

26 *Le cas Parvus. Une protestation et une réplique*, «Humanité», 19-10-1915; cfr. anche: I. Kiselev, *K razoblačenijam o Parvuse*, Pariž 1915; S.P. Mel'gunov, *ZNK*, pp. 33-35.

27 Rapporto sulla situazione dei lavori del Sig. Dott. Helphand, Berlino 6-8-1915. Ak- The German Association in Copenhagen, "Helphand". See also: H. Steinwachs a von Bergen, 24-12-1915, Akten des AA.

28 S.P. Mel'gunov, *Legenda o separatnom mire. Kanun revoljucii*, Pariž 1957, pp. 12-13.

29 Brockdorff-Rantzau al Cancelliere del Reich Bethmann Hollweg. Rapporto del 1-8- 1915. Akten des AA, Europa-Generalia n. 82, n. 1, B. 26

30 Letter from Brockdorff-Rantzau to Zimmermann of 14-8-1915, Akten des AA. WK n 2 [GRR, Doc. n. 5].

31 See no. 27.

32 Cfr. n. 30.

33 G. Karkov, 1917RF, p. 135

34 Brockdorff-Rantzau to the AA, Tlg. n. 1532 of 7-9-1915, Akten des Gesandschaft in Kopenhagen, "Helphand".

Chapter nine
The underground of the north

1 «Die Glocke» and the publishing house

The first issue of the magazine "Die Glocke" was published at the beginning of September, in conjunction with the Zimmerwald Conference. It wasn't just a coincidence. Parvus, knowing about her preparations and wanting to precede her, would have liked to leave as early as August. To this end, in May he had bought a significant share of the "Münchener Post", which owned a printing house, and then founded the Verlag für Sozialwissenschaft. * He had chosen Monaco also because the military censorship was less severe and in that city he could have many friendships. Thus was born his new publishing business, for which he was now rich enough to spare no expense.

The socialist conference against the war was committed to relaunching a new International: Parvus, however, was interested above all in what would be the position of the left led by Lenin. He launched the appeal for "the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war": an appeal that, given the objective situation of the various countries, could have followed only in Russia, where it immediately found numerous and growing adhesions," moreover encouraged by the Bolsheviks and the emissaries of Parvus. The German government was perfectly informed of Zimmerwald's work through his agent "Herr Baier", who was none other than Karl Moor;** moreover for his part, as it has been seen, Parvus was in constant contact with Bolsheviki, who participated in the conference.

With the "Glocke" Parvus wanted to launch his own slogan, which openly hoped for German victory, and with it the revolution in Russia and the progress of socialism in Europe. In fact, his extensive historical-theorical essay The German Social Democracy came out on the first issue. The bulwark of socialism, a writing of about fifty pages in which the summa of Parvusian political thought is condensed, for this reason often compared to Tratsky's Budgets and Perspectives. After going back to the beginnings of socialism in Germany under the influence of the French Revolution, Parvus moved on to the Manifesto

* Publishing house for social sciences.

** See Chapter vili, p. 163 note 11.

Of the communists and re-faced the Marxian concept of the state. It was here that he characterized Engels as "the great vulgarizer of Marxist ideas", who saw "the state as a simple machine of oppression"; and defined Kaut-

Ski as the one "who for a lifetime has spread as Marxism a decoction of English vulgarizations". Taking up his 1896 criticism of Engels and rereading some of Marx's fundamental texts, Parvus also returned in this essay to highlight that differentiation between the two fathers of scientific socialism and those shortcomings of theoretical Marxism that only half a century later would become the subject of discussion. Then passing through the movement of the sixties, the Russian-French war of 1870, Bismarck's law against the socialists, described the "decadence" of the "German model" of socialism. The conclusion was that the SPD "brings a great political guilt", caused by "a false tactic of twenty-five years".

But things were even worse for socialism in England and in

France. And so: was weiter? What would the future have in store? Since the socialist parties had proved powerless in the fight against the war and had not been able to prevent the world conflict, for Parvus, "the tactical task of the proletariat could only be to use the world war in the interest of socialism". To those who accused him of cynism, he replied, reiterating his pragmatic and realistic position: "I believe that it is better that the military showdown with Russia now takes place under the leadership of the German general staff instead of being assumed by a revolutionary army without a general staff... enthusiasm alone is not enough to win battles and wage a modern war... What counts here is specialized knowledge, organization, management, a plan of operations - in short, a body of officers and the general staff».

These statements naturally unleashed him against the accusation of entrusting the cause of socialism to the Hohenzollern. But wasn't it generally accepted that Germany was "the bulwark" of socialism in Europe? This could not be denied, just as was hardly contestable the hypothesis of Parvus that, in the event of victory of the Russia of the tsars over the Central Powers, the specter of a new Holy Alliance would become real and the consequences for the socialist movement would be catastrophic.

Lenin, Martov, Trotsky and others also agreed on this, including in the end also Luxemburg, who admitted that Parvus' magazine served the cause of the revolution in Russia.' And then, since on no front, for now not even on the Russian one, "the workers and peasants who wore the soldier's coat"° turned their weapons against the bourgeoisie, it was necessary to outline a possibility of correct action for the advancement of the partner.

In addition to the current, painful and central theme of war, in this essay Parvus resumed and deepens the theoretical problem: from the Marxian scheme of capitalist development to the big and decisive question, which he raised already between 1907 and 1911, of how "the system of capitalist production and distribution must be transformed into a socialist system". The "statization" had turned out to be "a dilated and undefined concept of extreme genericity, to which all concrete content was removed until it was reduced to a squeezed sausage", without anyone being able to explain what it diterated from bourgeois socializations. In a nutshell: "A socialism that is brought back to the concept that says nothing about socialization;

A revolution that no one knows how to be conducted».

The magazine, as has been said, raised since its first issue a wave of criticism and accusations from the German and Russian left, as well as from the patriotic socialists of the countries of the Intesa. But anyway, in Germany and elsewhere, the "Glocke" made noise: it was exactly what Parvus wanted. «I founded the

"Glocke" in 1915 as a free socialist tribune» - would have written in the 1918. «At the time of the founding of the magazine I did not calculate that the ruerra would last so long. I thought that in a few months it would start and therefore I intended to put the main problems of the post-war economic transformation on the agenda. But the war dragged on and put in the background the interest in what would happen next... The national passions fuelled by the war were also reflected on German social democracy, although not as heavily as on the French socialist movement... I'm not afraid of opinions. I believe that the tactics of the workers' movement are the result of a collective work of thought, which would not be possible without a clash of opinions. I consider it necessary not to stifle the opinion of others, but on the contrary to give it the opportunity to express itself to the end. Before the war, the "Glocke" collaborators belonged for the most part to the far left wing of the party. Haenisch, Lensch, Cunow were the chosen shooters and the pillars of revolutionary Marxism... So I was responsible for what I wrote in person and of course I can't take responsibility for the writings that were published by others outside my control»? From the third issue he transferred the magazine to Berlin, the center of political life, entrusting the direction to K. Haenisch.

Back then Parvus didn't just deal with his magazine, writing between one trip and another, between one meeting and another. At the same time he took care of the subversive network in Russia and dealt with the German authorities, developed the commercial activities of the Germany-Neutral-Russia triangle, which were a subsidy and cover for the political network; and again he took care of the publishing house al-

Copenhagen Institute. And he was also tireless in promoting start-

Tive, in mobilizing for particular missions the people who moved in the gigantic tour of the northern underground of those years. It saw a forculate of Russians, Swedes, Danes, Finns, Germans, Baltics: sometimes important figures or those who would become such, sometimes minor characters that the circumstances elevated to primary roles.

The Bolshevik clandestinity had its protagonist in Aleksandr Sljap-nikov, who between 1914 and 1917 organized the conspiratorial channels with Pietro-grado. Farmer and "old believer"* by birth, since he was a boy he had entered a factory in the native textile city of Murom and, after campaigning in the 1905 revolution, he had emigrated as a worker in France, Germany and England. Repatriated with a fake French passport, the comrades of the Fiat of Petrograd on the Kamennoostrovsky 4th Perspective are amazed by the speed with which he learned Russian. At the outbreak of the war, again for Lenin, he emigrated again to Scandinavia. There was still not much to do and he then moved to London, working at Fiat in Wembley, where he stayed until the summer of '15, when Lenin sent him back to Scandinavia. In Oslo** he met Kollontaj with whom he had a love that would last until 1917. She came from a rich family of ancient Ukrainian nobility, she had entered the revolutionary movement since she was a girl: first Menshevica, then follower of Le-

Nin. The war had hit her in Germany, where she had met Eduard Fuchs, a friend of Parvus since Munich, when he was director of the fortnightly satirical "Der Süddeutscher Postillon". Fuchs was also the first scholar in the world of eroticism and had published with a Marxist approach monumental works of the history of customs and erotic art with fabulous illustrations that were looted by his imitators for decades.

From him Kollontaj got the definitive push for those writings of his, which made her go down in history as the preacher of Bolshevik "free love" as well as the first female ambassador in the world. But Fuchs, who was always in contact with Parvus, was also the one who, when in August 1914 she was arrested along with other Russian revolutionaries, had her released and extradited to Scandinavia. There the Kollontaj became a zvjazistRa, or a liaison agent between Bolshevik emigration and Russia. Alongside Bucharin worked with her for Lenin the future creator of Swedish model socialism, Gustav Möller, who then made a conspiratorial trip to Pietrograd; and, also, figures such as Karl Kilbom, of the socialist left and then of the Komintern; the Finnish Karl Wiik, the banker Heinrich Bockelman, the Russianized Estonian Jakov Bogrovskij, the engineer Steinberg, the aforementioned Fredrik Ström and numerous others, all more or less involved in the trafficking of

* The great and famous sect founded by Archpriest Avvakum in the 17th century.
** Then Christianity.

Materials and money and several in contact with the partners and agents of Parvus, and with Kesküla.

The main lines, therefore, through which the action of the revolutionary underground in Scandinavia towards the movement in Russia was implemented were three: the Parvus-Fürstenberg line; the Šljapnikov party line; the autonomous Kesküla line. It is not possible to draw a clear border between them, since they often intersected and their men knew each other and played double and triple roles, while German espionage agents as well as the Danish and Swedish police were also infiltrated. In this colorful and complex picture are the seemingly marginal episodes that often make it possible to reconstruct even the plot of Parvu's "great game".

Thus, for example, at the beginning of the summer of 1915 the Danish journalist Alfred Kruse of the socialist left, who was in contact with Bucharin and Kesküla, had an assignment through Urickij from the Institute of Parvus. He was supposed to meet in Petrograd a certain Dr. Buchspan, an expert at the Ministry of Commerce. He was an economist, who had written an essay in which he argued that Russia should not be led by the Agreement to economic measures that would compromise its traditional trade relations with Germany for the future. Parvus was interested as a possible correspondent and collaborator, but Kruse on his return reported to Urickij that he could not track him down? Paid for by Kesküla and Parvus, Kruse's trip was nevertheless sponsored by Jakov Bogrovsky, the Bolshevik leader of Stockholm in the absence of Sljapnikov, and was not without results. Not only on behalf of Uricki) he brought many documents to Petrograd and brought back others; he contacted the Bolshevik committee of the capital, with his secretary V. Smidt and with Leonid Stark, as well as with some Mensceviche personalities, including V. Krochmal." When he returned to Stockholm in autumn, Bucharin began to dance with joy, "as Mrs. Kruse vividly remembers." Kruse had also collected a lot of news about the situation in Russia for Parvus. Kesküla, Uric-kij, Parvus and Bolsheviks ligi to Lenin were therefore involved in the journey. But on his return to Scandinavia, in September, Šljapnikov made fire and flames for this initiative: Bogrovsky and Kruse were charged with a real party "trial" to which Bucharin was no stranger.

In the same summer, Parvus tried to organize the publication of a large Marxist monthly in Petrograd. He thought of entrusting the initiative to a fairly well-known journalist, E. Smirnov-Gurevič. He had him called by the lawyer Kozlovskij, whom Gurevic already knew for having often met him at the house of the most famous lawyer N.D. Sokolov, his friend. Kozlovskij told Gurevich that Parvus could finance the initiative with several centi-

Naia of thousands of rubles. To Gurevic's amazement, who knew Parvus only as a left-wing political essayist, he explained to him that Parvus had become rich and now worked as a great manager. Gurevič replied that he was "too busy and that he could not take the direction of a large

Magazine»"

Mecislav Kozlovskij, at that time not yet forty years old, was not a simple intermediary, but - like Fürstenberg-Haneckij - a key character of all the great enterprise that had as protagonists, albeit not always close-knit, Parvus, Lenin and the high German hierarchies." Born in Vilna, he was of Polish origin, but he had studied at the University of Moscow and, twenty-four, he had entered the Posdr, standing out in the revolution of 1905 and at the V congress on emigration. He had then built a new image in Petersburg: of a distinguished lawyer with strim glasses and well-groomed lace, and enjoyed a wide professional esteem. Few knew that it was a mole of the revolution. Kerensky in his memoirs was ambiguous about him: perhaps out of "professional solidarity" he exonerated him "wrongly" of the accusation of links with Parvus and the Germans, but he confirmed his frequent trips to Stockholm during the war. Lenin's notebooks, published in secuito, contained three numbers of the lawyer so that he could be traced night and day in the period April-October 1917." And why did Gurevič meet him in Sokolov's house? For the simple fact that the two lived in the same building at 81 Via Sergievskaja, an elegant street in the center, where there were the palaces of Princes Demidov San Donato and Ol'denburgskij, Countess Kleinmichel and the famous banker Manus, proponent with Rasputin of the separate peace with Germany - song to name some of the high society of the time, - and they had in common the same telephone number:

45176"

2 The "new Russia"

"Faced with the defeats of the tsarist armies, which I had already hoped for for two decades, I declare: the future belongs to Russia'". Thus, on the "Gloc-ke", of October 15, Parvus wrote in the article The New Russia." How, new? Before the revolution? The Russia of the tsars that he wanted to annihilate, new? «It is enough to note - explained Parvus - that the revolutionary work of capitalism has already overcome its destructive period in Russia, that the factories are filled with workers; and the vast campaigns that the mugicco has scraped for centuries, have now been put into practice with the tools of modern agrarian technology. Now, with its natural wealth, the national power of Russia will manifest itself».

Figures in hand, Parvus demonstrated how this process was underway: between 1890 and 1913 the production of coal had sixfolded and that of cast iron quadrupled; the volume of trade with foreign countries had increased by almost 100% in the first decade of the century; the consumption of sugar, an index of living standard, more than doubled, and the same had happened for butter and beer; the railway network already had an extension of about 67 thousand km in 1913" and while Parvus wrote, in 1915, another 12 thousand km of railway lines were added, including the doubling of the Trans-Siberian and the line of about 1050 km to Murmansk, built in record time through tun-dre, swamps and rocky mountains in the Kola Peninsula, a region of eternal frost."

«Russia will become an industrial state in the sense of Western Europe... but also the power and strength of aggression of this state will grow and become a danger to the world... if a bolt is not put on the worst militarism the world has ever seen». This is what Parvus reminded the "myopic politicians", who tried to convince themselves and the whole world that the Russian danger was eliminated. But Russia, at least since the time of Peter the Great, had only conquered and occupied lands: "The Russian took the largest space in the European bed and pushed the others against the wall". Russia, Parvus continued, with over 20 million square kilometers and only 150 million inhabitants, has space for over half a billion men But "the ruling classes and the government have had no other care for these masses of people than to starve and massacre them".

This last statement by Parvus was nothing more than the cliché in use among the revolutionary left; it was a statement at least as incorrect as his analysis of Russia's transformation from a backward agrarian country into a modern agrarian-industrial country. After 1906, and thanks above all to the far-sighted policy of Minister Stolypin, the civil development of the country had kept pace with economic development. The political system was now based on constitutional principles, which guaranteed citizens the same freedoms and rights as European countries: full freedom of the press, right to strike, huge spread of education from compulsory primary education (according to a twenty-year plan) to a completely autonomous university education; broad development of social assistance and the trade union and cooperative movement. All this allows us to affirm - and even the most informed Western historians today have understood it - that for Russia already then, but also after 1917, the path of a modern democratic and civil evolution was fully viable, in any case not less than it was for countries like Italy or Spain compared to which Russia was already economically and culturally more advanced.

It is obvious that this reality, however historically documented, had to

To be denied by those who, like Parvus, pursued the project of the demolition of the Russian state. Lenin did the same and they did so far the successors. Parvus' writing, however, contained numerous food for thought: "The Russian state has blocked the way to the east of the civilized peoples of Europe... But is it right that the Russians have an immense fertile country, which they do not know how to exploit, while the rest of Europe, despite intensive cultivation, must bring wheat from all over the world?... America had to bring people from Europe; what would have happened if, with its wealth of space, it could have had masses of people like Russia today? A new America, which however has a population reserve of 150 million hardworking people, who only lack schools and the freedom to be civilized, this is Russia'». For Parvus it was the state order that slowed down the social development of the country and made it unsuitable for EU immigration

ropea di massa, quale sarebbe stata necessaria per il pieno sviluppo delle forze produttive del suo gigantesco territorio. La soluzione da lui proposta

Cra "the transformation of Russia into a federation of independent states, something like the American model". Because, "if Siberia became independent, it would take care to increase its population by attracting emigrants, as Canada or Argentina do today. The same goes for the

Caucasus".

In this essay, Parvus clearly emphasized the Russian danger to alarm public opinion, to justify the need for war and upheaval in order to bring down tsarism, a bulwark of reaction and con-

Service. He also winked at the proletarians and European capitalists: Russia could be a new trontiera! Yet, despite the exploitation, his assertions contained some truth: the country richest in natural resources in the world, much richer than America itself; the country that, although it was, at least until 1906, strangled by an autocratic system devoted to immobility, had achieved amazing productive developments in the last fifteen years; this country, given its system still too closed despite democratic reforms, in addition to curbing its civil and social evolution, constituted a threat to the world with its new economic power.

Parvus would then have had to repeat these ideas as early as 1918 in front of Lenin's Russia, noting the rapid degeneration of the party's dictatorship revolution, in a more closed and undemocratic regime than Tsarist Russia itself. Instead of this one, the scheme he outlined here would have fit perfectly. This belongs to the field of historical facts, of what happened, as it belongs to the reality of a bourgeois Russia, democratic and open to all development especially after March 1917, and still belong to it the violent prevarication of it in October 1917 and the expansion

Nism pursued with determination under the banner of the hammer scythe in place of the biceps eagle. Instead, the expansionism of that bourgeois Russia remains in the field of historical "ifs", of unverifiable hypotheses even if possible.

In 1915, in a writing aimed at very concrete objectives and written with the not dispassionate soul of the party in question, Parvus could not, and should not, foresee such developments, from which he would be the first to be displaced and seriously affected. But then Lenin, although treacherous, had to be an ace up his sleeve, as the Germans were, for his reckless challenge and conspire against the Russian Empire, to initiate and push the "revolutionary process", an expression he preferred to the more simplified term of "revolution". And the "revolutionary process" would have opened the doors to socialism, and in Germany, and in Russia: consequently, also in Europe, because, in front of a German-Russian giant started on the tracks of socialist democracy, the other countries would have been attracted into its orbit, and this also by the pressure of the masses tired of wars and anxious for the future. Parvus cultivated these perspectives and, like Lenin, more boldly than Lenin, was indifferent to the means to be used for the end. In fact, he liked those means: the conspiracy in a big way, the big-scale business, the theoretical battle, the public controversy. With him author, publisher, tycoon and patron of culture and science.

At the end of November he was still optimistic about an upcoming reversal of the situation in Russia after the summer disaster, the entry into the war of Bulgaria, the collapse of Serbia, the distance of the allies on the Dardanelli. On November 21, he appeared again at Brockdorti's with fresh news from Petrograd, almost certainly brought to him by Alfred Kruse. Among the military, he said, discontent extended from the troop to the officers, but the army would be ready for the revolution only after the defeat. Until now, only local mutinies have been recorded. Moreover, the "revolutionary organizations of the proletariat" were much more important, now so strong that he "declared the revolution inevitable", all the more so that the danger of hunger was looming in Petrograd and Moscow. Assuming that the thing was "absolutely secret", he confided to Brockdorff that "certainly one hundred thousand men could be mobilized in Petrograd within twenty-four hours for a strike; and that eight days earlier a meeting of the workers' leaders had taken place, who had decided on a three-day trial strike in view of a general strike." Parvus also added that he was still convinced that the revolution could break out on January 9(22) and that in the meantime it was necessary to perfect the coordination between the organizations and their links with the army."

You may wonder what organization Parvus could count on,

To support his thesis of an upcoming revolutionary explosion, on the end of the clandestine network that he had set up in Russia during the year. There was, in fact, no organization in the proper sense of the word. Even less had Lenin, whose contacts with Russia were reduced to the exchange of relationships and directives with the sister-agents Marija and Anna. The same Sljapnikov - who ensured the connection through the arduous route of thousands of kilometers that, bypassing the Golto of Bor-ja, went from Stockholm to Russia passing through Finland - would have written in his memoirs that the plenum of the Bolshevik committee did not then have more than eight-ten members, all known and supervised by the

Police."

Instead, there was a widespread tendency in broad strates to revolt against war and revolutionary changes; and more and more adherents conquered the message of Zimmerwald's conference. This atmosphere influenced large sectors of public opinion: from Bolshevik militants, without a point of reference and means, to Kerensky with his moderate socialists, to the trudoviki, that is, Labourists, also including groups of social-revolutionaries, whose leader Cernov was in at least ambiguous contact with the Ge-Sche-Schi," as well as the Mensheviks, although these parties were "defensists", and still people outside the parties but anxious for a change. There was also the Mežrajoncy group, an "interdistrictual" association (hence the name), neither Bolshevik nor Menshevik, close to Parvus. And Parvus, in addition to his agents and his many activities, had behind him the machine of the Revolutionierungspolitik, of which he was the first architect, and which at the end of 1915 involved not only the ambassadors in Copenhagen, Stockholm, Bern and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also the general staff and other official German bodies."

Parvus' activity in Russia, although not all documentable, was still intense, while Lenin lived isolated in Switzerland, studied Clause-witz, wrote the "philosophical notebooks" and prepared "imperialism as the supreme phase of capitalism", believing the latter dying, in putrefaction:

A finished story.

This was not the conception of Parvus, as is clear from his articles cited here. For him, the revolution in Russia, to be provoked by any means, had to be grafted into industrial economic development and gradually lead to the hegemony of the proletariat through a democratic process. Now the immediate purpose was the overthrow of the regime as the main obstacle and Lenin could be an ally.

He did not stop besieging the Germans with new projects, leveraging their need for peace in the east. On November 30, 1915, he presented the ambassador with an additional memorandum of seven pages, entitled On the possi-

Ability of a revolution of Russia." The possibilities of peace were examined and a three-point plan for revolutionary action was presented. Parvus' main concern was always the same: that Germany would come to conclude a peace with Tsarism. We kept talking about this and we would talk about it later. As has already been said, the German Foreign Minister von Jagow had not stopped advocating this solution and acting in this direction, and there was no shortage of influential personalities in Russia who had declared themselves in favour of a separate peace, starting with Count Vitte, who had since died. In Petrograd there was less and less talk of Rasputin and the German tsarina with Germany, and the saying circulated:

"England and France have decided to fight until the last Russian soldier."

3 The second Memorandum

In his second Memorandum, Parvus again warned the Germans not to venture into a separate peace initiative with Russia, arguing that the tsar had lost all prestige and was no longer able to negotiate on behalf of the country. If he had concluded a peace with Germany, a reactionary government "with a strong nationalist tint" would have been formed in Russia, which would have repudiated the tsar's commitments. With the help of the Agreement, it would have denied that peace and Germany would have been "deprived of the political results of its war companies". Yes, the war would perhaps have ceased for the moment, but peace was not guaranteed for this reason.

He then resumed his theses on the "new Russia": "Russia has already reached such a degree of political development, that peace with this country is only possible if the government that stipulates peace enjoys popular trust". But such a government could have been formed on condition that no peace was signed with the tsar. So, "the tiredness of the war, which now, together with the discouragement on its outcome, is strongly felt, will lead to the revolution. And a new government expressed by it will not only have to immediately make peace to respond to popular demands, but, being able to blame all the war on the past regime, it will be free to sign a peace treaty favorable to Germany, granting independence to neighboring nations».

Lenin, who had recognized the undisputed right of every nationality to self-determination, also agreed on this last point. It is true that in this regard there was a bitter controversy between Lenin and the Bolshevik left:

Bucharin and Pjatakov, for whom this position diverted the peoples from the lot-

Ta against capitalism towards the illusions of nationalism. But it was still significant that the idea of a dismemberment of the Russian Empire was advanced as a possible alternative, and it was also shared by Parvus as well as corresponding to the interests of Germany. * They were theoretical disputes that, translated into concrete political language, meant the destruction or not of the Russian empire and its power, which corresponded to the interests of Germany. It is no coincidence that Lenin during the war was for the dismemberment, a position that in substance fully coincided with that of Parvus. Lenin was then convinced that the revolution would be at least of European scope and therefore would have changed the cards in the table. When he had power, it was instead for centralization. Even Parvus then thought that Germany and Russia would be different with the advent of the socialists in government.

"The revolutionary organizations in Russia," he continued in his Memorandum, "are now stronger and more determined than on the eve of the general strike of 1905. The widespread exasperation in the popular masses cannot be compared with that of 1905 and the army takes a stand against the government. Only the last moments of inertia, which are always in the case of large mass movements, must be overcome. Here it is clear that Par-vus exaggerated on purpose to plead his cause, so much so that he took care to emphasize that in the "storm-pregnant atmosphere" one had to intervene "sensibly from the outside". And here is the plan in three points: 1. German conquest of Riga and Dünaburg to take away all military hope from Russia and make a deep impression on the country; 2. smuggle in

Russia fake banknotes with the same numbers and series as those in circulation, which would have created panic, discredited the ruble among the people and at the international level hit the economic system to death (this was a new version of its 1905 Financial Manifesto that called for an economic boycott); 3. propaganda towards the Russian army, but not anonymous and much less on behalf of the German government, but on behalf of the German socialists and trade unions, as an exhortation to proletarian solidarity, respectful of the national sentiment of others, so as not to ask to lay down arms, but only to dialogue. Parvus knew that Russians should not be offended in national feelings: "The important thing is to stimulate the rivo-luctional state of mind. All this must be used with energy, because, according to all expectations, the revolutionary events will be concentrated around January 9th.

Brockdorff-Rantzau became, as always, a warm supporter of Parvus' initiative and immediately sent the Memorandum to the Chancellor of the Reich instead of the Foreign Minister. In a comment letter he emphasized that the text had been written by Parvus "based on the secret information of

A trustee of his here from Petrograd», adding: «If, as in any combination, there is no guarantee that his plan can lead in an absolutely certain way to the end, nevertheless the political past of Helphand, and in particular the role he played during the revolution of 1905, give us a certain guarantee that his proposals can have a prospect of success; in any case, unlike the vague expectations that generally reign about the Russian problem, these can lead to a solution of the question, positive and perhaps advantageous, and it could assume, depending on the circumstances, such a radical character as we on the field of war successes have not so far considered in the scope of possibilities». *

And not only the count ambassador, friend and now admirer of Par-vus, supported with this letter his Memorandum, but he worked in every way so that every resistance was won. He wrote among other things to his cousin, Baron Langwerth von Simmern, secret legation adviser, urging him to take part diligently so that Parvus was received in Berlin in private audience by Bethmann Hollweg. He was convinced, he added, that he would "make an impression" on the chancellor and that he was wrong who, like Diego von Bergen, a man on the rise to Wilhelmstrasse, was of the opinion that people like Parvus should not have access to interviews in the upper streets. *

In the days of waiting for the answer from Berlin, Parvus intensified his activities directed towards Russia. Apart from the immediate prospect of revolution just over a month later, and almost revealing that he himself was not fully convinced of it, he tried again to capture Gurevich-Smirnov to make a Marxist magazine in Russia. He went for this to Stockholm, where the lawyer Kozlovskij had arrived from Petrograd and Gurevich was also supposed to arrive. Kozlovskij and Fürstenberg introduced themselves to Guervič, telling him that their friend would like to meet him. The Russian journalist decidedly refused because, as he would write later:

«At the time of the revolution of 1905, during his brief activity in Peter-burg, Parvus had revealed a certain inclination for political adventures and many of us, his companions, behaved with a certain caution since then». Two days later, Fürstenberg and Kozlovskij returned to the charge, requesting a meeting with Parvus, but Gurevič "refused this honor" The next day Fürstenberg reappeared, asking him for a favor for Kozlovskij, who was a consultant to a group of industrialists in negotiations with Parvus for the purchase of a shipping company. The conterrents, he said, had denounced Kozlovsky as a German spy. The latter therefore asked Gurevič to inform the lawyer Sokolov on his return to Petrograd and to have him come to Stockholm.

Because Parvus wanted at all costs to involve in his enterprise a di-

Declared "defense" as Gurevič was, and attracted him with hundreds of thousands of rubles for the establishment of a Marxist magazine, can only be explained by his intention to seek "a certain immunity for penetration in Russia"." After the revolution of 1917, the journalist Gurevič would have learned with amazement that Fürstenberg and the famous Bolshevik Hanecki were the same person; and he would have seen Kozlovsky, one of Parvus' main footholds in the trade of the revolution from 1915 to July 1917, become the Bolshevik representative in the executive committee of the Petrograd Soviet.

Preceded by the dispatches and missives of Count Brockdorff, between December 16 and 20 Parvus stayed in Berlin, in a suite of the Hôtel Kaiserhof, occupied mainly in talks with the high dignitaries of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Treasury. The owner of the latter, the economist Karl Helfferich, was immediately suspicious of the financial project; he said that printing and sending fake banknotes to Russia in a short time and in absolute secrecy was not possible. The dignity and honesty of the old-fashioned bourgeoisie probably spoke in him, which was disgusted with the use of such means, even if against the enemy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs instead judged Parvus' plan favorable and thus a further allocation of one million rubles was granted for the third point: propaganda among the army

Russian."

Both Parvus and Brockdorff, however, had the impression that the foreign ministry had not been diligent enough about the action that one proposed and the other supported for naturally different reasons. They knew that Minister von Jagow, in addition to not having abandoned the idea of a separate peace with the Romanovs, did not like revolutionary intrigues nor did he place any trust in them. So on the 16th, while Parvus was still traveling to Berlin or had just arrived, Brockdorff wrote a personal letter to Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, to insist on the political line he had matured with Parvus. The tsar, he wrote, "has assumed a terrible guilt in the face of history and has deprived himself of the right to any pity on our part... it would be a mistake pregnant with consequences... to now want to make the traditional friendship towards the Roma-nov house weigh again on the scale". The tsar "is a weak and insincere ruler" who "under the bewitchment of flagellant mystics dreams of victories against an enemy who never wanted to enter into hostility with him". *

And the ambassador still wrote: "Victory and, as a prize, the first place in the world, are still ours if we can revolutionize Russia in due time and, consequently, blow up the Enteente. The internal collapse of Russia after the conclusion of peace would be of little value and perhaps even undesirable for us. That Doctor Helphand is not a saint, nor a comfortable guest, is certain; however, he believes in his mission and has

Provided proof of his abilities during the revolution after the Russo-Japanese war. I believe, therefore, that we must use it before it is too late, and direct us towards a policy towards Russia, which one day will be called classic by our grandchildren, when the German nation under the leadership of the Hohenzollern will find itself in lasting friendship with the Russian people. Until the Tsarist empire in its current condition is upset, this end will not be achieved. Dr. Helphand believes he knows how to show the way and makes positive proposals based on twenty years of experience. Given the current situation, in my opinion, we must risk the attempt. The stakes are certainly high and success not absolutely certain; I do not even ignore in any way the repercussions that such a step can drag behind in our political life in-

Terna. If we were militarily able to achieve a final solution in our favor, this would in fact be preferable; otherwise, in my opinion, only the attempt of this other solution remains, because our existence as a great power and perhaps even more is at stake."

Brockdorff saw the situation lucidly: the Germanic military machine was not able to achieve victory on its own, the hopes of separate peace proved to be illusory. And therefore he had made his choice: Parvus' help was fundamental. How much he was right in thinking that the very fate was at stake, and perhaps more, of Germany as a great power, then entrusted history to prove it with the annihilating peace imposed by the Agreement. For Germany to continue to exist as a world power - Brockdorff reasoned - every means was good, diplomatic considerations had to be put aside, fears of the possible repercussions of a Russian revolution, the disdain of the German ruling class towards the revolutionary elements. Parvus made a similar reasoning: that he dispensed with a judgment of merit on a ruling class, heir of Bismarck, and on the Hohenzollern; if he accepted his help, represented by their armed forces and their money, so that tsarism could be overthrown, opened the way in Russia for a revolutionary process that, with its backlaps on German social democracy, determined a turning point in Europe. They both played with fire: in Russia, the revolutionary process will bring to power a ferocious dictatorship for decades; Germany will plunge into defeat, into an ephemeral revolutionary tirs and in an equally ephemeral socialist democracy, which will be followed by a dictatorship no less fierce, however, in its short historical duration, less totalitarian and more efficient than the Bolshevik one.

There were a few days left until the end of 1915, a few weeks before the announced Russian uprest of January 9, that is, West January 22.
Despite Brockdorff's requests, Parvus had not been received at

Berlin by the Reich Chancellor. But, back in Copenhagen, he had the feeling of holding the Germans in hand and was optimistic about the success of his work: there could have been a date difference and the anniversary of the Blood Sunday would not be worthily celebrated. But that wasn't the essential thing.

Notes

1 Parvus to L. Cohn, 11-8-1915, Nachlass Helphand BA, Rep. 92, N. 7.

2 S.S. Ol'denburg, 251R, pp. 562, 572, 610; P.N. Miljukov, Vospominanija, N'ju Jork 1955, t. I1, PP. 340-41.

3 Ch. Rakovski, op. cit., pp. 35-36.

4 Parvus, Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie. Die Hochburg des Sozialismus, "Glocke", No. 1, 1915, pp. 3-52. All related quotes refer to this text. Wider adjustment è contenuto in: P.A. Zveteremich, *Parvus...*, op. cit.

5 «Spartakusblätter», N. 10; anche *Spartakusbriefe*, Berlin 1958, p. 68.

6 *Storia del Pc(b) dell'Urss. Breve corso*, op. cit., p. 193, vi si legge inoltre: «... alla politica... di difesa borghese i bolscevichi opponevano la politica diretta ad ottenere la *"disfatta* Of his own government in the imperialist war"» (ivi, below in the rest).

7 Parvus, IKW, pp. 19-20; Pge, pp. 18-20.

8 Documentation of the A.

9 M. Futrell, NU, pp. 173-74, from where ZS and SZ take it, but the A. has ascertained that no Buchspan was in 1916 on the staff of the Ministry of Commerce: perhaps it was a consultant.

10 V.V. Smide (1886-1940) and LN. Stark (1889-1937) had an active part in the Bolshevik conquest of power in October '17, then high positions in the regime until they were liquidated (cr. GViVI); for V.V. Krochmal (1873-1933) cf. RP

11 M. Futrell, NO, p. 136 c RP, Pp. 156-211.

12 P.S. Mel'gunov, ZNK, pp. 137-38 .

13 M. Kozlovsky would have become one of the leaders of the soviet in the February revolution c, after the capture of the Bolshevik porer, leader of the Cheka of Petrograd and as such persecutor of the opponents. The social-revolutionary M.A. Spiridonova made an unfavorable portrait of it in Kreml za rešetkoj, Berlin 1922.

14 M. Futrell, NU, p. 177. Kerensky and E.D. Kuskova promised to reveal everything tren-
tYears after his own death, cr. RF 1917, pp. 13-14, 220 .

15 Leninsky Sbornik, xxl, p. 85. Cit. also in NU, p. 220

16 Personal documentation of the A.

17 Parvus, Das neue Russland, «Glocke», No. 4, 15-10-1915, pp. 173-81. Ture the related quotes refer to this rest.

18 Remarkable figure if you consider that today, after more than 70 years, it is not even doubled against the 340 thousand km of the United States, which have less than half the surface and an insistent motorway system in the USSR.

19 S.S. Ol'denburg, 251R, pp. 591-92. See also: G. Andreev, Kakuju Rossiju uničtožili bol Sevik? [Which Russia destroys the Bolsheviks?], "Kontinent", Paris 1984, n. 42, p. 260; as well as "Ežegodnik gazety Re" na 1913 g.", Peterburg 1914, II, Pp. 180-81 (for the earth).

In the same yearbook of the 1914 year, the economist M. Tugan-Baranovskij gave extensive ragguag of Russia's economic development (PP. 342-61), while the aforementioned article of G. Andreev is a rich summary of the situation in Russia until 1917 in the following aspects: agricultural, industrial, economic-financial, institutional, civil, cultural and political.

This reality seems to be starting to be recognized today even in the USSR judging by the article of V. Seljunin on the magazine «Vovyj Mir» (5, 1988) in which și states, for the first time in decades, that Russia until the First World War was in full expansion economically

21 The French ambassador to Russia wrote about these meetings. See M. Paléologue, op Cir., pp. 11. 21-22.

22 Brockdorff-Rantzau at the AA, TIg. No. 1943 in addition to No. 1932, ivi.

•23 A. Sljapnikov, Kanun semnadcatogo goda, M.-Pg. 1923, II, pp. 25 and 100. Even the official stories of the PCUS, while exalting the "revolutionary work among the masses" from August 1914 to April 1917, that is, almost three years, fail to dedicate less than a dozen pages in volumes that number hundreds

24 S.P. Mel'gunov, ZNK, p. 41; V. Cernov, Rożdenie revoljucionnoj Rossii, Paris-Praga-N'iu Jork 1934, passim

25 See the memoirs of Fritz Cahén, Brockdorff's press officer, who wrote: "Not everything is documented in the archives, various things are still ignored and will remain so". F.M. Cahén, Der Weg nach Versailles, Boppard/Rhein 1963, Pp. 197 ss.

26 Über der Möglichkeit einer Revolutionierung Russlands, in AAA, WK 11 c. A letter from Brockdorff-Rantzau to the Reich Chancellor of 30-11-1915 affirms Parvus' authorship of the Memorandum, which is neither signed nor dated. See also SZ, p. 209. The following quotations refer to the aforementioned text.

27 S.S. Ol'denburg, 251R, p. 572.

28 There is extensive literature on this discussion, which also involved Luxemburg and many European Social Democrats. See at least L. Schapiro, op. cit., which provides the bibliography on the subject.

29. Report No. 43 of 30-11-1915, in AAA, WK c.

30 Letter to Baron L. von Simmern of 8-12-1915, in AGK «Russland».

31 S.P. Mel'gunov, ZNK, pp. 38-40.

32 Ibidem.

33 Helfferich to Zimmermann, 26-12-1915, in AAA.

34 Brockdorff-Rantzau's personal letter to the chancellor, in AAA.

35 Ivi.

Chapter ten-
«The German bayonet and the Russian proletarian fist»

1 Towards another Bloody Sunday?

On December 21, after once again crossing the Baltic Sea arm that separates Germany from Copenhagen from Sassnitz to Oresund, Parvus was again in conversation with Brockdorff in the Danish capital. The same day he communicated in Berlin that Helphand requested the immediate payment of the promised sum of one million rubles, since his man was about to leave for Petrograd. They had to be able to intensify the organization of the uprisings planned for January and the connection between the various revolutionary centers. In the report he sent to the chancellor, Brockdorff stressed that, in his opinion, Parvus' request "did not give the impression of being a pressure, but seemed to derive from factual considerations without personal ulderbutions". Parvus also pointed out that, for the general action that was to culminate in the revolutionary change of the regime in Russia, at least twenty million rubles were needed. Sum that should not have been paid to him immediately, since it had to be disposed of gradually, considering the conspiratorial purposes for which it was destined, as the action on the spot required it and opportunities for banking transactions presented themselves.

For Parvus, therefore, the date of January 9 was only to mark a beginning, albeit sensational but still a beginning, of the expected revolutionary process, and not the culmination. This beginning, of which an immediate and decisive result could not be ruled out, but not even guaranteed, could only take place in the capital, while its propagation to other centers of the immense Russia would have occurred later. Once started, however, the movement would no longer give respite to the government. In order to accelerate this process, Parvus advised the German government to immediately begin the operations he suggested in the second Memorandum, first of all a new winter offensive.

He was well aware that the internal Russian situation, if not dramatic, was very difficult. Silver and copper coins had disappeared, replaced by "flying money", as people called small denomination banknotes. Bread and butter were almost 50% higher, and meat by 25%. These were alarming signs, which made them lose confidence in the ru-

Blo, but economic life was not yet upset for this. More serious were other facts: the chronic lack of ammunition at the front, the disorganization of transport, the millions of refugees, the overwhelming power of the "man of God" Rasputin, to kill whom the same Minister of the Interior A.N.

Chvostov made a conspire for which he was dismissed by the tsar. In short, an air of collapse, of collapse, as the liberal leader P. told the Duma. Miljukov.' The Bolsheviks, the pacifists and in general the defeatists revealed their strength at the time of the elections for the workers' group of the Industrial Military Committees, the new bodies that had to be created throughout Russia to unite industrialists, workers and government in order to strengthen the war effort. The assembly of the electors of the more than two hundred thousand workers of Petrograd boycotted the elections, adopting a resolution that stated: "The watchword of the defense of the homeland and its variants - defense of freedom, culture, national interests, rights, morality, etc... is only a cover of the predatory claims of the ruling classes..". * In December, Gor'kij's "Letopis'"* magazine began to be released, probably funded by "German-speaking banker Manus, representative of a fraction of the great Russian bourgeoisie who wanted a Russian-German alliance". Not even too larvally she supported the defeatist theses of Le-

Nin. Gor'kij, moreover, stayed away from the capital and had taken up residence in Finland, near the route of the revolutionary underground, where he easily had contacts with the emissaries of Lenin and Parvus. Already in October on the important newspaper "Birževye Vedomosti"** he had published a statement in favor of Parvus and such as to overturn what he had been saying against him ten years earlier: "About the publication of my works in German, and Parvus' participation in the edition, inaccurate news appeared in various newspapers. Yes, it seems to me that many things have been misrepresented in the newspaper reports regarding Parvus and his activity»? A repentance?

In his life Gor'kij had many and contradictory ones, and not only towards Parvus. At that time he was rather in agreement with the Revo-lutionierungspolitik and even condemned, for taking part in "an imperialist war", his adopted son Zinovich Peskov, who was seriously injured by the Germans in May on the French front and had an arm amputated at the Neully hospital. * Given this attitude, he had not been indifferent by Parvus' repeated attempt in the summer to finance a Marxist periodical in Russia with "hundreds of thousands of rubles"***. The Mensheviks, on the contrary, with Plechanov in the lead, had generally

* "Annual".

** "Stock Exchange Gazette".

*** One ruble was then equal to 2.1 German marks and 2.6 French francs.

They took a position in favor of the war and operated with commitment in state institutions. Some, however, were uncertain and acted according to the conjunctures in the way they considered most useful to the revolution. So the lawyer Gro-man, who kept in touch with Parvus, as representative of the Union of Cities, asked for the adoption of measures similar to those of "war socialism" adopted in Germany; was his request partly supported by the economist Struve?

On December 29, Parvus finally received in Copenhagen the million rubles "for the support of the revolutionary movement in Russia" (of which the written receipt and signed by his hand is preserved). His agent was finally able to leave for Petrograd. Sljapnikov led us on his tracks, who in the fall had already settled in the border area between Sweden and Finland to organize the connections and had then entered Russia himself, having been warned from there that the events could precipitate: what Parvus claimed in front of the Germans. He stayed there for 4 months.
"I had a meeting with Kruse in Petersburg - Sljapnikov later told in his memoirs" - at the Danish hotel "Dagmara". Although it had two telephone numbers (1461 and 15754), the hotel was actually a pension, located in the central street Sadovaja, near the famous Fontanka, in building number 9, where V lived. Groman; the owner had a Russianized French name, Miko Fransuà." The worker Kondrat'ev also wrote in his memories of the "Dagmara" hotel in Kruse."

«The arrival of Kruse in Russia - Sljapnikov said again - seemed extraordinarily suspicious to me and his explanation, very confused, only confirmed the distrust that had crept into me. Going to visit N.M. Bucharina in Moscow,* I had another series of indications and information, which justified my suspicions about the role and character of Kruse's activity. Obviously assuming that there was no suspicion about him, Kruse had offered Moscow the same means that already in '14 Kesküla wanted to impose on us. At the same time he tried to take advantage of our connections, in particular the address given to him by N. Bucharin... to establish contacts with Kesküla's friends who were in Moscow»." Strangely, Sljapnikov spoke in his memoirs of Kesküla and not of Parvus, perhaps because mentioning the name of Parvus in this context would have been compromising. But Sljapnikov was rightly surprised that, unbeknownst to him, Kruse could have so many contacts in the Bolshevik environment. In fact, Kruse had not only visited the Bucharina several times and had conversed with her for a long time," but he had also met Bucharin's father, a sister of Le-nin, the Bolsheviks Ivan Skvorcov-Stepanov, Petr Smidovič, Leonid Stark and

* Bucharin's wife.

Vasilij Smidt, who would later be senior Soviet officials, as well as the Menshevik leader Cheidze, future president of the 1917 Soviet, and others. And, apart from the fact that Sljapnikov was informed or not, these meetings confirm that Parvus was in contact, perhaps even without Lenin's knowledge, with the Bolshevik organizations. His agents recognized each other by showing off stickers from the Haag coffee."

Even Parvus, immediately after New Year's Eve, hurried to approach the

Russia. Just on December 31, the day before, a cold shower: the communication had arrived from Berlin that "the fantastic financial projects" of Helphand - as von Jagow had called them - they had been definitively rejected." So, no fake rubles; an important element, although not decisive, of the plan was missing. But he had had a reasonable advance of good rubles and already forwarded it. A small part of them had to be distributed, in addition to the organization, also to the strikers, according to his March memorandum: an idea that came to Parvus, perhaps remembering the traditions of the Russian Jewish communities. If Jagow's distrust of his plan and his own person had persisted, Parvus could also, unbeknownst to the ambassador, take advantage of support from the Political Section of the General Staff, in the person of Kurt Riezler, with whom he had already come into contact since March, and his old acquaintance

Room. Moreover, his business partners Georg and Heinrich Sklarz also had relations with that Section, although at a lower level.! *

He thus embarked on a ship that would take him to Stockholm, from where he could closely follow the events of Petrograd. And on January 3 of the new year he triumphantly telegraphed Brockdorff: "Everything is going as hoped, I await news from Petrograd." Of that voyage on the Baltic Sea from Copenhagen to Stockholm I also leave a singular testimony: an ironic and anti-heroic theatrical act, deliberately full of political signs, in which he himself embodied himself in various characters: a ventriloque and brilliant contradictory with himself in the form of "a conversation about wartime", in "a company of people sailed in all the waters, slammed on all the railways". *

For three weeks Parvus stayed in the capital on the rocks, where sometimes the winter is sparkling and hard as crystal, in constant and anxious connection with the foggy waters of Petrograd, immersed in the dark darkness of that January 1916. He knew Stockholm well and many of the economic and commercial operations he was conducting as part of his venture passed through the Swedish capital. In particular through Nya Banken, * still existing today, founded in 1912 and directed by Olof Aschberg,

* New Bank,

Who immediately occupied a prominent place in trade with Russia and in relations with Russian financial circles, where Aschberg was well known." He had been shortly before the official intermediary of a loan from the United States to Russia, and was part of the management of the great Russko-Aziatsky

Bank * But this did not prevent him from conducting a bold and unscrupulous banking policy, which included transactions on behalf of Fürstenberg and other partners of Parvus with Russian banks, primarily Sibirsky Tor-

Govyj Bank. **

Parvus often went from Aschberg in that January 1916, entering the large palace of the more Parisian than Nordic style, with the balconies of the cast iron balustrades, the five floors surmounted by ogival dormers with spike points on the top, passing next to the liberly hall of the counters, with the ceiling with a semi-cylindrical vault and the benches-desks for the public covered in leather: a necessary path to reach the director's office. But Parvus naturally had other contacts in Stockholm: with the well-known socialist Paul Olberg, for example, or with Bejnes (Boris) Mehr, a friend of Sljapnikov, who with his wife Sara was at the center of the colony of Russian revolutionaries, especially the Mensheviks. And there were in those days for Parvus many other political and other meetings, expectations, hopes, tensions that he unloaded by devouring smörgás*** watered with champagne in happy convivial and feminine company. The news from Russia was good and not good. Like the one that announced the arrest of about six hundred militants and working leaders of various left-wing organizations." It was good news, because it showed that things had started and the police feared and imprisoned preventively, as was his habit, the possible heads of riots; but it was at the same time bad news, because it meant that the authorities were on alert and so the movement would be deprived of many of its

Better clementi.

On January 9, the factories of Petrograd went on strike. The initiative started from the Vyborg district with a demonstration destined to develop into a general strike." In some cases the soldiers were in solidarity with the strikers. The demonstrations were repeated the next day, January 10; and in the evening, in the Vyborg dision, a demonstration of civilians and soldiers took place together, in which the soldiers also carried the red flag." A crowd that was estimated between fifty and one hundred thousand people, the latter figure that Parvus had announced to Ambassador Brockdorff.

Simultaneously, in Nikolaev's shipyards on the Black Sea, where

* Russian-Asian Bank.
** Siberian Commercial Bank.
*** Cold dishes specialty of Scandinavia.

Two large battleships were under construction, over ten thousand workers went on strike. The strike would last until February 23, when the management proclaimed the lock. This agitation had also been announced by Parvus in his memorandum. In the capital, at the beginning of February the Putilov workshops went on strike, but on the 23rd the lock was also declared here. The Du-ma discussed it in a closed session, but authorized the publication of the debate; for this reason the tsar dismissed General Polivanov, Minister of War, who had kept the report." Senior officials of the regime, such as Vice-Admiral Murav'ev, wondered if in these agitations there was the ma-

No, as well as of internal enemies such as left-wing parties, also of external enemy forces.

In the other cities of Russia, demonstrations and strikes were of marginal weight, but the movement that began on January 9, 1916 continued with some intensity until the whole of March. The sabotage of bridges and factories also began, which would continue throughout the year: this too had been planned by Parvus in his March memorandum. The sinking in the port of Sevastopol of the battleship "Imperatrica Marija", which had just been semanced, aroused in October. * A fuse had therefore been triggered that was to burn until February of the following year, when the revolution would have been triggered. A crescendo and unstoppable trial, as Parvus had told the Germans through Brockdorff, which however did not explode in January 1916 as they expected.

Back in Copenhagen, in the interview on the 23rd, Parvus had to give explanations. Brockdorff was understanding, he was all on his side, even if embarrassed by what he should have reported to Berlin, but von Jagow and the others down there were very "Prussian": they could not conceive that an alarm clock would not ring at the time for which it had been charged. It meant that she wasn't a good reliable alarm clock like the German ones, but a bad Russian alarm clock.

2 Disappointment in German diplomacy

The day after the Russian 9 January, that is, the western 23, Parvus showed up punctually in Copenhagen from Brockdorff, who had been disappointed that no resounding news had arrived from Russia. He explained to him that, if we had not reached the revolution, this was due to a series of factors that

* It was probably the author, as of other enterprises, the anarcho-communist Bencion Mojscev

Dolin, known under various pseudonyms, German agent, who then came from Switzerland and in the rest of 1917 committed suicide (cf. NU, 1917RF, RP).

They had made their weight felt in recent weeks. The government had "put in command positions several of those who... were the exponents of the revolutionaries, weakening the movement with this policy." Parvus yes

- reported to the military Industrial Committees that, although opised by the Bolsheviks, were supported by the Mensheviks and other groups. Moreover: the bourgeois parties were not for the downing of the regime; the revolutionaries themselves feared that the square would get out of hand and chaos would be created; the specter of hunger that snaked in Petrograd had been removed with extraordinary food supply measures; the Russian victory in Erzurum had acted as a deterrent. The organization, however, was ready to act at the right time - Parvus still assured -, had control of the masses, as demonstrated by the ongoing events and would have confirmed those that were announced. He, Parvus, had warned in December that one could not be sure of an overwhelming movement in January. And on the other hand, the Germans had not moved towards Riga, as he had advised, while the Russians were winning in Turkey.

Brockdorff was flexible and perceptive enough to understand these motivations. To the report he sent to the chancellor, transmitting these explanations of Parvus without any comment of his own, Berlin opposed an icy silence. She feels betted. He didn't even send a protocol of receipt. Von Jagow who, according to what Brockdorff wrote to Zimmer-mann, if he spoke of Parvus, he did it only "to better sharpen the language", on March 15 commented on the request for 30 thousand marks for a Russian revolutionary, made to him by the ambassador to Switzerland Romberg, with these words:

«I. Helphand demanded many other sums without any result. Maybe they ended up in his pockets. This other one at least has the advantage of costing a little." Now his papers for a separate peace were the Russian bankers Ma-nus and Rubinstein of the circle of Rasputin and the tsarina, the businessman and journalist Kolyško, who during the war circulated between Petrograd and the Baltic capitals, as well as the strange figure of Prince Bebutov. These in 1916 in Stockholm were in contact with Brockdorff, with the envoy of the peace mission Ford, with the Russian emigrants, with the head of the German military counterintelligence Colonel W. Nicolai and with Parvus himself." It seems that von Jagow was unaware of all this, especially about the relationship between Nicolai and Parvus. And instead Parvus continued to be in contact with the general staff, although throughout the year the Ministry of Foreign Affairs kept him in limbo, chasing

Vain projects of separate peace.

In those days Parvus wrote on the "Glocke": "The difficulties of concluding peace lie in the political and economic problems that the war has raised. First of all the danger of Russian tsarism... The danger is removed and Russia itself will get rid of tsarism, but the

Imperialist-militarist tendencies of the Russian capitalist class. The Russian bourgeoisie bears a large part of the blame for the war and the national liberalism that is emerging can become more dangerous than Russian absolute. In the looming revolution, Russian workers will have a great function... The young Russian capitalism still has a future ahead of it, it has a strong and vast possibility of expansion and also political and cultural tasks to fulfill. This gives him an awareness, an authority, an ideal exaltation that has long been lost in Western Europe.

It will therefore set itself great tasks and pursue them with energy, like any capitalism, but with greater means, it will conquer the world and try to submit it to itself; it will also try, and here there is no doubt, to strengthen the armed forces of the state. We are therefore interested in the democratization of Russia... and that the individual nations that are now oppressed by the Russians develop freely. It would be even better if we could tear this unprecedented state centralization to pieces. In any case, we must have a peace that protects Mitteleuropa from being overwhelmed by the growing military power of the Russian empire». *

Here Parvus once again used the "Glocke" in support of his "total strategy", deliberately amplifying the potential dangers and threats inherent in the industrial and economic development of Russia: although it must be admitted that his words contained a lucid historical prediction that would take shape in later times and in circumstances that were still unpredictable for the moment. But on the contingent level he still cleaned up the illusions of Zimmerwald: "Counting on the civil resistance of the people against the war turned out to be a frightening il-

Illusion. We know now that war is possible and that it can last a long time despite all its monstrosities.

Lenin now also knew it, who, resigned, had immersed himself in the libraries of Zurich and worked on that theme "state and revolution", which Parvus had repeatedly dealt with. His utopian book of the same name would have come out in which he announced the extinction of the state after the seizure of power. However, he insisted on asking the proletariat to turn its weapons against the common enemy, and announced that imperialism was on the eve of the socialist revolution." Parvus, on the other hand, saw in these positions a re-edition of the old illusion of the economic collapse of capitalism and wrote: "... capitalism will assert itself if it is not barred through the organization of the proletariat. However, it is not a question of increasing the chaos with agitation, but of getting out through the organization of the confusion of capitalism."

Meanwhile, despite the journalistic commitment and the spasmodic expectation of the events in Russia, commercial activity with Fürstenberg was as-

Adding more and more dimensions. If von Jagow continued to look at the Revolutionierungspolitik, his own ministry and other German government sectors continued to favor Parvus in import-export operations with Russia and other neutral or belligerent countries. And this is because they served to finance and cover its underground action in Russia, which not infrequently, as has been seen, made use of Bolshevik clandestinity.
That the German Foreign Ministry, despite the disappointment for the failure to turn in January, had not cut off relations with Parvus and was not fundamentally hostile to him, was demonstrated by another episode. In February 1916 he was granted citizenship and issued a Prussian service passport, reserved for those traveling in the interest of the Reich and valid for all neutral countries. It was not precisely this that Parvus aspired to. He wanted to be a German citizen of the Reich, which was different from being a citizen of one of the states that made it up. And Prussia, moreover, despite being the dominant state, was for him the part of Germany that he loved the least and was the most tolish for him for traditions, stiffness of customs and mentality. His Širokaja nature* of Russian, although scion of those millions of German-speaking Jews swallowed but not digested by tsarism in its expansion to the west, brought him closer to Germany, as has been seen, as progressive and vital as it was, to the great German culture in whose area he had matured from his university years in Switzerland until during the two hard-time decades in Saxony and Bavaria.

Now, after repeated attempts to get out of the condition of an apo-lide emigrant, precisely because of the multiple and delicate activities he carried out, he needed citizenship. And not only because, "as a German citizen he would have been less prevented in his action of freedom against Russia and therefore incomparably greater the services he provided", as Brockdorff wrote to Zimmermann, once again advocating his cause." Par-vus wanted the spiritual bond he had with Germany and the German people to be also formally recognized: "It is important that in the great struggle of the peoples that the war has unleashed every man expresses himself with his full energy. In my case it is only possible if I can legitimize myself as a full citizen of the German state," he wrote in his curriculum vitae presented on February 11, in which he emphasized that he had "for many years a worldwide notoriety as a scholar and exponent of the ideas of the Spd", that he belonged "for almost a generation to Germany for education, feelings and activity." But he had learned that the Ministry of the Interior had "heavy doubts" about him, and was satisfied with Prussian citizenship: it was at least a first step.

* Open, generous, communicative nature.

For several years Parvus was now a rich man, who lived in the "abundance of Mammone", as he had written in September of the "15 to his friend

Haenisch." During 1916 and beyond he would become more and more so, multiplying his business initiatives and expanding his journalistic and cultural activities. Throughout the war period he lived in Copenhagen, in a luxurious villa of the Vodrofsvej, a course of the elegant neighborhood beyond the water mirror Skt. Jørgens, on the edge of the center. The villa was guarded by numerous purebred dogs and a luxurious "Adler" sedan with chauffeur was always ready in the garage. All this served representation as well as comfort, which was assured to him by the kind Mrs. Maria Schil-linger, his economist and his cohabitant during the war years. She was a good German, affable and anything but trivial, who gave him two children, one of whom was born in mid-1917, was called Alexander and had his mother's surname. Parvus had here his nest, his Gemütlichkeit, his sweet safe intimacy, from where he could go out on the hunt for business, financial combinations and political plots, and sometimes also for erotic outings.

In every respect, his full personal freedom had remained intact with Schillinger, as had already happened with Groman.
He also had a house in Berlin, at No. 9 of the elegant Tiergartenstrasse, which flanks the park of the same name. It was the business center, with the City and the Kurfürsterdamm. But, when he arrived from Copenhagen, he often preferred to take a suite at the Kaiserhof, a hotel for princes and millionaires, to combine business and high-level meetings, where he offered representative lunches to cultivate social relationships and give polish to his image. From spring, after the feverish period of the action in Russia, it was often seen at the Caté Victoria, a meeting place for well-known socialists such as Südekum, Cunow, Baake, Hacnisch, Lensch and Baumeister. Many of these were collaborators of his magazine "Die Glocke", which in the summer Parvus transferred from Munich to Berlin with the Editions for the Social Sciences, entrusting the direction to Heinrich Cunow. Thanks also to substantial government subsidies, which during the war he had no qualms about demanding, the publishing house published books and brochures on an ever larger scale, thus realizing another dream of his: to have his own independent tribune, to exert influence in political, journalistic and cultural circles, to no longer be in the situation of the past: of an unheard theorist without power. As always, he had walrus mustaches, his physique increasingly obese and often gripped by rheumatism, but his energy, lucidity, spirit of initiative, unscrupulousness were at their peak.

3 Coal for Denmark

A significant example of the type of financial-commercial-politic activity that Parvus carried out during the war was the transaction he made in 1916 to sell German coal to Denmark. Dani-marca, a neutral country, bought coal from England, but with the war the price had risen a lot, especially due to the increase in freight, since transport was threatened by German submarines. And already in the winter of 1915-16 the country had suffered a shortage of coal with serious consequences for the economy. At that time, Germany was making efforts to take pro-British Denmark from its side, efforts that, despite the commitment of Ambassador Brockdorff, had come to nothing.

It was in this impasse that Parvus intervened, leaning primarily on the Danish socialist and trade union circles which, by political tradition, were instead oriented towards Germany. In the spring he proposed and studied with the unions - which owned various cooperative societies of consumption and sale - a plan that would allow coal to be imported from Germany and sold directly to consumers, eliminating intermediaries. Everyone would have benefited: the unions, which would have gained money and prestige, with positive repercussions also on the socialist party; the Danish population, who would have had coal in relative abundance and at a lower price; Germany, which thus placed a strong mortgage on English influence and on the possibility that Denmark abandoned neutrality; and finally he, Parvus, who in addition to benefiting financially from the operation, could dispel the coldness by which he had been surrounded in Copenhagen after his inauguration and appear instead as a benefactor. For a business of this magnitude, the cornerstone could only be him, with his entries and protections in the Germanic government and his knowledge of Danish social democracy.

Having obtained the support of the authoritative secretary of the trade unions, Karl Kie-fer, as well as that of the Danish foreign minister, Eric Scavenius, Parvus naturally did not struff to have Brockdorff from him, who immediately understood the importance of the undertaking. Preceded by a recommendation from the ambassador, in mid-June he was in Berlin to discuss the project with the baron

Langwerth von Simmern and with the authorities who controlled the export." A month later, the Danish unions could already count on a minimum monthly supply of 90 thousand tons of German coal and found their own sales company, Arbejdernes Faelleorganisation Braendseksforret-ning A.S.* Obviously Parvus was not included in the company, whose direction

* Worker's organization supplying fuels.

The president and the secretary of the unions were placed, but in the technical section there were the Germans, including his man, Georg Sklarz. Reasons of opportunity advised discretion in that delicate war situation, considered the neutral position of Denmark. Among other things, any suspicions or accusations of corruption against the German party and unions could have nip the operation in the bud. But it was a great political success of Parvus. Already in August Brockdorff was able to communicate in Berlin that the coal supplies "have produced such a favorable effect on the socialist party, that the leaders let me know that they are ready to engage their parliamentary influence in the sense I want." And Minister Scavenius told him that he now enjoyed the "most enthusiastic following among the socialists" for his pro-Germanic policy.

In October 1916 Parvus founded the Københawns Befragtnings-og Transport-Kompagniet,* which was entrusted with the transport of coal from Germany to Denmark. He appropriately made the Danish unions also participate, but kept in his own hands the direction of the company and most of the profits that resulted from it. With this initiative, however, he came to bump into Hugo Stinnes, an industrial and political tycoon, who until then had had a monopoly on the transport of German coal and amateur companies such as the Hamburg-America Linie. England also moved, influencing the most pro-British Danish circles. But Par-vus was not a man who was discouraged in the face of obstacles, especially when political and financial objectives of this magnitude were at stake; above all, the fact of challenging England excited him and pushed him to risk.

The story was then told by Parvus himself: "On the English side, the Danish coal traders were informed that supplies of goods from the countries of the Intesa would be cut off if they had sold Te-desco coal. And in fact they did not treat this coal, despite the growing lack of fuel. The coal company of the unions did not find any landing or storage for the unloading of its ships. Where possible, even cranes, trolleys and coal spades were refused... The Union of Danish Entrepreneurs was hostile from the beginning to the coal affair of the unions... The British had set in motion all the means of economic terrorism to annihilate the coal enterprise of the unions... In short, a boycott in all aspects! In October and November 1916, the Copenhagen hard was crowded with ships that had brought coal from the unions and were waiting for it to be unloaded. The docks of Copenhagen were overflowing with coal, while in the province the union society could not obtain deposits. You had to pay hundreds of thousands of crowns of pe-

* Copenhagen freight and transport company.

Nale for the forced stop of the ships... So the newspapers ironized about the "black mountains" of Copenhagen. The situation was extremely critical. At that point the enemies of the union society inferred the final blow: they managed to cut her bank credit... A well-known bank manager told me personally: "You are absolutely right, the coal will be sold out. We need German coal. But we can't give money, because the British don't want to. If we worked against the will of the British, it would be suicide for our bank."

The first great difficulty, the hostility of the German shipowners, was won by Parvus by restructuring competition between their association and the shipowners of Stettin who were outside it. He had organized his own fleet of charter ships, which in that autumn brought more than 200,000 tons of coal to Copenhagen. The Danish unions, on the other hand, had not been able to organize unloading and storage, and an agile sales structure to the public. Their company was in trouble and they had no credits. Not even Sklarz had managed to overcome this second difficulty. And Parvus then risked his just to tick it: "Thank goodness I had already taken into account the possibility of blocking the bank credit and had tried to free up as much cash as possible from my companies. With these sums and with the help of my personal credit, I was able to procure at the decisive moment the coal company the million it needed. *

This million crowns will be returned to him, devalued, only five years after the end of the war, but at that time he had won. And the enemies were numerous and strong: English interests, Danish interests at the first suc-Cubes, German interests.

Even in the early 17th century, when Germany unleashed the offensive of the U-Boots* that also torpedoed neutral ships, Brockdorff had to repeatedly intervene vigorously at Ludendorff to avoid damage, as well as to establish direct contacts with the Ruhr mines and obtain essential goods such as Danish horses and foodstuffs for Germany in exchange for coal. The trade union society, however, developed so much that during the year it equipped its own landings and docks, in which at the end of the war about a thousand workers and employees worked. The company became an important shipowner, building its own offices and guaranteeing fixed frees with long-term contracts.

The full economic and political success persuaded the Germans of Parvus' exceptional skill, and induced him to go further. So he proposed a analogous undertaking to the Swedish socialists through Wilhelm Jansson, a collaborator of the "Glocke", which the German ambassador in Stockholm Baron Lu-

* Submarines (German).

Cius von Stoedten was enthusiastic." His purpose was to link all neutral countries to German influence with similar initiatives. But a refusal came from Norway and the Swiss socialists also rejected the offer. In Denmark, however, the coal operation continued until the end of the war and beyond, saving the country from cold and paralysis. Ambassador Brock-dorff earned in front of his government the merit of having managed to prevent Denmark from passing to the side of the British and the Intesa. And Par-vus, in addition to pocketing several million crowns, proved to the then treasury minister Helfferich, the one who had rejected with disdain his plan of false rubles, that he was not only a utopian who pursued revolutionary dreams-

Nari, and anything but a scoundrel.

3 Export-import for sedition

Parvus was actually first of all a theorist of the economy, who wanted and also knew how to be an economic operator, linking the two things closely together, basing financial and commercial operations on the heritage of economic studies, of research on the laws of development of the world market, which since his youth had been accumulating and growing more and more. To this he added his nose for the new, for the opportunities continuously opened by the economic and political reality, in whose joints he knew how to insert himself with genius and passion. The spiritual satisfaction that his initiatives gave him was no less than his taste for wealth, which was however for him, as for all men of his mold, in the first place synonymous with power, affirmation of his own personality and indi-

Slope. He had been definitively convinced of this as early as 1910, when "the then published private letters of Karl Marx, which showed what a mortifying dependence on his wealthy friends he was, strengthened me in my decision to make money."

Even the attari of the Handels-og Exporteompagniet, directed from Fürsten-berg, were proceeding at full speed. Since April Georg Sklarz, hiamato der Klerne, had joined him, because he was "small, grazing, with minute traits", as Parvus' firstborn recalls, "with a sad actor's face". but of an unparalleled timeliness and skill in trade. He also relied on his brother Heinrich, who had been sent to Copenhagen in '15 by the German general staff with economic espionage assignments. Under the false name of Pundyk he directed a small central of double agents, such as Romanovič, Dolgopolsky, Müller, an artist named Amatis and beautiful girls enlisted to carpir secrets. With this staff and

With ads in the newspapers Heinrich discovered by which German goods on which the export ban was in force arrived in Denmark instead and were resold to countries of the Intesa. *
Georg Sklarz was a precious element, because he could be safely entrusted with any operation, and Parvus, who among other things was officially a stranger to society and its branches and simply appeared as director of the Institute and as editor, could devote himself to the other thousand activities and in the first place to political action.

The trading company prospered, extending its activity from the Netherlands to Poland and Romania, from England to the United States and, of course, to Russia. The volume of import-export that Handel-og Exportrompagniet carried out between Germany and Russia was very relevant, two countries at war with each other, which were tearing apart on the fronts, but which for their economy, even war, needed their respective goods. The news about it is extremely rare for obvious reasons, but it can be indicative that in the year 1916 alone Russia imported goods from Germany for eleven million rubles." Traffic passed through the Swedish-Finnish border of Tornio-Haparanda, the same one used by the agents of Parvus, by Kesküla, Sljapnikov, Kollontaj etc., and through which Lenin would have passed in April 1917.

These were the most disparate goods: medicines, syringes, contraceptives, thermometers, socks, razors, all small and high-priced items, in high demand in Russia, which Fürstenberg in the months of March-August '16 alone bought for a million crowns, that is, more than 50 thousand British pounds. * Most were sent to the company Fabian Klingsland, representative of Ne-stlé, which had two offices in Petersburg, one of which, Nadeždinskaja 36, a transversal of the Nevsky Perspective, worked Evgenija Sumenson, a young woman we will talk about. She was the one who kept in touch with

Fürstenberg
Those goods in Russia were worth many times more than Fürsten-berg had paid them in Denmark and from here the large profits, a percentage of which remained in Russia at the disposal of Parvus' agents and another came to the Copenhagen firm especially through the mediation of the important Russko-Aziatsky Bank" based on Prospettiva Nevsky 44 and branches in all Russian cities. As witnessed by the Austro-Hungarian embassy in Stockholm: "It is absolutely certain that, during the war, Helphand and Fürstenberg conducted, with Germanic help, export deals with Russia through Scandinavia... This import of German goods into Russia was carried out regularly and in considerable volume by the Helphand-Fürstenberg company in the following way: Helphand received certain goods from the Germans, as tools chi-

Rurgici, medicines and chemical products deficient in Russia. The cost of these goods was not paid in Germany, but, until the outbreak of the Russian revolution, it was mainly used for Leninist propaganda."

This was only a part of the transactions of the Par-vus-Fürstenberg company, which imported and exported everything to and from various countries: from raw materials to foodstuffs, from caviar and cognac to used cars and fishing boats, from textiles to chemical and technical items and whale oil. The most important items were, however, in addition to wheat, oil, rubber, metals such as copper, zinc, chromium, nickel, aluminum: all strategic materials. «From New York in 1916 you could get everything except volframium, chrome and vanadium.» In the archives of Berlin there are still countless telegrams of Parvus that talk about metals," which the German war economy needed like bread.

Parvus and Sklarz also founded specialized transport companies, which were owned by the Russian emigrant Viktin and others. Almost all of these operations were carried out with the secret support of the German authorities; some were legal, many others carried out with false or smuggling statements. Behind them were also German financial circles such as von Schwabach, Guttmann and the Bleichröder Bank. They were large-scale operations, which fully responded to the concept of total war that Germany conducted, both for the advantages that came from it in the war economy, and, according to Parvus' plan, for political action in Russia, since the import-export was in all respects an ideal cover for connections and clandestine financing, for which bank credits were enough.

Parvus' fortune also had a great increase, but he was also a man who entrusted and left a lot to others: responsibility as gains. His train of life was sumptuous, his activity grueling, and he earned many sums to the Institute, its editions and works such as the holiday home he created in Denmark for children.

Deschi, sons of workers and soldiers at the front." On the other hand, not all of his assets were in Denmark, where in 1916 he paid taxes on a capital of 540 thousand crowns and on an income of 41,200;* but partly they were deposited in banks, partly invested in shares and properties in other neutral and non-neutral countries, such as in Germany itself. Since July 1916, for example, he had engaged "rementable resources" in an agricultural society in Bulgaria and for the purpose of reorganizing agricultural production in Turkey."

Two years later he will write: "I am a businessman, an industrialist, a capitalist, but precisely in purely commercial companies I was interested, in addition to the profit and much more than it, the organizational, operational part...

I can name a whole series of companies in which under this or this other

Form I applied new ideas. However, all this is of little importance.
Far from me wanting to justify capitalist profit with personal merits.
However, I don't see why I shouldn't take from my side a share of the surplus value accumulated by the capitalist class. My wealth, whose dimensions among other things have been hyperbolized in an unprecedented way with noise and gossip, is in no way of the burden to me. It simply gave me the opportunity to extend my social activity. This also includes the Institute for the study of the social consequences of war that I founded and about which the newspapers have written a lot. It has collected a library in Copenhagen to which anyone who wants to do scientific work has free access. His publications have given him an international appeal and are cited in all the authoritative magazines of the belligerent countries, in England, Russia, Germany, Austria, etc. All this, however, has not stopped the paper smearers from suspecting this institution simply because I am its founder and without anyone knowing what it is suspected of». *

Fritz Max Cahén, Brockdorff's advisor and press officer, would have written about it: "On August 11, 1916, the "Frankfurter Zeitung" published an article dealing with the losses of deaths and injuries in the world war. He cited as a source for his figures an institute that was in Copenhagen... The institute, where I often worked for my research, offered visitors like me a quiet reading room, a sumptuous but gloomy environment that gave the impression of the anteroom of a cemetery, where publications could be consulted. You were almost completely alone». After saying this, Cahén curiously adds about Parvus: "Althephef I was often mentioned in relation to him, I never met him (sic.).

I only saw him by chance sometimes in the dining room of the Hôtel

Phönix in the Bredgade... A huge mass of meat, a bald head with a big round black beard, a giant cigar in the big hand." One would have to believe that this Cahén, who was expelled from Denmark as a German spy, was never at work in his embassy, where

Parvus was notoriously at home.

A surprising and revealing testimony of prestige and ability-

The penetration of the Institute of Parvus in Russia itself in war is given by the article that appeared on January 17, 1916 in the newspaper "Naš Golos" of Samara. It published a letter apologetic of the activity of the Institute and of Parvus himself: and the letter was signed by the economist Groman, as well as by the collaborators of Copenhagen: S. Dalin, Zurabov, V. Perazič and G.
Osipov alias Bienstock. *

1 Brockdorff-Rantzau to the Chancellor of the Reich. Report No. 489, 12-21-1915 AAA. See GRR, pp. 8-9.

2 S.S. Ol'denburg, 25/R, p. 568

3 Ivi, p. 569; P.N. Miljukov, op. cit., II, pp. 205 ss.

4 S.S. Ol'denburg, 251R, pp. 571-72.

5 G. Alexinsky, La vie amère de M. Gorky, Paris 1950, p. 179.

6 Ivi, p. 176; ctr. also Gorky: L. Andreev. Neizdannaja perepiska, Moskva 1965, p. 549.

7 'Birževye Vedomosti', Petrograd, n. 339; see also K. Haenisch, PBE, p. 19

8 N. Berberova, ZZ, pp. 160-61. Younger brother of the famous Bolshevik J. Sverdlov, who had a central part in the execution of the tsar and his family in Yekaterinburg (now Sver-dovsk), Zinovij was adopted in 1899 by Gor'kij, who gave him his surname. Having already become colonel and then general in 1916, he carried out his life on military and diplomatic missions for France, and from 1940 he was the right-hand man of De Gaulle. He died in Paris in 1966.

9 S.S. Ol'denburg, 25/R, p. 588 or E

10 preserved in the AGK, 'Helphand'

11 A. Sljapnikov, Kanun '17go g., Moskva 1923.

12 Personal documentation of the A.

13 "Krasnaja Letopis'", n. 7, 1923, Petrograd. Cit. in G. Katkov, 1917RF, p. 140.

14 See no. 11.

15 See no. 11.

16 A. Moorehead, The Russian Revolution, London 1968, p. 212. Also in L'oro di Berli-No, «Illustrated history», Milan 1959, n.11.

17 Jagow in Brockdorff-Rantzau, Tlg. n. 206 of 31-12-1915. In AGK «Helphand».

18 G. Katkov. 1917RF. pp. 127-2:

) Tig. n. 24 in AGK «Helphand», also in GRR, pp. 10-1-20 Parvus,

Ein Gespräch zur Kriegszeit, «Glocke», n. 1, 1916, PP. 24-35.

21 Olof Aschberg was also a friend of the famous Krasin, head of the "technical group" of the Bolsheviks until 1908 and then manager of Petersburg companies for which he made numerous trips abroad during the war. Aschberg would have worked in Russia during the Nep at the head of a commercial bank. Ctr. M. Futrell, NO, PP. 166, 170, 224; H. Björkegren, RP, *passim*.

22 G. Katkov, 1917RF, p. 130

3 Ivi, pp. 129-139. Katkov, who in his book dedicates a chapter to "Helphand and the comfortable workers' actions in Russia", states that "there is evidence that in the capital they had planned a demonstration destined to develop into a general strike".

24 Ivi, p. 130.

25 S.S. Ol'denburg, 25/R, p. 586 n.

26 G. Katkov, 1917RF, p. 137,

27 Brockdorff-Rantzau to the Reich Chancellor. Report No. 19 of 23-1-1916. In AAA ; Also in GRR, pp. 14-15.

28 In AAA, WK 2 geh. cit. in SZ, p. 221.

Rie (cf. bibl) W Nicola and a quespo panon mo evasi cit, p. 202 et pasim. In his memo-

30 Parvus, Einheit der Partei, "Glocke", n. 1, 1916, pp. 37-38.

31 Ivi, p. 39.

32 V.I. Lenin, OS, 1, p. 615.

3, парить, Віте Льну та іну, 12106, Танни 9, in 11Л

WK 11 c geh.

36K

Haenisch, BE, p. 37.

37 A manuscript letter from Parvus to Brockdorff-Rantzau (end of June 1916) illustrates

The ratrative. In Nachlass Brockdorff-Ranczau (H 231-408 - H 231411), AAA;

(235 See also: P.G. Chesnais, Parvus et le parti socialiste danois, Paris 1918, p. 16

38 Brockdorff-Rantzau at AA, Tlg n. 1190, 12-8-1916, Akten des AA, Europa n. ;Gencralia

39 Ivi.

40 Parvus, IK, pp. 38-39; Pge, pp. 38-39.

41 Parvus, Zur Aufeläung, «Glocke» 1919, p. 1214.

42 Nachlass Helphand, Rep. 92.

43 Lucius a Zimmermann, 12-6-1917, AAA.

44 Parvus, PhAK, "Glocke", p. 1339.

45 F. Gnedin, Kur. p. 46

46 AGK 123, messages Pundyks. For such activities H. Sklarz was expelled from Denmark. See SZ, p. 231n.; RP, p. 376, passim.

47 M. Futrell, NU, p. 170.

48 Ivi.

49 AAA, Nachlass Helphand, Rep. 92.

I know H. Grebing, So macht man Revolution, «Politischen Studien», 1957, p. 234.

51 G. Bonnin, Les Bolchéviques et l'argent allemand during the premiere mondiale guerre, «Revue Historique», January-March 1965, p. 119

52 Political Archives of AA, WK. B. 1, E286030, E286739, E286748, E286766. Cit. also in M. Frenkin, Zachvat vlasti bol'evikami v Rossii, Ierusalim 1982, p. 182.

53 Nachlass Parvus, BA, Rep. 92; see also K. Haenisch, PPE, pp. 39 et sex.

54 SZ, p. 233; ZS, p. 198.

55 AAA, Turkey, n. 197, German economic u. industricile Unternchmungen in Turkey.

56 Parvus, IKW, Pp. 42-43; Pgk, PP. 43-44.

57 F.M. Cahén, Der Weg nach Versailles, Boppard/Rhein 1963, p. 195.

58 H. Biörkegren, RP, p. 294.

59 G. Karkov, German Political Intervention in Russia during World War I in: Revolutio-nary Russia, Cambridge (USA) 1968, p. 87 c n. 32.

Chapter eleven

Lenin's train

«When Rasputin loomed like a black shadow on the throne, all of Russia was outraged by it... today the killing of Rasputin is considered as

"The first shot of the revolution", the push and the signal of the upheaval».

So wrote in his book' the charming gay prince Feliks Jusupov, who on December 30, 1916 invited Rasputin to his palace and killed him, Poisoned by an equine dose of cyanide, the healer and Siberian prophet, former horse thief, miraculously recovered, as he recovered from the subsequent pistol blows. More were needed and wild beatings, when he fell on the snow of the garden where he had escaped; and perhaps he was still alive when he was thrown into the icy waters of the Neva.

Somehow, the revolt at the death of that wild and vital force foreshadowed the end of the empire. Exhausted by the war with 15 million people mobilited, of which almost half have fallen on the field or prisoners, unhinged in transport, undermined by eversion and conspiracies, strikes, sabotage of German agents and revolts in Central Asia, always on the-

To collapse due to the incapacity of the generals and the fatigue of the soldiers, tsarist Russia did not seem to feel excessively the deprivations and hunger that troubled the rest of Europe and had more than doubled the war production.

Lenin in Zurich felt isolated, especially after the arrest of his sister Anna in July, then released for illness but subject to continuous searches and therefore burned for connections. Kollontaj was back in America with Cudnovskij, former collaborator of Parvus in Copenhagen:

He made a round of rallies against the entry into the war of the United States and informed Lenin about that dangerous rival that was Trotsky, also down there since January. On the "Novyj Mir", a Russian newspaper in New York, Trotsky polemicized against support for the Intesa together with Bucharin, who had joined him after being expelled from Scandinavia for his brochures printed with German money from Kesküla. Now Lenin's right arm was the fat, curly Zinov'ev, with clear watery eyes, perhaps the most uncultured and faded of the first-lever Bolsheviks. Lenin began to reorganize the party-

To in Switzerland, leaning on the local socialist Fritz Platten and the young German pupil Willy Münzenberg. But, according to Alexinsky, on December 28th Lenin would have made a strange trip to Bern, going to the German embassy without realizing that he was being stalked by a Russian counterintelligence agent."

The revolutionary prospects seemed to be compromised: the fact that Russia in '16 had not suffered military defeats and the collapse of Romania, with the Germanic occupation of Bucharest, from where the government had fled to settle in Jassy taking Rakovski as a hostage, could constitute in other circumstances the premise for that separate peace for which so many attempts had been made on both sides; of which there was so much talk, and of which even Radek had written on the "Berner Tagwacht". The Reich Chancellor in his speech to parliament on November 16 had confirmed the German propensity in this sense, and, at the last moment, in February '17, it also seemed to the tsar the lifeline. Meanwhile, Hanecki worked for Lenin in Stockholm.

Comrade Hanecki, that is, Dr. Fürstenberg, in fact continued the commercial-political work in association with Parvus. Not everything always went smoothly. Coincidentally, in September '16 the Danish customs had inspected some cash registers in transit to Sweden to be forwarded to Russia, and a diligent judge had opened an investigation noting irregularities in the licenses. Fürstenberg was arrested on January 17, 1917 and after a few days expelled and embarked by the police on a ferry to Sweden. Leaving his splendid villa in Schateplund, paid fifteen thousand crowns of bail, Fürstenberg immediately resumed his business in Stockholm, where he had an office and residence in Birger Jarlsgatan 8 and a villa in the vicinity of the sea, in Saltsjöbaden. A few weeks later, continuing to be the Fürstenberg businessman, he would have been put by Lenin as comrade Hanecki at the head of the party's Foreign Office, to play a decisive function from Stockholm for the October coup d'état and beyond. The incident with the Danish justice and the seizure of documents, however, revealed not only certain clues about the gender of his trafficking, but also several names, including that of Heinrich Sklarz and Sumenson.?

And the February revolution are. As all memoirs and historians attest, it was completely unexpected. Only Interior Minister A.D. Protopopov, who received extensive information from the police, was concerned about the climate in the capital." And only on February 23 did the allied military missions signal the danger of a revolution?

No one else had noticed floating on a volcano. At the Aleksan-drinskij theater, the premie of Lermontov's Masquerade was being directed by Meyerhold. The liberal leader Pëtr Struve supported on February 22 at the univer-

Sità the thesis The economy and the price, obtaining the title of doctor. Perhaps only the poet Aleksandr Blok, who in those days published the verses Vozmezdie, the revenge, the spontaneous and clement revenge, felt the tremor of the Russian bowels, what he called "music of the revolution". It was hypothesized that the revolution was the result of the work of the agents who had instigated the general rehearsal of February 1916, or the direct consequence of that movement, as Parvus had predicted. ® Nothing, however, had been prepared for a possible emergency. In Petrograd, which had reached two and a half million inhabitants, the police had no more than ten thousand men including the horse-drawn units. Instead, there were over two hundred thousand soldiers among recruits waiting to leave for the front and veterans who told of the horrors of war, the power of German fire, gas, mountains of fallen. The recruits were willing to do anything so as not to get killed.

The legend of the "hunger tsar" as the cause of the revolution was invented by the economist Groman in a speech on March 16, on things done." More than hunger, the population suffered from the enormous increase in the price of all products.
A tremendous explosive charge had accumulated in those years in the people because of the crazy ban imposed by the tsar, since August 22, 1914, on the sale of vodka, wine and beer. This safety valve blocked at the beginning of the war contributed not a little to blow up the boiler.

Perhaps an anonymous girl was the first person to talk about revolution. On February 21, in an office of the Turkestan irrigation body, he looked out the window, saw something unusual in the street and exclaimed: "You know, I think the revolution has begun!" The first demonstrations were a spontaneous protest against the queues, which for the first time in history the Russians were forced to do for food. The agitations followed.

First sporadic, then fuelled by the forces that were just waiting for this, they took on a defined character only on the 23rd, when ninety thousand workers went on strike shouting "Down with the war!". On the 24th and 25th the demonstrators invaded the center. On Saturday 25th a meeting was held at the house of the Mason lawyer N. Sokolov, the friend of Kozlovskij, who "awaited the arrival of authoritative Bolshevik representatives"," who did not arrive, as Nikolaj N. Suchanov-Gimmer, witness and author of the first, most complete chronicle of the revolution, also praised by Lenin. He, Kerensky and others were at the meeting. «The movement developed without a visible plane. The most varied elements turned it on. Undoubtedly, the German agents were also working very actively. The extreme left took advantage of the opportunity to deliver incendiary speeches; in the factories the watchword spread: "Soviet of the workers' deputies".

The Soviet was formed on the 27th. At dawn on March 2 (15) the tsar signed the abdication-

Tion. In the following months there would be the so-called "double power": on the one hand the provisional government with the premiers prince L'vov and then Ke-rensky and with the foreign ministers Miljukov and war Gučkov, as eminent figures; on the other hand a soviet formed by over two thousand representatives in which Sukanov, Sokolov and Steklov dominated, and in whose executive committee the Bolshevik Sljapnikov also entered with the lowest number of votes. But Ste-klov, pseudonym of Jurij Nachamkes, who probably also had ties to Parvus, was also a cryptobolshevik, in the party since 1893; and would have implemented Lenin's policy." In the soviet and through it in some days he had such power as to be able to challenge the government. On the one hand, therefore, the representatives of the liberal and reforming tendencies of the regime and the moderate socialist currents; on the other, the revolutionaries, who directly expressed the charge of rebellion that had ac

The announcement that the revolution had broken out in Russia arrived in European capitals on the very day of the tsar's abdication, March 15. Parvus, who had first theorized and actively advocated it, who had been working for it for over two years, had been in a state of feverish excitement for a week at the news that came to him. But everything was still uncertain and con-

Fused. Brockdorff, already disappointed once, refused to believe the rumors. Only on the 15th he surrendered and on the 17th it was decided to send Berlin the telegram that he dictated to him: "The revolution has won. Russia is politically paralyzed. The Constituent means peace». The ambassador said he was perplexed by Parvus' "a-podictic certainty", but added that "events are a great fortune for us." Kurt Riezler and the Kaiser had already known this on the evening of Wednesday the 14th from a communication of the Supreme Command, which had managed a radio dispatch from the Kronstadt garrison. On the afternoon of the 15th the news was confirmed, although - as Riezler noted in his diary - "the doubts were strong and we all considered an imminent victory of the reaction for sure, especially since the information testified that everything was still undefined". But he added: "Now of course th

Parvus immediately raised the problem in front of Brockdorff: to have Tenin return to Russia immediately, He had already foreseen it in the Memorandum of March 1915, because, as he had written there, Lenin was "a very angry man", that is, angry and determined, and therefore the one who most of all pursued the destruction of the empire. And he had also committed himself to an immediate peace. Brockdorff agreed and asked the foreign minister, who was now Zimmermann vLimmermann, a man of broader views than his predecessor, not a prisoner of the traditional methods of diplomacy, and long-time friend of Broc-

Kdorff, was available to any proposal even risky in order to weaken the Russian power. Parvus had in mind an evolution of events in Russia and Germany, such as to lead to a "socialist peace" between the two countries, so as to displace the Entente on the military as well as on the domestic political level. For the return of Lenin he wanted the sanction of the Chancellor of the Reich in order to tie him to a precise commitment and set in motion Fritz Cahén, the deputy Er- Riezler also saw the possibility of a socialist peace, since the situation in Germany was beginning to be dramatic. But it was a perspective that at the same time he highly feared. «If hunger comes - he wrote on March 28 - and, at least, at the same time peace, we have the conditions that, if they last, necessarily lead to the revolution.
We must obtain peace from the current Russian government; the next one will probably be socialist and will proclaim the international peace of socialism." Already a few days later, however, he had lost confidence that with the Russian interim government it was possible to quickly end the hostilities. He noted on April 1: «... if the war lasts beyond the summer, the Commune will come to Russia and then the peace of ¿Onale and will be stipulated by Haase and Cchcidze»." And the 3: «. We must try to conclude with today's men, tell them that we will not wait forever with military operations... People here are very optimistic; I am very skeptical. It is difficult to conclude peace with the Democrats, especially with the revolutionaries. They are people who act in the Comités and are impractical."

The dilemmas that some of the most lucid and far-sighted officials of the German government posed at the time were of little to the future developments of historical events. But Riezler himself was convinced within a few days that the most serious card to play was the one proposed by Parvus: to send Lenin to Russia immediately. And from that moment he will play it, in this and only in this ally of Parvus. But on the 6th he wrote in his diary: «... The revolution a year before!... A repugnant era and a decadence of all civilization will come... Russia will be terribly big and deep."

In fact, then no one more than Lenin gave guarantees for a radical turn in Russia and for peace. For a realistic politician like Parvus, this was what mattered. What would then happen was still absolutely unpredictable, it would have been the result of the forces in the Russian revolution: a completely open process, with a provisional government, the soviet and the Constituent in sight; a process of which Lenin was only a moment of push and by which he would then be overwhelmed. Then Parvus wrote the basic article for the «Glocke», which will be released on March 24: «Your \Our victory... Democratic Germany must extend its hand to democratic Russia for peace and for a harmonious collaboration on the ter-

Reno of social and cultural progress." And on the 22nd, in a letter to his Munich so-cialist friend Adolf Müller, he set out the terms of the policy that in his opinion should be pursued in Russia: weapons to the proletariat, public trial of the tsar, redistribution of large land ownership, eight-hour day in industry, convocation of the Constituent and stipulation of peace." Meanwhile, under the pressure of events, even the leader of the Spd, Scheidemann, had published in the «Vorwärts» of March 19 an editorial with the combative title Time of Action, in which, linking the anniversary of the 1848 revolution with the Russian one in progress, a broader democracy was also claimed for Germany."

2 Lenin: "the miracle"

And Lenin? At noon on the 15th, the well-known Polish revolutionary Bronski brought him the news home: in Spiegelgasse* 14." Together they went down from the old town of Zurich, reached the Niederdorferstrasse and, along the narrow Weingasse, the Limmatquais. Hurrying on this riverside they arrived at Bellevueplatz, where the headquarters of the "Neue Zürcher Zeitung" was, which displayed the news of the day. Yes, the revolution, Lenin thought, "if the Germans don't lie, then it's true". * He had the lake behind him and, right from-

Vanti, the majestic building of the Hôtel Baur-au-Lac obstructed his view of the hill. All of a sudden it seemed to rush at him with its size and the size of a memory that at that moment made him see: Parvus had come down there in May 1915 and from there he had come to him in Bern and had insisted that he move to Scandinavia. Just over a year and a half had passed and the revolution planned by Parvus with the Germans came true! He returned to his cursed Spiegelgasse and immediately wrote to Inessa Armand in Clarens: "Today at

Zurich we are agitated: from 15-I1I there is a dispatch on the «Zürcher Post» and on the «Neue Zürcher Zeitung» that in Russia on the 14th the revolution won in Piter... I'm out of my mind not to be able to go to Scandinavia! I won't forgive myself for not risking going there in 1915!»." From the würstel factory below rose the usual nauscant stench that revolted Nadja, and the noise of the dadas of Marcel Janco and Tristan Tzara thundered down at the Cabaret Voltaire.

Only the next day, Friday the 16th, was learned of the abdication of the tsar and the amnesty for all politicians. Lenin then sent a passport photo of him to Fürstenberg in Stockholm to get him a fake Swedish passport:

* Ammer's alley.

Pretending to be deaf and dumb, he could have passed for a Swedish citizen. But he must have received some news from Parvus or from the Germans through the ambassador in Bern von Romberg, because he immediately had Broński send Hanecki a telegram with other instructions: "Send a photo of my uncle* Georg Sklarz Tiergartenstr. 9 Berlin." My uncle was him: Lenin. The address, that of Parvus' house in Berlin. So, Lenin was not only in contact with Parvus, but also with the "infamous" Sklarz; and he knew very well not only where to find them, but also that Sklarz, a high-level German agent

Lo, was able to procure special documents.

A race against time began — of Parvus, of Lenin, of the Germans and their agents, of the Russian emigrants — so as not to miss the train of the revolution. On Monday, March 20, Parvus was still pressing on the Germans and on the same day the Russian emigrant and German spy Civin, alias Weiss alias Koler, advised senior officials to facilitate the return of the Bolsheviks." But neither the Chancellor nor the general staff needed to be persuaded: Parvus and Sklarz were already acting.

Although the thing tied his hands and was politically dangerous for him, it is very likely that Lenin had no choice but the German way of Parvus, both because this was already foreseen within the framework of the mutual commitments (Parvus-Lenin-Germany) of the Revolutionierungspolitik, and because of the high level of its entrances. However, he did not want it to appear publicly that he was feeding this project. For example, he did not go to the meeting held in those days in Bern among the Russian emigrants to discuss the problem of repatriation in person, but sent Zinov'ev to us: obviously not to compromise. At the same time he sent, deliberately by regular mail, to Geneva to the Bolshevik Karpinsky a letter in which the following extravagant plan was exposed: «... Get transit documents through France and England on your behalf and I will leave with them through England (and Holland) to Russia. I can put on a wig. I'll have a picture taken already with the wig and I'll show up at the Bern consulate with your papers and already with the wig. You will then have to disappear from Geneva at the minimum for several weeks (until a telegram from me from Scandinavia);

During this time you must be hidden from you very seriously** in the mountains, where we will of course pay the pension for you...»"

But at the meeting of Russian emigrants, held on March 19, Martov proposed repatriation through Germany. And, although the proposal was not approved by anyone, "Lenin seized the idea". * His greatest political rival, the Menshevik leader Martov, had naively

* Here and in the following quotes the underline (italics) is by Lenin.
** Letteral trad. And a typical expression of Lenin.

Removed the chestnuts from the fire, publicly sponsoring a solution for which Lenin had already opted. This is why the 22nd wrote to Karpinsky, contradicting the previous letter: "Martov's plan is good: you have to get busy with it; only, we (and you) cannot do it directly. We would be suspected. In addition to Martov, it is necessary that, the Russians without parties and patriots turn to Swiss ministers (and influential people, lawyers, etc., which can also be done in Geneva) with the prayer to talk about this with the ambassador of the German government in Bern. We cannot participate either directly or indirectly; our participation would ruin everything. But the plan itself is very good and very safe."

All this was needed for appearances, as he was already in contact with Hanecki-Parvus-Sklarz, and that same 22 had written to Christiania (today

Oslo) to Kollontaj leaving for Russia, to let his sister Ma-rija know that he would return as soon as possible via Germany." Kollontaj arrived in Petrograd on the 31st and brought, along with the news, the first two of the famous Letters from afar, which appeared on the "Pravda". So Lenin had already decided for Germany, because after the 22nd he would no longer be able to communicate with Kollontaj on the way. She was searched at the Finnish border of Haparanda by the Russian police and Lenin's letters were almost not found: Lenin's timely return to Russia would probably have been prevented."

Meanwhile, at the Berlin Foreign Ministry they seemed to drag on, busy overcoming the technical and legal problems of the trip. Par-vus thus relied on the political section of the general staff, founded in the fall of 1914 and now directed by Dietrich von Hülsen: the important thing was to bring Lenin to Russia, the others counted relatively. And, to get it right away, they immediately prepared the documents for him, adding Zinov'ev and their respective companions as a minimum measure of coverage and protection. A large group would have required, as it actually happened, much more laborious preparations and therefore more time.

German diplomacy was busy anyway. On March 23, Romberg from Bern telegraphed to his ministry in Berlin: «... the revolutionary emigrants from here have expressed the desire to return to Russia through Germany, as they fear passing through France because of the submarine war. I ask for directives...». On the same day, Minister Zimmer-mann addressed the General Staff: «... Since we are interested in the influence of the radical wing of the revolutionaries having the upper hand, I think it is convenient to possibly authorize transit through Germany... if the general staff agrees. And, on March 25, from the general staff:

"... Urgent! No objection to the transit of Russian revolutionaries as long as in

Special transport under secure escort». On the 26th the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rom-berg: "Communication of the date of departure and list of names are presented four days before crossing the border. Objections from the general staff against individuals are unlikely." *
On March 27, the messenger of Parvus and the general staff, Georg Sklarz, arrived in Zurich, who brought the documents for Lenin (with the photo he had sent on the 16th), for his wife Krupskaja and his friend Inessa Armand, as well as for Zinov'ev and his wife Lillina. A communication from the ministry to the embassy in Bern informed that Sklarz was traveling on behalf of the general staff and would accompany "two" Russian revolutionaries through Germany." It seems that Sklarz behaved in such a way as to be too noticeable and without tact, provoking the intrusion of people like Fritz Platten and Bronski, in front of whom Lenin intended to keep certain compromising contacts confidential. Platten later wrote that Sklarz offered Lenin the money for the trip and that this "proved to Lenin that the mediator was a gallop of the German government so he immediately cut off all other speech". * He obviously did not imagine that Lenin knew very well who Sklarz was, and that the very presence of witnesses like him, Platten, forced him to make that move. Perhaps Lenin did it reluctantly, because the opportunity offered by Parvus-Sklarz would have given him the opportunity to leave immediately, while he then had to wait in uncertainty and even in despair two more weeks; or perhaps, instead, Lenin had already at that moment chosen a late return, preferring it to an adventure too discovered that compromised him

Much more.

This second hypothesis is validated by the tenor of the conference that had been held for two and a half hours on the 27th at the Volkshaus* in Zurich on the Russian revolution, whose text was published by the socialist newspaper "Volksrecht". It had to please, and in fact pleased, the German military attaché in Bern Major von Bismarck, who had been warned and sent the agent "AB 10" to report to him. *
Lenin was interested in the Germans knowing the tenor as soon as possible, even before it came out in the newspaper. It was a matter of days. Only in this way could he trust that they would organize as soon as possible that collective transport of emigrants in which he could camouflage himself, thus escaping a public embrace with Parvus. In the excited wait he threw down his political thoughts: "The world has become different in three days...

How could it be overturned?... The miracle... Our conditions of peace...
Long live the Russian revolution, long live the world proletarian revolution that begins!»." In those days, while Sklarz waited in Zurich without an eye,

* House of the people.

Lenin was very busy: he went to Bern to interest the Swiss socialist Robert Grimm; he tried to mobilize Paul Levi, future leader of the German communist party; he telegraphed in Fürstenberg to re-propose the exchange of emigrants with German internees; and finally, on the 30th, he wrote a long political letter in which he blamed the "Pravda" and Kamenev for having spoken out in defense of the country, demanded "the withdrawal of troops from Armenia and Galicia", and repeated that "the Russian proletarian revolution has no worse enemy than the English imperialists"." A text that, circulated, pleased the tede-schi very much. The foreign minister noted it with his own hand: "Why wasn't this telegraphed to me right away?" *

In his letter Lenin added: «For the contacts between Petrograd and Stockholm do not skimp on money!'» And also prayed that Kuba, that is, Fürstenberg himself, as a "very trusted person" would immediately go to Pietro-grado, although in the first lines of the letter he had stated: "I sincerely thank you for the care and help. Of course I can't use the services of people who have to do with the publisher of the "Glocke"»." As if Kuba-Fürstenberg had nothing in common with that publisher! Smoke in the eyes, but that still created an alibi for him. In any case, there was Parvus behind him, who had been working for days to get him back. Sklarz had left Switzerland on the 29th and on the 30th he met in Berlin with Parvus and reported to von

Hülsen." From Munich, the Prussian ambassador announced that "Helphand's trustee, Sklarz, is already in Berlin to deal with this trip."

But throughout that day, since nothing new happened, Lenin still tormented himself in doubt, in anxiety, in despair, as we read in the lines written on the 30th to Armand: «... Apparently we won't get to Russia. England won't let us pass. Through Germany the thing doesn't work»"

In Berlin, however, the ground had long been prepared by Parvus: Sklarz's report presented to von Hülsen contained Lenin's counter-proposal of a special convoy for about forty people. The state immediately approved it and even put pressure on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to accelerate the operation. On the evening of the 31st, the consent and the reminder of Berlin reached Ambassador Romberg. The news of the trip had leaked to-

Sterno and certain Russian nationalist circles, supported by the Entesa, were already moving to prevent repatriation. It was also expected that the United States would enter the war within a few days.

3 Parvus: peace or tabula rasa

On April 1st, when the complicated matter of Lenin's journey finally seemed to have come to a good point, Parvus had a long conversation with Brockdorff during which he exposed to him, among other things, his hypotheses on the possible developments of the revolution in Russia as well as his suggestions about the line that Germany should follow. * Russia, he said, was tired of the war and Germany now had to refrain from any offensive, which would have aroused a patriotic feeling among the Russians "in defense of the achieved freedom". Only in this way, Parvus explained, could the Russian revolution "logically develop the consequences of the conflict of interest it caused", namely: the peasants would have expropriated the lands by force and the soldiers would have abandoned the trenches to participate in this movement; the proletarian soldiers would have rebelled against the officers and generals; the Ukrainians, the Caucasians and the other ethnic groups would have separated from the Empire, starting its disintegration; the growing hunger and the increasingly difficult living conditions would have produced the "worst anarchy" in the space of a few months. In short, chaos, the russkij bunt, that is the Russian revolt, anarchic and unpredictable, according to the definition of the pocta Pushkin, with violence, looting, fires and speeches in all streets.

The Germans, according to Parvus, could follow two possible political lines: large-scale occupation and destruction of the Empire or rapid peace with the provisional government. The first variant required the Germans to launch an offensive not immediately, but after two or three months, when the anarchist had reached its peak, they occupied the industrial and mining south of Russia, thus reducing it to their mercy. "For such a conduct," Parvus added, "you must, however, also be decided to exploit victory politically with the utmost energy. This entails the disarmament of the Russian army, the destruction of the forts and the fleet and the prohibition of the manufacture of cannons and ammunition, as well as in connection with this, a large-scale occupation of Russia. If this does not happen, this gigantic state will certainly develop after a certain time into a new and very powerful military force, whose hostility towards Germany will be all the more dangerous the more serious the wounds infelled!», For this radical solution it was necessary first of all, according to Parvus, "to support the extremist revolutionary movement in order to increase anarchy".

If, on the other hand, the German government did not intend, again in the words of Parvus, "to make a clean slate of Russia", it was necessary to "conclude peace with it, but a peace that does not leave any bitterness to either side".

Otherwise it would have been repeated "what happened in 1870 in our relations with France, with the difference that, while France did not surpass us eco-

Nomically and politically, Russia will certainly develop an economic and political power that will grow far beyond that of Germany, which is territorially limited». If Germany opts for a peaceful solution, "we have no interest in increasing the state of anarchy, but we must rather worry about promoting the stability of the situation in Russia and concluding peace with a government that can guarantee it".

Parvus presented the two alternatives - which Brockdorff immediately made himself" - in a neutral, almost detached way, and it is difficult to ascertain which one he was leaning or whether he himself was still hesitating between the two, since he did not leave any diary on this subject. It can only be argued that this apparent neutrality of his gave him the opportunity to make the German leaders understand that in him they could continue to have an expert and realistic advisor for Russian things. From all his texts, memorandums and essays of those last years it could be clearly deduced that he believed that rebellions, ruptures and violence of all kinds were necessary, to bring down the tsarist imperial regime, the "worst anarchy"; but that at the same time for him the revolution was not only a set of destructive acts, but also and after these a long process of aggregation and construction of a new order, of different relations, of a free society. And only a modern and democratic Russia could guarantee the security of Europe that was in occi-

Tooth. He had said and written all this several times.

However, now that it had done its part, and the tsar had been deposed, it was up to the ruling class to take its responsibilities and make its choices. And in fact in those days the governments and the German and Austrian high command decided together to suspend the military operations on the Eastern Front and to support the peace movement in Russia with propaganda." For Parvus, moreover, Lenin's imminent return to Russia was just a moment, albeit decisive, of his great plan. On April 3 he was in Berlin and at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs he had a meeting with Diego von Bergen to define the technical modalities of the journey of Lenin and companions. On his insistence, it was accepted that they be accompanied by his close friend, the Swedish socialist Wilhelm Jansson, "who had the trust of the German unions and authorities and could fulfill the function of liaison man, as well as explore the availability of the various Russian exponents to political negotiations.

On this occasion Parvus obtained the largest funding ever for the political objectives to be pursued in Russia: five million marks." Without demanding written receipt, however, he was asked to make a detailed report on the use of this large sum. As we will see, through the Fürstenberg-Kozlovskij-Sumenson channels and through the Nya Banken and

The Russko-Aziatsky Bank, the financing arrived as early as April to the Bolsheviks, and their sudden increase in means and newspapers surprised

All in Russia.

The day before, Sunday, April 2, Brockdorff had sent a long telegram from Copenhagen to Zimmermann. In it he made his own, point by point, the first of the solutions proposed by Parvus, that is, "the greatest possible state of chaos in Russia", leaning on extremists, "if we are not militarily and economically able to continue the war until autumn." On the same day he wrote him a personal letter on behalf of Parvus, in which he said: «... I can only say that Helphand has operated in a very positive way politically and in Russia, despite not having achieved the lift, has worked among the first for the success that is now achieved: a lot, perhaps everything would have been different if Jagow had not thrown his suggestions to the wind two years ago! The links that Helphand has in Russia can, in my opinion, now be decisive for the development of the whole situation; he is also in close contact with the German, Austrian and Scandinavian social democracy, so he can influence them at any time... despite the Russian revolution, which gave him his rehabilitation, he feels German and not Russian. I would therefore ask you to listen to him, because I am convinced that, if well guided, he can be of great use not only in deciding on international political issues, but also on the Reich's internal policy. I do not need to point out that I do not always agree with him in his conceptions; I think, however, that we should be used where we need a similar force."

Brockdorff then formally asked the foreign minister that Par-vus be granted a personal hearing, and this was granted. But Parvus was no longer in Berlin. On the 6th he had left for Copenhagen with Scheidemann and Ebert, leaders from the previous autumn of the SPD, and with the union secretary Gustav Bauer. He was thus beginning to set up an initiative for peace between Germany and Russia that was based on the socialist parties of these countries. It was Parvus' intention to also involve the socialists of the neutral countries, with many of whom he was already in contact. All this would necessarily have repercussions also in the pacts of the Intesa. It was a big machine that built and set in motion, a bold political plan that could mix the cards of Europe at war and bring out socialist understandings on the heads of governments. But the plan will soon bother Lenin as well as the Germans, and moreover he did not know or could not connect with the socialist forces of the Entente.

The first stone of this far-reaching project was precisely the trip he organized for the socialist delegation and the welcome he prepared in Copenhagen: the delegation was hosted in the luxurious Hôtel Cen-

Tral and a large reception was set up in his honor in the villa on Vodrofsvej. His friend Borgbjerg, a Danish socialist deputy and director of the newspaper "Socialdemokrat", who was about to leave for Russia with a peace mission at the soviet: the meeting arranged by Parvus with Scheidemann and the socialist leaders, leaders of proposals by Zim-mermann," gave his mission an unofficial guise. He had to point out to the Russians that Germany wanted a peace without reparations or annexations, that it did not intend to unleash an offensive and that an agreement could also be reached in the Balkans." Parvus insisted with Borgbjerg that he leave immediately, so as to get to Petrograd before Hjalmar Branting, the well-known Swedish socialist deputy, who was preparing a similar mission but was in favor of the Entente.

No less did he insist on Parvus to instruct Borgbjerg so that in his meetings with the Soviets he made it clear that, as long as the war continued, one could not even talk about a revolution in Germany. It was also good to clarify that no similarities could be made between the two situations: the revolution in Russia had to change the "state form", that is, abolish the obsolete structure of tsarism, remaining for now a bourgeois revolution; in Germany the revolution would have taken on a socialist character when the war was over. The Russian socialists should rather be concerned with achieving peace and bringing soldiers back from the trenches to strengthen organization and socialism.

On April 9, Parvus had confirmation from Brockdorff of the departure of the train of Lenin and companions and communicated his intention to meet them in Mal-mö." Only then did he let the German socialist leaders know, who were stunned, that Lenin, Radek and about thirty other emigrants were traveling to Russia via Germany-Sweden. He also proposed that at least one of the German leaders not return immediately to Berlin, but stay in Copenhagen so that he could quickly reach Malmö in case the Russians were available for a meeting with the German party. But they limited themselves to giving him a letter authorizing him to represent the leadership of the party in contacts with the Russians. At the last moment Parvus did not consider it appropriate to go to the port of Malmö, where Lenin and the others would come from Germany, and he in charge of preparing a Fürstenberg meeting for him who, as a companion Hanecki, was waiting for his leader.

4 The long stop in Berlin: why?

Still on April 5, Lenin feared that he would not be able to leave and had telegraphed Hanecki: "They make us incomprehensibly delay. Menscheviks demand Soviet sanctions. Send Finland or Petrograd immediately someone... Desirable opinion Belenin." (Belenin meant in figures Central Committee of the party). According to what von Bismarck communicated to Berlin, Lenin, like the others, feared being arrested, coming from Germany, an enemy country, and wanted to probe the ground in Russia." The minister of the provisional government, N. Miljukov, had in fact declared that those who returned through Germany would be tried.

But now the Germans were in a hurry, as evidenced by a telegram of April 5 by Zimmermann. ® The ambassador to Switzerland telegraphed on the same day in Berlin that "no one has yet contacted me despite having made emigrants aware of our availability through various channels. This is clearly for fear of compromise in Petersburg." Lenin spent those days in meticulous negotiations with the Germans on the modalities of the trip and the composition of the group. In addition, again to cover himself, he convened a meeting of socialists in Bern, where he had to draw up a protocol justifying the trip through Germany, which was signed by Paul

Levi (Germany), Broński (Poland), Platten (Switzerland), Guilbeaux and Loriot (France). And on April 18 he wrote the famous Letter of Farewell to the Swiss Workers," in which he saw in the German proletariat "the safest ally of the world revolution", while the Russian proletariat was only "for a certain time, perhaps very short", and dreamed of the "revolutionary war against the German bourgeoisie and not only German. We will conduct it. We are not pacifists."

This text was only published on May 1°, almost a month later. For the moment it was better not to touch the Germans. They had to take him to Russia. Among the modalities of the trip stood out that of the extraterritoriality of the wagon, which was not "leaded", as the old Platten wrote. Only the trunk was leaded, while two diplomatic cars of II classe were provided. Also: no passport control, no one could enter without Platten's permission, the only one authorized to keep in touch with the Germen. The German authorities had to provide for Sweden's permission for transit, which the foreign minister did. They also worried that nothing would appear in the press."

On Monday the 9th, which was Easter Monday, they finally left in great secrecy. But something in the colony of emigrants had leaked, because a small crowd of socialist opponents of that trip covered the partants with insults. * At the station there was an emissary of the German military attaché von Bismarck, and there were others, including a Swiss journalist from the "Neue Zürcher Zeitung", who

He would then publish his memories as an eyewitness." The convoy moved to the song of the "International". Lenin, always concerned about every detail, handed out a sheet of instructions to the travelers, and Platten, responsible for the organization, assigned each one a number. At the border of Schaffhausen, the Swiss customs seized part of the supplies, because they exceeded the exportable limit in times of war.

At Gottmandiengen, a German border post, they had to get off: in fact, special cars arranged for them were waiting for them, whose first compartment was occupied by German officers. In Singen they stopped for the night on a dead track. At five in the morning the car was hooked up to a regular train and the Prussian aristocrat Arwed von Planitz of the Royal Guard of Saxony together with Lieutenant Bühring got on it as an accompanying officer.

When the train stopped in Stuttgart, Jansson got on. Lenin, who had a reserved compartment with the Krupskaya, refused to receive him although he brought him the greeting of the German unions and although he had known him for at least three years and in 1914 he had also asked him to provide him with clandestine addresses in Scandinavia. Moreover, he feared that he would recognize Radek, who was well known in Germany and had boarded the train with the false Russian name of Bojcov, as an Austro-hungarian deserter citizen; in case of alarm, his hiding place was in a trunk. The two escort officers got off in Frankfurt. It was reported to Berlin that until then "the journey of the Russians had taken place very smoothly", that they were "very satisfied", that "they had been richly supplied with food" and that "in Berlin milk was already ready for the children". There were in fact women and children, like Robert, the chy and capricious son of Zinov'ev, who threw Lenin's watch out the window. The cars of the Russians were detached for the night and surrounded by the troops.

The next day, Wednesday 11, they arrived in Berlin. At the Potsdam station, in addition to the chain of guard soldiers, there were many officers in civilian clothes of the general staff, curious to see Lenin and the Russians. Emperor William II sent the text of his Easter message to the nation and his consent to travel from the thermal resort of Bad Homburg while having breakfast, provided that the emigrants "operated in their homeland in an illuminating way", guaranteeing in case of difficulty the passage through the front lines." In his telegram of response to the emperor®, Chancellor Beth-mann received all the credit for the operation. The train continued from the Berlin station of Stettin, where von Planitz and his helper went up; and the final station was Sassnitz, the port of embarkation for Scandinavia. The leads were removed from the trunk and the stuff returned to the passengers. But it was late and they had to spend the night there.

The fact that normally trains travel the route from the border

Swiss to Sassnitz in less than thirty hours, that is to say in time for the ferry and in ten hours less than Lenin's train, led to the assumption that the documented twenty-hour stop in Berlin and the consequent conscious delay on the connection with the ferry to Sassnitz, was due to conversations held by Lenin in Berlin. S.T. Possony in his biography of the Bolshevik leader considers a ministerial meeting with the Kaiser Kurt Riezler's General Staff member possible;" others have fabled about Parvus. But Lenin was too cautious and a skilled conspirator to compromise so unnecessarily with the latter. Historian K.D. Erdmann considers it rather likely that Riezler went to the train or traveled on it as far as Sass-snitz." Lenin's conversation with Riezler between the morning of April 11 and the next day also seems to be suggested by the words written in those days by Riezler in his diary and by the events that followed. On April 13 Riezler, who certainly not by chance and contrary to usual was in Berlin, said: «... in a couple of weeks Russia is ready for great concessions-

Ni»"

Where did this certainty come from when in those days the Russian Provisional Government, through the mouth of its then prime minister and interior minister Prince L'vov, had instead proclaimed the determination to continue the war, to fulfill all commitments with the allies and not to tolerate any downsizing of the former Russian empire? «Strange situation: we are about the catastrophe or maybe even the victory»,* Riezler always said to himself on the 13th. Given Germany's situation, it would have been the catastrophe if the war had fully continued even on the Russian front, especially after the intervention of the USA, and, instead, the victory if those "great opportunities" had come. And who could they come from if not from winning Lenin?

Lenin gave the guarantee of unconditional peace, the cession of Poland and direct negotiations between the Germanic state and its new "Soviet" state. This eliminated the danger of socialist peace that, as we have seen, Riezler feared on April 1st. In this Lenin was perfectly in agreement with him, who already on March 16 had written to Kollontaj against any hypothesis of socialist alliances." Ccheidze is the name that symbolized this danger: both Riezler and Lenin mention it as a signal. Riezler already knew from September '15 that Lenin offered precisely that peace,* but then the thing seemed far away while now it was expected to be feasible and from now on he would work for it.

The Riczler-Lenin interview explains all the subsequent behavior of the two: the exclusion of Parvus, Riezler's stay in Stockholm until the end of October and then in Moscow after the Bolshevik seizure of power; the total

* Cf. Chapter vl.

Overthrow of the policy of the party imposed by Lenin immediately on his return, his "voice coming from outside"*, his declarations and moves, as well as the events that would follow from then on for more than a year. All things that will be seen here, because they are also part of the history of Parvus.

Now, after the stop in Berlin, completed crossing the territory of the Reich, it was a matter of continuing the journey to Sweden, from which the German authorities had obtained the transit permit for Lenin & C. % They embarked for Sweden on the morning of the 12th and the storm caught them. Tur-ti suffered seasickness minus Lenin, Zinov'ev and Radek, who stayed for a long time to discuss animatedly on the bridge. In navigation, a dispatch from Fürstenberg arrived, asking if Mr. Ul'ja-nov was on board, but he was not found, because Lenin, always afraid of traps, had given and made everyone on the boarding list give only the pseudonyms. In Trelleborg they were welcomed by the mayor of Stockholm, who came especially for them, and of course also. Hanecki At the Hôtel Savoy was offered a hearty smörgás, on which everyone threw themselves, according to Radek's memories, like "a swarm of grasshoppers".

They then continued by train to the Swedish capital, where they arrived at 8 am on Friday the 13th. For Lenin, Radek, Hanecki, Zinov'ev this part of the trip was largely spent on discussing whether or not the Bolshevik leader should meet with Parvus. According to what had reported in his name Hanecki who was now accompanying them, Parvus was waiting in Stockholm; and Radek was so excited and flattered by the prospect of that meeting that he irritated Lenin. The fear of Parvus' personality was meandering; the fear that, after the crossing of Germany, an obvious encounter with him could weigh even more compromisingly; the fear that, with his unpredictable political initiatives, he could fit into the game of the Russian revolution and compromise the Leninist design of Bolshevik hegemony.

In Stockholm they were received with greeting speeches held in the waiting room decorated with red flags. Then part of the group went to the Hôtel Regina, where Lenin had the Bern protocol read and also had it signed by the mayor Carl Lindhagen and other exponents of the Scandinavian left. So Lenin was able to exhibit a richer list of signatures justifying the trip to the Soviet of Petrograd. It was not a secondary question, because among the Bolsheviks themselves, like Bogdanov, there were many who condemned him, not to mention the Mensheviks of Plechanov and the other parties for which Lenin's journey, organized with complicity te-

* See later, p. 248; and Chapter XII, p. 263.

Desca, it was national betrayal. But hadn't Plechanov himself - he would have replied - been repatriated to Russia by the British with a battleship escorted by destroyers?" What could be the importance of the fact that they were allies? Which allies, of the tsar's government?

What did Lenin do in Stockholm and how long did he keep there? The stories as well as the official biographies are very reticent and contradict each other, as well as the "complete works" published in Moscow. The 13th is the exact date of arrival, as confirmed by Western sources, Swedish eyewitnesses of the time and, above all, a photograph of him and the group taken that day in the Vasagatan, a street not far from the station, by the well-known photographer

Malmström for the newspapers?
Of that alleged one-day stay, with or without overnight stay, in Stockholm, official sources only say that Lenin organized the Bolshevik Office abroad, with Hanecki, Radek and Vorovsky." The first, as is well known, had its commercial-political base here in common with Par-vus; the second could not enter Russia for the moment, as an Austrian subject; the third was on site since 1916 and acted under the cover of a representative of the German-Russian company Siemens-Schuckert, whose headquarters in Petrograd was the director of the engineer Krasin. This foreign office with many tasks, as we will see, would have played an important role in the framework of Lenin's foreign policy, including during the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk.

In the writings of Radek and Parvus there is talk of a missed meeting between the latter and Lenin. Parvus wrote: "I was in Stockholm when Lenin was in transit. He refused a personal meeting. I made him say through a mutual friend: now first of all we need peace, consequently peace negotiations are necessary, what does he think of doing?

Lenin replied that he did not deal with diplomacy, that his task was revolutionary agitation. Then I objected: "Convey to Lenin that he can also only stir; if state policy for him does not exist, he will become an instrument in my hands"* Parvus knew that at that moment Lenin was almost unauthorized in the party in Russia and thought he could bypass him. His political design was, as has been said, to convene an international socialist congress that would dictate peace to the governments of the belligerent countries and also consolidate the political influence of the working class for the future.

Although proven by the hectic activity of those weeks, perhaps more cur-

Of the usual, however, Parvus was as always flourishing, impetuous, overflowing with energy; Lenin, on the other hand, had aged prematurely and appeared almost unrecognizable to Hanecki, who had not seen him for two years. It was as if something had happened to him. As it was later ascertained, the tremendous malaria that will destroy his brain and lead him to death already gave the first obvious symptoms. Politically, the two men were as distant as they were at the time of the "I-skra" and the 1905 revolution: Lenin wanted victory and power for his party, but still did not make this intention explicit; Parvus thought of the affirmation of socialism in a mass movement that would strengthen the organization and, according to the historical conditions of the various countries, fulfilled those tasks that were placed on him for a revolutionary process to continue and not for a blow. Of this, the international socialist congress could be a first important moment and also give the way to link the developments of the Russian revolution to Europe: in the dual sense of extending its influence in it and preventing Russia from following its ancient vocation to the revolts against Pugachev and Asian isolation.

However, Lenin, to confuse everyone's ideas, had it said that in two weeks he would return to Stockholm at the head of a peace delegation, something that the Danish newspaper "Politiken" of 14 punctually published, as well as the German "Vorwärts", and the Russian and English ambassadors reported to their governments." It was an intentional nonsense not to discover the cards and to mislead. Instead, it seems that he was very concerned about the attitude to be held towards Parvus, because Radek wrote: "Parvus tried to meet with Lenin on behalf of the central committee of German social democracy, but Ilič was not only against it, but he asked me, Vorovskij and Hanecki, along with other Swedish comrades, to register the refusal. The whole day was spent discussing this in a continuous coming and going of these characters, but, just before Lenin's departure, a real consultation was still held». So, first a "discussion", then "a real consultation", "a whole day": there was something very, too important in relations with Parvus.

From Lenin's published diaries it appears that on the 14th he was still at Stockholm. According to the Bolshevik Raisa Skovno, who then lived in Stockholm where she joined the group and in 1962 was still alive, Lenin stopped at the "Clara Larsson" hotel. There is a report from the Swedish police and this is confirmed by the son of the photographer Malmström. The hotel is still located in the central Birgerjarisgatan 29; it is the same as that time and, as then, open to a non-connerable clientele.

Or had Lenin perhaps gone to Saltsjöbaden, where he had the Fürstenberg villa, near that of the banker Aschberg, or even to Uppsala or Govle? Anyway he was in Sweden. A secret meeting with Parvus can be hypothesized in

A buen retiro, but it is more likely, given what will follow, that the agreements with Parvus

Even if conducted through intermediaries such as Radek and Hanecki, they were long and tiring, given their multiple financial-political aspects and their importance. In fact, how do you explain the discrepancies and reticencies of the official historiography on the various dates of departure and arrival? What did Lenin have to hide? What does this day stolen from history mean? The fact that Parvus himself then wrote that he could not meet Lenin does not constitute historical evidence, especially since he wrote this in 1918 at a delicate juncture for him, when claiming to have met with Lenin in Stockholm would have harmed him in all aspects and would have also received denials from Lenin and C., with whom he had now broken bridges. On that day April 14, 1917, the mystery therefore remains.

In fact, Lenin crossed the border between Sweden and Finland and continued for Petrograd only at eight in the evening of the 15th and not before, as evidenced by: 1) the telegram sent to his sister Marija from the border: «15-IV-1917.

Lathe. Telegram no. 148. Ul'janova. Sirokaja 48/9, kv. 24 * Petrograd. Time: 20.04. Military censor no. 87. We arrive Monday night at 23 communicated "Pravda" Ul'janov»;* 2) the report of the Finnish gendarmerie on the border crossing to Torno of Lenin and 29 other people with an entry visa to Russia issued by the Russian consulate of the provisional government in Stockholm on April 13. In the Stockholm archives, however, the exit from Sweden on the same date appears.

Lenin, like others, therefore had the government visa to enter Russia and this confirms what has already been stated, namely that he could have returned from Switzerland via France-England-Sweden and not via Germany, as Trockij did, but he had to make the German route via Berlin, and not only for the meeting there with Riezler, but for the commitments that bound him.

From Stockholm to Tornio it took a day to travel and therefore Lenin could have been in the Swedish capital or surroundings at least until the morning of the 15th; in any case, as seen above, he entered Russia, of which Finland was still part, not before evening. Staying on the border made no sense and it was very uncomfortable because of the cold of those latitudes and because there were no what are now called accommodation facilities. Not only that: there was not even a railway bridge, which will be built much later, but simply a wooden bridge. Travelers had to get off at Haparanda from the Swedish train and walk or sled to get on the Finnish-Russian train in Tornio. * This could also be dangerous for Lenin and the others, who were not sure of the reception that would be reserved for him. Lenin, indeed, that throughout the journey-

*Širokaja is the way; kv. is the interior.

Gio had continued to say that they would be arrested, as Zinov'ev and Platten told;" and, "entering Russia through Germany he intended to go from the station to the prison", as Trotsky reported," he was the first to want to avoid a stop at the border. The fact of having a Russian visa did not reassure him, but it made him fear a trap. There, in fact, the English garrison officers rejected Fritz Platten, because he was not Russian, and escorted the train to Beloostrov." There was also the Danish socialist Borgbjerg, who could not pass because he was pro-German," and would have liked to join Lenin's group for his peace mission, but had a refusal. Lenin had something else in mind: above all, not to mix with anyone, as he had been saying since 1903, and that the greatest misfortune would be a united socialist party, as he had written to Kollontaj already two days after the tsar's abdication."

The train went down along Finland and arrived happily but with a long delay, due to bad weather and farewell rallies, on the night between 3 (16) and the 4 (17), as Suchanov also wrote, who went to welcome him to Beloostrov, the first Russian station not far from Petrograd. The announcement of Lenin's arrival through Germany had caused a great stir and there was a timid attempt by someone from the Provisional Government to prevent it. Although the thing was not within his competence, Colonel B. Nikitin was appointed head of counterintelligence. He called the border garrison, but the commander told him that the soldiers did not want to move. So nothing was made of it." In Beloostrov he was welcomed by the Bolsheviks led by Sljapnikov, but it was the only Kollontaj that Lenin brought up to his compartment, driving away the Krupskaya and the Armand." They had to talk in secret.

At the station of Petrograd, the Georgian socialist Cheidze, whom Lenin despised, gave him the greeting of the Soviet. However, he had to answer him and did it "as if everything that happened did not concern him in the least", "with a round hat on his head, his face numb and a splendid bouquet of flowers in his hand". He proclaimed: "If not today, tomorrow, every day, all European imperialism can collapse... Long live the socialist revolution

World!». *

«The whole "context" of our revolution... he told Lenin one thing, and he from the window of his lead wagon... came to talk about everything else... Lenin's voice echoing directly from the wagon was "a voice coming from the outside"," Nikolaj Suchanov will write in his famous

Chronicles of the Russian Revolution stretched out in the heart of events. Just a few days later Hans Steinwachs, the head of the German counterintelligence in Stockholm, telegraphed the general staff: "Lenin has happily entered Russia. It works completely according to our wishes». *

Lenin had left Zurich on April 11, two days after the European Protestant Easter, and had arrived in Petersburg on April 3, the day after the Easter of Eastern Orthodox Russian Christianity. A journey between two Pasques, a journey back in the calendar of history. He knew it well, and immediately wanted to imprint the turning point in the utopia that had to deny the calendar-

River. Hence the "ten days that upset the world".

Notes

1 F.F. Jusupov, Konec Rasputina, Paris 1927, p. 7.
2 L. Trotsky, MŽ, t. 1, pp. 311 € 313.

3 M. Futrell, NU, pp. 132 ss.

4G. Alexinsky, Du tzarisme au communisme, Paris 1923, pp. 29-30

5 Ch. Rakovski, op. cit., pp. 30-31 .

6 Fu soltanto nel 1964 che la rivista ufficiale di storia del partito dell'Urss lo ammise per la prima volta. Cfr. «Voprosy Istorii KPSS», n. 3, 1964. Cit. anche in G. Katkov, *1917RF*, p. 122. Cfr. anche *SIE* e *GViVI*, voce «Ganeckij-Fjurstenberg J.S.».

7 Per tutta questa vicenda cfr.: M. Futrell, *NU*, pp. 152-96; S.P. Mel'gunov, *Martovskie* Dni 1917 g., Parish 1961; L. Trockij, Iz vospominanij zurnalista, «Scgodnija», 20-1-1929; H. Björkegren, RP Futrell interviewed the living anchor Olof Aschberg who confirmed to him the activity of Parvus and Fürstenberg, "a world of which many politicians, officials and soldiers knew little or nothing ... whose equipment was a roll of banknotes, a network of contacts and brains".

8 S.S. Ol'denburg, 251R, p. 627.

9S. Mel gunov, op. cit., p. 18 3.

10 See in particular G. Katkov, 1917RF, pp. 516-17 '.

11 S. Mel'gunov, op. cir., p. 16.

12 N.N. Suchanov, CRR, t. I, p. 4.

13 Ivi, p. 18.

14 S.S. Ol'denburg, 251R, p. 627.

15 Cfr. GViVI, p. 568, entry 'Steklov'; also N.N. Suchanov, CRR, passim; S.S. Ol'denburg, op. cit., p. 633; G. Katkov, 1917 RF; R.A. Medvedev, OCS.

16 Brockdorff-Rantzau in Langwerth von Simmern, Tlg. of 17-3-1917 in AGK, 123.

17 TAD, p. 419.

18 Ivi, p. 421.

19 Ibidem.

20 Ivi, p. 423.

21 Ivi, p. 424. See also: W. Hahlweg, LRR, pp. 29, 31; E. Ludendorff, Meine Kriegse-Rinnerungen (1914-18), Berlin 1919, Pp. 404, 407.

22 Parvus, Der Steg der russischen Revolution, «Glocke», n. 52, 24-3-1917, p. 970

23 Parvus to Adolf Müller, AGK Russlano 1.

24 Ph. Scheidemann, Collapse, pp. 40 et sex.

25 V.I. Lenin, Soč., 2nd izd., c. 35, p. 237.

26 Ibidem.

27 Ibidem. What Parvus, in their meeting of 1915, had urged him to do and he had not resolved himself (v. Chapter VIII).

28 N.F. Platten, IZK, 1, p. 107.

29 Ivi, p. 108; A. Ivanov, F. Platten, Moskva 1963.

30 Schubert to the Reich Chancellor, 20-3-1917. AAA.

31 V.I. Lenin, Soč, 2" izd., t. 29, p. 339; OC, v. 35, p. 215, Rome 1955.

32 N. Krupskaja, My life with Lenin, p. 291.
33 V.I. Lenin, Soč., 2" izd., t. 29, p. 339; OC, v. 36, pp. 308-09, Rome 1969.
34 A.M. Ickina, op. cit., p. 136.
35 Ivi, p. 133.
36 W. Hahlweg, LRR, Dokk. 18, 19, 20 and 21, Pp. 65-66.
37 Ivi, Doc. 22, p. 67.
38 F. Platten, Die Reise Lenins durch Deutschland in plombierten Wagen, Zürich 1924, p. 40.

39 'Volksrecht', no. 77, 31-3-1917 and no. 78, 2-4-1917.

40 W. Hahlweg, LRR, Doc. 24 and 25, Pp. 68-71.
41 V.I. Lenin, OC, v. 36, pp. 310-11, Rome 1969.
42 Ibidem, p. 311 l.
43 W. Hahlweg, LRR, Doc. 39, pp. 82-83).
44 V.I. Lenin, OC, v. 35, pp. 221-25.
45 LRR, Dok. 26, pp. 71-73.
46 Ivi, Doc. 35, p. 79.
47 V.I. Lenin, op. cit., p. 220.
48 See no. 45.
49 Stenogram of 1-4-1917 in NBR (H 232.307 - H 232.325).
50 Brockdorff-Rantzau at AA. in W. Hahlweg, LRR, Doc. 8, pp. 47-49.
51 RA, Bd. 12-5-484f. Cit. from TAD, p. 423; also p. 91.
52 LRR. Doc. 38. p. 81.
34 Brock pott anai a egonaio di siato 2immman, 2/4997, 414. in GRR.

Doc. 23, pp. 32-33.
$S Ivi, pp. 32-33.
56 Ph. Scheidemann, op. cir., 1, p. 421.
57 Ivi, p. 424.
58 Ivi, p. 42)
59 Brockdorff-Rantzau at AA, Tlg. No. 560, 9-4-1917 in AAA. The following quotes are

They refer to this text.
60 V.I. Lenin, OC, v. 36, p. 313, Rome 1969.
61 W. Hahlweg, op. cit., Dok. 57; "Proletarskaja Revoljucija", n. 1, 1924, p. 107.
62 Ivi, Doc. 40, pp. 83-84 et sex.
63 Ivi, Doc. 33, pp. 76-77 '.
64 V.I. Lenin, UC. V. 23. PP. 364-70. Rome i.
65 W. Hahlweg, LRR, Dokk. 40-49, pp. 84-91.
66 Ivi, Doc. 57, pp. 96-98.
67 N.F. Platten, IZK, 2, Pp. 161-62.
68 W. Hahlweg, LRR, Dokk. 54 and 58, pp. 93-94 c 98; also Dok. 59, p. 99.
69 Ivi.
70 Ivi, Doc. 55, pp. 94-95.
71 S.T. Possony, Lenin, eine Biographie, Berlin 1965, pp. 262 ss. As for the long stop in Berlin, it appears indirectly confirmed for the duration of twenty hours by a recent official biography of Lenin (V.I. Lenin, Moskva 1981).
72 K.D. Erdmann in TAD, p. 84 n. 40.
73 TAD, p. 426.
74 Ibidem.
75 V.I. Lenin, OC, v. 35, p. 212.
76 LRR, Dok. 61, PP. 99-100.
77 Ivi, p. 30, n. 116.
78 As A. was able to ascertain, the Malmström company keeps in its archive the nega tl had dated that famous photo .
79 V.I. Lenin, Soł., c. 23, p. 399, 1952.
80 Parvus, IKW, p. 51; PgK, pp. 52-53. Parvus also stated: "The authority of the rivo-

Russian lution cra then immense. In the rutta, an anxiety of peace reigned in Europe. A socialist congress in such conditions could have dictated peace to governments. It would have had a luxurious historical function. Firstly, to put an end to the war, secondly to conso-idate also for the future the political influence of the working class. The congress was made fails by the Entente. However, it must be taken into account that for a certain time it was also boycotted by the bol-

Scevichi» (iv1)-

81 S.P. Mel qunov, ZNK, pp. 69-70.

82. K. Radck, Portrait and pamflety, Moskva 1927, p. 153.

83 Riksarkiver, Stockholm, Polysbyråns VPM 16-4-1917 (cf. RP, p. 235 and 349n); "Pro-

Metoi», Moskva 1972, p. 72.

84 VI. Lenin, PRR, p. 186.

85 In the Riksarkivet of Helsinki (Helsingfors) there is the report of the Finnish gendarmerie (Delo 1917 g. po opiske n. 16, dossiers 1142), signed by the commander, about the crossing of the border of Lenin & C. on April 15 with the list of the relevant visas issued by the Russian consulate in Stockholm on 13/4, that is, two days before. On the same occasion, the consulate gave the person in charge

C. Lenin also obtained 300 crowns in cash from the consulate of the provisional government or crenski) and another sum from the committee of aid to emigrants. He ascertained everything cie

Hans Björkegren (cf. RP, cap. 'Det oplomberade råget' and related notes).

86 Cfr. M. FUTRElI, NU; H. Björkegren, RP

87 N.F. Platten, IZK, 2, p. 176.

88 L. Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, I1I, 2, Milan 1938, p. 176.

89 W. Hahlwcg, LRR, Dokk. 66 c 68.

90 Ivi, Doc. 61.

91 V.I. Lenin, PSS, r. 49, pp. 399-402.

92 B. Nikitin, RG, pp. 57-58.

93 A.M. Itkina, op. cit., p. 139.

94 N.N. Suchanov, CRR, 1, Pp. 487-88.

95 Ivi.

96 W. Hahlweg, LRR, Dok. 68.

Twelfth chapter
Who feeds the mole?

Even before Steinwachs' report, the Germans had information about Lenin's happy arrival in Petrograd and his intentions from Parvus in per-

Sona. On April 16, the same day that Lenin arrived in Russia, he was in Copenhagen, where he had an interview with Brockdorff. He told Berlin that Parvus had dealt with "Russian emigrants" and would arrive in the German capital on the 18th.' The issues that Parvus had discussed with the Russians were of such weight and so complex as to require a hearing. at the same foreign minister, Zimmermann. It was primarily about the immediate exit from the war of Russia, to which Lenin had been committed since '15, and the huge German funding for this purpose.

Postponing the visit to the ministry, Parvus met first of all with the leadership of the social democratic majority. The session, scheduled for the afternoon, was postponed to 11 pm while waiting for his arrival. He then continued the next day. Parvus intended to mobilize the Spd for his socialist peace in order to cover his backs with both Zimmermann and Riezler, as well as Lenin. But if the primary issue was peace, who can you count on to do it? On the provisional government, on the soviet or on Lenin? Everything was fluid. You understand this very well Scheidemann, who said: "We must work and deal with people who cannot and must not be appointed". In response to the declaration of April 14 of the Soviet of Petrograd, a motion was voted for "a peace without annexations and reparations on the basis of a free national development of all peoples". This left the doors open to further and perhaps unpredictable developments in the situation, and confirmed the importance of the mission of the Danish Borgbjerg, who was finally in Russia.

The talks that Parvus had at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, personally with Zimmermann, for understandable reasons were not recorded, nor were there witnesses, and the only thing ascertained is that they took place. Only assumptions can be made about the content. Parvus had to talk about the help the Bolsheviks needed, and in particular Le-

Nin. The allocation of five million marks, which he had obtained on April 3, implied this orientation, confirmed by the pleased reports on Lenin's article How we returned that the ambassador to Bern sent

To the Chancellor of the Reich ç by the fact that Platten, rejected at the Finnish border, got in touch with the German ambassador in Stockholm, spent several days in Berlin and, back in Switzerland, on the 30th he was received by Ambassador Romberg. He thanked him "on behalf of the Russians" for the help, referring to the triumphal reception to Lenin, said that it was not yet known what developments the revolution would have, that it was necessary to make propaganda among the soldiers still hostile to the Germans, a task for which Lenin needed financing; and, finally, that it was necessary to bring other revolutionaries back to Russia to give a hand to the "partisans of peace". *

In addition to Parvus, who was the main, conscious and conniving through, Lenin clung to all possible sources of financing on the Germanic side He needed his own means to lead Russia to that peace for the achievement of which only the Germans had taken care to give him the green light towards Russia, and the means were needed: to make propaganda among the soldiers, the peasants and even the workers, but, in the first place, to fight within his same party and take the reins, since now it was not in his hands, he did not follow his directives.
Returning from Siberia following the amnesty, Stalin and Kamenev at the end of March had become masters of the Central Committee, the Bolshevik hamlet to the soviet, as well as the "Pravda". The latter published only one of the four letters sent by Lenin from afar from Switzerland, and on top of that with cuts They were in fact on completely different positions from those of Lenin: "conditional" support for the provisional government and continuation of the war as a defense of the Russian revolution against the German imperialism. Regarding the Mensheviks, the party conference of April 9-15 decided, on Stalin's proposal, even to unify with them. Quite the opposite of what Lenin had ordered in his famous telegram of March 22 from Zurich: "... no support for the new government, no rapprochement with the other parties.."? They wanted to put Lenin in front of a fait accompli, cutting him out of the direction of a reunified party. *

Arriving in Petrograd on the night between the 16th and the 17th, he just had time to speak at the Palais di Tauride to the delegates of the conference and then at another meeting extended to the Mensheviks on the 17th himself, presenting his famous April Theses. They exploded like a bomb, leaving everyone stunned. As Trotsky then wrote: "The prospect of the immediate passage to the dictatorship of the proletariat came completely unexpected, contradicting the tradition. It just didn't fit in the head...».? The theses were summed up in this: no support for the provisional government; no concession to the 'defensism of the revolution'; peace is possible only after our conquest of power; not a parliamentary republic, but of the soviets, but only after the Bolsheviks have won the majority; muta-

Ment of the party's program, which will henceforth have to be called the Communist Party to differentiate itself from the European Social Democrats and the Russian Mensheviks;" and, finally, the International III.

Therefore, a "simultaneous declaration of war on three fronts: against the

Central Committee of its own party, against the Provisional Government, against the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries»," as well as against socialism eu-

Горео.

"The "sinistrism" unleashed by Lenin," Suchanov already wrote then - his turbulent radicalism, his primitive demagogy not stopped by science or by common sense, later guaranteed him success among the largest proletarian-mugic masses, who knew no other weaning than that of the tsarist lash." The fact is that in less than two weeks Lenin won the primacy in the party and, at the VII Pan-Russian Conference of it (7-12 May), he was elected head of the presidency, while Stalin and Kamenev were excluded. He had thus won in the party, he was again its recognized leader, but outside the party there were the masses to conquer, first of all workers and soldiers, the latter were nothing but peasants in uniform. And for this, we needed: organization, propaganda tools, many publications, that is, a wide availability of financial means.

And why was Fürstenberg slow to forward the money? Lenin bombarded him and Radek with letters and telegrams on the days when he had to fight against his own party: "April 25. Dear friends! So far we have not received anything from you, absolutely nothing: neither letters, nor packages, nor money... Be arci-accurate and cautious in your relationships..»; «May 3. Received money: two thousand from Kozlovskij... In total, 15 Bolshevik newspapers come out..»." It was the letters and telegrams partly intercepted by the allied counterintelligence, which would have triggered what was called the July scandal. The foreign office that Lenin had located in Stockholm therefore functioned as an essential point of reference for the chief of the Bolsheviks who acted in Pietro-grado, and remained in permanent contact, until all of December 1917, that is, even after the Bolshevik conquest of power, with Parvus and Gustav

Mayer, a trusted man of the Germans, and with their agents including Gol-dberg (who operated on behalf of Erzberger, deputy to the Reich and friend of Parvus) and Karl Moor. It seems that the latter was also a channel through which, after the July scandal, funds came from the German Minister of the Treasury, Count Siegfried von Roedern, under the supervision of the senior official Diego von Bergen and through his relatives Moritz von Saelmisch and Walter Nasse, one an official of the ministry and the other deputy-ad-

Military said in Bern."

Von Roedern was the one who had arranged on April 3 the payment of

Five million marks to Parvus as support for the Bolsheviks; and this sum, which for the time being was their main source of funding, was being ironed into Russia through the import-export company directed by Fürstenberg. In Petrograd they worked as a link Evge-nija Sumenson, cousin of Fürstenberg and the lawyer already known to us. skij. Lenin had marked in his personal notebook not one, but three telephone numbers to be able to keep in touch night and day, as well as the addresses of Fürstenberg." Fürstenberg and Radek lived together, with their respective wives, in a wealthy villa in Neglinge near the famous seaside resort of Saltsjöbaden, not far from Stockholm. In the capital they had an apartment in Birger Jarlsgatan 8, the same street as the hotel "Clara Larsson", while Vorovskij, nominal head of the Foreign Office, lived at no. 16 of Rådmansgatan." These addresses will be baptized in Sweden the "Lenins Stockholmsambassad". *

2 Parvus: peace and democracy workers

Parvus cra assiduous in these environments and especially in contact with Fürstenberg and Radek. On May 10 he met instead with Borgbjerg returning from Russia, where for his peace mission he had had talks with Čchejdze, Kerenskij and Skobelev, leaders of the soviet. The outcome of the mission could be said to be unsuccessful, because the soviet stated that it intended to hold a peace conference in person and the Bolsheviks, on the proposal of Le-nin, in the VII Conference, rejected the Borgbjerg project of a peace congress of the International." For Lenin, peace could only be discussed when he had had power, and the manifesto of the soviet was a trick: he had already written it clearly and round in the April Theses. He had closed the door in Borgbjerg's face on the train, all the more he repelled him now that he was preparing to storm power.

Parvus informed Brockdorff of the results of the Borgbjerg mission, asking him to pass on to the chancellor the advice to "underline even more torously" Germany's peace policy in his statements.

In the meantime, another committee had been formed that wanted to act for peace: Dutch-Scandinavian led by Troelstra and Branting, who were pro-Intesa as much as Borgbjerg was pro-German. In the last decade of May, many preparatory meetings of various delegations were held in Stockholm and there was also the German one, made up of the major socialist exponents,

* «Lenin's Embassy in Stockholm».

Such as Ebert, Scheidemann and others. Parvus kept away from Stockholm. He limited himself to meeting, since it was not possible for appearances to do so, the German delegation passing through on the 30th in Copenhagen. Again he was a good host for his German comrades and sang and danced with them until late at night, but let them leave alone for Sweden. Not only that: in his magazine "Glocke", where he usually published regular political comments, he wrote nothing about these peace initiatives, not even in the form of an editorial note. He had to take note that Lenin was against it and that even the Germanic and Austro-Hungarian governments were oriented towards ensuring that the Stockholm Conference took place without any result, "we will later get them ourselves and not already the socialists", he had in fact telegraphed from Vienna, on May 24, the foreign minister Czernin to Ambassador Pallavicini to

'Constantinople."

So Parvus had modified his plan: like that of the Germans and Lenin, his clock was set to another hour: the time of his program presented in March to Brockdorff, the hour of the power of the Soviets and peace that was to be implemented through Lenin and the Bolsheviks. Like Luxemburg and many others, Parvus still deluded himself that they would establish a sort of "working-class democracy". Radek didn't go around saying that he wasn't looking for accommodation in Stockholm for the winter because he was sure he would return very soon to Russia where the seizure of power by the soviets was imminen-te?" Only then could a speech of peace have been opened even in-

International. Therefore Parvus, in a waiting position, had to make himself a fugitive; and he left for Marienbad for a four-week cure of his rheumatism, which had been bothering him for some years now.

In May 1917, his essay Il balance sociale della guerra was published in a brochure," of which the enormous novelty and audacity of thought were not caught at that time.

The third year of the war had not been completed, everyone still believed that they could emerge victorious and reaping layels. And here instead Parvus draw a disastrous balance of the conflict and warn about the future of Germany, Russia, Europe. He hoped for the common reconstruction, the economic and political unity of Europe, anticipating the theses of Keynes' famous book, The Economic Consequences of Peace. But then the foresight of his analysis was not understood. The sage, however, was immediately kidnapped in Germany by the military authorities; Parvus responded by publishing it in Stockholm in French, from-

Nese, Swedish and Russian.

But it had also been written for an immediate function: "The most urgent commandment of the moment is peace!". Every other problem had to take a back seat. If, with the fall of tsarism, the Russian danger was temporarily shelved, this did not mean that it had disappeared in a historical perspective. «The further democratic development in Rus-

It demands peace. The revolution is not a justification for war»: with these words he addressed the provisional government and those forces of the soviet that advocated the continuation of the war. But he also warned Lenin, who meditated on the conquest of power with the exasperated masses of the soldiers-peasants who crowded Petrograd and the cities, deserting the front:
«Don't be fooled about the effects that the revolution has had on the Russian army... it's still an army of disgruntled peasants, new moods can take over... To ensure the progress of the revolution in Russia, the army must be demobilized». He knew since he was a boy the tremendous unbridledness of those masses, of which he had always said could serve to create chaos, but not a workers' democracy that was the free development of civil society.

Parvus' peace plan was always based on a socialist perspective:

"Democracy in Russia will assert itself all the more, the more it will be supported by the workers' democracy of Western Europe", "official diplomacy has completely failed", "the war ends with the bankruptcy of nationalism and imperialism and opens the way to socialism", "it is the only salvation we have left". This would have been his attempt: to pursue a socialist peace, through which the Russian revolution would also find support and corrective in Europe. In this drawing he was equally adverse to the intentions of German diplomacy as to those of Lenin. The first, from that moment on, put him in quarantine, and the seizure of the sage was the first sign; the second, as soon as he took power, would keep him as far away as possible.

Parvus had made it clear to both parties that he aspired to a leading role: "We too collaborated in the overthrow of Za-rism... we risked the battle, took responsibility and it really was not easy to risk and endure the risk".

His program of peace and revolution required: 'a new organization of the economy, in which the very character of the state changed; quality production, only thanks to which Europe could still assert itself on the world market, a 'new culture of cities', a worker-consumer, and priority to the internal market. Things went in a completely different way, but Parvus remains the merit of having been the first voice that rose in full conflict with the arguments of a geopolitical vision and a mature economic thought.

In Russia, as Suchanov wrote in his fresh and lively Chronicles, "al-

The beginning of May, in the middle of spring, when the night darkness no longer thickened on the splendid capital of the north, the days of the revolution became much shorter... The birth of the coalition government slowed down the whirlwind of events." The war continued. The government of Kerensky took the place of that of the liberal Miljukov and had the trust of the soviet, which at its 1° congress on June 16 rejected the Bolshevik resolution asking him to take power. But more: to the Menshevik Cereteli, minister, who said there was no party in Russia that could hold power alone, Lenin, rising from his seat in congress, gave the memorable and presumptuous answer: "Yes, there is!" Already from May he pressed the party in this sense, although his forces were scarce: a hundred Bolsheviks out of more than eight hundred delegates to the congress. At the beginning of May Trotsky had arrived from the United States; the famous terrorist eser* Boris Savinkov, Deutsch and others had also returned by sea.

The provisional government tried to control the internal order in a situation of anarchy and license prevailing especially in the countryside, where the Bolsheviks incited looting with the watchword: "Steal the ru-bato!" And with the other "The land for the peasants", usurped from the social-revolutionaries.
Lenin repeated again in his speech on 17 at the congress, that his party was "ready at all times to take full power (applausi-risa-te). You can laugh as much as you want....." On the 19th he had in fact decided by his Central Committee and his military center a great demonstration under the sign of "All the power to the soviets!" For the 23rd, but the same congress of the soviets banned it and the Bolsheviks gave up. It should have been an armed demonstration that combined with other actions and was aimed at overthrowing the provisional government. The pretext was the eviction, ordered by the government, of the villa of the former Minister of the Interior P.N. Durnovo, where a gang of criminals had barricaded themselves who boasted for revolutionaries and that the Bolsheviks had hegemonized.

But that the action was prepared with more ambitious prospects is proven by the fact that the "Lokal-Anzeiger" in Berlin published the program and slogans already on the 16th. How could the German newspaper know the secret decisions imposed by Lenin on a recalcitrant Ce? A dispatch, signed by Vesolovskij, editor of the "Pravda", had left from the telegraphic office of the soviet at the Tauride Palace bound for Stockholm, Lenin's foreign office, which sent the news to Germany. This telegram

* This is how the social-revolutionaries were called by the Russian pronunciation of the initials.

He was intercepted by Captain Pierre Laurent of the allied counterintelligence in Petrograd and, together with other facts that we will examine later, put on alert on the relations of Lenin & C. with the Germans. *

The attempted Bolshevik action coincided not by chance with the beginning of the offensive on the front, decided by the provisional government in agreement with the so-viet. It had begun on the 18th and soon forced the Germans to remove eleven divisions from France and the Austrians three from Italy, but it would die out in mid-July due to the refusal of entire regiments to fight. The Bolshevik attempt of June had failed, but that process of disintegration was taking shape more and more that, from the return of Lenin, quickly developed the Bolshevik committees of soldiers, as the stories of the Pcus themselves tell with complacency. This process had in fact already begun with the Agenda No. 1, issued by the Soviet on March 7, which exempted the troops from all discipline and delivered weapons to the soldiers' committees. Moreover, when in the days of the February revolution the insurgent crowd had opened wide the doors of the prisons, letting out more than ten thousand prisoners, the vast majority of whom were common criminals, a certain Karl Gibson, who was in prison as a German agent, had also found himself at large. He immediately led the assault on the Ochrana, which was devastated and burned with the loss of three hundred thousand name cards, including the complete paper library of all the revolutionaries from Lenin to the last." There was a total holiday of police bodies. The provisional government then appointed Colonel B. Nikitin, from the front, head of counterintelligence on March 25. Nikitin got to work through a thousand difficulties: among other things, he lacked premises and means, to the point of having to borrow money, and the soviet oposed him. At the end of May he conducted an operation that led to the arrest of the well-known journalist I.A. Kolyško, already in 1916 implicated in a separate peace deal with the te-deschi, and of the banker Manus, called the "king of the stock market", who defended himself armed in his apartment at the "Evropejskaja Gostinica". *

The searches indicated them of connivence with the enemy and put Niki-tin on the trail of a certain Stepin. As Nikitin himself later told, "the observation immediately confirmed his active role among the Bolsheviks, while another investigation conducted after the Kolyško affair revealed that Stepin was an agent of Lenin in charge of enlisting soldiers and workers who participated in the Bush-Shevik demonstrations for monetary compensation," as Parvus had suggested in his Memorandum of March 1915. It was Aleksandr (Artur) Stepin, today praised in Soviet encyclopedias for his revolutionary merits. He was arrested in flagrante delicto while distributing ten ruble tickets, even fake, printed in Germany - fact

* The "European Hotel", of mediocre category, in Michajlovskaja street 1.

Also implicitly confirmed by Trotsky when he writes that fakes were not but good. * Stepin was entangled by counterintelligence agent 5 and took him to his office, where he showed him thousands of bills. The stalking also found that he frequented the palace of Kšesinskaja, where the headquarters of Lenin and the Bolsheviks were. The Kšesinskaja was the famous dancer of the Imperial Theater, favorite of the Romanov, now expropriated.

After snifting these traces, Nikitin, also instructed by Minister Pereverzev about Parvus and Kozlovskij," he got in touch with the head of the Finnish counterintelligence and had the dacia frequented in Finland by Kollontaj checked, giving the alert at the Tornio border with Sweden.

Some letters addressed to Parvus were thus seized and others that, submitted to the examination of sworn graphologists of the court, were written by Le-

Nin. Nikitin reports a few sentences in his memoirs: "the work is progressing very successfully", "we hope to reach the goal soon, but we need materials", "I received the materials sent to Vyborg, but we still need some", "send more materials", "be very prudent in the connections"."

At the same time, Nikitin began to stalk Kozlovskij, ascertaining that he "every morning went around various banks and in some he withdrew money, in others he opened new current accounts".

«The natural course of the revolution was artificially deformed from the outside. And, the more this artificial pressure encouraged the bearers of pure doctrine or coincided with the buzzwords pleasing to the tolla, the more successful it was and led to extremism»" — so writes Colonel Nikitin, who, being opposed to the Bolsheviks, can be suspected of partisans. But the revolutionary Nikolaj Suchanov echoed him: "In the-

P environment of authentic revolutionaries, of the true executors of a class proletarian policy, already from the beginning of May one could hear say: - Bolshevik mole, you are digging and how!». *

4 1 intercepted telegrams

"The investigation - says Nikitin - however took on a serious character only after the brilliant officer of the French service, Captain Pier-Re Laurent, delivered to me on June 21 the first fourteen telegrams that had exchanged Kozlovskij, Fürstenberg, Lenin, Kollontaj and Sumenson. Later Laurent sent me another fifteen telegrams." In a note he adds that telegrams have become many more. The most important correspondence and large sums between Petrograd and Stockholm, or between Lenin, the Uf-

Foreign ficio and Parvus, were forwarded by couriers, such as the Bolshevik engineer Isidor Steinberg, who traveled with a diplomatic passport, and the Finnish socialist Karl Wiik, who between March and August made many trips from Scandinavia to Petrograd." The telegrams evidently responded to an urgency character and trusted in the coverage of commercial-banking transactions, using a encrypted language that was often too transparent. However, in the situation of total vacancy of power in Russia in those months, when the government ruled but had no power, and the soviet had power but did not govern, and a Steklov, a Kozlovsky could threaten the ministers and even more their subordinates, there was no need to worry too much, although the suspicious and far-sighted Lenin always recommended to be "arch-cautious".

Colonel Nikitin had been put in touch with the counterintelligence allied by M.I. Tereščenko, Minister of Finance and then Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Government, who had created his own center in Stockholm with the purpose of "discovering the channels and means of the Germans" for action in Russia. The Minister of the Interior Pereverzev, on the other hand, then stated, in emigration, that he had been blown by an infiltrator in the Bolshevik committee." Kerensky, in his memoirs, says he was warned by the French minister Albert Thomas, visiting Petrograd in May, and with this it seems to attribute the first of information. Tomas Masaryk, future president of Czechoslovakia, which was then in Russia, tells of an American journalist who had organized his own anti-German power plant in Petrograd with eighty agents in contact with the English counterintelligence

Be that as it may, the Lenin-Sumenson-Germany liaison was discovered and Kerensky was informed of it. Arrests were made, including that of a certain Burnstein, suspected agent of Parvus.

Here are some of the 29 telegrams then intercepted by the allied counterintelligence, with their addresses,* nicknames then not known to strangers, indicative of bank transactions and political instructions:

- Kozlouseij SergievsRaja 61. Lathe seized all in Stankevic. Personal search done. Protests demand immediate sending to us things if-

Questrate. Not received any "Pravda" number, telegram or letter. Volodja** telegraphs to what extent to send telegrams for «Prav-
From». Kollontaj.

- Fürstenberg Stockholm Saltsjöbaden. Number 86. Received your 123. Re-

* That A. was able to check on the Petrograd guides of the time.
** Lenin.

Hurt me my telegrams 84-85. Today again paid 20,000 instead of 70,000. Sumenson

- Kozlovskij Sergievskaja 81 Sumenson Nadezhdinskaja 36. * I'll be there in a few days Petrograd I communicate day. Cuba.

- Fürstenberg. Saltsjöbaden Stockholm. Call as many of the left as possible for an imminent conference. We send special delegates. Telegrams received. Thank you. Ul' janov. Zinov'ev.

- Gisa Fürstenberg. Saltsjöbaden. Very difficult finances. Absolutely not possible to give at least 500 as last time in pencils. Huge losses. Original desperately empty. Nya Banken telegraphs new hundred-
The. Sumenson

- Sumenson Nadeždinskaja 36. Urgent to know I can come now. Gen-
Rich waits.

- Fürstenberg Saltsjöbaden n. 90. Russko-Aziatskij paid one hundred thousand. Su-menson.

- Fürstenberg Grand Hotel Stockholm. Nestlé doesn't send flour. Intervene.
Sumenson

- Sumenson Nadeždinskaja 36 Petrograd. Telegraph how much money Ne-
Stlé you have.

- Sumenson Nadeždinskaja 36. Impossible to come second time. Recomi Sigizmund ** Telegraph residuals at banks and possibly pay on Nestlé account. *

In addition to Lenin, the central figure of these telegrams is Fürstenberg-Hanec-ki alias Kuba alias Genrich, who would have wanted to go to Petrograd in those weeks, but was warned by his comrades not to do so.

Why? It was the campaign, mentioned in Tg. n. 17, which had been raised in the Russian press following a collective dispatch by his correspondents from Stockholm against the "shady" activities of the businessman

* It was the address of his office at the company Fabian Kingsland, which represented Nestlé and the Fürstenberg company in Russia.
** Location in code.

Fürstenberg The allies and the provisional government had begun to rule out controls; even Sumenson and Stankevič feared passing the border, while the Finnish Karl Wiik, a friend of Le-

Nin. However, Fürstenberg also used the diplomatic suitcase thanks to Steinberg."

In that June 1917 the telegrams presented by Laurent were discussed in a short meeting of ministers at the home of Prime Minister G.E.

The vov. He did not take a position, while Laurent and Minister Tereschenko considered them, along with seized letters and other clues, sufficient material for an accusation of collusion with the enemy, clashing in this with Minister N.V. Nekrasov, then an official under Lenin, who considered them insignificant.

Colonel Nikitin had meanwhile ascertained that Sumenson had a bank turnover of about one million rubles, that lawyer Kozlovskij handled an even higher amount, and that the accounts at these banks, "Russko-Aziatskij" and "Sibirskij", were in relation to payments made to the "Nya Banken" of Stockholm by the German "Diskont-Gesellschaft Bank". Counterintelligence then took action and on July 13 the prosecutor signed the arrest warrant for 28 people, including: Ul'janov (Lenin), Apfelbaum (Zinov'ev), Kollontaj, Gel'fand (Parvus), Fjurstenberg (Hanecki), Kozlovskij, Sumenson, Il'in (Raskol'nikov), Rošal, Bronštejn (Trocky) and others. *

5 The July scandal

The accusations justifying the 28 arrest warrants were published only on August 5 and in the meantime the accusations of treason and organization of armed insurrection had been added to the connivence with the enemy. This is because Lenin's immediate response to the arrest warrants was precisely the Bolshevik armed insurrection, which was triggered on July 16, three days after the arrest warrants were signed. Nikitin says that on the 13th he himself communicated to the provisional government his decision to make the mandate enforceable no later than the 20th, and adds: "Then I realized that I had made a big mistake... since I had neglected the fact that, with the new structure of the supreme power, it could not keep any secret... three-four ministers confessed daily at the presidency of the soviet even if they were not part of it..."." And Nikitin draws the conclusion that, having learned that they wanted to be captured, the Bolsheviks anticipated the insurrection they had agreed with Berlin.

This thesis, supported by a defeated emigrant, may have seemed not very credible in 1937, but it was confirmed in the documents discovered after the war, which testify to the revealing conversation that Parvus had on July 17 in Berlin with the foreign minister Zimmermann. After his stay in Marienbad in June, Parvus had reached Stockholm at the beginning of July.

He intended at least to be seen at the pre-conference of peace of the socialists, which also involved a delegation from the Soviet of Petrograd. But he also wanted to resume contacts with Lenin's Foreign Office. In fact, he had long talks with Fürstenberg and Radek, so when he arrived in Berlin, he was well informed about what he was preparing in Russia. He reports that Lenin's influence was constantly increasing; that the Russian offensive, already stunted, had been undertaken only because the Anglo-Americans had set it as a condition for new supplies; that disappointment was now spreading and the collapse was imminent. He added that chaos was about to break out and that, according to his information, no force in Petrograd could stop the bol-

Scevichi. *

The plan of the insurrection was prepared in great haste and in the maximum se-

Gretezza. Lenin, who was known to be sought after, moved continuously from one accommodation to another, as unanimously indicated by two opposing witnesses such as Nikitin and Kollontaj;" the Central Committee also induced him to take refuge in the villa of the Bolshevik Bonč-Bruevič, brother of the Tsarist general. But on the 17th, the day of the action, he returned to Petrograd and spoke from the Kšesinska-ja palace, claiming "all power to the soviets". The moment was not poorly chosen.

There was a lot of anxiety in the working-class neighborhoods and among the soldiers, the military offensive had failed and the government was resigned. Following the Bolshevik proclamation that invited action, tens of thousands of people took to the streets. There were acts of violence and armed clashes with dead and wounded. But, which few expected, the soviet reacted energetically in accordance with the still efficient bodies of the provisional government, and on the 18th the Bolshevik coup attempt had already failed. As Trotsky recalls: "On the morning of the 18th I saw myself with Lenin. The exit of the masses had been rejected.

"Now we shoot-

Ranno — said Lenin — is the most propitious moment for them.

Lenin eclipsed himself and sent a letter of protest to the soviet for the search that Nikitin had carried out in his house, finding only the Krupskaja and requisitioning a suspicious hand-drawn copographic map." «And the so-called true culprit - wrote Suchanov - left his army, his companions, and sought salvation in the escape!... Was the life or health of the Bolshevik leader threatened? You couldn't talk about this in the summer of 1917!.. The escape of Lenin and Zinovev... was unacceptable on a political and moral level... they were the only two of them... I consider the episode of Lenin's disappearance as typical of the personality of the Bolshevik leader, furu-

Ro head of Russia.:». ** Instead, Kozlovsky, Sokolov, Su-menson and others were arrested, as well as Trosky, but soon released. The Bolshevik departments were disarmed, the party's headquarters at Kšesinskaja Palace and that of the "Pravda" were searched, and the publication of much of the Bolshevik press was suspended. There was, in short, what Suchanov still called "the disarmament and humiliation of the "insurgent" Bolshevik army, which had been frightened and put to flight by a random shooting". *

6 Arrest warrant for Lenin, Parvus, Hanecki

On July 18, the scandal of the Parvus-Fürstenberg-Ko-zlovskij-Lenin connection broke out, but a secondary newspaper, the "Živoe Slovo" had already published the 5th of the news. The Bolsheviks put everything and everyone to work to prevent its spread. The "Georgian mafia" was also mobilized: Stalin was sent by his compatriot Cheidze, president of the Soviet, so that together with the other Georgian, Minister Cereteli, "called on all newspapers with the request not to publish the document". But it still came out in a newspaper or two," and then spread on July 22 throughout the press. It was the Minister of the Interior Pereverzev who took responsibility for it and for this he was made to resign the same day by Kerensky and other ministers. It was said that that leak had compromised the follow-up of the investigations and the full ascertainment of the guilt of Lenin and his colleagues, as well as accelerated the attempted Bolshevik coup. In reality there was a set of scruples and fears in a part of the members of the Provisional Government and the exponents of the Soviet, of pressures and intimidation by the Bolshevik exponents and uncertainties in people in good faith such as

Martov or Suchanov.

In any case, as Suchanov wrote, "the published document made a truly huge impression." The soviet communicated that, at the Bolshevik request, a commission of inquiry had been formed and begged newspapers and public opinion to refrain from spreading any news and comments." But the controversy continued in the newspapers. The well-known journalist G.A. Alck-sinskij, who had published partial documentation, continued the revelations. A certain second lieutenant Ermolenko jumped out, already a prisoner of the Germans and then released to make pacifist propaganda in the rear: arrested, he would have mentioned the names of Lenin and Parvus and told the whole story. In the newspaper "Buduscee", the journalist V. Burcev proved to be quite informed about Parvus' net and also mentioned the name of the Romanian Rakovski, who had already fled from Petrograd, because he felt compromised."

The response of the Bolsheviks was weak, even considering that their newspapers had been closed. On the illegal "Listok-Pravda", the Central Committee protested the "unheard-of accusations" and the "monstrous slander". Lenin, in a letter of July 24 to the newspaper "Novaja Žizn'" by Gor'kij, rejected the accusation of being "meddled in the commercial affairs of Hanecki and Kozlovskij";* and in the article Reply on the "Rabočij i Soldat" of August 9 he wrote: "The prosecutor plays on the fact that Parvus is linked to Hanecki and Hanecki is linked to Le-

Nin! But it's a scoundrel procedure, since everyone knows that Hanecki had money business with Parvus while we had no one with Hanecki."

The official accusation of the prosecutor, made on August 3, was detailed and precise. It was based on the ascertained facts of the Sumenson and Kozlovskij accounts, on the intercepted letters and dispatches, on the Bolshevik activity culminating in the attempted insurrection. The act read, among other things: "The investigation showed that Jakov (Kuba) Hanecki-Fürstenberg during the war years spent in Copenhagen had close business relations with Parvus, who for his part was an agent of the German government. In addition, Parvus' activity, as a German and Austrian agent, was aimed at the defeat of Russia and the detachment of Ukraine... From the numerous telegrams, which are in the hands of the authorities, it appears that there was a regular and extensive correspondence between Sumenson, Ul'janov (Lenin), Kollontaj and Kozlovskij in Petrograd with Fürstenberg (Hanecki) and Helphand (Par-vus). Although such correspondence refers to business affairs, sending all kinds of goods and money transactions, there are enough reasons to conclude that such correspondence was a cover for spying relationships... For this purpose and with the money received from the aforementioned states, they organized propaganda among the civilian population and the army, inciting them to refuse to continue military operations against the enemy, as well as, in the end, organizing in Petrograd from 16 to 18 July 1917 an armed insurrection against the established order...». *

Even before the formal indictment came out, there had been some reactions. Trotsky, who had arrived from the USA in May and had joined the "inter-rional" group, dissociated himself from Parvus in an article on July 21 on "Novaja Žizn'", recalling that he had already condemned his old friend in 1915. On the 23rd he sent the Provisional Government a letter of full solidarity with Lenin and was thus imprisoned in Kresty prison, where he had been in 1906 with Parvus. The most energetic response came from Radek in an article published on July 31 in the "Russische Korrespondenz Prawda",

» that was

The Bolshevik organ in Stockholm. After an indignant contestation of the "material liar" of the "scoundrel Alexinsky", he went on the ground of explanations and justifications: the Parvus institute in Copenhagen was "purely scientific"; Fürstenberg-Hanecki had collaborated

In business with Parvus, but only "because he considered him (and still considers him) an honest person"; because he had to support his family (sic); because that way he could "also give strong financial help to the party organization in Russian Poland".

In Radek's article many dangerous things were admitted: that Parvus' money was also used for political purposes and went to that Polish party, which was a creature of Lenin, in contrast to the other of Luxem-burg, and was also in close contact with Lenin and with the Russian party.

Not only that: the paper also defended Parvus, declaring that he was not a German or Austrian agent; that Lenin himself, calling him in his 1915 article a "social-shovinist", only meant that Parvus was driven by his own business activity to this orientation. Finally, he added that various Bolsheviks considered Parvus an incorruptible man and that Hanecki considered his policy during the war resulting in his socialist ideology. The key to Parvus' policy during the war had to be sought in the revolutionary theory he developed

Before 1914.

Radek also attempted a counter-maneuver by accusing Leo Winz, an important confidant of the Germans, of being at the origin of these "false revelations".

For this purpose he probed the Germans in Stockholm, through Cahén, but was dis-His."

In summary, the Stockholm Foreign Office had to on the one hand refute the accusations of the press and the court and on the other could not repudiate Parvus and who was behind him. Among other things, they still needed him and knew well his impetuous and often irascible character: provoked he could have revealed dangerous secrets. In addition, they ignored his reactions to the pounding press campaign that had spread menacingly in all the countries of the Intena. They issued their statement, which was also published in Italy by "l'Avanti". At the same time they feverishly searched Parvus through German diplomatic channels. After the failed Bolshevik Putsch and the outbreak of the scandal, Parvus had gone to Switzerland. In Scandinavia the glowing atmosphere and in Germany he should have given explanations to the socialists, many of whom looked at him with suspicion.

To two telegrams from Hanecki and Vorovskij, forwarded on July 25 to the German embassy in Switzerland, von Romberg replied that he did not know Parvus' address. Only on the 27th he tracked him down in a hotel in Bern and sent him the dispatches in which he was asked to send a sworn statement that he had never transmitted money to the Bolsheviks through Hanecki or others, and to return immediately to Stockholm.«

Parvus did not go to Stockholm and instead printed for the types of his publishing house My answer to Kerenskij & C.," which came out on August 9: "The agency

Petersburg telegraph* spreads the news that the Russian provisional government has raised a formal accusation against me. I don't know what I'm accused of. The accusation does not seem to differ much from the one on the basis that the Tsarist government threw me into the SS Fortress in 1906. Peter and Paul: attempt to conquer power by armed hand. My crime seems so unheard of to the representatives of law and democracy, freedom and humanism in Russia, that even the possibility of an interview with me or a support received through me is enough to condemn and send the people concerned to the gallows... As a socialist, I have supported the Russian revolutionary movement throughout my life by every means at my disposal and I will continue to do so in the future. Crazy, what's up if I gave money to

Lenin? Lenin and the others you name have not received money from me either as a gift or as a loan. But I gave them and many others much worse than money and dynamite. I belong to those who have spiritually nurtured that revolutionary will of the Russian proletariat, which now you would like and cannot eradicate...».

Only these first lines and a further passage touched on the issue of German funding, which obviously all interested parties had to deny. For the rest, Parvus' writing was more than a polemic a theoretical-political discussion, a sort of political program in which he reiterated theses repeatedly expressed: the conception of the revolution as a process and movement, and the need to move to a new phase of the revolution.

He stated in all letters that they are "the victories of the German armies that created the Russian revolution", then "made their own by the workers and the army"; that the Russian proletariat was not yet able to "take over the history of the state and still let itself be guided by the herd of revolutionary intelligence".

This cra for him, as already supported in 1904, the ranks of leaders of the Posdr, Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, including Lenin and even more his closed party, militarized, aimed at prevaricate on the masses. In a writing like this, which was supposed to be polemical towards the common opponents and con-

Intent, the louder the warning to Lenin sounded: I am with you for the further fasc of the revolution, but let it be workers' democracy, not the power of a party. It is understandable why he took care to say it. He was aware of what he was pressing: "I am sure that the revolutionary movement in Russia will soon be so strong that it will be the one to achieve peace... Kerensky and his gang of crazy people... won't resist the current». There was no lack of an outburst against those who strove to "build an antithesis between me and them on the outside, precisely

* Parvus intentionally uses the original toponym rejecting, like the entire left, the nationalistic Petrograd.

Thus siping in the most squalid crusade of principle amalgamated with the most absurd insults»: an outburst against the flaunted Leninist-trozki-sta purity towards those who, after all, had done the dirty work for the revolution in the common interest.

The Bolsheviks did not seem dissatisfied with Parvus' response and on the contrary let the Germans know that it was desirable to spread his writing as much as possible. Brockdorff asked the foreign ministry on August 16 that the text be sent by the German news agency. However, even going through a revolutionary program was too much for the Kaiser government, and Diego von Bergen replied that the favorable comment published in the "Vorwärts" on August 14 seemed sufficient, but that the spread of the writing in Switzerland and Sweden could still be planned. * Von Bergen was the man in charge of the Revolutionierungspolitik in Russia and was perhaps the only one who knew the entire "Germany-Parvus-Lenin" story.

Notes

1 Brockdorff-Rantzau at the AA, Tlg. n. S95 of 16-4-1917, AA, also in GRR, Doc. n. 50.

2 Minutes of the meeting of the Extended Party Committee on 18 u. April 19, 1917 in Reichstag building in Berlin, p. 74.

3 V.I. Lenin, OC, v. 24, Rome 1966, pp. 17-19. See in particular: W. Hahlweg, LRR, Dok. 70, pp. 106-107 (Ambassador in Bern Baron von Romberg to the Chancellor of the Reich von Bethmann Hollweg).

4 Ivi, Dokk. 64, 65, 67, 69, 72-85, 87, 96, Pp. 102-135. In fact, dozens of them continued to return through Germany, including the Menshevik leader Martov (with whom among other things the writer I. Ehrenburg traveled, cf. autobiography in Pisateli, Moskva 1928, pp. 366-7), Axelrod, Lunačarskij, Martynov, Balabanova etc. Romberg reports on Count Pourta lès, already ambassador to Petersburg until 1914 and now in charge of Russian affairs at the AA, who noted that everything was settled. F. Platten was also commissioned to bring back through Austria other revolutionaries, including N.A. Semasko, the Bolshevik doctor to whom dozens of hospitals are named in the USSR; and for this purpose he had a special passport. On April 20, Miljukov had telegraphed the governments of Paris and London, as well as in Switzerland, to favor the return via Great Britain-Norway "to all emigrants regardless of their political ideas", but few chose this itinerary because it was too long and slow.

See: G. Katkov, German Foreign Office Documents on Financial Support to the Bolshevies in 1917, "International Affairs", 32, n. 2, 1956; W. Hahlweg, LRR, Dokk. 79-80, nn. 124-123-126, PP. 114-15; Z.A.B. Zeman, GRR, passim; M. Futrell, NU, passim; G. Katkov, GPIR, passim; M. Frenkin, ZVBR, PP. 189-90, 247-50. Even only the sums documented, apart from the Parvus-Fürstenberg line, are large; of them were, among other things, through: G.L.

Sklovsky, friend of Lenin and administrator of the party in Switzerland (PA des AA, Geh., WK, B. 33, 38, 49), the German agent H. Steinwachs (PA des AA, Apr. 2, B. 12), as well as K. Moor aka Herr Baier.

6 A. Avtorchanov, PP, I, p. 250.

7 V.I. Lenin, PSS, 31, p. 7. It was not for nothing that the minutes of that conference were always kept secret and published only in 1962, in the chrushevian period, when Stalin's policy was questioned for the first time. They, as A. Avtorchanov wrote (op. cit.,

. 251), "give the opportunity to reconstruct the effective policy of the CC before the return of Enin to Russia and the significance of that first revolution that Lenin implemented against his own party itself and without which the second revolution would have been impossible, that of Otto-

Bre". The minutes appeared on «Voprosy istorii KPSS», n. S, 1962.

3 A. Avtorchanov, op. cit., p. 270, which reads: "This great conspity of the Bolshevik leaders against Lenin was intended to put Lenin in front of a fait accompli: in front of the unification of Bolshevikism and Menshevism. In this case, of course, Lenin disappeared as the leader of the unified Posdr. Stalin-Kamenev-Martov-Cereteli:

That's who had to lead the United Party. Lenin literally prevented the conspirats at the ult-

Top now».

9 Trotsky, MZ, II, p. 255

10 V.I. Lenin, Soch, 4ª izd., t. 24, pp. 4-6.

11 A. Avtorchanov, op. cit., p. 272.

12 N.N. Suchanov, CRR, I, p. 514.

13 V.I. Lenin, PSS, c. 49, Pp. 437-38.

14 Diego von Bergen you are the central opcrative figure of the Revolutomerungspolatk in his capacity as an official of the AA seconded to the general staff: for him as for the figures mentioned here see in particular the works of G. Katkov, W. Hahlweg, Z.A.B eman, St. T. Possony mentioned in Bibliography; see also n. S

15 «Istoričeskij Archiv», Moskva 1959, 3, pp. 39, 41; Leninsky sbornik, XXI, 1933, p. 85; Also in NU.

16 For kind information from Prof. Martin Grass, director of the Arbetarrörelsen Arkiv of Stockholm; see also RP and, for K. Radek in particular: F. Cahén, op. cit., pp. 218, passim.

17 KPSS v rezoliuciiach, op. cit., c. I, PP. 332-353.

18 G V.I. Lenin, Soč., 4th izd., t. 24, PP. 4-6.

19 Brockdorff-Rantzau to the Chancellor of the Reich, Tlg. no. 572 of 15-5-1917, AAA.

20 Tlg. n. 250; HHuStA, PA Krieg 25 z, 958.

21. G. Mayer, op. cit., pp. 276 ss.

22: Parvus, Die soziale Bilanz des Krieges, Berlin 1917. The following quotes are from here re-

This text.

23 N.N. Suchanov, *CRR*, II, p. 3.

24 I. Cereteli, Vospominanija o fevral'seoj revoljucii, Paris 1963, II, p. 170. See also the official histories of the Pcus.

25 Ibidem; see also: V.I. Lenin, PSS, c. 32, p. 267.

26 B. Nikitin, RG, chap. "Dača Durnovo", and pp. 58-59, 114-15. Neither Laurenc, nor Nikitin lo sapevano, ma Vesolovskij, che firmerà almeno un altro telegramma sospetto, non era un semplice redattore, bensì il noto rivoluzionario polacco Bronisław Wesołowski (1870-1919), in quel periodo a Pietrogrado con incarichi direttivi fra i bolscevichi. Nel '18 He will be president of the Revolutionary Supreme Court.

27 B. Nikitin, RG, p. 9.

28 Ivi, PP. 68-69-

29 L. Trotsky, MZ, II, p. 33

30 B. Nikitin, RG, pp. 108, 111; S.P. Melgunov, ZNK, PP. 99 ss.

31 B. Nikitin, RG, p. 109.

32 Ivi, p. 111.

33 Ivi, p. 7:

34 N.N. Suchanov, CRR, II, pp. 4-5

35 B. Nikitin, RG, p. 111.

36 M. Futrell, NU, pp. 157-59; H. Björkegren, RP, pp. 184-291 (for J. [I.D.] Steinberg

And K.H. Wiik).

37 S.P. Mel'gunov, ZNK, pp. 99 and 104; B. Nikitin, RG

38 A. Kerensky, The Russian Revolution, Milan 1932, p. 89.

39 S.P. Mel'gunov, ZNK, p. 105.

I B. Nikitin, RG, pp. 110-15. It is these telegrams that are perfectly concatenated with letters and unintercepted telegrams, which in part will instead be published by

I decided to take measures to protect myself and for a while the Bolshevik group of the Sestroreck ammunition factory hid from me... After Kornilov's liquidation, I decided to go to Stockholm, where the Zimmerwaldian conference was to be convened. Here the October revolution surprised me» (op. cit., pp. 31-32). In a telegram from the German ambassador Bussches in Berlin of the same period we read: "The Romanian socialist born in Bulgaria Dr. Christo Rakowsky runs a Russian socialist newspaper in Stockholm. He was previously in contact with us in Romania and worked for us» (Tig. n. 1804 of

11-16-1917. Files of the AA, Wk geh.).

55 The Provisional Government 1917, Stanford 1962, p. 1366.

36 V.I. Lenin, PSS t. 34, p. 7.

57 Ivi, p. 31. Words that will soon be denied, cf. n. 40. In addition, at the end of July, the Bolsheviks held the vI congress and Stalin there claimed that Lenin had to be constituted. In the official versions he always claimed the opposite, but this was confirmed in 1962 by the official magazine "Voprosy istoriii KPSS" (n. 4) in an article in which it is symptomatically recognized: "there were delegates who.. naively assumed, that the judicial process against Lenin would turn into a unmasking of the Aleksinskij, Cereteli and company; that the party would come out victorious from this process-

I know» (pp. 46 and 48).

58 The Provisional.., op. cir., v. 3, pp. 1364-65.

59 K. Radek, Aus unserer Materialsammlung tüber den Kompiont gegen die Bolscewiki: Parvus, «Korrespondenz Prawda», n. 14, 31-7-1917. In this regard, the well-known and well-founded revelations of Eduard Bernstein on the "Vorwaerts" in Berlin in 1921 (cf. Bible).

60 Cfr. F. Cahén, op. cit., pp. 218 ss. (which also reports the reproduction of the documents); G. Karkov, GPIR, p. 66.

61 «Avanci!», Milan, 5-8-1917.

62 The Under-Secretary of State Stumm at the Embassy of Bern, Akten der Gesandschaft Bern, "Russland Sonderheft über Personen Hilfehand".

63 Parvus, My answer to Kerenski & Co. Flugschrift, Berlin 1917; also in «Glocke», 1917, pp. 521-33. Subsequent quotes in the chapter refer to this text.

64 Bergen in Brockdorff-Rantzau, Tlg. n. 1060 and n. 606 (18-8-1917) AAA.

The insurrectionary defeat and the July scandal temporarily burned the canals between Stockholm and Petrograd, but the Revolutionierungspoli-tik did not stop. Parvus was now seen with some suspicion by German diplomacy for his autonomous attitude in the face of peace and other current political problems, but he found a way not to lose contact with the governing spheres of Berlin. His intermediary was now Victor Naumann,

Trusted man of many powerful and prominent figure behind the scenes. * Adolf Müller had introduced him to him and he also paid him a regular salary.' From him he received confidential information and personal information on the high spheres and made them known through him his suggestions and advice on what should be done in the changing conditions of Russia that summer. And Naumann, who was introduced to all the ruling courts, was also an intermediary between him and Count Czernin, Austrian foreign minister and the hereditary princes of Germany and the

Bavaria?

> In those months of the summer of 1917, spent largely in places of care in Germany and Switzerland, except for rapids aimed at Stockholm and Berlin, Parvus' inactivity was only apparent. In Copenhagen his presence would have created embarrassment especially for the unions, linked to him in the coal affair that was in full development although it was in contrast, as we have seen, with the interests of many. In Stockholm, however, his name had loudly appeared in the press and he did not want to aggravate the difficult situation in which Radek, Hanecki and Vorovskij had found themselves. In Berlin, too, the July revelations and Parvus' response had caused a stir, especially in the Spd, and the socialist deputy Cohen-Reuss had called for Helphand's disavomination for his attack on Kerensky, which was "an ill-concealed adherence of the party to maximalist propaganda". The thing, however, came back immediately and this was the only dissonant voice in a party that

* After the war he will have the title of ambassador and will direct the press section of the AA,
The center of Weimar politics until his death in 1927.

He welcomed the "deepening" - a term then in vogue - of the revolution in Russia.

But even on the other side of the front, in the countries of the Intesa, the Italian socialist party was in solidarity with Lenin. Alexinsky at the door! On August 1st it headlited the "Forward!", while on the 9th he had reported on the visit to the editorial office of the Soviet delegates who went to London after the first stop in July in Stockholm. but, where they had also met Parvus. The "Avanti", which on July 31 had mentioned with contempt "the various Parvus", now wrote: "Speaking of Lenin they assured us that he was an honest man to the fullest, excessively idealistic, who allowed himself to be surrounded by unscrupulous people".

Parvus stood and acted in the shadows, as he had already done so many times in his life, continuing to weave the plot of his canvas. That summer he heard of the death of Tanja, his first wife. He hadn't seen her for over ten years, he was sorry, but the news only made him fleetingly go back to those distant times. Through a relative who lived in Copenhagen and Berlin, a correspondent for the Russian press and also a member, he had the address of his son Leo Lazar' or Ženja, as they had always called him at home. He immediately sent him a letter, but his son's answer hurt him much more than Tanja's disappearance. The episode was then told by Ženja himself: "In the summer of 1917... Parvus sent me a letter written on an extraordinary card and an even more extraordinary platinum watch. I understood his message not as my father's letter, but as the "letter from a stranger". I told him that I didn't want to receive gifts from him and I wouldn't have personal relationships until I had explanations about his social and political activity. I had no answer that year or later." * Actually Parvus didn't answer him. What was it worth? It was the letter of a boy in which he recognized, yes, the abstract moralism of his mother, but also the revolutionary romanticism to which he himself had once paid his tribute. It was before the studies of political economy and his intense life experience taught him that it was not a battle of paladins against infidels, that the action for socialism was not a frontal struggle with capitalism, but an interlocking in it, a thousand meshes and a thousand teeth of increasingly complex congens, and that the working class was simply a category of thought, to which one could, and should, continue to resort, and not the designation of an existential and social-historical fact. Zenja's letter made him think about the fact that each generation had to start over to deal with history and theories. But at that moment other events were urgent. In August Parvus had turned fifty: his "Renaissance nature", as it had been defined, emerged in full maturity, overflowing with physical and intellectual energies. His attention was more

That never focused on Russia and Germany, the two countries that in his feeling and imagination were united and complementary, and so he saw them in his design of a European socialism.

In that summer, the pressure of Parvus and Brockdorff, as well as Riezler, on the German authorities to intensify aid to the Bolsheviks, so as to change the situation in Russia and immediately come to peace with Lenin, was constant and a harbiter of results. The new foreign minister Ri-chard von Kühlmann, who had taken over from Zimmermann in August, immediately had more open ears for the tabula rasa plan. At the end of September, Kurt Riezler, who had been available to the AA again since August 5, and was already in Scandinavia, was seconded to the embassy in Stockholm, where a completely autonomous "Russian" section had been organized.

This section maintained, moreover, contacts with the Bolshevik Foreign Office and with Parvus. On 29 September, in a telegram to von Hülsen, liaison officer in the political section of the army's general staff in the field, Kühlmann summarized the balance sheet of the Revolutionie-rungspolitik as follows: "The large-scale and successfully conducted military operations on the Eastern Front were seconded by the AA through intense mining work in Russia. At the forefront we have been concerned with promoting nationalist-separatist tendencies as much as possible and of effectively supporting the revolutionary elements. For a long time we have been proceeding in full agreement with the Berlin Section of the general staff of the field army (Captain von Hülsen). Our joint work has shown tangible results. Without our continuous and broad support, the Bolshevik movement would never have reached the size and influence it has today. All the clues speak of its further extension.»?

In the summer, despite the check of July, the decisive elements of the]Revolutzonerungspolitık, in particular 1.

"Luxury of money and the pressure on the front from Germany, flanked by the secret diplomacy of Parvus and the Stockholm Foreign Office. At the same time Lenin pressed on the party for the armed insurrection.

The hopeless success of the general strike called in Moscow by the Bolsheviks on August 25 had convinced Lenin that it was "all possible to grow the movement like July 16-17... the watchword must be precisely the seizure of power". ® The surrender of Riga to the Germans, on September 2, confirmed this in this decision. But even in public opinion the belief that the Bolsheviks wanted to take power was so widespread, that General Kornilov, to prevent them, attempted the famous march on the capital, which failed without a shot being fired.

From Finland, like a king in exile, Lenin demanded from his followers that

They took the palace. He was impatient. He felt the urge of events in Russia and abroad. In those same days von Kühlmann sent his revealing telegram, to which on October 2 Ludendorff replied by thanking the ministry for the work of subversion in Russia. Lenin sent letters and notes, but the Bolsheviks rejected his demands, or procrastinated or silenced an opposite policy.' In the letter of October 11, he threatened to give the remission from the Central Committee if the date of the insurrection was not immediately fixed. The Central Committee decided to burn Lenin's letter," but it had a certain effect: on October 20 the Bolsheviks abandoned the

Pre-parliament, breaking bridges with legality.

Lenin cut his beard and mustache, put on a wig and returned to Pietrograde, but it is not known exactly when: another mysterious date? On September 23, the wife of the Menshevik Suchanov, making sure that her husband would not have returned home, opened the door to the Bolsheviks, all in wigs, for the decisive meeting." Lenin was there and the date of the insurrection was set: 10 in favor, 2 against, but the other 12 members of the Central Committee were absent! The resolution recorded as an unfavorable circumstance "the threat of peace of the imperialists"!" On October 29 there was another extended meeting that took the decision back, but by now the machine had started, and a third meeting was held on November 2 with Trotsky and Stalin, but without Lenin.

All the newspapers talked about the imminent Bolshevik insurrection. Minister Tereščenko declared on November 6 to the British ambassador: "I'm waiting for the Bolshevik pronouncement for tonight. I think we could crush it, but I hope it happens anyway. I'm tired of this uncertainty and tension." This was the state of mind. Suchanov wrote that already on the 3rd the provisional government no longer existed in the capital." Gor'kij this time spoke clearly about the «Novaja "Žizn'» in the article You can't be silent:

«Increasingly insistent rumors are spreading that on November 2 there will be the "Sorting of the Bolsheviks"... Again the disgusting scenes of July 16-18... All the dark instincts of the crowd poisoned by the chaos of life, by the lies and the mud of politics will swing: people will kill each other not knowing how to annihilate their fereal stupidity». He asked the Bolsheviks to deny the alarms, even if their Central Committee had not become "a tool in the hands of impudent adventurers and fanatics im-

Crazy.""

On the 6th the Central Committee shed the last meeting. Lenin kept himself away, for fear of being captured, but sent yet another letter: "The government must be arrested at any cost tonight, tonight... You can lose everything!!... The government hesitates. You have to give him the coup de grace at any cost...»." In the evening, however, he couldn't take it anymore: "He changed his clothes, wrapped himself

A cheek with a handkerchief, he put on a wig and an old hat»* and took the tram to go to the Smol'nyj Institute, the headquarters of the Bolsheviks.

The insurrection, or rather the Putsch, was led by Trotsky, president of the soviet. Suchanov wrote in his Chronicles: "There was no resistance... the military operations seemed rather a rotation of guard posts in the main points of the city... absolutely bloodless... not even a victim." Even the day of the "great revolution of October", as the Soviet historians called it, remained a mystery or at least a controversial issue, because they do not even agree on the date: the morning or evening of the 6th or even the 4th." It should be added that, unlike February, there were no "masses" in the streets: that evening Saljapin sang in Don Carlos, people walked, everything was quiet. The famous cannonball of the cruiser "Avrora" was only the signal, very theatrical, for the irruption, also bloodless, of a chosen department in the Palazzo d'Inverno.

At the head were Antonov-Ovseenko and Cudnovskij, already a man of Parvus a

Copenhagen.

Trotsky says: "The next day, at the session of the Cc of the party, Lenin proposed to appoint me prime minister... I jumped to my feet protesting.. "Why not? - Lenin insisted, - you were at the head of the soviet that took power"." They respected the bon ton. Since Trotsky absolutely did not want to, "Lenin exclaimed: "There is no better Bolshevik than Troch-kij". Kerensky had left for the front in search of "troops loyal to the government". * Cereteli and Ccheidze had gone on vacation in the Caucasus (?!).

So Lenin and Trotsky formed the provisional workers' government according to the formula of Parvus of 1905, adding only "and peasant". Immediately after, at the Congress of the Soviets long set for that day, the Bolsheviks asked for the formal recognition of the government, but the Mensheviks and part of the revolutionary socialists left in protest, and so the majority was of the Bolsheviks. Lenin, however, didn't feel safe: "Is it as if the white guards killed us?" He said in those early days to Trotsky.

The news of those events immediately reached all the European capitals. The newspapers of the Central Powers rejoiced, because for them it meant the collapse of Russia and the end of the war on that front. Already on October 3, Kurt Riczler had written in his diary: "... peace can only come to the West unless a miracle appears in the East in the figure of a man". Later he would have added; «Lenin actually comes to power: another miracle for our salvation....». Already on the 9th, two days do-

* He had not escaped, as it is often written, in a car with an American flag, but that does not mean that as a politician he was powerless.

After the coup d'état in Petrograd, the German treasury allocated fifteen million marks, to help the Bolshevik government that had "great financial difficulties", and "another two million for the well-known purposes" were forwarded to the embassy in Stockholm on November 10 with the designation "Fund

Riezler."

Parvus had gone to Berlin in early October to confer, but in the meantime he had left the German capital. After a brief stop in Switzerland, from the end of the month he was in Vienna in the campaign of the trusted Naumann, who had provided him with a meeting with the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister. Already on the 9th he could read in the "Arbeiterzeitung" enthusiastic lines about the "revolution of peace" and the "new era in the liberation struggle of the international proletariat". Eight months after the collapse of tsarism, what he had worked for with so much intellectual commitment and operational assiduity was completed, with a determination and lucidity comparable only to those of Lenin, and yet with much greater breadth of views, elasticity and foresight. At the marble tables of that same Caté Central where in 1910 he had met for the last time his then friend Lev, he was now reading about that Trosky, who had suddenly become famous all over the world for having led the Bolshevik insurrection and was now in government with Lenin.

2 Parvus: a socialist peace

Except for a few initiates, Parvus was almost a stranger for the immense Russia traveled by the revolution. Those who had also read the summer newspapers hardly linked their name with the events. And everything would have been done to erase his name from the history of Russia. But then they still needed him. On the 14th, already a few days after the seizure of power, the Bolshevik Foreign Office of Stockholm sent him a telegram asking him to urgently request the socialist parties of Germany and Austria for maximum support for Lenin "through large demonstrations and strikes" and then to go immediately to Stockholm." So they always knew where to find it, despite his constant movements. That same day he was in a hearing in Vienna with Count Czernin with whom he discussed the prospects of peace and the possible detachment from Russia of Poland and Lithuania, which should not have met resistance from Lenin. In Vienna he naturally also met the socialists for the action desired by the telegram, while he kept in close contact with Berlin, where he had already arrived on the 16th.

Listened to and appreciated as ever, Parvus exposed orally to the diplomats and then summarized in a short Memorandum* to the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs von dem Bussche, his old acquaintance, not only his own considerations and forecasts, but also this time a real program. He advised first of all to respond with "the maximum availability"

The appeal for peace launched on the 9th by the Lenin government and the formula "no annexations and repairs" in order to strengthen those who wanted peace in Russia and to create a favorable ground for negotiations. Such an attitude on the part of Germany would have aroused a great echo in public opinion and perhaps determined the collapse of the Russian army. In fact, it still held only by inertia, for fear of a Germanic offensive. In this way, the position of the Bolsheviks was also strengthened, who had proven to be the most willing to peace, as he had always maintained. On the other hand, according to the latest information he received from Petersburg, he knew that Lenin's government was not yet firmly in the saddle, that "he had won with a minority over another minority", dragging in recent months the "dark masses", which now, in a situation of chaos and scarcity, threatened his stability not supported by a majority of the people. There was also a threat from the adverse political and military forces, while the politically torpid peasant masses were out of control and the Bolsheviks "simply let what happened happen".

These, Parvus said, could do nothing but implement "an energetic, clear and simple policy" also with the aim of asserting themselves in the upcoming elections for the Constituent Assembly. If so far they had not committed themselves to the peace projects developed in recent times by the Socialist International and others, it was because they hoped for revolutionary events in Germany and Austria. And yet, on their part, there was "no particular hostility towards the German government", especially since Par-vus pointed out that their leaders had passed through the school of German social democracy. «If they give up adventureism in their plans, they must find union with German social democracy and with German culture». And he said: "In the ranks of the leaders themselves, in close proximity to Lenin and Trotsky, there are personalities who throughout the war have maintained their relations with German social democracy".

In the concrete prospects of peace, therefore, the Germans had to take into account that any national separations "were not to be excluded", but could only take place with "unconditional consent", that is, it was not the case to force the hand in that

Looking to the future, it could be much more convenient for the very security of Germany to start mutual economic relations

Advantageous. Germany needed raw materials; Russia needed railways, machines, plants, chemicals. Therefore, he already wrote in that Memorandum, anticipating a thesis that he would more massively support in the following years, but which he had also overshadowed in the past: "The Russian market and the participation in the industrialization of Russia are for us more important than all the detachments of territories". And, finally, in this context, the winner of the war should not only be the Germanic state, but also socialism.

A weak point of his project, as it soon became clear, was in his conviction that Lenin would sign peace as soon as possible according to Decree No. 1, issued immediately after his inauguration. But the Decree was designed for the masses, to obtain consensus, disorganize the army and disarm attempts to oppose the new power. In reality, far from abandoning what Parvus called "adventurism", Lenin was counting on the revolution in Germany, Austria, all over Europe. And also the negotiations of Brest Litovsk were prolonged by him as much as possible and peace was signed only when the Germans arrived at the gates of Pietrogra-do, the Bolshevik government was forced to repair Moscow, threatened by all sides, and the European revolution was postponed. As he had also written in the Social Balance of the war in May, Parvus instead hoped for a winning Germany that, with a social democratic government, would form a socialist bloc with the Russia of Opcratic democracy. Lenin pursued a completely different design: the hegemony of the party in the Russian revolution and of this in the European and world revolution.

Ebert and Scheidemann, the leaders of the socialist majority, whom Parvus met after the talks at the ministry, immediately rejected any idea of "great demonstrations and strikes" in support of the Bolsheviks, whose victory they were not particularly enthusiastic about. This is because, in their opinion, the Spd should not put the government in difficulty at a time like that, of total uncertainty in the east, on the Russian front and of hard war in the west, where the pressure of the Entesa and the intervention of the US did not compensate for the advantage of the Italian defeat in Caporetto. They agreed with Parvus that they would launch an appeal for a negotiated peace during the propaganda tour they were about to undertake, and that he, going to Stockholm, would bring to the Bolshevik Office the wish of the German party and the news that in the next great rallies in Dresden and Barmen a resolution of sympathy for the Bolshevik victory would be proposed. In Stockholm he had to perfect the draft of this resolution with the Bolsheviks, who should have immediately responded with a telegram to be read in the rallies.

To implement this it was necessary as quickly as possible: and the 17 Parvus was

Already in Stockholm, after also stopping in Copenhagen to meet Brockdorff. It is to be thought that he used special means, perhaps even a military acre, given that the Berlin-Copenhagen-Stoccolm journey with normal trains and ferries could hardly be completed in less than twenty-four hours. Vorovskij, who would later tell about those weeks," he remembered that, when Parvus arrived, Fürstenberg had just left for Petrograd. Parvus therefore agreed with Vorovsky and Radek both the addition of the words "energic support" to the "solidarity" promised in the resolution of the German party, and the response of the Bolsheviks, which he wanted to be addressed not only to the majority SPD, but also to the left-wing USPD. He then had to worry about forwarding messages, which could only take place through official channels. Riezler promised Parvus that he would send the telegrams to the two German parties, but, unbeknownst to him, he abbreviated the text of the one sent to the Uspd so much that he made it generic and insignificant, so that the real text was then received only by the SPD. Not immediately, however, and not in time for the Ebert and Scheidemann rallies on the 18th, because, when the dispatches arrived at the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, von Bergen judged the Bolshevik response dangerous and deliberately delayed its forwarding. So the German and Bolshevik messages appeared on the

"Vorwärts" only on 19 and 20 November respectively.

And that wasn't all: from the left, as from the government, Parvus was the target of attacks. Already on the 17th the deputy Hugo Haase, head of the USPD, had lashed out at him in the Reichstag with a violent polemical speech, saying that he was amazed and considered suspicious that the SPD had chosen a similar way and a similar man to contact the Bolsheviks, a man who had become German in such a "particular" way. * It was the same position of the "Spartakus" group of Luxemburg and Liebknecht, who in those days wrote: "Only the desperate search for any starting point for a proletarian action in Germany can... explain, if not justify, the fact that in the end the Bolsheviks even began to deal with German government socialism... However, that they try to spread the revolution among the German masses using dirty canals like Parvus-Scheide-mann proves that they too suffer from an inconsistent duplicity, which deeply contrasts with their usual extreme rigor»."

On the part of Riezler and the German government, they were immediately wary of these peace negotiations between Bolsheviks and social democrats of which Parvus was an intermediary. It could not be the parties and private individuals such as Parvus and Mat-thias Erzberger, a deputy of the Center, who had also set himself on the move, and had his own men in Stockholm" to replace the state bodies in such a negotiation. You immediately react vigorously. The foreign minister rejected the protests of the two German parties for the late forwarding

Telegrams and already on the 18th he sent a telegram to Riezler for making the channels and the embassy code available." On the same day, the Abwebrstelle, the military counterintelligence, and the Telegraphic Supervision Office were ordered to follow Parvus' every step and record his every telegram, an order that was only suspended the following year, on May 23, 1918. Riezler also had the directive to make the Bolsheviks understand that dealing directly with the German government was in their own interests and also to communicate that, immediately after the conclusion of the peace, Germany was ready to grant a large loan." The Austrian ambassador to Stockholm, Prince Emil von Fürstenberg, also aligned himself with this position."

In reality, Riezler had nothing to reproach himself for, having immediately after Lenin's seizure of power set the problem of peace through direct negotiations between the two governments. But, esteeming very much the abilities of Par-vus, superior in his opinion even to those of Lenin," he feared him and did not want to have him as an opponent. He also could not know what relationship Parvus was in with Lenin. Indicative is his report of November 25 in von Bergen, where there is talk of the "parvus danger", that is, the peace plan through the socialist parties promoted by Parvus, and he added: "The most likely thing is that Lenin and Trotsky simply declare Russia defeated and... since no other path opens up to them, assume hopes in an international revolution as a road to peace... I have the feeling — according to Riezler — that my transmission of Parvus' telegram has given the impression that I am not independent of him. I couldn't reject his first wish. As soon as I ascertained that the Bolsheviks in fact do not tell him everything, I began to use other ways beyond him and in spite of him. Moreover, he has adopted a loyal attitude for a purely practical behavior, which takes account of the position of our government. He himself says that Lenin and Trotsky, who were once his students and figures perhaps less important than his, seem to have

Today the tendency to exclude it."

At this point, despite not being aware of the measures that had been taken against him, Parvus had understood what was fundamentally the Germanic line for possible peace negotiations, just as he knew that Lenin's line was to keep the socialist parties out of the game in any case; in recent times then - as he wanted to say to Riezler - he had also understood Lenin's tendency to keep his distance with him as well.

And yet he believed that there was still enough room for his action, based on the weakness of both Soviet power and Germany, whose situation was well known to him, and on the uncertainty of both governments towards the line to be adopted; he also counted on leveraging the attitude

Of his interlocutors, who crave Radek and Vorovsky for the Bolshevik side, and Riezler for the Germanic one. Both the former, which at least until mid-December, seemed to follow a logic different from that of Lenin and support his socialist peace plan; and the second, who still in the report of December 15 reported to the AA that "Parvus, who wants to have a role, works together with Vorovsky so that the negotiations take place in Stockholm"," gave him the impression of leaving him a margin of maneuver. And he forced the si-

Tuation, hoping to bypass the German authorities and Lenin in Russia. It should be remembered that at that time many thought that the latter was destined to lose power not within weeks, but within a few days." And, as Riezler and Radek-Vorovskij played a double game with him, Parvus did it with them.

As Prince Fürstenberg, a special councilor in Stockholm of Austria, acutely noted, the views of Parvus could hardly be put under the same hat as those of Wilhelmstrasse. «His tactics - he wrote - start from completely different premises and his ends are absolutely not the same. Helphand is an old revolutionary, who also in the last two years has worked energetically on the preparation of the Russian upheaval and now would like to crown his work with a peace, so to speak, of brotherhood of peoples under his own auspices... Helphand works in equal measure — if I may say so — for a third for the Central Powers, for a third for social democracy and for a third for Russia, whose proletariat would like to conquer itself, guaranteeing it better conditions. In such circumstances it is advisable to strictly observe his chess moves and possibly not allow him a too prominent role». *

The ambassador's judgment was right, nor had Parvus ever made a mystery of his political ideas, let alone had he stood up for a supporter of Germany with diplomats or other authorities. Instead, they accused him of this and even more would have been accused later by his interested detractors. His relationship with the German government wanted to be on an equal footing: do ut des: let's collaborate together as long as the interests coincide, then we'll see. The Germans did not know - and it would have been a stunning surprise for them - that already on 17 November Parvus in Stockholm had not only reiterated to the Bolshevik Foreign Office his project for a "socialist peace", but, in a private interview with Radek, he had also formally asked him to personally convey to Lenin his desire to return to Russia. Parvus operated on two lines: the socialist congress for peace that was to displace the governments, in the first place the German one and that of Lenin; and, in this context, his own return to Russia to act as a protagonist.

Radek wrote that Parvus had proposed to organize a general strike in Germany if it did not immediately enter into peace with Lenin's government. Also: "In a personal interview he asked me that, after the signing of peace, the Soviet government would allow him to go to Pietrogra-do: he was ready to present himself in front of the judgment of the Russian workers and to accept their sentence; he was convinced that they would understand that in his policy he had not been guided by any personal interest, which would allow him to enter the ranks of the Russian working class for work rare for the Russian revolution." Radek was stunned by this idea, but he considered Parvus' proposal and the Spo's embassy he took so important that he decided to leave immediately. He reached Hanecki already on his way. The two, after having adventurously crossed the Haparan-da-Tornio border, from there they sent a telegram to Lenin: "We arrive in Petrograd by special train. We have a very important assignment. It is desirable to meet immediately."

Parvus hoped that, following the chaos that broke out in Russia, Lenin's government would change the attitude he had described as follows:

«Instead of uniting the socialist parties and opposing them to imperialist governments, the Bolsheviks sought separation. They believed that, in order to provoke a revolution in Western Europe, Bolshevism should first be implanted there." In the conversation with Radek, he believed that he had convinced him that their position would be meaningless because "if, at the same time as the official peace negotiations, a congress of the socialist representatives of the negotiating countries were met, the work of this congress would produce a strong impression on public opinion in favor of a democratic peace".

But, as he would have noticed later, Radek had talked nonsense with him and Lenin was of a completely different opinion. Parvus had not modified his plan, but he could not give it up, because this action was implicit in the political line he followed throughout the war: that is, to exploit the war to advance socialism. The collapse of Tsarist Russia and the developments of the revolution, as he had always written, had been a moment of this process. A second moment, now current, consisted in ensuring that in peace negotiations the socialist forces emerged with an autonomous and decisive role, as factors of state politics, as he had already argued since the beginning of the century.

He mobilized the head of the Danish social democracy, Thorvald Stauning, until he promoted a second congress to be held in Copenhagen, where he himself enjoyed great prestige and had support and means of all kinds. As president, Stauning would have followed his con-

Sigli and everything gave hope that the hostility of the German government would be neutralized. On the other hand, as has been seen, it was immediately heard, although Ebert and Scheidemann had given their consent; and the thing failed.

Subsequently, under the threat of the official negotiations of Brest Litovsk, which began on December 9, and, in conjunction with the second appeal addressed in the first decade of December by Lenin to the governments of the Entente for a general peace, Parvus summoned Ebert and Scheidemann to Stockholm to confer immediately and directly with the Bolshevik Foreign Office. Scheide-

They left and the German government knew it late, when he had already crossed the border with the passport issued to him in June." The Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs then sent a telegram to Brockdorff to stop him in Copenhagen and another to Scheidemann himself so that he would give up the initiative, which was unconstitutional and played the game of the Entesa. * Scheide-mann gave in as usual; he told Brockdorff that he was going to Stockholm only to "listen to Helphand's advice, and that he would not take any step that would harm the government's negotiations". * In Stockholm he was hosted in the villa of Parvus, but Kurt Riezler immediately summoned him and, now subject to the will of the diplomats, on December 14 he had a three-hour meeting with Vorovskij and Parvus. To the arguments of the latter, then also supported by Vorovskij, in favor of the socialist peace congress, he did not give any support and also rejected Vorovsky's protest because Brest Litovsk had been chosen as the seat of the official negotiations and not Stockholm, as the Bolsheviks wanted. He only in solidarity with Parvus when he explained to Vorovsky that there would be no revolution in Germany as long as the war lasted.

If Scheidemann's indecision and weakness had dealt a mortal blow to Parvus' project - so that the German embassy could communicate with satisfaction that "despite Parvus had not combined anything"* - the coup de grace came from the Bolsheviks. Precisely in those days they opted definitively for official negotiations, after Schei-demann had made it known that, if Lenin or Trotsky had participated, the German side would have the foreign minister Kühlmann present. Parvus would then have written: «As soon as Radek arrived in Petersburg, he changed his ideas to such an extent that he could no longer resolve to honestly report his own opinions and in his report he falsified the content of our interview in a shameful manicra»."

On December 15, moreover, the Swedish newspaper "Social-Demokraten" came out with the resounding headline on three columns: Advertising in Brest Litovse - Secret diplomacy in Stockholm, above two large oval photos of Scheide-mann and Vorovskij. Among other things, the text said that the real negotiations were taking place "between Parvus of the German socialist majority and the embassy

Of Lenin in Stockholm in Nybrogatan», the headquarters of the Foreign Office of the Cc, with the secret participation of Scheidemann. The article played the hands of the Germans and Bolsheviks in favor of official negotiations and instead put Scheidemann, Parvus and Vorovskij in a bad light, creating difficulties in relations between the three. Although he had now achieved the failure of the socialist peace project, Berlin still feared Parvus; he feared that, through his daily contacts with Vorovsky or perhaps with some of his unpredictable outings, he could endanger the conversations of Brest. So on the 17th, shortly after his meeting on the 14th with Riezler and the same day of the armistice, they summoned him urgently to Berlin with a dispatch to the embassy, under the pretext of "important economic conversations". * Parvus ate the leaf and invented, in turn, that all reservations on trains and ships were sold out and therefore he had to postpone the trip.

He wanted to stay on the spot waiting for Radek's return with Lenin's response to his request to return to Russia. His real intentions in this regard do not transpire from the words with which Radek told about it with the hypocritical language used by the socialist parties, and in particular by the Bolshevik one, to cover real politics with the veil of self-denial towards the cause and the working class. Parvus certainly did not intend to immerse himself in the "tile of the Russian working class", like Tolstoy and the populists of the "going to the people" in the Russian peasant. He claimed the merit of having contributed decisively to the victory of the revolution with theory and action, and to the affirmation of the Bolsheviks with the financing and timely arrival of Lenin. He therefore thought that this merit should finally be recognized to him. He did not trust Lenin's authoritarianism and Trotsky's revolutionary, nor their ability to organize the economy. They could prevaricate the "working democracy", which he theorized as a process of grafting in capitalist development, and instead jump into the darkness of a socialist system that had no valid socio-economic model behind it and for which Russia itself was immature because it still had to fulfill its bourgeois and liberal era. Such was the opinion not only his, but until shortly before Lenin himself and all the rational brains. For these reasons, or even just because of the contribution he felt he could give as an economic expert, a specialization foreign to most Bolshevik leaders, he considered his presence in Russia important.

In the article The Bolsheviks," written during those days spent in Stockholm, but which would come out two weeks later, Parvus made his assessments, positions and intentions very explicit: "Now the social abysses have emerged on the surface. The image that Russia offers is that of an unprecedented anarchy. But from chaos a new world will be formed... Reckless-

Personal and arbitrariness of the mass, which recall the Wild West of America at the time of the Declaration of Independence.. however, the social ferment will be decanted and, leveraging an industrial proletariat, which, even if the experiment of its direction of the state decays, will become a powerful political factor, as so far in no other country in the world, as well as on a reinforced peasant, industry and agriculture in Russia will develop. All hopes for the destruction and sunset of Russia are based on ignorance and foolishness. In 10-15 years Russia will become the strongest and richest country in Europe».

These words sounded like a warning to the Germans for the mistakes to avoid towards Russia, and to the Bolsheviks for the tasks that awaited them. Parvus continued: "How will things develop now? The Bolsheviks present themselves as the socialists of the radical direction. In reality, through their compromise with the peasants they have implemented the worst violation of principles that has ever occurred in social democracy. The agrarian programs of E. David and G. Vollmar, at the time rejected by the Sap, were pure child's play compared to the concessions made by the Bolsheviks to the backward peasant... They made concessions at the expense of socialism to save their own revolutionaryism... The Bolsheviks are now able to form a strong government. Since they rely on the authority of the masses and on military force. All the governments of the world know how easy it is to govern with the army... However, the difficulties lie in the harsh words: bread and work... this matters more than everything else: it is a state policy problem. It is necessary to give the farmers, who have come into possession of the land, also the means to cultivate this land and obtain a harvest. We need to take care of the transport for the harvest. This brings employment for the workers. We need to reset the war industry for the production of agricultural machinery... The main premise of all this is, however, peace... Will the Bolsheviks have the courage and vision of statesmen necessary to subordinate everything else and these immediate economic needs? So far, their policy remains attached to a fanaticism of revolutionary agitators. On the path of agitation they want to unleash a European revolution. They want to have it suffered, because they believe that otherwise the political domination of the working class in Russia will not be able to hold. But the Curopean revolution will not take place as long as the war continues...».

4 May Parvus stay away!

When Parvus wrote these lines full of allusive signs, he still didn't know what answer Radek would give him from Lenin. Radek communicated it to him on December 17 and in the most studied and most false way:

«I sent Parvus' request to Il'ič. Il'ic rejected it, declaring: "You can't work for the cause of the revolution with dirty hands." "False" answer, because Lenin had no qualms about Taratu-ta's money; the appropriation of Smit's inheritance; the proletarian expropriations of Stalin, Kamo, Peters; the political and financial relations with the Germans through Kesküla and others, but above all with the Parvus and Fürstenberg themselves.

"Studied", because, despite the apparent nonchalance and haste, which Radek echoed, it took a month. And it was late because there were many subjective and objective reasons for this delay. The objective reasons were: 1) waiting for an official contact with the Germen, which was important because it legitimized Bolshevik power; and of which

Lenin had certainty only after 7; 2) no less decisive, the Ha-necki-Parvus or Fürstenberg-Helphand issue, for the extremely burning party, which was discussed at least eight times at the Central Committee in August-September, when Lenin was a refugee in Finland, and then again until February 1918. ® Hanecki, absent, was subjected to a line of attacks for his relations with Parvus, of which, however, most of the members of the Ce only knew by hearsay and from the newspapers, ignoring the true scope of the affair and its derivations. The mere fact of trade and personal relationships was enough to scandalize them. On this, although they too were unaware of the whole plot, Urickij, Sljapnikov, and Bucharin, who had lived in Scandinavia during the war, were better informed. All of them were against Hanecki, and this was repeated in a meeting on 12 di-

Cembre. They suspected not only Hanecki of commitments with Germany.

The Civil Code annulled the appointment of Hanecki as ambassador for all the Scandinavian countries decided by Lenin, who immediately protested with a letter: "What evidence do you have against Hanecki?... Hanecki earned his bread as an employee of a company of which Parvus was a shareholder. That's what Hanecki told me... Aren't there others among us who have worked in Russian, English or other capitalist trading companies? The whole thing is nothing more than
"Fear" of irresponsible chatter talker... Such an attitude towards an absent comrade, who has been working for the party for more than ten years, is the culmination of injustice." Lenin, who was not present at the meeting, had to cash in, because the truth would hit him to death.

It was therefore a real trial against Hanecki at the top of the party and, indirectly, against Lenin. The latter, in the month inter-

Course from the seizure of power, it had already been once bypassed by the Cc, which had accepted the dissolution of the Bolshevik government for a coalition government with only five Bolsheviks, excluding Lenin and Trotsky. Lenin reacted like a beast to the idea of leaving power: "If you have the majority, take power in the Cc, but we will resort to sailors!" Rykov, Teodorovič, Miljutin and Nogin then resigned from the government; Kamenev and Zi-nov'ev from Cc. They declared that by now for a Bolshevik government there was only one way to preserve power: "the means of political terrorism".

In this situation, chaotic and dramatic of the country and fluid of power, of which Parvus was well aware, but perhaps ignoring the weight assumed within the party by the Hanecki affair, the possibility of going to Russia and taking on a role there tended to be realistic. For Lenin, on the contrary, this request was the most inappropriate and dangerous that could come to him. In addition to facing the armed counteroffensive of the forces of the restoration, he had to deal with the opposition of the majority in the country, of the other revolutionary parties and with that in his party." The "dictatorship of the proletariat", the power of his party, his power, already vacillating, would have risked falling into a new, more dangerous crisis with a Parvus and with his policy of "workers' democracy", which could find the support of Martov and other Menshevik leaders as well as of other parties; of the opponents inside, from Kamenev to Rykov, up to the already fide Sljapnikov, who now put autonomy and workers' rights in the first place Even Gorky with his prestige and with the "Novaia Zizn'" was against his arbitrariness.
These were the objective reasons for Lenin's rejection, which was not easy, because, on the one hand, Parvus with his qualities could be a competitor, also for the influence he had in Germany and for his knowledge of the background of the Reich; on the other hand, precisely because his reputation appeared compromised in the eyes of public opinion and many political forces, Lenin could have made him a prisoner and a valuable ally in many respects. And here the subjective reasons came into play: how much would Parvus have let himself be entangled? Which of the two personalities would have prevailed in the complex and fierce game of political alliances in which Lenin was certainly more skilled in the party, but not outside? In the event of a decisive clash, how could Lenin have opposed the international support that Parvus had and certainly asserted it? What if, coming to a breaking point, he had come to reveal the common backstory? Apart from everything, he was a too independent brain and a fearsome man for the ability he had, envied by Lenin, so devoid of political imagination, to feel the shocks, the changes in the depths, in the geological layers of the peoples and the

History, to predict, to seize the moment and put his hand to the decisive lever, to intervene promptly, to conceive large yet realistic and feasible drawings, in which he moved with the strategy of a feline, taking into account the multiple factors and interests that moved men; not to mention his brilliant acumen as a theorist and expert economist, in which the book culture was associated with practical application in the small as well as in the big. All in all, it was better to say no right away, than to face an unknown like that. As already with Struve, as he would later do with Mar-tov, personally providing him with the furtive way to expatriate, Lenin preferred to keep away the intelligences he feared.

Talking about Parvus' disappointment for Lenin's "no" is perhaps not appropriate: it was much more, considering the opportunities that a yes would have opened up for him instead: returning to Russia and history from the main door, becoming a Vitte of the new Russia, and perhaps more. He unloaded the burning of the offense for how Lenin's refusal had been expressed to him - the "dirty hands" - on Radek, whom from then on he would call "harlequin", an attribute that was confirmed to him by history, but he was well aware of the reasons for the refusal, because he knew Lenin no less than Lenin knew him. He knew that those words for Lenin were defensive. Behind them Lenin entrenched himself, because he did not want to, he could not face the true terms of the question. More than an offense and a personal disappointment, they meant to him that what he had insinuated in his article The Bolsheviks was true, although he only fanning it as a fear: that Lenin's choice was already made: "to leave the interests of the working class to the arbitrariness of fate in order to preserve power."

The events of the following days gave him a decisive confirmation: on December 20, with a written decree of his hand, Lenin established the Včk, that is, the Čeka and appointed Dzeržinskij as its president; on December 22, he had the sum of two million gold rubles allocated from the devastated country for the "world revolution". Already on November 20, at Trotsky's proposal, freedom of the press had been buried: closure of "bourgeois" newspapers, seizure of printing houses and paper warehouses and their handover to power. The picture was clear: Bolshevik dictatorship, repression to the end, strategy of the world revolution.

This was the answer that Parvus received from Russia: the response of the new masters, those whom the revolutionary left immediately called the "red tsar". Impossible with them any collaboration. This was his disappointment and his political defeat. On Christmas Eve he told the German embassy in Stockholm that he was finally ready to leave for Berlin.

1 Pervenuto a Pietroburgo il 26 dic. (8 gen.).

2 V. Neumann, *Osterreich und Argentinien*, Berlin 1928, pp. 257-60.

3 «Vorwärts», 20-8-1917.

4 B. Cavalla, *Ibn*, pp. 20-21.

5 Russia 83 n. 1, AAA; also in GRR, Doc. n. 71. Of this document he had for

primo sentore lo storico G. Kublin, che la riconobbe e la pubblicò con altri atti; ma poco dopo, quali la risposta di Ludendorff del 2 ottobre con i ringraziamenti per l'opera di avvicinamento in Russia. Cfr. G. Kublin, *German Foreign Office Documents on financial support to the Bolsheviks in 1917*, «International Affairs», v. XL, n. 3, April 1964, p. 451. Il telegramma By Kuhlmann was published by Z. A. B. Zeman in a more complete collection.

See GRR, as well as no. 7.

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[illegible]

40 Ivi, p. 54; ivi, p. S9

41 Ph. Scheidemann, op. cit., B. 2, pp. 127 ss

42 Von dem Bussche in Brockdorff-Rantzau, Tlg. n. 933, 9-12-1917, AAA. Also: Von dem Bussche in Scheidemann, Tlg. n. 936, 10-12-1917, AGK no. 122, 'Dänemark'.

43 Brockdorff-Rantzau to the AA, Tlg. n. 1440, 10-12-1917, ivi.

44 Riezler and Lucius at the AA, Tlg. n. 2037, 12-15-1917, AAA.

45 Parvus, IKW, p. 53; Pgk, p. 55.

46 Von dem Bussche to the Copenhagen embassy, Tlg. of 17-12-1917, AAA

47 Parvus, Die Bolschewiki, «Glocke», n. 40, 5-1-1918, pp. 522-33. The quotes in the chapter refer to this text.

48 K. Radck, op. cit., p. 153.

49 Su queste discussioni vige tutt'oggi il segreto e anche i Protocolli del Cc del partito per il periodo agosto 1917-febbraio 1918, pubblicati a Mosca nel 1958, li omettono. Cfr. *Protokoly CC RSDRP (b)*, Avgust 1917-Fevral' 1918, Moskva 1958. Peraltro in nota si dice: «Gli Publishers have removed from the minutes the controversial affairs of Hanecki (Fürstenberg), Kozlovskij and others, which were discussed in eight meetings». Ivi, p. 250.

50 The letter was first published in: Leninsky Sbornik, XXXVI, Moskva 1959, Pp. 18-19.

51 A. Avrorchanov, PP, 1, PP. 415-431; M. Geller-A. Nekrič, Uv, 1, PP. 43-44.

52 Cfr. KPSS, PP, UV.

53 Parvus, op. cir., p. 532.

Chapter fourteenth

Against the Bolshevik dictatorship

Councilor Kurt Riezler, who as a faithful Reich official had opposed Parvus' peace policy that bypassed the government, was now very happy to accept his request for an immediate hearing at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On December 24, 1917, he wrote to von Bergen:

"At a time when his interests are again parallel to ours, he is again very important and I would strongly recommend that you take advice from him in Berlin in a completely confident and confidential way, especially for the Romanian question (the future role of Rakovski etc.).

In any case, he is an exceptional man and has excellent ideas. It can be very easy that in a short time we will have an interest in basing our position in Russia on much larger circles than those of Lenin, and then we will absolutely need him. He must have no reason to suspect that he was wanted to be kept away»'

In this letter Riezler also anticipated something of the policy that Parvus was now preparing against the Bolshevik government. It is certain, he wrote, that "the little spirits... are on his side. Dr. Helphand is working to create a strong position in Russia despite Lenin and Trotsky and possibly against them with the help of "no-Commissioned officers". The "little spirits" and the "non-commind officers" were the revolutionary middle cadres, on which Par-vus thought he could act, exploiting the intestinal contrasts in the Bol-Shevik party, as well as in the other parties of the left, and the discontent towards the leaders widespread in the base. Although Lenin had taken power, Parvus knew that the games were still open, that the dialectic of revolutionary forces was complex and many of them were opposed to despotism and one-party power. He believed that there was room for other solutions, especially since the elections for the Constituent Assembly had to be held. He thought that it was still possible for him to return to the game in Russia "nonostante" or "against" Lenin, and also for this action he intended to use the German lever.

What Parvus had promised Riezler was the result of sleepless nights during which he had spent feverishly on sheets of paper notes and con-

Sigli on the situation in Russia, on how to save it from the Bolshevik power, a harger of economic chaos, hunger and oppression. It was necessary, he wrote, "to drive away Lenin and Trotsky from Petrograd" and for this to push the Germans to an offensive and a bombing of the city, but first to evacuate the population, and this necessarily with heated wagons given the winter season

Nale. They could be equipped with stoves"

On December 26 or 27, 1917, Parvus was in Berlin, where he had decisive talks at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The content is deduced from Riezler's diaries and minutes of his meeting on the 30th with Brockdorff in Copenhagen, during which he summarized his conversations at Wilhelmstrasse. He told him that Lenin's government was an anomaly, a period of transition, that in about two years after the signing of the peace treaty would end up giving way to a "constitutional republic", albeit with a socialist majority.

The negotiations of Brest Litovsk were a positive fact, but if the Bolsheviks had created difficulties by dragging them out, it was necessary to return to the "old plan" for which five hundred thousand soldiers were now enough in order to "completely defeat" Russia and detach entire nations subject to it, such as Ukraine, the Baltic countries and the Caucasus. The ambassador then asked if, in the event of a decisive victory of Germany in the west, the German position in Brest, regardless of the attitude of the Bolsheviks, could not have changed, since the need for a "agreed peace" with Russia would come to fall. To which Parvus replied "with great energy almost literally" like this: "It is self-evident that we would not talk about it. Immediately after the outbreak of the revolution, I indicated in a party session in Berlin that if Russia had been taken out of the way and France defeated, of course we would have made speeches in a different tone and could annex large territories. My last idea was to annihilate the French army forever, to prevent Russia, through dismemberment, from rebuilding a large army, and to create only in Germany a gigantic army capable of dominating the whole of Europe». To my comment on the attitude that Scheidemann would have taken in the face of these nice ideas, Helphand replied that, as far as the annexions were concerned, Scheidemann was the first to approve the plan without reservation».

However, tell Brockdorff not to have too many illusions. He told him that Russian revancism would soon make itself felt, since, even separated from Russia, Finland, Poland, Ukraine and other nations would always gravitate around it and would never represent safety pads for Germany. He also reiterates the concept, already expressed immediately after the Bolshevik settlement, that much more important than the territorial ones, were for Germany the economic results that could be obtained from a country that had an immediate need of two or three hundred

The kilometers of railways not to mention the rest: "The function that belongs to Germany is to help Russia in the development of its economic life".

This last thesis was of perspective. As for the attitude towards the Bolshevik government, Parvus had already made his choice and acted accordingly. The Germans, on the other hand, were probabilists on this point. If peace was reached with Lenin, this allowed Germany to have its hands free in the west; if it was seen that with Lenin, despite all the precedents, it was not possible to achieve it, it had to be crushed immediately its power to relieve itself anyway, although at a higher price, of the eastern front. The whole story of the negotiations and the peace of Brest, and then of the relations between Russia and Germany until the defeat of November '18, was conditioned by this tug-of-war. On the German side there was still sufficient war force for maximum pressure; on the part of the Bolsheviks there was the threat-hope of a revolution in Germany, which was based on the calculation of the exhaustion of the energies of the central powers and the probabilities of contagion of the Russian example. Already in the summer of '17, when Kerensky's offensive had collapsed, the Germans could have broken through the Russian front and reached Petrograd, putting an end to the revolutionary process, which began in March with the abdication of the tsar, and the war in the east. Why didn't they do it? This was asked by a delegate to the 7° Extraordinary Congress of the PCR(b) in March 1918, and he answered: simply because "they expected to achieve their goals even easier: they expected the internal disintegration that the revolution should have taken with it, they expected the victory of the peace party, that is, the Bolsheviks". *

This had happened on November 7 and everything seemed to be proceeding for the best, but various obstacles had stood in the way: first, Parvus with his action for a socialist peace and, at the same time, the Erzberger action. Having eliminated these dangerous contenders and, having reached at the end of December the certainty of the hostility of Lenin and Trotsky towards Branting Scheidemann Parvus, and therefore of being able to "start direct negotiations", in the words of Riezler, who was leading the game from Stockholm, Germany found itself facing the obstacle of violent opposition to Lenin within the Bolshevik party that opposed its determination to achieve peace anyway. Thus, Germany outlined two policies towards Bolshevik Russia: one hand of help, especially financial, because it guaranteed it peace in the east; the other, instead, ready for the fatal blow if not. In the two policies, of course, military, political, and economic interests of different and conflicting groups intertertered. This will take place beyond the end of the war, in Weimar Germany.

Riezler was very satisfied with the Bolsheviks when he dealt with them a

Stockholm through the journalist of the «Frankfurter Zeitung» Alfons Paquet and, in his own home, personally with them. «The Bolsheviks are smart guys», he communicated on December 3 in Berlin, «they did everything very well and with skill. Is it not possible to offer him some suggestions from a financial point of view?». ° It was there that the decisive talks took place for the cessation of fire and for the beginning of the negotiations, for which Riezler had a first victory by getting them to take place in Brest Litovsk and not in Stockholm as the Bolsheviks wanted. «The negotiations

- would have written the well-known Fritz Cahén - they kept in shacks made available by the Germans. I know for sure that they were full of microphones in every corner and that the Soviet delegates could not say a word, let out a sigh that we were not aware of. Modern information methods began well before ordinary people could imagine

Narselo.?

2 The two policies of Germany and Parvus

Parvus thought that many things would soon change, he thought that, as would happen in Russia for that of Lenin, even in Germany the government would soon be another. He had written in August: «..the war has revolutionized Russia and also Germany; Germany is on the eve of a great transformation from a political, economic and social point of view and only the war still prevents its democratization, like that of Russia and the whole of Europe». Thus, Russian-German economic and political cooperation was also seen by him in the perspective of two different governments.

Now Lenin's government had taken a path that made it impossible, with the precipitous decree of December 27 that established the state monopoly over the entire banking system, after the decrees on the Cheka and the export of the revolution, the exposition of the soviets and the gag to the press. All this was the opposite of the "workers' democracy", all this could not receive the adhesion not only of the majority of the country, but not even of the majority of the workers on whose behalf it was said to govern the working class and for it a party. «Even the revolutionary dictatorship has its limits - said Parvus - a workers' government cannot stand up forever with the help of machine guns».? Luxemburg was of the same opinion: "Freedom only for supporters of the government, only for members of a party - however numerous they may be - is not freedom. Freedom is always only the freedom of the other thinker... All right,

Dictatorship! But this dictatorship consists in a mode of production of democracy, not in its destruction." And Parvus of emprashing: "The convocation of the Constituent Assembly is necessary."

But the criticisms were ineffective: we had to act. Parvus intended to create "a large-scale press organization", the ambassador reported on December 30," specifying: "For this general press office he could create the center in Berlin and later establish branches in Stockholm and Copenhagen. What a necessary sum he has solicited four million rubles; he declares to be able with this sum to provide authentic news from Russia to the Pacific Ocean, which he wants to extend to the whole world to counter the tendentious communications of the Entesa». In order to spread this press in Russia and receive direct news from there, so as to form an opposition to Lenin that was not only of opinion, but also an organization in nuce, Parvus intended to make use of a company similar to the existing import-export one. Brockdorff from Copenhagen and von Stocten from Stockholm advocated the project at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, calling it "fair and unquestionably worthy of attention."

Waiting for Berlin's answer, Parvus spent New Year's Eve 1918 in his house on the Vodrofsvej in the Danish capital together with Maria Schillinger and his family. Maria had given him two children, who were added to the now twelve-year-old Leo and Lazar-Ženja, who had not even answered him in the summer. Now he must have turned nineteen in Odessa or who knows where in stormy Russia.

Those days of rest and truce at the turn of 1917-18 were not long for Parvus. Already on January 5, the approval of his plan came from Berlin. The Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs telegraphed that the AA was "agreed" and was waiting for subsequent information "about the methods of the financing"." On the same day, the Constituent Assembly was opened in Russia in the Palace of Tauride, of whose dream "the best Russian men - as Gor'ky wrote - had lived for almost a hundred years." But, since the social-revolutionaries had a majority with more than 40% against 24% of the Bolsheviks, 2.7% of the Mensheviks and 16.4% of the "bourgeois" parties, Lenin dissolved the Assembly, which he called "parlatory", of two hundred trusted sailors and President Cernov risked being shot in the courtroom. Against the public protest demonstration you follow, the Red Guard opened fire. Gor'kij, who had worked so hard with money and more for Lenin, was now in opposition and in the article entitled January 9 - January 5," in which he linked two mournful dates: the tsarist rifles of 1905 against the workers of the gold mines on the Lena and the Bolshevik rifles against the workers demonstrating with the red flag against Lenin, he wrote "no matter how much the "Pravda" will never be able to hide this infamous fact".

This was the situation in Russia and Parvus ran back to Stockholm to immediately give body and momentum to the small Russian-speaking magazine he had founded in mid-December. His headline was "Izvne", that is "from outside". It was to perform the important function of vehicle and diffuser of Parvus' political positions, and coagulator of the elements that adhered to it. From this moment it was sent, although not regularly, in several thousand copies to Russia. As he told the adviser of the Austrian embassy in Stockholm on January 22, Parvus wanted "with this publication... to gain influence on the soviets of soldiers and workers in the big cities and in the province... to give them a basic lesson and spread under the nose of the government all the mistakes he had made substantially in recent weeks to the total detriment of his most vivid interests". ® The articles of the «Izvne», written almost entirely by Parvus, were in fact real lessons in history and economic-politics, such as The requisition of private banks by the Bolsheviks, also translated into the «Glocke».

The dissolution of the Constituent, moreover, - as Trotsky wrote, - "meant for the Germans that we were clearly ready to cease the war at any cost. Kühlmann's tone immediately became more arrogant». In fact, peace negotiations continued in Brest, which saw the clash of conflicting positions both within the German leadership and within the Bolshevik leadership. Lenin, who with a few others was unconditionally for the signing of any peace with the Germans, just 18, two days after that "signal", was nevertheless defeated in a session of 63 members of the CC: his Theses for peace were not approved." Bucharin led the leftist group hostile to the signing of peace as it compromised the prospects of an international revolution; Trotsky supported the famous formula "neither peace nor war", which, in its ambiguous subtlety, was the most skillful since it effectively supported Lenin's position, but evaded the responsibility of the signature and the consequent damage to the revolutionary prestige of the Bolsheviks and for their image inside, in the environments still sensitive to Russian national interests, which had great weight.

On the German side there were discrepancies of views between the Kaiser, the chancellor

Hertling, Generals Ludendorff and Hoffmann, who was at the head of the delegation in Brest, Foreign Minister Kühlmann and, finally, Riezler. The latter was the orientation and coordination center of the German attitude towards the Bolshevik government, but not without friction.

He was also accused by Ludendorff of disloyalty." The embassy in Stockholm, where he now played a central role, saw the issue of peace with Russia differently from the Berlin authorities and the military authorities. Although there was no illusion about the possibility of an agreement based on understanding with Lenin and the Bolsheviks, Riezler was of the opinion that the

German military leadership was "in the hands of heavy industry" and felt the pressure of their collusion with the interests of large agrarians."

On the other hand, he was very lucid in the awareness that the revolution in Europe was in motion, as he wrote in his diary on January 14" and several other times, and that the Bolsheviks, and the extreme left inside, worked for it. "... Everything had to lead to peace, - he noted the 29th, - an agreement? An absolutely non-Bolshevik concept. They want revolution and not conciliation. In Vienna, demonstrations against Hoffmann: if the Bolsheviks believed in Hoffmann's strength, in 24 hours there would be peace.

Now the thing is almost lost. And Ebert also protests against Hoffmann." On the 26th, the socialist David had said in his speech at the Reichstag: "We must achieve a truly democratic peace in Brest without demanding that the Bolsheviks abandon their principles". * On the same day Riezler was asked by Berlin to illustrate "what tactics in his opinion the Central Powers should have applied to the Bolsheviks"," request that had already been made to him previously and that would be repeated to him later.

On the Bolshevik side, the situation was even more tense and dramatic: the tug-of-war between Lenin (peace), Bucharin (revolutionary war) and Trotsky continued with his thesis of formal alternative and substantial support for Lenin. On January 11, the Co voted on Lenin's proposal to delay the signature as much as possible. * But the Germans soon understood this tactic and reacted accordingly. On the 28th, according to the directives of the Co and a telegram from Lenin, Trotsky broke off the negotiations in Brest." The Germans were held back for a long time by the contrast between the general staff and the Kaiser, who wanted the immediate resumption of hostilities until the overthrow of the Bolshevik government" and the AA with Kühlmann and Riezler, who instead considered its maintenance more convenient with the chaos that paralyzed Russia." On February 18, against their opinion, Germany sent the ultimatum and moved on to action." Lenin immediately demanded that peace be re-proposed, but only the 23rd had the upper hand after he had been put in the minority in various meetings and reached the bringe of splitting in the party." The French and English agents in Petrograd offered help against the Germans, but it ended in nothing." Germany, now sure that Lenin would accept any peace, granted 48 hours, presenting even more burdensome conditions." Among the greatest contrasts and the bewilderment of the Cc, the other political forces and the whole country, the German Peace Dikt was signed on March 3.

Parvus immediately attacked him with energy, denouncing precise responsibilities.

He felt part of the issue: if the Bolsheviks in November had not boycotted his socialist peace initiative, they would not have been put on the ropes in the Brest match and forced by the German military force to a peace

Humiliating: "A compromise was possible. It should not be forgotten that Germany has a strong economic and political interest in maintaining friendly relations with Russia. For the German delegation, the starting point was not annesionist, but strategic: it wanted to protect East Prussia from the possibility of a Russian invasion and have a buffer state between itself and Russia... I do not want to say that the issue would have been resolved; other advantageous combinations could also be agreed, but for the Bolsheviks there were no other methods of struggle than the revolutionary ones, nor any other solution that was not under the aegis of everything or nothing! Thus, as soon as it was convinced in Germany that a negotiated peace with the Bolsheviks was impossible, the basic thesis of German social democracy was discredited. The annessionists and the military party got the better of them and Russia suffered a Dietat of peace. In this way the Bolsheviks blew wind in the sails of the imperialists

Germans...». *

In his writings, like this one, directed against the Bolshevik government and published in the magazine he sent to Russia, Parvus made it clear that he also considered the German government partly responsible for the Dikt of Brest.

There is another testimony of this in the confidences made to Prince Fürsten-berg: with his annexations Germany had put a large mortgage on the much more important prospect of performing a decisive economic function in the east, the treaty would have had serious consequences on the future relations of the two countries. *

Later, in his memoirs, even Fritz Cahén, who closely follows those events, would have written: "The guidelines of the AA since December 1917 - as I knew from my conversations with Brockdorff-Rantzau - adhered precisely to the thought of an agreed peace without annexations and reparations and on the ground of the right of self-determination of peoples.

After the peace, they provided for a German-Soviet collaboration for the achievement of such a peace with the other allies and pursued such an attitude also for a subsequent general conference of peace. It must be assumed that the experts who elaborated them reasoned in good faith. Politicians acted differently." * He considered the Diktat of Brest as a serious blow to the prestige of Germany abroad and as the model, which would turn against her, of the Diktat that she would have suffered in Versailles." They are words that not by chance echo those of Par-

Vus, more than him actor of those events

Germany continued in the two policies towards Lenin's Russia. From April Riezler was seconded to the German embassy in Moscow, where he conducted a policy of support for the regime. Foreign Minister Kühlmann and he personally considered it necessary to support it, since there would be no other alternative Russian government willing to re-

Wait for the peace of Brest. The high spheres of Berlin and the general staff instead aimed at the end of the Bolshevik regime. But even Riezler and Kühlmann did not completely neglect this eventuality, because, as he wrote this last one in May: «... It should be borne in mind that the peace of Brest-Litovsk was ratified only by the Bolsheviks and not even all, while the others of the extreme left, precisely the social-revolutionaries, as well as the social-democrats, have spoken out against it and the parties that are further to the right hate it. However, it is in our interest that the Bolsheviks remain at the helm for now... Transport, industry and the economy can fall into our hands...

Although our policy follows this line, this does not mean that over time we cannot confidently make contact with other parties eager to approach us." * Untrusting in the stability of the Bolshevik government, which could have given way to another Soviet government if not to a government of another tendency, in that ongoing situation of non-war and non-peace the Germans kept themselves available for any alternative.

3 A publishing and political network

German industrialists at the time looked at Russia as a source of raw materials and a potential market. A group formed by the most representative presented a report to the government in May asking for facilitations in this regard." According to the foreign minister's words

Hintze who had succeeded Kühlmann, thought of "putting Russia under control" and penetrating it economically. "What do we have in the east?" he said. - Russia's military paralysis. The Bolsheviks protect

This is political and it is political." * Informed of this orientation, Parvus found the favorable conjuncture to force his action and, in early June, presented in Berlin a new Memorandum that, in support of the German intentions of economic intervention in Russia and however also for the benefit of the political battle against Lenin, proposed a grandiose editorial-journalistic enterprise with a financing of two hundred million marks. Entitled Germany's attitude towards Russia, signed in an enclosed sheet, but without dara, it is kept in the archives of the Ministry of

F".. If we, with the necessary tact and great means, are about to work... we can put the entire Russian journalistic system under our control». The plan provided for the publication of 200 new newspapers throughout the

Territory of the former empire, which would have connected and mutually supported for information and articles. But there was more: a news agency with "about a hundred branches" up to China, Japan, Afghanistan and Persia. Each newspaper had to be independent and financially self-employed. "The link will be prepared by the ownership of all the shares at a power plant in Berlin, of which, however, the public must not know anything. The central will give its instructions through trusted men... The burft would be possible with a capital of about 200 million marks».

The project naturally required preparation and a network of diffusion in Russia. As the first means to weave it, Parvus proposed the immediate publication of calendars by family with various texts and vignettes, according to a Russian popular tradition, as well as brochures of political popularization, with which it was possible to 1) "establish a permanent organization extended to the whole of Russia. In large cities and provincial capitals, offices will be created in which the forces will be inserted that will then have to take on the task of newspapers... The offices will have a total of one thousand permanent employees and, with agents, broadcasters and commissioners, they will have about ten thousand people; 2) Germany will thus have the opportunity to carry out a search for economic personnel and its own political propaganda: "We will also say what is owed on England. In short, we will carry out a fruitful propaganda».

All this was fully in line with the direction of the government and industry in Germany in those months. The fantastic lobby project of the press was immediately approved and already on June 17 the treasury made available at the request of the AA, "another 40 million marks"* with which Parvus received the task of immediately moving on to the production of calendars. And he himself tells it: "With the impressive volume of the Russian market, there was really something to achieve if from the beginning you operated in a big way. I risked a large capital, but I resolved to that, because I thought I could serve the cause of peace and the resumption of cultural relations between Russia and Germany. It was in a way my answer to Brest-Litovsk. The Russian Bolsheviks and the imperialists had wasted in Brest-Li-tovsk the only possibility of implementing a just European peace..»." Already the publishing house of Parvus during the war had sold 257,500 copies of books and brochures and three million copies of all the issues of the magazine published until then. Now she was joined by the Russian editions of "Izvne", which also published various of her essays.

This had to serve him for his most ambitious aspiration: to be a political protagonist. His network of newspapers, agencies, editions had to create the network of the opposition to the Bolsheviks, unify it, make it active. It do-

He also had to support, for the advantage of both countries, the economic collaboration between Germany and Russia, and therefore: finances and business in which he would have had his part. Continuing its policies towards Russia, Germany financed the Bolshevik government with one hand, as is still clear from the letter of December 3 to the emperor of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and other documents even following the assassination of Ambassador Mirbach in Moscow. * With the other hand he financed Parvus in the project of alternative to the Bolsheviks, counting on the prospect of a democratic government that would open the doors to economic collaboration.

So much so was this need felt by both sides, that already in July 1918, despite the nationalization of the economy in Russia, the Soviet embassy in Berlin dealt with economic relations. The then first secretary G.A. Solomon gives a broad explanation and talks about the frequent visits of Fürstenberg, now become the Russian Ganeckij, and the "clegante figure of Par-vus", who almost never showed up, but was also behind these treaties, which included, among other things, a large import of coal." Russia in chaos needed everything and it was even easier to get coal for the Petrograd industry from Berlin instead of from the Donec or the Urals. On August 27, the Russian-Derman treaties were signed that facilitated economic collaboration." The space that Parvus had identified for his plan was actually there at that time, but, in addition to the difficulty of the paper, which was also lacking in Germany, it was necessary to overcome various obstacles; and what cut the legs of the enterprise was the loss of the possibility of exporting publications to Russia. The communist power decreed that no foreign press could enter the country, a prohibition that still applies today: every economic relationship had to pass only through state bodies and was therefore subject to the control of the Bolshevik government. Russia closed itself like a hedgehog.

Moreover, the hypothesis that in that disastrous situation the Bolshevik government would fall at any moment, turned out to be fallacious. On the contrary, his army, organized in less than a year by Trotsky, already in September began to win and in 1919 would impose itself on all fronts. Nessu-o had foreseen this fold of events, except for lex deputy ca etto to the Constituent A.I. Singarev, murdered by the Bolsheviks in clinic after the dissolution of the same, who had said that not days should be talked about, but of decades of communist power. *

Disillusioned in his initiative against the Bolshevik power, Parvus cra on the other hand was the target of a new furious press campaign. The Danish newspaper "København" had started months before and the attacks had subsequently appeared in the French, Swiss, English and even Italian press. The «Corriere della sera» titled on the front page L'occulto artefi-

Ce of the Russian revolution a report taken up by the «Journal» which concluded: «Parvus was the occult and active soul of the maximalist revolution». * Parvus then published, in German in Berlin and in Russian in Stockholm, his self-defense with the respective titles In lotta per la verdad and La verità brucia

The eyes."

Now, exhausted in the West the "Battle of the Kaiser", made possible by the peace of Brest, and the Franco-Anglo-American offensive began, from July the heavy clouds of a storm that stunned, gave discomfort, but did not break out. It was the agony, of which many and he too felt the symptoms at the end of the summer. And so he acted accordingly. Since the fate of the war now seemed decided, continuing it was a useless carnage and Germany could have faced the same collapse as Russia with the consequence of uncontrollable eruptions: The lesson of the Bolsheviks was before the eyes and they were ready to attempt even in Germany: "The essence of Bolshevikism is simple: to introduce their revolution everywhere, at any time, without any reference to the political situation and other historical circumstances". It was therefore blind madness to persevere and risk the fate of Germany and perhaps of Europe. He ceased the publication of his fortnightly for soldiers «Sozialdemokratische Feldpost», changed the orientation of the «Glocke» in favor of peace and so he would have liked to do with his «Internationale Korrespondenz», a «daily political service and news in a big style» but, since the director Ernst Heilmann refused, he preferred to pay him twenty thousand marks of penalty to break the contract. In October he intervened with an article on the "Gloc-ke"," criticizing the formation of the new government chaired by the prince

Max von Baden, who promoted democracy simply to remake the face of Germany in order to make it more acceptable to the Entesa and thus obtain a better peace treatment.

4 Anticipating Keynes

The events were urgent. As a confirmation of his and others' fears, after Germany's request for peace and Wilson's harsh response on October 20, after Ludendorff's resignation on the 26th, here is the mutiny of the sailors of Kiel on November 2, here is the abdication of William and the Berlin revolution on the 9th, when Scheidemann proclaimed the republic from the balcony of the Reichstag. But Parvus didn't have much confidence that the leaders of social democracy were able to control the situation. Apart from Ebert, they seemed to him more inclined to speeches than to government action." E

That Hexenküche, the "kitchen of witches", which the newspapers had been talking about for a long time, alluding to the revolutionary action of the Bolsheviks in Germany, he knew that it was not entirely a fantasy, but responded to precise directives from Moscow, while the small Spartachist group acted on its own. The fact is that already from the 5th the Räte, that is, the councils, the soviets, were formed and operated: what he had warned of a Russian specificity, absolutely inapplicable in the West, and now also in Russia outdated and degenerate. He then engaged in a very important essay, Peace and Socialism," which continued the meditation that began the year before with The Social Balance of War. Parvus cast his lucid gaze on the world that came out of war and revolution, identified the geopolitical changes that were maturing and formulated a series of recommendations for the reconstruction of Europe. It was an anticipation, in December 1918, of the theses that Keynes would have expressed in The Economic Consequences of Peace. But as always Parvus remained unheard.

He moved away from Berlin and went to Munich, where with Naumann he helped the Bavarian Prime Minister von Dandl to face the impending civil war. He told him to call new elections immediately, that the people had the right to express themselves and to choose new men to represent him in the Reichstag.

It was again a chess player's move: instead of getting burned in the crucible of Berlin, where during the day everything or almost everything worked normally, and at night instead they still shot and raged in the name of the Räte, where the delegations of the Intesa were beginning to arrive, it was not known how much the social democrats would have held up and he personally was too well known and too unwelcome, from the Allies to the followers of Lenin and even in the SPD itself, he made a bypass on the side and from Munich he gave an indication of a possible way to ride the tiger of the popular uplift and to get out of the impasse with a strengthened and authoritative socialist party." Then continue to Zurich, where he arrived on November 20 after a journey made long and tiring by paralysis and the traffic of the railways in remote Germany. In Wädenswil, a village on Lake Zurich, he bought a large villa with an estate. He had agricultural workers who cultivated his land and took care of his cows; cooks and waiters in the villa and a driver for his car. He could afford it, because, apart from his investments in Scandinavia, Romania, Turkey and Germany, in Switzerland alone he owned, in addition to Wädenswil, a capital of 2,200,000 francs and paid taxes on an annual income of 123 thousand. * He had always known how to invest and handle his money well, as well as spend it generously. Venture capital was not his invention, but he had in him in Germany, Scandinavia, the Balkans a skilled pioneer, who knew how to grasp the economic situation with intuition to make it fruitful and with rare foresight intertwine economy and politics.

The first period in Wadenswil was one of rest and second thoughts. The past year, from November 1917 to November 1918, had marked the collapse of Helphand's hopes and illusions. He had won at the table of two historic matches: the February revolution with the collapse of tsarism, in which he had been the biggest and most determined player, and the return of Lenin with the possibility of power to workers' democracy and peace. But he had lost other equally historic matches that he had deluded himself to win: that of the new power in Russia; and that of peace, won by the Germans on his own table and with the cards that he had given him in hand. Another lost match, an illusion cradled to the last, had been the bet on Germany's victory and on a new socialist-brand European balance founded on it in alliance with the new Russia.

Parvus was not the person who could never consider himself definitively beaten and turn to cry over the past, to sadden over regret. It wasn't the first time he had to start over, reset his own existence and all his business. But this time he had a past behind him that counted anyway, gave him strength and prestige; and he also had a great wealth, which allowed him, if he wanted to, to retire from active life.

However, he was not a person made even for such a solution. On the contrary, that tabula rasa that had tentatively been created in Europe from Atlantis to Russia, that immense overturning, that total reopening of the game, excited and spurred him on. Everything could still happen. With the roar of cannons extinguished, everyone was looking around on the endless battlefield. It was a moment of pause, of waiting. What could be better than waiting in Switzerland, on Lake Zurich, a stone's throw from Germany?

5 The King of Zurich

In Wädenswil, Parvus established his life in a stable way, fulfilling all the formalities required by law for a long stay.
In addition to having a house with adjoining land ownership, he had moved the family there, sent the children to a Swiss school and continued to follow his business: the old ones, such as the import of coal in Denmark, which in that winter reached the peak; and the new ones, such as the recycling of Reich military vehicles that in Denmark were transformed into machines for civil use. In Copenhagen he always had Georg Sklarz as a trusted business partner. *

But in Switzerland his life was not as quiet as he would have liked and his presence went far from unnoticed. Shortly after his arrival, at the end of November 1918, Switzerland was hit by a general strike guided by Müntzenberg, Lenin's student. The Bolsheviks were thought of, the possibility of a coup d'état: a fear that found a foothold in the arrival in Bern, as ambassador of Moscow, of the well-known Latvian revolutionary Janis Ber-

Zinš, also very close to Lenin. In the following January, the Soviet Foreign Commissioner Cičerin also came to Bern for the International Socialist Conference. In this context, the "Neue Zürcher Zeitung", which had always been for the Entente, saw in Parvus an "agent of Lenin" and in his heritage a coverage of funding for a possible Bolshevik revolution in Switzerland.

"I was suspected of Bolshevism and there was nothing better to incite Swiss public opinion against me," Parvus wrote. «I was watched, surrounded by spies, listened to my phone calls, read my letters and telegrams; finally, one fine day I was arrested on the street»." It was January 30, 1919, just over two months after his arrival in Switzerland; but the next day, after a ridiculous interrogation, he was released on bail of twenty thousand francs. For Parvus, however, his old friend Adolf Müller, now ambassador to Bern of the new German government, had to intervene, who presented an energetic protest, declaring that Helphand was a politician of the ruling socialist party and that he "forcefully fought the Spartans and especially the Bolsheviks". *

On January 15 in Berlin she was murdered in the Eden Hôtel Rosa Luxemburg, of which Parvus had not shared the abstract ol-tranzist theses for a long time, but she was a lucid mind as well as a convinced democrat, and her tragic death made the Spartac movement even more dangerous. This focused more and more on adventure and, under the influence of Radek, Ioffe and other Bolsheviks who were in Germany, turned against the socialist government the anxiety of the masses by proposing the model of the so-viets. Against this suggestion, widespread in the masses and in the socialist parties themselves, Parvus intervened in his Letters to the German Workers," which he had begun to write in Switzerland, and which were a further critical reflection on the Bolshevik experience and a new attempt to outline an alternative society to capitalism. In a few months, however, all the illusions of being able to reproduce the revolution of the soviets would have dramatically fallen to

Berlin, Bavaria, Hungary.

In front of this was the desolate picture of the disorientation and partisanship of the socialist forces, as emerged from the Bern conference that strongly disappointed Parvus, and that of the pettiness and blindness of the politicians who conducted the negotiations at Versailles. Even in Switzerland, Parvus met

Often his friend Brockdorff, who not without Helphand's support had become foreign minister at the new socialist government and had been head of the German delegation to Versailles since January. Wädenswil, on Lake Zurich, was a stone's throw from the itinerary that Brockdorff frequently traveled from Berlin to Paris in those months. There was between them a mutual esteem and an affinity of understandings, and it is no coincidence that the report that Brockdorff presented on May 13 in Versailles on behalf of the German Economic Commission echoed Parvus' analysis and theses on the situation of Germany and Europe in the post-war period, using almost his own style.

Parvus also kept in close contact with Scheidemann and Ebert, one prime minister and the other president of the Weimar Republic. It was therefore no surprise to him when in June Scheidemann and Brockdorff refused to sign the treaty. But all this did not please the Allies at all and the attention of the secret services of France and England turned to Parvus again, especially after Scheidemann, in July, came to his estate in Wädenswil to spend a period of rest. And a new press campaign lit up against him, still led by the "Neue Zürcher Zeitung". In September he accompanied Scheidemann back to Germany and here he found himself involved in that controversy over the army, which divided the socialists. In favor of Scheidemann, who would resign from the government in November, and against Noske he also intervened on the "Glocke".

In Berlin, Parvus was at home in government circles, but as always he conducted his own policy. In that two-month stay, in the fall of 1919, he cultivated and expanded social relations in the most diverse environments. In the luxurious dinner-parties he gave at the Hôtel Kaiserhof, he kept diplomats, politicians and journalists on the problems of world politics. Count Kessler, a figure of a cosmopolitan politician and intellectual, who enjoyed great prestige in Weimar Germany, was strongly impressed by a conference on Russia. In "French fluid" and in controversy with the proponents of a policy of hostility and sabotage, Parvus argued that the West, with supplies of materials and technology, had to promote in the Soviet regime a "turn to which Lenin and Trotsky would not oppose", while Bucharin appeared to him "of too narrow-minded" to contribute. Kessler noted this in his diary on October 14.

However, Parvus did not do long in that city he had never loved. It had always been for him only a mandatory point for political and business meetings and now, after the tragic events of recent months, it seemed even more dark and threatening, when at night in the long dark streets and in the deserted squares fear hovered and here and there from the cabarets a sinister cheerfulness came out. At the end of October he was back at his estate on Lake Zurich.

Not a month had passed since his return to Switzerland that in the German press Parvus was involved by M. Harden and H. Ströbel in a campaign that targeted him and Sklarz, but actually aimed to hit the socialist government. The matter of the publishing-journalistic company against the Bolsheviks, which Parvus had proposed a year earlier and for which he had obtained state funding, had been re-ranguned. Once again he was reproached for mixing business and politics and for having accumulated a lot of wealth. He replied on the "Glocke", still specifying his attitude towards Russia: "Since the overthrow of Russian absolutism I have promoted an orientation towards the east. Even now I see you as the only way of salvation. I certainly don't mean a plea bargain with Bolshevism, which I criticized before and stronger than any other from the point of view of socialism, but the resumption of cultural and commercial relations, as for my part I had planned through my editorial activity and I still think I implement»."

In defense of Parvus, the voice of Konrad Haenisch, his old friend and now Prussian minister of education, was heard. He wrote in the "Achtuhraben-ablatt", a Berlin evening newspaper: "I think Parvus would be out of place as an honorary member of a society of Protestant virgins... A member of the church might perhaps disapprove of certain aspects of Parvus' way of life... As for his financial transactions, whose details I do not know, we must not forget that he is not a small bourgeois conformist to the German... Parvus is a true son of Russia... and in his veins undoubtedly flows a remarkable mixture of Jewish, Russian and Tatar blood. Such a man has the right to be judged by the laws of his nature."

Haenisch's generous and sharp argument only fueled the hypocritical moralism of traditionalist Germany and well-thinking socialists. Kautsky also intervened by clumsily dusting off facts of Parvus' personal life, dating back to the times of their long and past friendship.

Between beatings and answers, the diatribe would have lasted for years on the ge-sca press, fueling the propaganda of Weimar's enemies. In 1919-20, discrediting Parvus, they wanted to discredit Scheidemann, Ebert and the government, who had relations with him. They were external and foreign forces. It was mainly used by the Nazis, who even before the seizure of power, exploited the slogans of the "November criminals", that is, the architects of military defeat, and of the "Junewish influence". Parvus, especially by the Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg and Goebbels, was pointed out as a symbol of all this: the defeat, the humiliation of the peace treaty, the obbrobrious intrusiveness of the "Jews of the East", who corrupted Germany and undermined the nation.

In Wädenswil he suffered the backling. Encouraged by the campaign in Germany, the Swiss press resumed the attacks, unleashing itself in ridicule.

He gave him the title of "roi de Zürich" to paint a picture that could not fail to impress the morigerata Switzerland: in his estate there were crazy orgies with swarms of young females under the protection of the head of the Zurich police, who had become his trusted friend. His public statements of protest were of no use and Ambassador Müller could do nothing. At the end of January, the police headquarters for foreigners informed him that his residence permit would not be renewed and that therefore he would have to leave the country by February 11. Parvus protested proudly, appealing to the convention between Germany and Switzerland on the right of residence of their respective citizens, but he could not do anything but part-

King.

In Berlin he took up his usual suite at the Kaiserhof. He planned to settle on Lake Constance or in southern Germany, still pursuing that desire for isolation that he had believed to achieve in Wädenswil. But it was he himself who could not for his nature detach himself from the events, in addition to the fact that the relationships that bound him to Ebert and Scheidemann and other exponents of German politics such as Brockdorff were too close and engaging, even if these after Versailles had resigned from the government. He resumed his favorite meditations and in March published the article Germany and Russia," which was once again an exhortation to politicians to look at the reality of things.

"The Bolshevik government has power in its hands," - he reiterated here - and "the future internal political development of Russia in this situation is now conceivable only through a metamorphosis of Bolshevism and not through its expulsion from the outside". This was the historical turning point he wanted to highlight. "From a spiritual point of view, it is easy to fight Bolshevikism," he wrote. It has made a development from doctrinalism to political charlatanism through demagogy", liquidating the other political forces "with pogrom socialism", but it all depends "to what extent international ties will be restored in the economic, political and cultural life of Russia". Russia's economic potential is so great that, with Germany and through it, the entire world industry will have new momentum... it will also give a boost to the restoration of world market relations destroyed by war».

They are theses that he had basically already exposed in the last two years, a thesis that Keynes now also supported. But two new facts made them feasible: the stabilization of Bolshevik power, until then considered ephemeral throughout the world, and the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles. It is in its article 292, which annulled every treaty of Germany with Russia

And Romania, but did not foresee anything for the future, that Parvus with his nose of great manager discovered that gap by which "the economic encirging" of Germany found the breach through which "an entire world could be insinuated". He thus gave all the approach that allowed Russia to circumvent the "cordon sanitaire" wanted by France; to Germany to guarantee the border to the east; to both to develop economic relations: they were the main lines of the Rapallo Treaty signed two years later, thanks to which the two countries would have escaped allied control and would have developed for years a huge collaboration also technical and

Military.

Parvus divided these great projects, for which he was almost never credited, and it was precisely at that time that one of those reactionary coups d'état came true, which he had already hypothesized in his famous essay of 1896, giving the antidote. Kapp won in Berlin on March 13, 1920 and held the capital for five days, while Ebert's government fled to Dresden. But the Socialists opposed the mass political strike - the means that the then I.H. had theorized to block the pronouncements of the reaction -, and the Putsch was thus defeated. It was not for nothing that Parvus was secretly behind Ebert, president of the Weimar Republic, with whom he had a direct telephone line night and day. The strategy he recommended and now recommended was successful; and again Keynes would have devoted attention to it in 1922, underlining "the defeat of that Putsch mostly due to the weapon of the general strike (whose first success curiously had been obtained in the defense of the order le-

Gale)»"

The Putsch was followed by riots, which was not alien to Moscow, in Westphalia and the Ruhr, where the German government sent troops, which caused the arbitrary and unilateral French occupation of Frankfurt and Darmstadt, anxiety and disagreements between the Allies, the conference of St. Remus; but, especially in Germany, a situation of deep uncertainty and discouragement

Ment, while the mark began to fall

Parvus felt perhaps more than others the weight of this situation. That stagnation, that oppression of small internal and European fights exasperated and depressed him. He confided in Bruno Schönlank Jr., the son of his great friend from the times of the «Leipziger Volkszeitung», a young pocta protected and bitter by him who also became editor of the «Glocke». In a letter of April 25, she vented to him: "I decided with difficulty to come to Berlin. I had the feeling that this time I would go to the bottom. I hate these masses of stone, I can't stand this oppressive atmosphere, nor the Berlin world: this skepticism and this world capital cynicism, which lacks the French esprit, mixed with a vulgar

Arrivalism. There's only one thing left: small talk. And the world is so full of hatred that it suffocates. This is bad. But do you know a way to get out of it without humiliating yourself? Starving with others, reducing yourself to ashes, acting the part of poor Job even without feeling the need, and this only to be equal to the others?.. But all the shit around me depresses me just because I feel out of the spiritual life of our days. I don't see it or it doesn't exist at all?... I need reciprocity, creative life and I only see putrefaction, slime, disintegration. I only hear the tramping of footsteps and market shouts, I would like to get away from the tumult of the hungry, I can't stand it. However, I want to eat to satiety, I want to return again to a world that operates and is ingenused, I no longer want to hear the scream of murderers and moans, I want intellectual creation, the joy of hope, the triumph of the spirit, the joy of new discoveries: I want to hear the pulse of civilization again». *

Looking around, he saw only a spectacle of tragedy and agony. The dream of a "worker democracy" in Russia, of an affirmation of democratic socialism in it and in Germany, and of its irradiation at least in Central and Eastern Europe proved to be increasingly illusory in the face of the degeneration of the Russian revolution. That "Germany bastion of socialism", as he had defined it in 1915, now proved to be non-existent. It was a defeated, devastated, drifting country, and even its socialist strength had collapsed and emptied. Russia and Germany, the two poles of Parvus' life, the two worlds, the two cultures of which he felt equally child and which he saw complementary in a great socialist design, now appeared lost. The idea of a united Europe and still capable of a historical function also vanished. However, as already other times, the optimism of the will prevailed in him: reacting to the inertness of men and institutions, still believing so much in himself and in others that he could erect himself as a mentor.

1 Riezler in Bergen, 24-12-1917, in AAA; also GRR, Doc. n. 111.

2 Of these notes wrote E. Gnedin, firstborn of Parvus, who found them in an unspecified archive of his father shortly after his death. From his story it is not clear whether he subtracted them or copyed them, in any case the text was seized from him during his arrest in 1939. See: E. Gnedin, Kvr, pp. 66-67.

3 «Secret notes», 30-12-1917, in «Nachlass Brockdorff-Ranczau», H 232334-H 232335.

4 VII ikstrennyj s'erd RKP(b). Mart 1918 g. Stenogr. otter, Moskva 1962. Cic. in: J. Felštinsky, Brestskij mir ("Grani", n. 141, 1986, pp. 203-251), which is the best reconstruction of the peace affair of Brest Litovsk by the Russian side and of the debate within the party li Lenin after that of A. Avtorchanov (PP, I, pp. 432-464).

5 Riczler at AA, Stockholm 3-1-1918, Tlg. n. 14, PA, Wk 2 c, B. 12. Cit. in TAD, p. 91 N. (in the imposing essay by K.D. Erdmann on K. Riczler, pp. 19-159).

6 Ibidem.

7 F. Cahén, op. cir., p. 227.

8 Parvus, MAK, p. 5.

9 Parvus, IKW, p. 66; Pg, p. 68.

10 R. Luxemburg, The Russian Revolution (1918), 1963, pp. 77-78, cit. in SZ, p. 305 n. 1.

11 Parvus, IK, p. 67; PgR, p. 68.

12 «Nachlass Brockdorff-Rantzau», H 232343

13 Ivi, H232344.

14 Bergen in Lucius, Tlg. n. 27, 5-1-1918, AAA.

15 M. Gor'kij, «Novaja Žizn'», 9-1-1918; in it. Intempertive thoughts, Milan 1978, p. 170

16 V. Bonč-Brucvič, Na boevych postach Feural'skoj i Oktjabr'skoj revoljuciii, Moscow 1931 p. 245. Cit. in M. Geller-A.Nekrič, Uv, 1, p. 45.

17 M. Gor'kij, op. cit., p. 161.

18 Fürstenberg in Czernin, 28-1-1918, HHuStA, P.A. Krieg 3, 836.

19 Parvus, Die Beschlagnabme der Privatbanken by die Bolschewiki (Aus der russischen Zeitschrifc «Iswnje» in Stockholm), «Glocke», n. 46, 1918, p. 689-93.

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21 J. Fel'stinsky, op. cir., ivi.

22 TAD, pp. 93 and 457.

23 Ibidem.

24 Ivi, p. 455.

25 Ivi, pp. 456-457.

26 Ivi, p. 457.

27 Ivi, p. 94.

28 J. Felštinsky, op. cit., p. 224.

29 Ivi, p. 227.

30 TAD, pp. 92 ss.

31 Ivi, p. 97 ss.

32 J. Felštinsky, op. cit., PP. 229-30.

33 Ivi, pp. 230-32.

34 Ivi, p. 231.

35 Iv.. Pp. 231-32

36 Parvus, Der bolschewistische Friede, «Glocke», n. 7, 1918, pp. 198-99

37 Fürstenberg in Czernin, 23-4-1918, HHuSt/4, P.A., XXVI, 33.

38 F. Cahén, op. cir., p. 228.

39 Ivi, pp. 229-30.

40 TAD, p. 101

41 R.K. Debo, Resolution and Survival: she Forsign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1917-18, Toronto 1979, pp. 218-21

12 F. Fischer, Griff nach der Welmachs, Düsseldorf 1961, PP. 764-63.

43 Das Verhältnis Deutschlands zu Russland, AAA, n. 31 gch.

44 Letter from the Reich Treasury Office to the AA, 17-6-1918, in response to a request of 15-6-1918, AAA, Deutschland, no. 131 gch.

45 Parvus, Zur Aufklärung, "Glocke", no. 39, 1919, pp. 1216-17.

46 G. Katkov, Germain Foreign Office Documents on Financial Support to the Bolsheviks in 1917, op. cit., passim; G. Bonnin, Les Bolchéviques et l'argent allemand during the premiere guerre mondiale, op. cit., passim; Z.A.B. Zeman, GRR, passim.

47 G.A. Solomon, Sredi krasnych voždej, Paris 1930, t. I, passim; for Parvus, Pp. 99-101.

48W. Baumgart, Deutsche Osspolitik 1918, Vienna-München 1966, pp. 348-50, 390.

49 V Burcev, op. cit., p. 21.

50 "Corriere della Sera", 29-1-1918, p. 1.

51 Parvus, In Kampf um die Wahrheit and Pravda glaza kolet, cfr. Bibliography.

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53 H. Heilmann, "Das freie Wort", 10-4-1931. Cit. in ZS, p. 258.

'54 Parvus, Notes on the Chancellor's crisis, «Glocke», 1918, p. 904.

55 V. Naumann, op. cir., pp. 406 et sex.

56 Parvus, Der Friede und der Sozialismus, Berlin 1918; also in AuW. Extensive passages of this text are reported in parallel with the cit. op. of Keynes in: P.A. Zveteremich, Par-vus, a figura anticipatrice, Rome 1984, pp. 81-95.

57 Parvus also wrote an article about this in the «Münchener Post» of *11-11-1918

In which he recalled that he was the first to theorize the concept of "soviet" in 1905 on the Russian political-social ground of the time, of which it "sovie" remained a specific phenomenon, in his opinion outdated or in any case to be re-examined in Russia of 1917-18 and, in any case, inap.

Plicable to Germany and Europe.

58 SZ, p. 319.

59 Parvus, Zur Aufelärung, op. cit., PP. 1215-10 5.

60 Parvus, Mere Distance from Switzerland, "Glocke", 1920, p. 1483. Below mentioned ›
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(53 Parvus, Der Arbertersozzalismus and the World Revolution. Letters to the German workers, Olten-Berlin 1919.

64 Parvus, Die Reichswehr, "Glocke", 1919, pp.

(65 H. Kessler, Tageoücher, Frankfurt 1962, p. 203.

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(7 Parvus, Zur Aufklärung, op. cit., pp. 1219-20

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Chapter fifteen
For the unity of Europe

1 Scyn Island

Around June 1920 Parvus inaugurated his new home on the peninsula of Schwanenwerder, or "Swan Island" of the Wannsee, Lake Wann, whose white beach is the largest in Europe on freshwater. And a place that even today the green wall of large woods separates from the center and the outskirts of Berlin, a privileged residential district before during and after the Weimar Republic. Parvus settled there with luxury and pomp, restoring the grandiose villa, surrounding it with a large park and rose gardens, opening the doors to the political, financial, intellectual world of Berlin.

He gave official receptions, where the guests were served by waiters in livery and white gloves, and others more familiar to the circle of intimates, but everyone could enjoy his wide and generous hospitality. In addition to the beautiful villa, the splendid site, the marina with motorboat and boats, the beach on the lake and the park made the stay and visits pleasant.

Here he also had serene days with friends and family. His new partner was a twenty-year-old Bavarian, brunette and slender, who had already given him a little girl named Elsa.

They frequented the villa of Schwanenwerder ministers and undersecretaries of Weimar, economists, journalists and writers, diplomats and academics, political and trade union leaders and, of course, very nice sex. Among the regulars was Scheidemann, who at that time had an advantageous contract with the Parvus publishing house, but he would have spoken of him only in passing in his memoirs; there were Konrad Haenisch; Otto Wels, the president of the Spd; Erich Gradnauer, since 16 collaborator of the "Glocke" and now ambassador of Saxony in Berlin; Ullrich Rauscher, head of the press office of the Reich Chancellery; the old confidant and trusted man Victor Naumann, the banker of Cologne C. Witzig and many, many who had already collaborated with Parvus or others who would do so in the following years, together with important figures that he occasionally invited to expand their contacts.

There are also many foreigners, including the two well-known French professors Hesnard and Haguenin, who worked in Berlin for the improvement of the

Franco-German relations. Other foreigners were the gloomy Ladyžnikov, who became a Russian-Soviet publisher in Berlin, and Krjučkov, the intimate secretary of the former actress Andreeva, who from those years was also Gor'kij's secretary.

The two had executive positions in the USSR trade representation in Germany. Often there was the secretary of the Russian consulate in Berlin, Landau, a relative of Parvus, while Krasin, at that time ambassador in London, also appeared more rarely. Ladyžnikov introduced himself shortly after the inauguration of the villa as a shadow of the past, and with his humming monotonous bass voice told Parvus without abagi that now it was necessary to think of Gor'kij, who would soon come to Europe. Lenin, in fact, had written to him: "Go away! Otherwise we will exile you!».

Often, as in a pension house, journalists and provincial socialist secretaries converged in Schwanenwer-der, who requested aid for editions, printing houses, people's houses and found themselves embarrassed by the splendor and etiquette of those receptions,' but they never came out empty-handed. As always happens, arrivalists, strangers, also sneaked in, despite the supervision of the doorman, the gardener, the staff, the owner's dog mut. But the intimates, like Schönlank, like Hae-nisch, like Amo Scholz, who is his private secretary, remembered another Parvus: the protagonist of heated conversations in the tables of friends, the inspirer, the master of economics and politics and wisdom of life, the one who also introduced them to the Russian world, the tireless architect of all time

New projects.
From the period of depression, which he had gone through in the winter, especially after the expulsion from Switzerland, Parvus had come out in the spring, with the settlement in Schwanenwerder, on the wide estuary of an exhilating eu-foria, of fever of life and political activity. He transformed the "Glocke" which, despite having had brilliant and important columnists in recent times, from Bernstein to its new director Max Beer, a successful author, had expired in rank. Robert Breuer, a cultured journalist and essayist of the famous "Weltbühne", made it the director, and changed its address. His program was to aim for the unity of all republican and democratic forces in the face of the problems of reparations, reactionary threats, the reconstruction and salvation of Germany and Europe. He wanted a "deideologization" of the magazine. He, who at the turn of the century had been one of the greatest protagonists of Marxist ideological battles, now considered ideological questions as old-fed, at most to be recovered in fusion; it was necessary to discover new leagues for new economic and political vents, the only ones that could respond to the request of the masses, for a system that gave bread and work, full employment, certainty of tomorrow. It could, and perhaps should, be called socialism, if only for the enormous evocation senti-

Mental and ethical, as well as political, inherent in this word, but we no longer needed the diatribes and spears of idcological doctrinarism, but democratic unity and knowledge of the facts, that is, the knowledge of the mechanisms through which a modern economy works.

On the "Glocke" and on the newspaper "Achturhabendblatt" Parvus published with an incessant rhythm articles and even essays, which analyzed the pressing issue of repairs, touching on major political, economic and financial problems of Germany and Europe in a very broad perspective based on a solid system of economic analysis. From those pages emerged a rough examination of crucial problems such as the restoration of the world market, the European and international political balance, the reconstruction and the modern reorganization of industry and trade. But he didn't write as a professor: of the word and the concept of "currency" he made a popular term as it was glamorous girl, would have said later Moritz Bonn, the liberal essayist student of Lujo Brentano at the London School of Econo-mics." Parvus' ability to say the most difficult things with simple words, an art that he had always practiced even in the most subtle and absurd Marxist diatribes, was reconfirmed and gave unpublished results: brilliant in analysis and exposition as in controversy. Speaking to the teachers, however, he wanted to be understood by the wide public, since he considered the hour too serious, public opinion too lost in Germany and abroad so that one should not at least try to give her a signal in the darkness in which Europe was sailing.

The extraordinary success of Keynes' book, translated in a few weeks into French and German and which was immediately talked about all over the world, made Parvus think melancholy. His essays of May 1917 and November 1918, respectively on the balance of war and on the "social peace", had had an eco-zero comparison. Yet between what he had written in those essays and Keynes' book there were surprising affinities. It almost seemed like the English professor had read them! Again he had arrived too early, as too many times in his life had happened to him. Keynes had written after Versailles, when the hopes, which still flowed in 1917-18 from the pen of Parvus, had now dispersed in the wind:

«The treaty does not include any provision for the economic reconstruction of Europe, it does not decide anything to include the defeated central empires in a good neighborly relationship, nothing to organize the new curate states or to save Russia. It is extravagant that the fundamental problem of a Europe dying of hunger and disintegrating before their eyes did not concern the Four. The reparations were their main incursion into the field of the economy and they regulated this issue as a problem of theology, politics and electoral tactics, dealing with everything

Less than the economic future of the states whose destinies they had in their hands». It was a paraphrase of the diagnosis made by Parvus.

The consequences of not having listened to these two doctors were those known to all until the Second World War and today's situation. And it is strange that two men of such distant origin and training had given a warning, and one would say opposites, like Parvus and Keynes: the first, during and immediately after the end of the hostilities, when nothing had yet been done; the second, when Versailles was already a fait accompli and one could only hope for its revision. The professor at King's College in Cambridge had reached his conclusions after participating for six months in the negotiations of Versailles as an English representative and resigning in opposition to the treaty; Parvus, on the contrary, had feared those outcomes in advance on the basis of his political experience, his economic culture, his incredible capacity for historical prospecting. Both started from concrete data, statistics and laws of the economy and the market, but both had a sense of events and history.

2 European production and cooperation

«France is sick, what a danger to civilization and humanity! — wrote Parvus in June '20, - ... France, which is thirsty for money and at the same time destroys the material and spiritual premises of world industry, abandons itself to the hashis of accounting ... But money without industry becomes the yardstick of nothing." Keynes had also spoken out against the dullness of the French rulers in his book. Parvus made them responsible for much more: having given national legitimacy to Bolshevism with the support of whites and the promotion of an anti-Russian Poland. «The current French militarism, - he wrote - which would like to exploit the disarmament of the central powers to establish its own dominion, does the preparatory work for Russia and Asia... Russia will tear off the last flowers of European civilization, which now it still carries only for appearance...»''

In that September 1920, the Congress of the Peoples of Asia was held in Baku in Azerbaijan, wanted by Lenin, who, as we have seen, already in '15 bartered peace with the Germans with the project of a revolutionary Russian army that would invade British India. The Congress proclaimed "the holy war to English imperialism". Trotsky then said that "the road to London and Paris passes through Calcutta" The famous Herbert Wells, who went there and who was in Russia to interview "the little man whose feet barely touch the floor while sitting on the edges of the chair", that is Lenin, wrote that

«One after the other the states to the west and east of Russia will fall and perhaps all of world civilization will perish»? Yet Lenin's army in August '20 had been stopped by Piłsudski in Warsaw, in that Poland that was supposed to be the "red bridge" to Germany; yet, still in '21, the Bolshevik power sat on a volcano: the civil war had been taken over by a real peasant war, which culminated in the insurrection of the peasant-s-sailors of Kronstadt in March of that year, ruthlessly repressed with troops chosen by the ex-tsarist "technician" Tukvsky. Hunger spread over 20% of the territory, rowing millions of lives.

However, many understood that if Russian expansionism relied on revolutionary imagination for the moment, sooner or later it would also have more effective tools. Parvus knew best of all the men who led Russia, their psychology, their designs, already pursued since the years of the gestation of the Leninist party and now become feasible by all means thanks to the possession of power in an immense country.

«There are only two possibilities - he wrote on May 23, 1921 - either the lion of Western Europe or the domination of Russia... This people of 150 million, who for centuries have been in conscious opposition with Europe, which under the regime of the tsars copied the European armies to dominate Europe, and under the regime of the Bolsheviks falsifies the socialist ideas of Europe... finding no obstacles in unarmed Central Europe, will be encouraged by the rivalries that tear the continent to develop a large army and a great industry to finally extend its state to the Atlantic and to the Mediterranean... Either Europe maintains the position of industrial leadership, and for this purpose it must be politically united, or it will be economically, politically and culturally under the great Russia, whose borders will reign from the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic... It would be the sunset of German culture as of the French one. So let's let our children study Russian at school from now on, and let's start them with the history of Russia, so they won't be helpless when the great Russian domination arrives... The whole bunch of neighboring states will end with an annexation to Russia if they are not united to Europe in an economic community, which can oppose Russia». *

Already, in fact, Russia was taking the first, albeit small, step that, from the revolutionary illusions of "war communism", had to bring it to be built as a military-industrial power. Noting the economic disaster, due to his own pursuit of utopia, Lenin, with a turn of 180° degrees, in March of '21 decreed the Nep, that is, an economic policy of limited compromise with the free market. It was a temporary maneuver, but the effects were not long in coming. Germany also found itself

Before a turning point: the London ultimatum of June 5, which required her to pay 123 billion gold marks of repairs, of which 50 immediately. Discussions were heated: the rejection party was formed, led by Hugo Stinnes, an industrial tycoon of the Ruhr and the Rhine region, an economic and political mind. Parvus, who also condemned the Treaty of Versailles and all the economic policy allied to the defeated, instead fought for the imposition to be accepted. Only by demonstrating that it was prepared to pay up to the limits of its possibilities, in its view, could Germany convince its allies of its good will and lead them to understand that the reparations were not an accounting problem but a political problem, to be tackled within the great framework of the common European reconstruction.

At the end of 1921 his book Construction and Compensation was published," which collected writings on repairs, on the decisions of Paris and on ultimatum, as well as - fundamental themes - on the stabilization of the mark and on the tacolity on the part of the German side to pay for repairs in goods and not necessarily in cash. So Germany would have entered the reconstruction.

Soon after, in January 1922, Keynes' second book, Revision of the Treatise, came out," which again revealed surprising similarities with the theses supported by Parvus. The latter had adopted the idea "of an international loan promised in certain circles in France, England, Germany and the United States." During the '21 he devoted a lot of attention to it, underlining its necessity and urgency for Germany, as well as for European reconstruction, examining in detail the concrete possibilities, the guarantees to be offered, the modalities and the entity." He also returned to you

Keynes in that second book of his."

However, for Parvus, the loan was configured not only and not so much as a relief to meet the payments due to the Allies, but as a tool to provide credit to the industry, to get it back on its own and achieve that productivity that could allow, it alone, payments and, beyond them, the reconstruction of Germany and Europe. Luigi Einaudi was of the same opinion in Italy, who, regarding the allowances, wrote in November '21: "Germany's ability to cope with them is determined by its production capacity and not by the course of the mark". This constructive and positive approach, not of mere monetary give-to-get, had however been advanced by Parvus already in '18, and then affirmed by Keynes in his first book. As regards mainly the way of paying the allowances, Parvus since "18, in co-conscious with his own approach, advocated the payment in goods, which even Einaudi considered as the only positive and feasible in his lucid writing of February '21: "The allies seem to have a sacred horror of German goods, even given away.

But since Germany has no other way to pay other than the goods... it is

Pure have the idea of being able to remove from us the bitter cup of the goods paid to us as compensation»."
In 1921 Parvus reiterated a proposal of his, already previously advanced and on which he would have insisted with various adjustments throughout the year and later, placing it at the center of the solution of the problem of repairs and of the same German and European reconstruction: "I believe that the solution is very simple," he wrote -. Do you want to take part in the industrial development of Germany? Ensure a relative direct participation in the industry itself and promote, through the formation of a world consortium, the necessary credit for this industry to develop effectively.' The idea of the consortium was born in Parvus from the demands posed by the collapse of the mark, from the need to give guarantees for "a foreign credit aid, without which Germany will not be able to provide the large payments imposed on it in the coming years"," and is accompanied by his projects of a monetary reform and a tax reform.

3 The way to economic salvation

All these themes, also examined in detail and accompanied by the relative statistical data in the writings of '21, were condensed by him in a second book: The way of economic salvation," which came out in five languages at his publishing house at the end of the year. The problems of credits to industry, overcoming the state deficit, restructuring of the mark and tax reform are debated, all things that he advocated in an organic project of economic renaissance. Even Einaudi in September "22 wrote: "... Germany must balance the budget and initiate monetary reform"; and argued that it was not the exchange rate, but the stabilization of the mark and "the development of production and consumption"* that mattered. These particular aspects of the great debate on the German situation, and therefore necessarily also the European one of those years, today may seem "data-ti", but in reality they represented a "historical lesson" for economists who, like Keynes, would have profit from it for the purposes of "new econo-mics". They also show how many connections in the field of research and reflections on the problem posed by the first post-war period united P

In his book Parvus he offered a sinresis of his own assessment of the German economic situation, of international economic ties, of the prospects of overcoming the world crisis, based, as he had always done, on an exemplary use of staristics. His program, whose

The central idea of a consortium of private and state companies was not transposed, for other aspects it was instead met with the ideas of both Keynes and other economists, including German, and in this sense it had results. From the writings of Parvus at the turn of the century, through these post-war his, we reach Hel-Iferich, Schacht, the Keynes theoretical full employment of 1936.

In close connection with the problem of repairs and reconstruction, the great issues of the unification of Europe, its relations with Russia and finally the danger of German revancism always remained for Parvus. As for Russia, he reaffirmed: "The first thing that the Russian government will do in any case, whether or not the Soviet regime remains, if the economic conditions of the country improve, will be the armament of its army. The first industry that Russia will develop will be the war industry. So, in a time that can be expected, Russia will in fact be able to dictate its will to the whole world." Keynes himself, who had also warned against Bolshevikism exported to Europe, had illusions: "An extraordinary experiment of socialism is developing". * To which Einaudi replied: "By now the disaster has happened - and really Keynes is too lenient with words, when he says that an experiment of socialism is underway" *'

For what he attached to the second great danger looming over Europe: German revanscism and reactionary involution in Germany, Parvus launched his warning on several occasions during this period. Already in 1918 he had explicit and prophetic words: "States can be annihilated, but nations never. The example of the most recent history is given to us by the Po-lacca nation. Even the German people have at least the same strength of resistance and development capacity as Poland. If you annihilate the Reich, you will in the German people a feeling of revenge of an intensity that the world has never seen. And push the German people into the arms of Russia... If you annihilate the German state, you show that the only people who defended a just cause in the world war were the German people.

Since he fought for the existence of his own state. If you trample on unarmed Germany, you show that Prussian militarism was a historical necessity... If you annihilate the Reich, you make the German people the organizer of the next world war». * These warnings of Parvus and other enlightened minds, in Germany and abroad, in the years of illusions and, as Keynes wrote, of the "arbitrary" of the Treaty of Versailles, remained unheard and neglected. The communists themselves devoted themselves more to the social democratic danger than to the National Socialist one. History unfortunately proved the most pessimistic predictions right.

4 A great magazine in five languages

To lead the battle of cooperation and Curopean unity, a magazine such as the "Glocke" no longer seemed sufficient to Parvus, whose dissemination took place above all in left-wing circles. He wanted to reach a much wider audience in Germany and throughout Europe, even beyond it: to reach readers of the most diverse opinions and also to be able to use collaborators of different orientations. In his mind was the project of a great magazine of economic and political problems that was the spokesperson of all the progressive forces of Germany and Europe, republican, liberal and socialist, and that was set up on a large scale so as to have a worldwide echo. It should have been released in five editions: German, English, Spanish, French and Italian and collect the best international collaborations. To give body to his idea he made approaches to those liberal circles in Berlin that had influence in the political and financial world, as well as to the "Democrats-Spd-Popular Party" coalition. The former belonged to Ernst Jäckh, the founder of the Berliner Hoch-schule für Politik,* former adviser for Turkey to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, often sent during the war to secret missions in the Balkans. In addition to being a diplomat, the Swabian Jäckh was known as a scholar and sharp essayist and combined discretion with sociability, open-mindedness with erudition, the spirit of initiative with patience and courtesy. Parvus found in him an ally and a valuable collaborator for the preparation of the magazine, for the necessary contacts with political and economic personalities. Jäckh suggested that he entrust the direction to Moritz Bonn, as he was a liberal and now a professor of economics at the University of Munich, after being an embassy clerk in Washington and then Brockdorff's economic advisor to the Versailles negotiations. He also had a long stay in Africa.

Already at the first meeting Bonn was deeply impressed by the personality and figure of Parvus: the "giant with a discontented and melancholy appearance", a bounced character, massive, but not shapeless, a primordial force of exceptional intelligence and organizational talent. He shared Parvus' orientation towards "a realistic policy aimed at the purpose of a world civil community" and gladly took on the task of directing the publication. However, he did not want to appear in order to have the opportunity to retire when he wished. He would have done it only in mid-1923, because he no longer agreed with Parvus' line and his editorial methods.

The new magazine was called "Wiederaufbau", which means "reconstruction". The

* Berlin high school for politics.

The first issue appeared on May 4, 1922 with two studies by Parvus on repairs, followed in No. 2 by an article on the "Russian problem". * Shortly before, at Easter, Rapallo's treaty between Germany and the USSR had been signed, which Parvus criticized as a serious mistake. Like Moritz Bonn, whom he personally had included in the official German delegation at the Genoa Conference, he believed that the treaty could be understood in an anti-Western sense, and thus scratch the already weak trust of the winners in Germany, compromising the community of European states he desired. The president of the Reich, Ebert, was of the same opinion. Parvus, who already in '19 had spoken out for a rapprochement with Russia and above all for the possibility of economic collaboration, in the changed situation of '22 considered Rapallo's agreement as untimely, the result of precipitation and the fear of isolation. Now that Germany had to conquer its place in the community of Western states and also contribute decisively to the construction of this community, which in Parvusian thought also had an anti-Russian function — that separate agreement played into the hands of Russia, which since the days of Brest aimed to oppose Germany to the West and soon used it for its military collaboration with it. It would have been possible to negotiate and cooperate with Russia only within the framework of the building unity of Europe. He wanted his magazine to follow this course, a Western course.

"Magazine for the world economy published by Parvus" - "five editions per week": this is how the "Wiederaufbau" was advertised for which he had created a new publishing house also based in Lindenstras-se 14 and invested a large amount of capital. And this "new magazine in style" in a few weeks in fact proved to have first-rate collaborators.

Among them were, in addition to Bonn and Jäckh, scholars and politicians, such as the president of the Prussian ministers Otto Braun and his finance minister Moritz Saemisch, the secret adviser Duisberg exponent of the chemical industry, Cunow future Chancellor of the Reich, Theodor Heuss of the Berliner Hochschule für Politik, Karl Renner and many other well-known names, including prominent socialists. There was no lack of foreign collaborators such as the then president of the Italian government F.S. Nitti, the then Russian foreign commissioner Krasin, the editor of the English magazine "Statist" George Paish, as well as French, Czechoslovaks and others.

As a good publisher, Parvus had secured a solid advertising contribution, represented by companies such as Mercedes, AEG, Bosch and the Italian

Bank of Rome. Hugo Stinnes also secretly financed the magazine, who now no longer opposed the payment of repairs. A few days before the editorial launch he had stipulated with the powerful Confédera-

Tion Générale des Coopératives de réconstruction des Régions devastées a contract that, under the aegis of the two governments, involved German industry in the reconstruction of northern France. And yet, although it had such important sources of financing behind it, the "Wiederaufbau" soon found itself in difficulty. It was not the sales that were missing, but the costs exceeded the estimates also due to the devaluation of the mark. Above all, the four foreign editions weighed with the costs of translation and composition. Parvus had to request further funding from Stinnes; and their relations ceased when he, at one point, refused to pay more sums and made a last allocation only because of Parvus' threat to publicly reveal his share of the magazine. *

The "Wiederaufbau" in fact followed the political course desired by its creator and publisher, who was also the main author with articles and notes published on a weekly basis. The central arguments were the unification of all republican forces, from liberals to socialists (a coalition advocated by Ebert, leader of the Volkspartei), currency and fiscal reform, the link between reparations and the reconstruction of Europe. Back then in Germany a kilo of meat or butter was bought with bills of millions of marks. They were the themes that Parvus had worked out in the last two years and their debate on the magazine prepared the ground for Dawes and Young's future repair plans of '24 and '29, and for the monetary reform implemented at the end of '23 by Luther, Helfferich and Schacht, the so-called Renten-mark,* which was in nuce a Parvusian idea.

5 Signs of death on Rathenau and Parvus

Hard, uncertain and stormy times were running for the Weimar Republic. On June 24, 1922, the Minister of Reconstruction and Foreign Affairs Walther Rathenau, who had refused to escort, was murdered in the heart of Berlin by reactionary hitmen. He was an enlightened industrialist, philosopher and essayist. A harsh critic of traditional capitalism and socialism, he advocated a new economy, albeit a market, but subject to democratic control. He shared Parvus' thinking in many ways: from the repair problem to Germany's return to the Western community. He was also a forerunner of the battle against nascent Nazism.

Parvus, like Rathenau and Matthias Erzberger, was also on the list

* Income mark, yielding, guaranteed by subscriptions to state bonds.

Of the traitors to be liquidated put into circulation by the captain's Femekreis*

Erhardt Bracht and Krull, two former officers prepared his assassination. They intended to assault his villa in Schwanenwerder with hand grenades, but the plot was discovered and foiled in time, as announced by the "Vorwärts" of September 22. Parvus did not give much weight to this attack. What demoralized him was something else: it was, as he had already written to the young Schönlank two years earlier, the miserable spectacle that the socialist political world gave of itself.

He will remember in 1949 the historian Gustav Mayer, a participant and attentive observer of that world: "These new statesmen all appeared to me more or less like little men who saw themselves facing great tasks, which should have been faced only by extraordinary men with extraordinary means... so I came to the conclusion that German social democracy had lost its hour". * This was also the nagment of Par-vus, what tormented him: feeling, especially after the death of Rathenau, a solitary figure, one of the few lucid and open minds of the democratic and renewing camp, and seeing himself surrounded only by the daily political activity with its plots and its beges in which the activity of the socialists and almost all governments was exhausted. He also felt that in Germany and elsewhere dark but vital forces were emerging, which came from the depths and expressed their primitive and fanatical devices of thought: Hitler in Germany and Stalin in Russia, who had become secretary general since April 1923.

It was necessary to continue the "Wiederaufbau" and lead from the magazine the battle for the economic recovery of Germany and the broader one for the unity of Europe and economic cooperation, for disarmament and peace guarantees, for a modern industry that focused on domestic consumption and full employment, for a new balance of the world market, for the development of economic relations with Russia, also aimed at giving birth in that country embryos that would allow a transition from Asian despotism to a democratic socialist structuring. Parvus focused in this battle on the alliance with the republican and liberal forces, in the sign of that democratic socialism that he had always pursued. But then everything was lost and submerged and could only resurface after the second carnage, because those were and remain some of the basic problems of contemporary history, which he had the fortune to face in their birth, signaling their includibility.

The "Wiederaufbau" gained prestige, circulated new ideas, contributed to breaking the political isolation of Germany, but not to make

* Circle of punishment, from a designation of the German high Middle Ages.

Emerge Parvus as a public personality. In this sense he always found closed doors, a fin de non recevoir. The "little men" of Weimar socialism instinctively feared him according to a tradition that dates back to the time of his youth militancy in the SPD, when his renewing momentum, which led him to break the patterns of theory and daily political practice, made him grow around him a host of "enemy-comrades" like a cultivation of poisonous mushrooms. So it was still now, after more than a quarter of a century: the past that was now behind him appeared ambivalent. Precisely because he imposed himself for the amount of political work, discoveries, the most daring and fearfully successful enterprises, his story was a double-edged sword: a man like that, who had everything had come before and achieved too much, must have something alien, sive diaboli-

Cum, could not fit within the framework of normal political life.

This was the part assigned to him by his political "frends" starting with Ebert, who would never consider his entry on the scene in Weimar. Helphand-Parvus, despite the genius and respectability achieved with the villa in Schwanenwerder, the three houses in Copenhagen, the castle in Stockholm and the riches scattered in half of Europe, the strong publishing house and magazines, despite his experience and competence as an economist and politician, he nevertheless remained a stranger, a monster who could not find capacity in the cramped living room of Weimar among those fragile porcelain of Mainz. Yet he had appropriated the legacy of Goethe and Heine better than all of them, but what was behind that mess of his with Lenin and with Guglielmo's men that had such spectacular results?

Such a thing was not in good taste and above all it was not part of the statute of a socialist party and no other party. Not to mention his other companies, perhaps less historic, but always out of the norm.
And, then, a nice Germanic "Halt'" at the entrance to parliament or, not to mention it, to a government post. And this was already a surrender in the face of the attack unleashed by the Nazis: Parvus "November criminal", or guilty of the defeat (he, who had done everything for the German victory, even at the price of losing face in front of the "pure internationalists"!), Parvus Jew, Russian Parvus and therefore friend of the enemies, Parvus millionaire. Naturally, if the money was his, it was a sordid Jewish speculator who wanted to corrupt the Ario-German in order to annihilate him; if instead it was not his, here is the definitive proof that in him, indeed, he was disguised

A Bolshevik agent.

Every month, every week that passed, he felt that reality was getting torpid and hostile. On the one hand, that zone of hatred, vulgarity, contempt of civilization and culture, which he had written about in Schönlank, and which now had its organizing center in the na-

Hitler's socialism. Even if the "Wiederautbau" found echo and con-

Senses, the possibility of acting in the first person on the political scene became more and more remote for him. On the other hand, even the magazine cost effort and money: it was not a bargain, it was a pronouncement of his political ambition. But beyond a certain threshold it made no sense to risk. Whether it was money or brain matter, throughout his life he had always reasoned in terms of investment and an investment has a raison d'être as long as it promises to be supposedly profitable. The magazine now no longer seemed the suitable medium for the intentions he had set himself and also began to weigh on his mammoth and very vital body, which tormented him with rheumatism, alarmed him with arrhythmias and heart spasms. He went more and more often and for longer periods to the waters of Marienbad, but what good were they? The evil was another, he knew it. On September 17, 1923, he decided to cease the publication of the "Wiederaufbau", which had reached its 51st issue. He was a tired and disappointed man.

With the war and what followed, the old regimes of Russian tsarism, the Germanic Empire and the Austro-Wingarian Empire had collapsed, but what had they left room for? To a shattering, to an even worse Kleinstaaterei; c, even more serious, also to a shattering of the ideals, of men themselves, of visions and political concepts. You lived and reasoned to the day without even conceiving that you could build if not für Ewig* at least for tomorrow. The new ruling classes, which after the whirlwind had taken power in Russia and Germany, again had only the name and turned out to be no less corrupt and obtuse than the previous ones, nor more far-sighted, even if they flagged the ideals of communism and socialism. The old ones, who remained in power in the victorious countries, had become even more meschinized, as the events of the peace treaty and all those post-war years had shown. It had been miserable and as if emptied socialism and the "lighthouse of Moscow" was a proditory signal that stood out on a "prison of peoples" more armored inside and fierce than the tsarist one.

Everything he had written until recently about the new Russian regime was confirmed to him by direct information he received from the men who represented him. Krasin, for example, was very concerned even more than with Lenin's illness, which now appeared fatally irreversible, for the situation that Lenin had created in the party-state. He was first totally a prisoner of it, yet he only exasperated its structure. It was his creature, conceived in 1903, now monstrously grown in a self-functioning and self-regulating machine. And he wanted

* Forever, for eternity (ced.).

That this superstate had an even greater power of capillary control from above. In the intervals of lucidity granted to him by the disease, he had written in this regard two articles published by the "Pravda" in January and March 1923. Krasin had been the only one who had the courage to always answer about the "Pravda", asking the alternative: Control or production? It was the tragic paralyzing alternative in which "real socialism" is still debated today. Krasin argued that the enormous political control apparatus that was being built, often formed by incompetents, would block production, compromise the economy of the pacse and its own development. Moreover, Stalin already largely controlled that apparatus. And Krasin, just as at a certain point, in 1908, he had been able to say no to Lenin in the continuation of the terrorist expropriations of which he had been the technical leader, he now lashed out at Lenin, calling him "the main element of what

It's old." He also repeated it at the XII congress of the party in April 23, in which Lenin did not participate, paralyzed and without a favella: he was now a living corpse.

6 The revenge of the past and the end

The protagonists of the great design of the Marxist revolution and communism, of the battles of his youth, had all left the scene: first Plechanov in 1918, who was rejected in Moscow; then, Luxemburg, of whose death the German communists had been accused of connivance" and these in turn now turned the accusation against Radek and the Soviets, also involving Sklarz. Dark shadows weighed on Lenin's agony, while at only fifty years old Martov also died of disease, that Lenin himself in the

'20 had saved from arrest by making him board the last train to the West after marginalizing him in Moscow to the "control of the canteens" and then reduced to clandestinity. Potresov was also banned and sick. Troc-kij had begun his downward slope, already encapsulated by Stalin's "new men", by "mean demons". These were now also advancing in Germany, throughout Europe.

Here is that Krjučkov, for example, the "Uncinate", as his name said,* was in small an honorable representative. Lawyer who had just been a lawy, an assistant in a legal office, with the revolution he had started to make a career, earning the graces of Andreeva, also becoming intimate with Gorky as soon as he had emigrated to Germany in the autumn of '21.

* From the Russian word rjuk, which means hook, hook, harpoon.

He had the torgpredstvo and the Meždunarodnaja Kniga as his cover,* but in reality he was an agent of the Ogpu, put on the writer's ribs to watch over him. Gor'kij always needed a lot of money for his life train and Helphand had agreed to give him a hand to close once and for all with that story that had been dragging on since 1905, although, as he had written, he did not feel at all his debtor. A figure of 35 thousand dollars had been agreed, which was paid by him in four annual installments of 2000 dollars each. He had paid the first installment in January 22 and in the last time it was Pëtr Petrovich Krjučkov who acted as a link between his administration and the bank of Gor'kij. Insinuant, helpful, always affectionate, that little man in his thirties with the pince-nez, with thin blond hair on his almost bald skull, had a tendency to sneak everywhere, to take confidence. He had made the mistake of giving him a chance to do some business in Berlin, since he constantly lamented that with the miserable Soviet pay he couldn't get by and he always found a new excuse to stay on his ribs. Neither Parvus nor Gorky could know or push the imagination to this point, but Krjuckov was a fatal figure in their existence. *

Helphand's was now coming to an end. While the scandalistic and anti-Weimar press periodically exhumed the legends of the dark traffics, treasures and orgies of Schwanenwerder, in that Villa Helphand lived instead an almost exclusively private life with the young secretary, with little Elsa and with her teenage son Leo. He no longer gave the sumptuous receptions of the past and saw only a few friends. He felt isolated and forgotten by the political world to which he had been close, while the nationalist rawing advanced, casting a dark shadow over Germany. On the one hand, the reactionary dictatorship of von Kahr in that Munich that he had known and loved in the era of revolutionary and artistic fervor, and which had always remained dearer to him than the plumbea Berlin.

On the other hand, in Saxony, a region also linked to its best memories, the adventurous velleitarianism of the left. That autumn of 1923 was for him the beginning of the end: der Anfang der Ende, as he had written twice: the first in a serious political context and the second in 1906 for Celia in prison, with bold sarcasm. Now those words had a tragic sound.

In November, Hitler's Putsch came to confirm his saddest fears: gloomy perspectives dawed at the beginning of winter, while Lake Havel lit up in front of his windows and, behind him, Berlin appeared like a compact and impenetrable mass of concrete. He avoided or-

* Commercial representation and "International Book" (Soviet bodies).

Never to go there, and Schwanenwerder at least gave him the illusion that the city was far away and even non-existent, that the mediocrity, stupidity and madness in which it seemed to be sunk could not reach him. Even in the fact that Hitler's Putsch had been crushed by the troops of the Reich-Swehr, there was a sign of degradation: only three years earlier, Kapp's coup attempt had been defeated by the mass political strike that he had advised. Now the army was needed.

So he lived a volunteer prisoner in Schwanenwerder and that exile was lethal for him, because his nature instead demanded an audience, a combat arena, contenders his peers and a crowd of spectators. He sank more and more into a goomy apathy, interspersed with explosions of angry revenge during which he devised grandiose economic and political plans. He took notes, traced projects and then destroyed them, falling back into a will of absence, of rejection of everything: even of his own past, even of the last years and of himself. As if driven by a fierce desire for self-destruction, he burned letters, documents, papers in the fireplace that attested to his presence in those events and in those historical events that had seen him as a protagonist since the end of the century. Yet, precisely in that last year of his life, with the Streseman government, with the new Mark, with the Dawes Plan and with the approach of Locarno, the economic and political ideas that he had first promoted and supported from 1918-19 and then disseminated in his essays and through the "Wiederaufbau" found recognition and application, opened the way in Europe to the

Germany.

Maybe Parvus saw this time even further away? Did he think it was too late, that by now other forces would capture the nation, as it happened in Russia, where a regime of regimentation and closure towards the outside world was affirmed? An obsessive mania of self-confession and unmasking everything and everyone took hold of him: "He seduces success, especially literary and political success. It is so pleasant to be enveloped by general sympathies, that unintentionally even strong men make concessions so as not to be outside the current. Those who go against the current, are in turn seduced by the consciousness of their heroic isolation.

Even if the current changes, he does not believe it and swims against it, because the thought that drives it is insufficiently free and daring for him... Traditions seduce, the martyr's crown, one's past. The more sacrifices you have made for an idea, the more difficult it is to part with it, and the mind involuntarily gives in to sophisms so as not to see the falsity of the idea even when it is demonstrated. This is why revolutionaries are usually people of a conservative mental nature: once the revolutionary point of view has been adopted, they in their own brain protect it from general movement

Ideas, like surrounding it with stone boulders. Compassion for the masses, love for humanity seduces: it is difficult to separate from illusions when the image of the happiness of mankind is linked to them. Who of you has not seduced the masses to gain their trust? In my eyes this means deceiving the miserable...

«Looking back at me, looking at the living minute that tingles far away, down down, trying to smear me with mud, I feel that between me and this crowd there are entire cultural stratifications. Attributing to me the lowest motivations, they revealed all their inner abi-tion... The last tange of the spirit, mud of ideas... Renegades of thought, that you drag yourself wearing a socialist cloak that has long been torn and frayed to hide your spiritual nudity... Molluscs of journalism, useless furniture, water insects that fly over the surface of public opinion, strontati climbers that smell everything and have penetrated into the anteroom of scientific socialism but no more than that, servile creatures whose people I once called the room of the lackeys of socialism and socialism as servants... Mentecatti, immature fetuses of civilization, rags of thought, cenciaioli of the spirit... The best of you are not able to rise above everyday life unless by climbing on a rope that others make and hold... Your virtue is dressed like a shopkeeper and annoying like a beggar... They steem like mice, bite each other, fill the atmosphere of their lezzo. Disgusting show of the human baseness.. No, better not to linger... "Look and pass", as Dante used to say... I'm going over it... on my way..»."

There was no longer any path that Parvus' tremendous, vigorous body could still travel although the mind could still imagine it.
The immense vitality, the apparently inexhaustible energies of man had burned. The last premortal blow annihilated her and also took the life of her brain. When a few days later, on December 12, 1924, he died, there was no more light in that mind.

1 M.J. Bonn, Wandering Scholar, London 1949, p. 263.
2 Ivi, p. 234.
3 J.M. Keynes, Les conséquences..., op. cit., pp. 182-83
4 Parvus, AuW, pp. 165, 167.
5 Ivi, p. 172.
6 Cfr. Chapter XII, no. 3.
7 M. Geller-A. Nekrič Uv, 1, pp. 96-97.
8 G.D. Uel's [H.D. Wells], Rossija vo mgle, Sofija 1921, p. 80.
9 Ivi, p. 96.
10 Parvus, Aul, pp. 198-201.
11 Parvus, Aufau und Wiedergutmachung, Berlin 1921; cited here as AuW.
12 J.M. Keynes, Revision of the Treaty, London 1922. We quote from the ed. ted.: Revision des Peace Treaty, Munich-Leipzig 1922.
13 J.M. Keynes, Les conséquences..., op. cit., pp. 225-26.
14 Parvus, AuW, pp. 80-162 c passim; WR, pp. 5, 14-16, 32-37 et passim.
15 J.M.Keynes, *Revision...*, op. cit., p. 64.
16 L. Einaudi, *Gli effetti disgregatori della caduta del marco* (18-11-1921) in: L. Einaudi, *Cronache economiche e politiche di un trentennio (1893-1925)*, VI, Torino 1963, p. 445.
17 L. Einaudi, The enigma of the German indemnity (5-2-1921) in op. cit., pp. 29-30.
18 Parvus, Ausfubrzall oder?.., in AuW, pp. 14-15.
19 Parvus, WR, p. 1< 5.
20 The economic rescue route, Berlin 192: 2.
21 ... Einaudi, op. cit., p. 8 37.
22 L. Einaudi, ibidem; also Parvus, WR, pp. 149-1 51.
23 Parvus, WR, pp. 292-93.
24 I.M. Keynes, The Bolshevik financial system, in: L. Einaudi, op. cit., VI, p. 699).
25 G. Einaudi, Keynes seems too lenient, op. cic., p. 701.
26 Parvus, AuW, p. 199.
27 M.J. Bonn, op. cit., ivi.
28 Parvus, Das russische Problem, «Wiederaufbau», n. 2, 1922.
29 SZ, pp. 338-39 n. Information from Martha Jäckh, wife of Ernst, collaborator of Robert Breuer, director of the Parvus publishing house, who personally participated in the trattative.
30 G. Mayer, op. cit., PP. 308-0 9.
31 Dvenadcatvi s"exd RKP (b). Stenografileskij otter, Moskva 1923, pp. 248-49, 27 9.
32 G. Mayer, op. cit., p. 333.
33 V.I. Lenin, PSS, t.S, P. 10.
34 See No. 35 of the Epilogue.
35 Parvus, IKW, p. 47; PgK, Pp. 47-48.

Epilogue

1 A coffin that weighs

The body of Parvus was incinerated on December 17 in the crematorium of the Berlin cemetery of Wilmersdorf. A small crowd took part in the funeral ceremony. There were many crowns: the largest and most sumptuous, that of the delegation of the trade unions of Denmark. There were friends, collaborators, a representation of the management of the Spd. The president remembered him

Otto Wels, Georg Gradnauer, Robert Grötzsch of the «Dresdner Volkszei-tung», and his young last friend Bruno Schönlank.

Otto Wels: «Living is before us the picture of the existence of Alexander Helphand... and I am doing here a duty of gratitude on the part of the Spd. For the German working class his life was worth, his activity was worth it, his works were worth it. The work of his whole life was particularly valid for the working class of the whole world... We, of the direction of the Spd, must regret a man who in difficult hours was not only an advisor, but a friend who helped... » *

Georg Gradnauer: «We who are gathered here represent a very small number of the many who mourn this great loss... He continued Marx's thought and worked to apply it to the new phenomena of social development... He was a thinker and an investigator of great originality and always knew how to express his ideas in an extraordinarily effective way... He was guided by the motto that he himself once enun-ciò: "We love the high wave of life". He was not a character who could be quiet, calm and cautious; he was always pushed forward and everywhere by a powerful and tireless search..

«He was a man that many could not easily understand when approaching him. It had many peculiar and strange sides in itself. He was an outwardly rather rude man. But those who knew him closely, knew that he had a good, noble and loving heart. We learned to realize that he often and promptly helped his friends... We saw and experienced with what particular care he encouraged the young talents of the labor movement to facilitate their path... You, Alexander Helphand, have ended your great stormy existence. We have to say goodbye to you,

But we want to keep you in our memory as you were, intrepid, a thinker of great breath, epic giant. Soon the flame will devour what was periture in Alexander Helphand. But your enterprises, the great battle of your life, your strong will, all this will remain alive, and so I shout to you, dear friend, the last word: may you rest in peace!».

The times of the «Sächsische Arbeiterzeitung» and the activity of Parvus, a journalist, were evoked by Robert Grötzsch, who emphasized how he "knew how to fight the enemy with concrete seriousness and scientific cannonage, with spirit and satire, with derision and sarcasm... Even after going to Munich, he often met with his comrades from Saxony: while the police searched for them, especially during election campaigns, he was among us and laughed at the police hunt. The old Saxon comrades can tell many shots that Parvus played to the police... Because he was cheerful by nature and ready to seize opportunities to laugh. As for Rabelais, for him rice was the noblest privilege of man...».

Now that he was dead, everyone praised his qualities. However, Bruno Schönlank's sincere and moved words were: "I proudly declare Parvus my friend even if often different political worlds have been able to separate us. He was a man and a man who had a head. An immense knowledge, an unprecedented wealth of idec, a surprising life force...

I never got tired of scanning into that head, from which two almost always sad eyes looked at you, but which also knew how to shake into a thunderous laugh. His mouth, almost hidden by the mustache, could tell many things, because the Russian revolution of 1905 was for him, the first founder of the soviets, as familiar as the Fortress of the SS. Peter and Paul and at the same time his sibaritic existence of Gaudente drawn with full hands from the assets of the

Life.

«Parvus was a friend to me in the best sense of the word. At all times, helpful and understanding, stimulating... The precise work of his thought, his power of representation when he told something - what a life he had, indeed a thousand rich lives! - fascinated me and captured me. He knew how to be sweet as a child and then, suddenly, of a frightening harshness. I loved him so much that I was now happy that he could not live further, since it would have been a terrible tragedy if such a sublime brain could no longer live with all its cells and feel life..».

Quite other words were read in the newspapers of those days in Germany, Russia and elsewhere. Many ignored the fact. Many announced the death of a gauding millionaire, a war profiteer, a business and politics adventurer, a Schieber, as the Germans say for a cheating climber. Once the news of the death is exhausted, the stam-

Pa of the Spd did nothing to defend and keep the memory of Parvus alive. Paradoxically, the Nazis did it instead, who could not lose such a precious symbol of the incarnation of Evil; for Goebbels and Ro-semberg and Hitler's propaganda, Parvus was the undertaker of Germany, the progenitor and the capo of the Jews of the East who corrupted the race, the nation, prepared its ruin.

And the newspapers of the "Republic of the Soviets"? The first to give the news was the «Večernjaja Moskva», which on December 13 published a short news: «The death of Parvus. Berlin, December 12. And died from a Helphand-Parvus shot. The deceased was 57 years old." A few lines followed, which concluded as follows: "In the era of the First World War Parvus passed into the field of the most extreme social-patriots and played the role of direct agent of Germanic imperialism". The next day a miserable obituary by Radek came out on the "Pravda": "All the politics of The International... found its expression in the figure of this man who began as a great revolutionary writer and ended up in the swamp of speculation and in the role... of advisor to the president of the bloody capitalist republic".
Behind Radek was the Komintern, but above all there was already Stalin. On the first issue of the official German organ of Il Internazionale, «Kom-

Munistische Internationale», dated January 1925, appeared a great essay by Clara Zetkin on the figure, the life, the work of Parvus Speaking of the revolution of 1905 and the Petersburg soviet, the Zetkin quoted Parvus and Chrustalev-Nosar' and did not say a word of Trotsky. Condemning Parvus as a social-schuvinist and a traitor to Marxism, according to the hasty scheme already disclosed in '15 by Lenin and Trotsky, Zetkin meticulously listed the revolutionary merits of Parvus: first against Böhm-Ba-werk, first in the theorization of the mass political strike as a weapon of revolution, first in the theorization of trade unions, first against Bern-stein, first in the economic analysis of imperialism, first in the revolution of 1905, first in seeing the new developments of capitalism. Then, all of a sudden, a traitor and an execrating being. What Parvus had done to provoke the revolution of February '17 and bring Lenin to Russia could not be said; I sing less, in the face of those beautiful results, that he had fought for democratic socialism and for the salvation of Europe. This was of course, for Moscow, the most infamous betrayal. But all those merits that Zerkin put in the foreground served well for one purpose: to belittle the figure of Trotsky and reduce his role, according to Stalin's directive. For Stalin: Parvus was finally dead, as had Plechanov, Luxemburg, Martov and Lenin. That at least his corpse would be used to clean up Trotsky and all the enemies of the new course.

Already four days after Parvus' death, on December 17, the very day of his funeral, Stalin had written: "It is not true that the theory of "Permanent revolution", of which Radek does not speak out of shame, was formulated in 1905 by Rosa Luxemburg and Trotsky. In reality, this theory was formulated by Parvus and Trotsky. Today, after ten months, Ra-dek corrects himself and considers it necessary to take it out on Parvus... But justice demands that Radek also take it out on Parvus' colleague, Trockij»?

Almost no one, in the party and outside, knew who actually was the bearer of that name, for the Russians exotic and strange. So that name, although reduced to an empty pod, invaded Russia in millions of copies of newspapers, brochures, books. Even today, although also canceled by Bol'šaja Sovetskaja Enciklope-

Dija after the first edition,* purged from everywhere, never considered worthy of even a mention,** nevertheless continues to look out, for the new generations as mysterious as the iron mask, from the pages of the works of Lenin and Stalin, in which the evasive recurring notes about him deceive more

†The same happened in the adopted homeland, Germany, where his works were burned. When Nazism fell, in East Germany even historiography was gagged as in the USSR, and in West Germany the reborn Spd had now forgotten or preferred to forget Parvus sc even the solemn publications of the centenary almost do not mention it. None of his works, with the short passages, have ever been reprinted in German, Russian and, as far as we know, in other languages.

Of the men engaged in the Revolutionierungspolitik, Brockdorff-Rant-zau, known as the "red count", had already died in 1928 after being ambassador in Moscow. The ambassadors von Romberg and Diego von Bergen disappeared in 1939 and 1943 respectively. Later, in 1955, Kurt Riezler died, but only in 1972 his diaries came out, which revealed the documentation available until then.

2 The elusive legacy

On the evening of December 13, the day after his death, his twenty-five-year-old and eldest son, who had assumed the name of Evgenij Gnedin, learned of his father's death in his office at the Economic-co-legal Section of Nkid, the Foreign Commissioner of the USSR. It was Julian Marchlewski who got him that place in 1920, when the young man was

* Where it appeared in a fairly wide although deviant voice in the t. 44. 1939.
** He reappeared in a three-line entry on a 1981 "Enciklopedičeskij Slovar'".

Arrived from Odessa to Moscow, where Marchlewski was for consultations, in the ephemeral role of head of the Polish provisional government, which would soon be overwhelmed by Marshal Piłsudski. The Zenja of the past - as you will remember - had decided to break up with his father already in the summer of the

'17 when he had received a letter from him and the platinum watch. Now a colleague brought him the fresh number of the «Vecernjaja Moskva» with the news of the death. He was moved, but not saddened, especially since he hadn't seen him since he was five years old and then returned to Russia with his mother.

"Reasoning as an official of diplomacy, that is, of a political apparatus, - he wrote fifty years later, - I immediately thought that my rights over the inheritance of a man like Parvus could be exploited in the interests of the Soviet state." He therefore turned to one of his superiors, Viktor Kopp who, protected by the powerful Ioffe, had already made a good career. The indomani, through the vertuška, the secret line with the Kremlin, spoke by phone with Bucharin, who pushed him to leave for Berlin and the same evening made him have a diplomatic passport. The Moscow-Warsaw line was no longer in operation and the journey was long, because it had to pass through

When he arrived in a carriage at the Soviet embassy on the famous Unter-denlinden, curiously they told him that Parvus' funeral had already taken place the day before in Dresden. No rest was found and then began a struggle that lasted for many months between the pretenders to the "Parvus heir", something of which the zealous ambassador N.N. Krestinsky, later eliminated by Stalin, regularly reported to Moscow. The inheritance was, as they say, under curatorship, because trustees and friends of the deceased had questioned the validity of the marriage contracted almost at the point of death with the Bavarian stenographer and therefore the rights of her and her daughter. There were other suitors and many interests were pinned on the legacy. Perfectly in agreement with

So, supported by the legal section of the commercial representation of the USSR, he started hunting for them. One of the first visits was of course to an office in Parvus, where he went with the bailiff Paul Rich-ter. There were coffers, suitcases and sealed trunks full of papers, which Richter recorded and cataloged, showing them to Gnedin. However, he did not know his father's handwriting, nor German well enough to get through all that material. He later remembered having seized some of his sheets of political notes, of

His correspondence with the Swiss government to obtain citizenship.

He immediately put his hand on various documents of the direction of the Spd, including a

Letter from Ebert to Parvus, all things he delivered in Moscow to the Institute Le-

Nin. All this, he wrote, thanks to the "good-noted Richter", a judge who in the examination of the papers was struck by the personality of the deceased, of whom he knew little, as well as by the greatness of his figure and his generosity; and explained to his son that Helphand in German could mean "helping hand". The documents had by Gnedin were however an infinite part of those that Richter cataloged, which also constituted only a part

Of the Parvus archive.

Always looking for documents, Gnedin went to the Parvus publishing house, which occupied an entire building in the city of Berlin. He then wrote that "it was a large company, which published scientific works, translations by foreign authors such as Wells, popular necklaces and various magazines, which were the handlebars of Parvus". But "those good people were wrong. He didn't know my true intentions, not even my distant relative Wugman (Vesov), who was my mentor in Berlin... I was very embarrassed to deceive those civil and nice people and the cute relatives, who did not suspect that he did not come to Berlin simply as the legitimate heir of Parvus, but as a Soviet official who wanted to obtain the inheritance of Parvus for the state»." Robert Breuer, a well-known political writer, who was the director, received him in the publishing house. He immediately understood what Gnedin was aiming for. He showed him the situation of the company and also showed him some master books, but "he suspected that not everything was clear in my struggle for the inheritance"?

Another visit Gnedin made to Georg Sklarz, who still lived and had an office in the villa of the elegant Tiergartenstrasse, which belonged to

Parvus Crossing the vast hall in front of silent servants, climbing the wide staircase and admiring "the rich furniture so far only seen in Western films", Gnedin was received by Sklarz, who was sitting under a huge portrait of Parvus, who told him painted on his order. It was probably Bondy's, now kept at the British Museum. Gnedin said: "Initially I couldn't take my eyes off the portrait of Par-vus. I finally had the chance to get an idea of what my father looked like. I saw a rather pingue man with a big head of good shape.

"A Socratic head on an elephant body." — twice I later found this judgment about the appearance of Parvus in the memories of his friends. Looking at the portrait, they hit my forehead, huge and high, and the deeply thoughtful, even sad expression of my face. It seemed quite strange to me that my father had a beard»? Sklarz told him about his devotion to Parvus and proposed an alliance against the other suitors, but Gnedin, as a good young communist, distrusted that pasted businessman who seemed to him the prototype of the capitalist. Nobody had told him that Sklaz

He was, among other things, also a trusted man of the Soviets and who managed a large film production company on their own. To Sklarz's advances he reacts by closing in on himself. Gnedin had the impression of being surrounded by a wall of hostility and that they wanted to hide many things from him and above all what interested him most: the archive of Parvus. That impression was reinforced during the pragmatic visit to the executor Werthauer, who was a Justzrat, that is, a "counsel of justice", the highest rank of the legal profession in Germany. He led an important firm with the assistance of four other lawyers and was a legal advisor to large financial companies, including some linked to Parvus. Werthauer told him that the court's trusteeship on the inheritance would not be removed so soon, since many questionable claims had been made and especially large interests were at stake, so the outcome of the creditor dispute depended on other very influential people. Gnedin suspected that Werthauer had a little hand on it and wanted to keep it away.

It was ascertained, in the meantime, that there was a Parvus safe deposit box in a bank in Zurich. Gnedin could not go to attend his inspection because, as the holder of a Soviet diplomatic passport, he was not granted a visa for Switzerland with which the USSR had broken off relations after the dark murder of Vorovskij. The diplomat, who had been head of the Foreign Office established by Lenin in Stockholm in April '17, was one of the first to disappear of those who knew the background of that trip and more. Gnedin then delegated the socialist lawyer Benheim to represent him, but, when the box was opened in the presence of the lawyers and with all the chrisms of legality, only twine and shreds of wrapping paper were found there. The court finally recognized the rights of the legitimate children Leo Lazarus Helphand alias Evgenij Gnedin, who was able to show a copy of his birth certificate in Dresden, and Elsa, to whom he assigned three eighths each, as well as Elsa's mother, his second wife, to whom two ottavos went. All the others remained outside the hereditary axis. This was established in a preliminary line long before the issue of the elusive credit was resolved, the search and subdivision of which lasted until July 1927.

What intrigued heirs and lawyers was the fact that it was not found, nor has it ever been found until today, a trace of those bank deposits that all the circumstances, and the very personality of the deceased, made us think that they inevitably had to exist. Maybe he had taken with him in his head the code of the secret accounts he had in Switzerland, in Denmark and who knows where, or he had marked it and hidden it who knows where or even burned it?

Hadn't he always said to Haenisch: "I've never despised money as much as now that I have it"? There are still those who are looking for. The

Assets that result in companies and real estate were however huge: a shipping company in prosperous activities, commercial companies, the great publishing house of Berlin with its headquarters, the famous institute of studies of Copenhagen, then second only to Carnegie, the library and the headquarters of it; c, finally, together with other real estate properties, the villa of Schwanen-werder and that of Wädensvil with land. The liquidation of this heritage took time, but finally Evgenij Gnedin had for his share of three evths one hundred thousand gold marks and the Institute, which he donated to the IMEL in Moscow." According to what he wrote, the two jurists of the torgpredstvo who, on his own and the Soviet state, followed the practice, had to rely on his share of the inheritance. Soon after, suddenly enriched and became real estate owners, they abandoned Soviet employment and citizenship."

Of course there were those who also took advantage of the other shares during the liquid realization of the assets

Even on the political legacy of Parvus, on his archive, on his documents, the mystery still remains today. If Gnedin, as he wrote, subtracted something from his hand; if boxes of slips, as he said, passed to the Spd c subsequently it seems, disappeared, - even today scholars ask themselves: how is it possible that there was nothing else, that everything has vanished? The villa of Schwanenwerder was rummaged by relatives and friends from top to bottom, but then it was sold and, at a certain moment, Goebbels bought it who made it his home and today it is open to tourists. But, before living there, Goebbels had it restored and adapted also for security purposes, which meant gutting walls, floors, ceilings, and if anything of Parvus was found, no one today can know if it was destroyed or where it ended. As for his archive of the era of the "Iskra" and until 1910, Parvus had in his time declared that he had gone "irretrievably lost during his wanderings in Turkey", to the editor of the series The Social Democratic Movement in Russia, who in 1922-23 dealt with him to have, among other things, the letters addressed to him by Plechanov, Zasulič, Axelrod, Potresov, Luxemburg, Lenin and others." It is also possible that he lied and did not want to give anything for the editions of a regime he fought. The historian Mi-chael Futrell, who explored the northern underground in the second post-war period, stated that before him the terrain had been carefully probed, even with regard to Parvus." In essence, little of its own came to light after the Second World War, only mean notebooks of business notes." The found documents, such as the grand plan of the Revolutionierungspolitik towards Russia and the other subsequent plans, the receipts and other papers were handed down from the German state archives. As for the copious correspondence of Parvus, largely of inestimable historical value, except for that part that was published in the volumes cited here in the bibliography, it is dispersed or

Inaccessible. To this group belong his letters to Boris Kričev-sky, to Luxemburg, and to other prominent figures of the east, later overwhelmed by events and death in the USSR. Not even the letters to Parvus have been found - including those from Luxemburg, which he still kept in 1919 - and this again falls within the mystery of his archive.

Although he had desperately searched for the documents, Gnedin was too little informed and above all too prisoner of what he called the "epochal character" of his generation, that is, a real communist mystic, to know how to orient himself correctly in that unknown world that was for him Berlin and, in particular, the political and business Berlin in which Parvus had moved. It seems that, on the contrary, he did everything to avoid or intimidate even those who, already friends or acquaintances of his father, wanted to see him and could have given him advice and help. So it happened with Hildebrandt, leader of the Spd, whom as a child he often saw in the house and called the "good uncle"; so it happened with Luise Kautsky, whom he agreed to see only because she had been friends with his mother; the same was with Buchholtz, who tried to dissuade from "his negative attitude towards the USSR"

Incurably Russian unlike his father, Gnedin attended the clubs of Russian emigrants, who were then numerous in Berlin and often saw illustrious guests: from Andrej Belyj to Zamjatin and the young Bachrach, from Remizov to Ehrenburg, from El Lisickij to Tsvetaeva, from Chodasevič to the future writer Nabokov, whose former minister father had been murdered in the German capital. Gnedin also befriended Walter Benjamin, who understood him at first and said to him: "You are a true Bolshevik". He then saw him again in Moscow at the end of 1926, but as he later wrote recalling those meetings, Benjamin "no longer showed the enthusiasm of the past for my Bolshevik qualities. Maybe he had noticed that I was becoming an official." Benjamin didn't say it openly in his Moscow Diary, but he made it clear, noting that Gnedin "has completely lost the youthful appearance he had two years ago... but he is always intelligent and nice. I answered his questions very cautiously. Not only because people here are always susceptible and Gnedin particularly cares about his communist ideas... he is a consultant to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Central Europe. It is said that his not insignificant career... depends on the fact that he is the son of P.»" Even this small detail: that not even Benjamin could manage to write Parvus' name in full is indicative.

With Benjamin, Gnedin in Berlin met the director Bernhard Reich of the Deutsches Theater, a student of Reinhardt. Bernhard Reich would then write in his memoirs about men like Gnedin: "They represented a new human type: Homo sovieticus. I had the desire to

To know more closely that Homo sovieticus and to see with my own eyes the pacse in which this species was formed»."
For inheritance issues, Gnedin stayed that first time in Berlin from December 1924 to May 1925. Back in Russia by sea from Hamburg to Leningrad with a merchant ship, he was entirely absorbed by his work as an expert in the team, led by Ganeckij, who was preparing the trade treaty with Germany. With him he could not help but talk about the Parvus inheritance and the times when he still signed Fürstenberg-Hanecki.

«We create the Soviet outpost in the business world of capitalist Europe»* — Gnedin said to himself, preparing the treaty. In October of the same year he had to return to Germany again for the inheritance. Here he attended the funeral of Julian Marchlewski, another of the old generation who was leaving, another whose name was linked to his father. And this time he also met Bruno Schönlank. In old age Gnedin would then regret not listening to him and not having maintained contact with him.

In that autumn Schönlank appeared to him as a young left-wing intellectual who had already betrayed his past, abandoning politics.
He even had the feeling that it was his father who "misled" him, disillu-

Dendolo with revolutionarv ideals.
The old gardener, who knew him well, immediately opened the gate of the deserted, but still well-kept park of Schwanenwerder, but the villa was under seals and you could not enter. Parvus' legacy was in fact always under curatorship and, although the torgpredstvo had fielded a well-known expert to get as much as possible, everything still seemed to be on the high seas. Already in a bad way because of this situation, Gnedin, who this time was in Germany with his wife, felt once again played, when the gardener confided to him that entire boxes of Parvus cards had been taken away by Spd emissaries authorized by the court. He was almost annoyed at that moment by the behavior, the gentle care and the memories of Schönlank, while then as an old man, at his senses and abonded by the tragic

Lived experiences, so instead he would have evoked that meeting:
«Schönlank was very excited and even emotional: he remembered the pleasant hours spent with Parvus; he talked about lunches and brilliant convivial discussions, of which the soul was the master of the villa. But Schönlank was also moved by the singular and dramatic circumstance that led him, after the death of his protector, to accompany Parvus' firstborn to the abandoned villa with his young wife. He begged the gardener to pick all the autumn roses left in the garden and offered the bouquet to my wife. "How happy the old man would have been if he could have welcomed her here!" Schönlank exclaimed, turning to Nadja - he would have been the one to offer her these roses!"

What happened to those who took part in Lenin's journey through Germany or knew too much about it?

In 1936, Zinov'ev was shot with his wife Zinaida Radomysl'skaja and his son Robert, now an adult, who had traveled in the

At a lunch offered on December 20 of that year to a few leaders for the anniversary of the Včk-Ogpu-Nkvd, Stalin, as one of them told, had the scene of the terror of Zinov'ev played in front of the platoon, laughing his eyes out loud when his escort Pauker, former hairdresser from Budapest, who played the part, fell to his knees mimicking the moan of the con-

Damned: «For God's sake, comrades, call Iosif Vissarionovič!». **

Fürstenberg-Hanecki-Ganeckij, relegated in 1935 to the task of "di-

Rector of the Museum of the Revolution", after the important state assignments he had until 1932, he was shot in 1937. But a son of his, a diplomat, managed to lose his tracks by changing his identity and staying in the West. Ganeckij was rehabilitated after the 60s and one of his daughters was still alive

Karl Radek, expelled (1927) and then readmitted to the party (1930), faced the final judgment by making fun of everything and everyone, and also playing Stalin. Something unheard of: he wanted an interview with him and Stalin went on purpose to the headquarters of the Nkvd, today KGB, perhaps because he feared the revelations that Radek could have made on his missions in Nazi Germany precisely on behalf of him, Stalin, who in those years with Molotov pursued, over the head of Litvinov and the foreign police, that policy of rapprochement with the Nazi power that would culminated in the 1939 pact and had distant aims still to be investigated by historians. In that interview Radek bartered his silence in one sense and revelations to Stalin in another sense (the past: Lenin, Parvus, others and more)" with the promise that his life would be saved. On January 20, 1937, at the reading of the sentence, after an endless row of death sentences, Radek's ten-year sentence eccoted.

He was deported to Siberia, where in the camp he was killed in 1939 by an urka** not We know if on Stalin's directive."

A third prominent figure of Lenin's return in 1917, the Bolshevik Swiss socialist Fritz Platten, who in January 1918 saved Lenin's life in the first attack, receiving the bullet in the arm, was also eli-

* Stalin's name and patronymic, with which, according to Russian usage, those who knew him closely could call him.

** Common criminal in the jargon of the Soviet camps.

Mined. Founder of the International Island, after bringing the family to the USSR, he was arrested in 1939. His wife Berta, who was in charge of controlling Soviet agents infiltrated in the Western socialist parties, had already been arrested and shot in '37. He was accused of being a German spy since 1917, tortured and then deported. He died of a heart attack in April 1942 in the Kargopol camp", where he "pleated planks and weaved baskets". In 1956 they were both rehabilitated. The son N. Fritz Jr. saved himself in Switzerland and wrote the most complete and documented story of Lenin's journey from Zurich's alley of minors to Russia." Willy Müntzenberg – also trusted by Lenin in Switzerland, also present at the meeting reserved in the restaurant.

«Eintracht» on the modalities of the trip after the proposals of Sklarz, later head of the German PC, deputy to the Reichstag and official of the Komin-tern — was found hanged in 1939 in a forest near Grenoble, after he had refused to return to Moscow." The well-known Karl Moor, German, Austrian and also Soviet agent, after having also been a vehicle of German financing to the Bolsheviks in '1" protected Müntzenberg, Platten and Ra-dek respectively in Swiss, Lithuanian and Berlin prisons. He was made an honorary citizen of the Usor and died in Germany at the age of eighty in 1933.

What was the fate of Lenin's other travel companions? The two people closest to him met a completely different fate. Inessa Armand died prematurely in 1920, mowed down in the Caucasus by cholera.

Nadezda Krupskaja survived until February 1939, but in the last fifteen years, although she was formally deputy commissioner for education, she was expelled from the CC, and isolated and controlled so that she could not intervene politically, nor speak publicly. Writes R. Conquest, quoting Orlov: "It is not known with which methods exactly Stalin reduced the Krupskaya to silence. It is only known that once he let go that, if he did not stop criticizing him, the party would have declared that not she, but the old Bolshevik Elena Stasova was Lenin's real wife. "Yes yes – added Stalin sternly – the party can burp"»." Today the Soviet encyclopes recognize that she was silenced, and her works have been reprinted.

G.I. Safarov, the one who in 1915 had lunch with Lenin in Bern and witnessed his departure for the interview with Parvus, was from '21 in the Cc; he was then arrested with his wife in '35 and died in a Vorkuta camp in '43. Grigorij Sokolnikov, known as Brilljant, member of the Politbjuro, after holding positions at the top was arrested in '36 and died in prison in

"39. Rosenblüm (Firsov) had the same fate. The Polish Feliks Kon, who died in disgrace in 1941, and the former Georgian expropriator Micha Cchakaja, who died in '50 at the age of eighty-five, got away with degradations and marginalization. Brofski, alias Mieczyslav Warszawski, the one who had led to

Lenin in Spiegelgasse in Zurich the good news of the February revolution and was also present at the meeting at the «Eintracht», later deputy minister and then ambassador, was marginalized after '22 and disappeared in the
1937. Aleri fellow travelers like A. Abramovič, O. Ravič, do not have

Made history.

Aleksandr Sljap-niko, the hero of the Bolshevik underground in Scandinavia, fell victim to the great purges, but without trial. Having become leader in 1920 of the "workerly opposition", which defended the autonomy of the unions against the dictatorship of the party, he fell into disgrace already under Lenin and Trotsky and in 1933 he was expelled from the party, administratively convicted without trial together with a hundred opponents and deported to Verchneu-ral'sk in the Baskyria. He was shot in 1937. Thus ends the honest legendary revolutionary and working leader, whose memorial works are still banned, just as his name is erased from history. Kesküla, the Estonian revolutionary, kept away from Russia and, more difficult, from the hunting of the Soviet secret services. He died in 1965 in the USA.
The other Estonian, his friend and conspiratorial, that Siefeldt who wrote in the Baku newspaper about the meeting between Lenin and Parvus in Switzerland in 1915, was instead arrested in the USSR and died in 1938 in captivity." Christo Rakovski, pioneer of the revolutionary movement in Russia and the Balkans, a free and generous man of mind, known in the West as in Turkey, cosmopolitan and polyglot, friend of Parvus in Germany as in Constantinople, Sofia and Bucharest, friend of Trotsky, since 1919 member of the

Cc, was head of Soviet Ukraine and until 1927 he had important diplomatic assignments, useful, however, to keep him away from Moscow. Stalin hated him personally, as well as as a dangerous witness. In 27 he had him expelled from the party and exiled to Astrakhan and then to Barnaul. Rakovski continued to fight the opposition until, destroyed, in 1934 he surrendered to Stalin's "new party", because with the usual trick they made him believe that the war against the USSR was imminent. Arrested again, he then had to suffer the humiliation of the '38 trial, accused of the murder of Gor'kij and others as well as having always been a German spy: and died
David Rjazanov, the theorist who had founded the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow, discoverer and curator of unpublished texts, did not want to surrender to Stalin and raised his voice loudly against the excessive powers of the political police, the death penalty and terror. He had already clashed with Lenin, claiming freedom of power in the party. As Victor Serge says, he declared publicly: "They are not one of those old Bolsheviks that Lenin treated like old idiots for twenty years." He too was dear to wanting to be a free man: dismissed, arrested and deported without trial, he was thrown into anonymity, contempt, hunger, while his works came-

In vain banned. Arrested already in 1931, he died in "38 in detention
No one knows where.
The lawyer Kozlovsky, one of the protagonists of the "July reveals" on Lenin's journey and his relations with the Germans, after being the author of the first decrees of Bolshevik power and having held high positions, also had the fortune to die in 1927, that is, before the purges began. Even before that, Cudnovskij, already an employee of Parvus in Copenhagen, was perverted, then sent to the USA with the Kollontaj, then "inter-rional" to Petrograd and one of the leaders of the assault on the Winter Palace. He died in Kiev in February '18 at the head of the "Red Guards". They are celebrated in Soviet encyclopedias, as are Steklov-Nachamkes and Stepin. The latter - as you will remember - was the one who distributed in the summer of 1917 in Petrograd the rubles of German origin to the soldiers so that they could make propaganda against the war. He died in '20 of typhus. Steklov-Nachamkes, who was connected through Kozlovsky with Fürstenberg-Hanecki in Stockholm, was arrested in '37 after a conversation with Stalin, he died in 1941 in a camp. And Georg Sklarz, one of the organizers of Lenin's return to Russia, business partner and trusted man of Parvus, whom the unsuspecting son met in Berlin in 1925? The latest evidence mentioned him towards the end of the 1920s as an external collaborator of A. Rapoport, head of the Soviet commercial representation in Germany. To the German communists, who accused him of not being a stranger to the killing of Luxemburg and Liebknecht, Moscow ordered to remain silent. In 1927 he was received with great pomp in Moscow, where it was decided to found the film company Derussa with mixed participation: German and Soviet. Sklarz was its president and, according to Rapoport, he had a major scam against the USSR, which Sklarz, however, cited in court for non-compliance." The deal remained obscure and even the German press took care of it, as it had already done years before for Sklarz's business with the Wci-mar government. After that nothing was known about him, who was a coveted hunting prey for the Gestapo as well as for the Ogpu.

There is abundant literature on Gorkyj's dark death and the mysteries that still wrap it up. Today he is in the Soviet pantheon, but here he also reached that Krjučkov who in 1938 was tried and shot for poisoning the writer and his son. According to Berberova-Chodasevič, Krjučkov had the aggravating factor of his relations with Parvus in the period 1921-24, "not only financial, but partly friendly." Today it is rehabilitated and this validates the hypothesis, already advanced at the time, that the double crime order came from Stalin. Tragic fate had V.G. Groman, Ekaterina's first husband, or Katja, Parvus' partner in 1904-06. The economist Groman, who had joined the Bolshevik power and had become an important official

Of planning, he was arrested with the historian Suchanov and others in July of '30. They were involved in the trial held in '31 against an imaginary "unified Bureau of the Civil Code of the Menshevik Party". * In the prison of Verchneural'sk of political isolation Vladimir Gustavovič Groman, who knew he was innocent, believed in the promise of the Ogpu to free him if he had cooperated "for higher reasons" to manufacture a dossier on saboteurs, but then he realized that he had been deceived and went to prison. Suchanov, on the other hand, made hunger strikes until he was released and then arrested again and shot in '37.

Completely recently, between 1987 and 1988, the glasnost' promoted by Gorbačëv allowed the rehabilitation of almost burps these: from Rakovski to

Bucharin, from Radek to Zinov'ev and other minors.
Nothing more was heard of Ekaterina Groman after she left Parvus' life, nor was she present at the funeral and interested in the inheritance. She could have stayed in Denmark or even returned to Russia after the revolution or, finally, disappeared in Germany, perhaps during the genocide of the Jews. This could also have been the fate of his son Leo Gro-man, had by Parvus. As already written, he lived with his father in the period before his death and it is completely unlikely that he had gone to Russia. It has been hypothesized that he was that Lev Helphand who in the 1930s was in charge of the Soviet embassy and, thanks to Minister Ciano, he fled to the USA." But it is a hypothesis denied by a whole series of circumstances and considerations. In the staff of the USSR embassy in Rome at that time there was a L.B. Helphand together with Ambassador B.E. Stein and the councilor P.S. Fridgut, while the consul was P.M. Dneprov and the commercial representative B.S. Belen'kij. Already the surname and the patronymic, however, do not match, as the son of Par-vus bore the surname of his mother and the patronymic should have been Aleksandrovič and not Izrailevič. However, the names can be changed. There is also a clarification by Nadežda Markovna Gnedina: «Lev Borisovič Helphand, chargé d'affaires of the Soviet embassy in 1940, and fled abroad, unlike Leo, was educated in Russia and was born approximately in 1901-02. He had no siblings, he left his sister and mother in Russia, whose fate seems to have been very worried when he left his post. The ambassador was not there at the time; he was in Moscow». *

Nothing was heard of even Maria Schillinger, and her two children and Parvus, after the court excluded them from the inheritance. As for Parvus' second legitimate wife, the twenty-five-year-old Bavarian, and her daughter Elsa, after sharing the heir with Gnedin, they retired to the shadows. And, infar-

You, during Nazism it was more than dangerous to reveal such kinship.
Dramatic and full of events and also of turning points was the long life of the

Firstborn Gnedin, whom we left in Berlin in 1925 in the park of the villa of Schwanenwerder. In July 1927, just as the story of Parvus' lying inheritance ended and he received his share, his career made new progress. He was appointed referent, i.e. consultant for Germanic affairs at the Nkid, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and at the same time was an articleist of the "Izvestija". He preferred political journalism to a diplomatic career, as he told Litvinov." So, in 1931, he left the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for that newspaper. But in 1935 the Politbjuro again imposed diplomatic work on him and he was appointed first secretary of the USSR embassy in Berlin. From this position, in the decisive years of European history, of the unparalleled development of Germany's industrial-military apparatus and Hitler's preparation for war, he was also able to observe the progressive rapprochement between Hitler and Stalin, which was implemented by the latter through the torgpredstvo evading the embassy. "And in 1939," he wrote - when Litvinov was dismissed and the preparation of the USSR pact with Germany began (at that time I headed the press section of the Nkid), along with other innocent victims of the repressions sent me by direct order of Berija to prison, to the camps and then to deportation "for eternity"" Chranit večno, "to preserve forever" - this was the ritual formula for human things and beings.

Gnedin spent two years of investigation in the terrible Stalinist prisons of Lefortovo and Suchanovka in Moscow, but even "under the torture he did not denounce the innocent, he did not name anyone." Berija had him tortured in his presence and personally took part in it. He was accused of consiracy with the Nazis and national treason. He was one of the few who did not recognize any guilt. It was actually wanted to ascertain what he knew about the Stalin-Molotov plots behind Lirvinov, of whom he had been a close collaborator at the ministry in Moscow since 1937, and if he had not stolen Parvus' documents. In the autumn of 1941 Gnedin was deported to the Akčatau camp in a deserted locality between Karaganda and Lake Balchaš, where he was forced to make half a ton a day of rock containing sulfurous natrium with a high and intoxicating concentration. He then also had other jobs no less heavy, but morally more satisfying in the field of technology-Enrichment of light metals And yet eight cones of loget during the war and immediately after were an experience to which few, relative to the millions of zek * survived

When Stalin died in 1953, Gnedin was subsequently rehabilitated, but at his release he was still opposed to the top of the USSR who feared what he knew about the intrigues of Soviet politics with Nazism. He did di-

* Term of the slang of the lagers for zakljułennyj, that is detained.

Rightly the name of Molotov, which maneuvered the attorney general Ru-denko, the Stalinist who remained in his place until the old years. In 1955, thanks to Ehrenburg's intervention, he returned to Moscow and became a collaborator of the magazine "Novyj Mir" where he published various essays in the sixties. After the dismissal of the "liberal" director Tvardovsky in 1970, Gne-din, who had matured a vision of things foreign to the official ideology and critical of the regime, became the author of the samizdat in clandestine magazines, supporter of dissent, friend of Sakharov and the best in-

Russian telligencija. Brezhnev bravely resigned from the party in full, published abroad between 1975 and 82 two memoirs with a preface by Sakharov," in which with calm serenity and lucid awareness he narrates his own events and the country's in a general rethinking of the fate of the generations that grew up in the sign of communism. Of exceptional importance are his publications on the history of relations between the USSR and Nazi Germany. *

Evgenij Gnedin died in August 1983, after a long emblematic life: watched in the cradle by Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg, he later became Homo sovieticus; surviving the camps in the period of the worst Stalinian despotism, he was able to recover a lucid and critical mind. He thus reconciled as an adult with a father who had also traveled many dramatic stages in his shortest life and whom he had repudiated as a young fervent Bolshevik revolutionary.

Notes

1 For this and subsequent speakers, see: 'Glocke', n. 38, 20-12-1924, PP. 1229-37.

2 C. Zetkin, opThe October revolution and the tactics of the Russian communists in

3 I.V. Stalin Ovezioni of the lenini-

Smo, Moscow 1946 (cd. it.), p. 106.

5 G.A. Solomon, Sredi krasnych voždej, op. cit., 1, PP. 95-98

6 Ker, pp. 41-42.

7 Ivi, p. 42.

8 Ivi, p. 46.

9 Ivi, pp. 46-47.

10 Parvus, PhAK, p. 1339.

11 Kur, pp. 97-98.

12 Ivi, pp. 80-0%

13 SDD. p. 6

15 Part is located in Berlin Hauptarchiv (RFT) and part in East Berlin (RDT).

Boris N. Kričevskij (1866-1919), a Russian social democrat, in 1898-1902 was director of the "Raboče Delo"; correspondent from Paris of the "Vorwaertso; in correspondence with nua accounts with Luxemburg, Jogiches, Parvus, Lenin and others. He returned to Russia and was a correspondent

From Pictroburg of the «Humanité», for which among Taltro wrote, live events, the most lucid articles on the Bolshevik seizure of power, then collected in a book published in France. Here he died and later the widow sold his entire precious archive to the USSR.

17 Cfr.: Parvus, PhAK, p. 1332.

18 Kvr, p. 27.

19 Ivi, p. 76.

20 Ivi, p. 82.

21 W. Beniamin. Diario moscovita. Turin 1989. P. /-.

22 B. Rich, In Wettlauf mit der Zeit. Erinerungen aus fünf Jabrzehnsen deuscher Theater-History, Berlin 1970, p. 94.

23 Kvr, p. 86.

24 Ivi, p. 96.

25 Tisp, p. 335.

26 Ivi, pp. 193-202; as well as works by E. Gnedin cit. in n. 43.

27 R. Conquest, Bol'soj terror, p. 627. Mentioned later as Bt.

28 R.A. Medvedev, St, p. 250. See also: IzK, I, p. 102.

29 Cfr. Bibliography.

30 IzK, II, pp. 195 c 197; also: R.A. Medvedev, Si, p. 273.

31 Tzsp, p. 255; rip. also in R. Conquest, Bl, PP. 169-70.

32 NÜ, Chapter V (Lenin's Friend), pp. 85-116, Chapter VI (The Ingenious Estonian), PP. 119-91 and related notes; RP, p. 365. For Siefeldt (Zifel'dr-Simunjasj) A.R. cf. Who was who in the USSR, Metuchen 1972, p. 636.

33 V. Serge, op. cit., P. 249.

34 A. Rapoport, Sovetskoe torgpredstvo v Berline, New York 1981, pp. 213-14.

35 ZZ, p. 301 and, generally for Kriučkov, passim; see also: G. Alexinsky, Le ve Amère.... op. cit., PP. 253-84 c passim; R. Conquest, Bi; R.A. Medvedev, St; A. Orlov, Tisp; B. Suvarin, pref. to Untimely Thoughts by M. Gorky, op. cir.

36 Br, p. 246.

37 SZ, p. 81; ZS, p. 72; cf. G. Cyan. Diary, Milan 1946, p. 293.

38 Communication to the A of N.M. Gredina.

39 Kvr, p. 99.

40 Ibidem.

41 Cfr. n 38.

42 Cfr. Bibliography.

43 E. Gnedin, V narkomindele, New York 1977; Iz istorii otnošenij meždu SSSR i fasisteo germaniej, New York 1977. For these writings and other news about E. Gnedin see: P. Zvetere-mich, He had come out of the labyrinth, «New European Magazine», Milan-Nekrie, Profajas's E. Gmedinym: On ne bojakja smore pravde glaza..; Proiedi skovoz labi-rint, «Russkaja Mysl'», Paris 6-10-1983 N. 3485.

Appendix

Memorandum of Dr. Helphand*

Preparations for a mass political strike in Russia

A mass political strike must be prepared in Russia for the spring under the watchword: freedom and peace. The center of the movement will be Petersburg; here it will start from the Obuchov, Putilov and Baltici establishments. The strike must embrace the Petersburg-Warsaw, Moscow-Warsaw and the southwest railway railway links. The railway strike will be implemented especially in large power plants with heavy labor, in railway mechanical workshops, etc. In order to generalize, the railway bridges will possibly be blown up all over the air, as was also the case during the 1904-1905 strike movement.

Conference of Russian socialist leaders

This initiative can only be implemented under the leadership of the Russian social democracy. The radical part of the latter has already come into action. ** It is necessary that the moderate minority fraction also adheres. *** So far it has been mostly the radicals who have prevented a unification. The head of the latter, Lenin, however, raised the question of unification with the minority two weeks ago. A unification could be reached on a median line to exploit the weakening of the administrative apparatus within the country, caused by the war, by undertaking an energetic action against absolutism. It should be noted that the moderate part is under the influence of German social democracy. Even now through the personal authority of some leaders of German social democracy

* Sul Memorandum, consegnato all'AA il 9 marzo 1915, non v'è data, né firma. Diego von [illegible] Sulla prima pagina figura l'ulteriore indicazione di 5. Published in: ZGRR in English crad.; SZ in the original red. and here for the first time in Italy

(Trans. of N. Corigliano).
** Bolsheviks.
*** Menscevichi.

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